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 to the farewell of a Roman dawn, 
































































































They will never die on that battlefield 
nor the shade of wolves recruit their hoard like brides of 
wheat on all horizons      waiting there to consume battle’s end 
There will be no dead to tighten their loose bellies 
no heap of starched horses to redsmash their bright eyes 
or advance their eat of dead 
They would rather hungersulk with mad tongues 
than  believe that on that field no man dies 
They will never die who fight so embraced 
breath to breath      eye knowing eye      impossible to die 
or move      no light seeping through  no maced arm 
nothing but horse outpanting horse      shield brilliant upon 
shield      all made starry by the dot ray of a helmeted eye 
ah      how difficult to fall between those knitted lances 
And those banners! Angry as to flush insignia across its 
erasure of sky 
You’d think he’d paint his armies by the coldest rivers 
have rows of iron skulls flashing in the dark 
You’d think it impossible for any man to die 
each  combatant’s mouth is a castle of song 
each iron fist a dreamy gong      flail resounding flail 
like cries of gold 
How I dream to join such battle! 
A silver man on a black horse with red standard and striped 
lance      never to die but to be endless 
a golden prince of pictorial war 
 














This doctoral dissertation presents a collection of eight articles, published on different 
scientific journals, and focused on the theme of the production of weapons in Renaissance 
Florence. 
Developing from the problematic military issues of the Florentine Republic, the essays will try 
to outline the structures of the offices charged with the organization of the army, analyzing 
their expenses in particular.  
The interest of the Dieci di Balìa and the Otto di Pratica in the manufacture of munitions will 
reveal the existence of a lively market in arms, characterized by the involvement of numerous 
craftsmen and important firms, the polycentrism of factories and arsenals, and the innovations 
in several goods, such as artillery. 
From the first experimentations on bronze bombards to the adoption of the French style 
ordnance, in fact, firearms and gunmakers will be at the core of the whole research. 
Comparative papers will examine developments in practices and technological transfers, as 
well as their repercussions on actual warfare. 
The case study of the conflict between Florence and Pisa, one of the most important campaign 
of the late fifteenth century, will lastly underline aspects and concerns of the procurement of 
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NOTICE TO READERS 
AN ARTICLE THESIS 
This Ph.D. thesis is intended to be a compilation of eight separate articles, connected by the 
theme of the production of weapons in Renaissance Florence. All of the essays have been 
published on, or have been accepted by, various scientific journals. 
Each paper has been written following the guidelines of its periodical, and is now presented 
with the very same format. Thus, every chapter differs from the others in bibliography and 




BEHIND MACHIAVELLI, BEYOND THE MAGNIFICENT. 
FOR AN HISTORY OF WARFARE IN RENAISSANCE FLORENCE 
The purpose of this thesis is dual. The first aspect concerns the reconstruction of the whole 
production process of weapons in the Republic of Florence during the Renaissance, from the 
trade of raw material to the equipment of the army. A particular attention will be directed at 
craftsmen, at their workshops, and at their contribution towards the diffusion of artifacts and 
techniques. The second strand deals with a reevaluation of the military organization of the 
“fifth power of Italy,” an administration so far considered as backward and ineffective. This 
analysis will focus on the awareness of technological developments in armaments developed 
by statesmen, their incentive to enhance the industry, and their improvement in the 
management of arsenals. 
A similar scrutiny was never endeavored for this geographical area and for this period of 
time. Besides, this essay is intended to look at the military topics from a different, original 
perspective, combining the issues of manufacture with the political concerns about warfare, 
the actual usage of materiel during campaigns and the necessity of arming soldiers, the 
availability of skilled manpower and the control over the commerce of arms, the polycentrism 
of factories and the construction of centralized magazines. In the following pages, the role of 
the public demand in innovating weaponry and in circulating ideas will be assessed, as well as 
the experimentations and the adaptation of artisans to new forms and modern shapes. 
The chronology of the dissertation will be defined by two unsuccessful sieges, two 
critical moments of the Florentine history. One of these is the failed conquest of Lucca, in 
1430, a climax of the long conflict against Filippo Maria Visconti, which accentuated the 
disagreements between the rival city factions, leaded by Rinaldo degli Albizzi and Cosimo de’ 
Medici. The other defeat dates 1499, when the retreat from Pisa deteriorated the critical 
political situation of the Republic, strengthening the popular opposition to the government. In 
these seven decades, the Republic would have been involved in other, numerous military 
campaigns, from the battle of Anghiari to the defense of Piombino, from the reconquest of 
Vada to the sack of Volterra, from the Pazzi’s War to the conquest of Sarzana, spending about 
forty years in winning or losing against the armies of the whole Peninsula. In this time of near 
permanent war, moreover, several changes would have occurred in the “art of war,” with the 
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creation of permanent military offices and the enlistment of standing armies, with the early 
spread of firearms and the late appearance of the innovative French ordnance. 
An accurate research into primary sources has underlain this work from its very outset. 
Data have been collected from the Florentine State Archive, from the Biblioteca Nazionale 
Centrale of Florence, and from the historical fonds of the Istituto degli Innocenti. The study has 
been based, above all, on the documentation written by the appointees of the two military 
institutions of the Commune, the Dieci di Balìa and the Otto di Pratica. Their registers of 
ammunitions have been useful in finding out the orders placed by the councils, the output of 
workshops, and the various specializations of practitioners. The variations in the expenses on 
salaries, ammunitions, and fortifications have been measured through the accountancy of 
treasurers. The resolutions of the officials and the correspondence of their commissioners 
have disclosed strategies and tactics, needs and impositions, commitments and achievements. 
Moreover, the tax statements, the books, and the notes of several artisans, as Maso di 
Bartolomeo and Bonaccorso Ghiberti, have revealed the formation of their knowledge, the 
destinations of their frequent travels, the links of their networks, and the characteristics of 
their goods. A significant examination has been conducted also on numerous diaries of 
contemporary Tuscan authors, such as the storie of Piero Parenti, Luca Landucci, Piero 
Vaglienti, Biagio Buonaccorsi, and Giovanni Portoveneri, which reported information on the 
political upheavals, on the progresses of campaigns, and on the reactions of Florentines to 
taxation. Lastly, the comparison with other Italian state commenced with the reading of local 
chronicles and published records of the Milanese, Roman, Neapolitan, and Venetian 




Further readings in literature have modeled a “very elastic method of cross-examination, so 
that it may change its direction or improvise freely for any contingency”.1 If the original project 
was centered around the economic themes of production, the very last observations were 
addressing the artistic status of gunmakers as one of the principal reasons behind their 
freedom of movement.  
1 Marc Bloch, Apologia della storia, o mestiere di storico, trans. from the 1993 French edition by 
Giuseppe Gouthier (Turin: Einaudi, 2007), 52. 
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Interesting suggestions have been given by numerous publications relative to the 
patterns and the developments of Renaissance technology. Scholars have affirmed, above all, 
the crucial role of the context in the assimilation of new products, emphasizing its social, 
political, and material roots. John Staudenmaier, for example, insisted on the inherent 
contingency of progress, on its dependency upon a large number of heterogeneous factors.2 
Analyzing the gradualism of technological evolution, Pamela Long has recognized the 
persistence of traditions as a background to innovations.3 Nathan Rosenberg has reflected, 
instead, upon the user redefinition of techniques, the communications, and the confrontations 
between communities and producers. 4  The supportive services for maintaining fully 
operational technologies has been analyzed by David Edgerton.5 Luca Molà and Carlo Belfanti 
have discussed the policies of technological transfer and industrial growth, often realized 
through the migration of practitioners and the imitation of goods.6 Liliane Hilaire-Perez and 
Catherine Verna have recently published a general survey of these contributions, 
recapitulating the diversity of development paths, the necessity of primary sets of material and 
immaterial resources, and the outcomes of the multiple mediations in the various interests 
involved in the transmission of knowledge.7 Lastly, Bert Hall has invited to open the “black 
box” of technology through the analysis of wares, makers, and purchasers.8 
2 John Staudenmaier, “Rationality, agency, contingency. Recent trends in the history of technology,” 
Reviews in American History 30, no. 1 (2002), 168-181. 
3 Pamela Long, “The craft of premodern European history of technology. Past and future practices,” 
Technology and Culture 52, no. 3 (2010), 698-714. 
4 Nathan Rosenberg, “Economic development and the transfer of technology. Some historical 
perspectives,” in ID., Perspectives on technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 151-
172; ID., Exploring the black box. Technology, economics, and history (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994). 
5 David Edgerton, “Innovation, technology, or history. What is the historiography of technology 
about?,” Technology and Culture 51, no. 3 (2010), 680-697. 
6 Luca Molà, “States and crafts. Relocating technical skills in Renaissance Italy,” in The material 
Renaissance, ed. Michelle O’Malley and Evelyn Welch (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2007), 133-153; Carlo Belfanti, “Guilds, patents, and the circulation of technical 
knowledge. Northern Italy during the early modern age,” Technology and Culture 45, no. 3 (2004), 569-
589. 
 7 Liliane Hilaire-Perez and Catherine Verna, “Dissemination of technical knowledge in the Middle 
Ages and the early modern era. New approaches and methodological issues,” Technology and Culture 
47, no. 3 (2006), 536-565.  
8 Bert Hall, Weapons and warfare in Renaissance Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997), 2. 
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These contextual theories seem to have influenced also the study of a “socially shaped” 
military technology,9 after years of heated debate about the “military revolution” in tactics, in 
strategies, and in state administration.10 In fact, the engaging and controversial thesis of 
Michael Roberts and Geoffrey Parker has been discussed and criticized multiple times. In 
general, historians questioned the accuracy of the technological determinism inferred in the 
transformation caused by gunpowder weapons and modern fortifications, both in terms of 
“technical change causing social change” and “technology shaping society.”11 So, according to 
a paradigm of “punctuated equilibrium,” Clifford Rogers has proposed a centuries-long series 
of “incremental and revolutionary changes” which would have altered wars and societies. 
Jeremy Black and John Lynn have attributed the “revolution” to the political and economic 
development of a modern, absolutist state, more than the innovations in heavy artillery and 
portable guns. John Hale and Kelly DeVries refused to associate the political control of 
gunpowder weaponry with the rise of the modern state. David Parrott rather affirmed the 
“complete failure to meet the challenges posed by the administration and the deployment of 
contemporary armies,” and “to come to terms with the real determinants of warfare.”12 
The multiple ties of military technology with war production, however, have been 
effectively demonstrated by other authors, including Kelly DeVries and Robert Douglas Smith. 
The two have analyzed the various typologies and utilizations of armaments, underlining the 
experimental development of new military machines, the formalization of technical treatises, 
9 John Stone, “Technology, society, and the infantry revolution of the fourteenth century,” The 
Journal of Military History 68, no. 2 (2004), 361-380. 
10 Michael Roberts, “The military revolution, 1560-1660,” in ID., Essays in Swedish History (London: 
Widenfeld & Nicolson, 1967), 195-225; Geoffrey Parker, La rivoluzione militare. Le innovazioni militari e 
il sorgere dell’Occidente, trans. from the 1988 English edition by Gianfranco Ceccarelli and Natalia Seri 
(Bologna: il Mulino, 2005). 
11 Edgerton, “Innovation, technology, or history,” 689; Kelly DeVries, “Catapults are not atomic 
bombs. Towards a redefinition of ‘effectiveness’ in premodern military technology,” War in History 4, 
no. 4 (1997), 454-470.  
12 Clifford J. Rogers, “The military revolutions of the Hundred Years’ War,” The Journal of Military 
History 57, no. 2 (1993), 241-278; Jeremy Black, A military revolution? Military change and European 
society, 1550-1800 (London: Macmillan Education, 1991); John Lynn, “The trace italienne and the 
growth of armies. The French case,” Journal of Military History 55, no. 3 (1991), 297-330; David Parrott, 
“Strategy and tactics in the Thirty Years’ War. The military revolution,” Militargeschichtliche 
Mitteilungen 38 (1985), 7-25; Kelly DeVries, “Gunpowder weaponry and the rise of the early modern 
state,” War in History 5, no. 2 (1998), 127-145. For the scholarly discussion about the military revolution, 
see also: The military revolution debate. Readings on the military transformation of Early Modern 
Europe, ed. Clifford Rogers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 
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and the promotion of practitioners.13 The complexity of the long-term “gunpowder revolution” 
has been examined by Bert Hall, along with the evolving tradition of fabrication of propellant, 
and the interdependence upon changes in gunnery.14 The study of behavior, development, and 
manufacture of propellant has been also developed in two collections of essays, both edited 
by Brenda Buchanan, which have dealt with “history of technology, of science, of economics 
and trade, and of politics.”15 Bertrand Gille and Pamela Long have described the careers, the 
cultures, and the meetings of engineers and practitioners, which contributed to the “rise of 
new sciences.”16 Carlo Maria Cipolla and John Guilmartin have reflected on the dynamics of 
cannon founding and the changes in battles, concentrating also upon social and financial 
questions.17 Other researches have been dedicated to the management of artillery in several 
European states. Philippe Contamine, Simon Pepper, and Emmanuel de Crouy-Chanel have 
evaluated the ordinary administration and extraordinary appointees of the French artillery at 
the eve of the Italian Wars, its presumed success during the campaign of Charles VIII, and its 
impact on royal finances.18 DeVries and Smith collaborated also for the examination of the 
guns of the dukes of Burgundy.19 Maria Dolores Herrero Fernandez-Quesada investigated the 
13 Kelly DeVries and Robert Douglas Smith, Medieval military technology (Peterborough: Broadview 
Press, 1992); Kelly DeVries, “Sites of military science and technology,” in The Cambridge History of 
Science, III. Early Modern Science, ed. Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 306-307. 
14 Hall, Weapons and warfare, 67-200. 
15 Gunpowder. The history of an international technology, ed. Brenda Buchanan (Bath: Bath 
University Press, 1996); Gunpowder, explosives, and the state. A technological history, ed. Brenda 
Buchanan (Burlington: Ashgate, 2006). 
16 Bertrand Gille, Leonardo e gli ingegneri del Rinascimento, trans. from the 1964 French edition by 
Adriano Carugo (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1972); Pamela Long, Artisans, practitioners and the rise of the new 
sciences (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2011). 
17 John Guilmartin, Gunpowder and galleys. Changing technology and Mediterranean warfare at sea 
in the sixteenth century (London: Conway Maritime Press, 2003); Carlo Cipolla, Vele e cannoni (Bologna: 
Il Mulino, 2003). 
18 Philippe Contamine, “L’artillerie royale française à la veille des guerres d’Italie,” Annales de 
Bretagne 71, no. 2 (1964); ID., “Les industries de guerre dans la France de la Renaissance. L’exemple de 
l’artillerie,” Revue Historique 550 (1984), 249-280; Simon Pepper, “Castles and cannon in the Naples 
campaign of 1494–95,” in The French descent into Renaissance Italy, 1494-1495. Antecedents and 
effects, ed. David Abulafia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995); Emmanuel de Crouy-Chanel, “Charroi de 
l’artillerie et construction de l’état moderne en France dans le dernier quart du quinzième siècle,” in 
Contre-champs. Études offertes à Jean-Philippe Genet, ed. Aude Mairey, Solal Abeles, and Fanny 
Madeline (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2016), 159-176. See also David Potter, Renaissance France at war. 
Armies, culture and society (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2008), 152-157. 
19 Kelly DeVries and Robert Douglas Smith, The artillery of the dukes of Burgundy (Woodbridge: The 
Boydell Press, 2005). 
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ordnance of the Catholic Monarchs in the fifteenth century Spain.20 Dan Spencer has recently 
studied the arsenals and the facilities of London under the Lancaster, York, and Tudor 
sovereigns.21 
Unfortunately, the Italian literature has not achieved comparable advances in this field. 
On the contrary, Manlio Calegari has denounced a surprising disinterest in technological 
themes.22 The military expenditures were scarcely considered, too. In spite of its premises, 
even the recent article of Elisabetta Scarton on the “costs of wars” has turned into an analysis 
of diplomatic correspondence, more than of the real prices of equipment, supplies, and 
wages.23 Therefore, it is not surprising that Richard Goldthwaite, William Caferro, and Enrico 
Stumpo have claimed the necessity of examining the impact of Renaissance conflicts on 
productive activities.24 
Compared to contemporary engineers and renowned architects, however, smiths, 
founders, and gunpowder makers continued to be ignored by economic and military 
historians. Only the renowned Milanese armorers seem to have attracted the attention of 
artistic scholarship, with their precious, luxurious cuirasses, acquired exclusively by noble 
customers.25 As regards the mass market of weapons, Silvio Leydi has analyzed the supply and 
20 Maria Dolores Herrero Fernandez-Quesada, “Los Reyes Catolicos y la artilleria,” in Isabel la 
Catolica. Homenaje en el quinto centenario de su muerte, ed. Juan Carlos Dominguez Nafria and Carlos 
Perez Fernandez-Turegano (Madrid: Editorial Dykinson, 2005), 65-80; ID., “La artilleria de los Reyes 
Catolicos. Procedencia y sembianza,” in Artilleria y fortificaciones en la Corona de Castilla durante el 
reinado de Isabel la Catolica, ed. Aurelio Valdés Sanchez (Madrid: Secretaria General Tecnica del 
Ministerio de Defensa, 2004), 156-179. 
21 Dan Spencer, “The provision of artillery for the 1428 expedition to France,” Journal of Medieval 
Military History 13 (2015); ID., “The tower of London and firearms in the reign of Edward IV,” Arms and 
Armour 13, no. 2 (2016), 98-110; ID., “The Lancastrian armament programme of the 1450s and the 
development of field guns,” The Ricardian 25 (2015), 61-70. For the preceding period, see David 
Bachrach, “The military administration of England. The royal artillery,” The Journal of Military History 68, 
no. 4 (2004), 1083-1104. 
22 Manlio Calegari, “Nel mondo dei ‘pratici.’ Molte domande e qualche risposta,” in Saper fare. Studi 
di storia delle tecniche in area mediterranea, ed. Manlio Calegari (Pisa: ETS, 2004). 
23 Elisabetta Scarton, “Costi della guerra e forze in campo nel secolo XV, tra verità storiografiche e 
manipolazione dell’informazione,” Revista Universitaria de Historia Militar 6, no. 11 (2017), 23-42. 
24 William Caferro, “Warfare and economy in Renaissance Italy,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 39, no. 2 (2008); Richard Goldthwaite, The economy of Renaissance Florence (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 400-401; Enrico Stumpo, “La finanza di guerra negli antichi stati 
italiani,” in Storia economica della guerra, ed. Catia Eliana Gentilucci (Rome: Società Italiana di Storia 
Militare, 2008), 196. 
25 Stuart Pyhrr, José Godoy, and Silvio Leydi, Heroic armor of the Italian Renaissance. Filippo Negroli 
and his contemporaries (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1998). 
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the demand of Lombard equipment during the early Spanish dominion, while Emilio Motta, 
Francesco Malaguzzi Valeri, and Luciana Frangioni have briefly examined the production of the 
late fifteenth century.26 Contributions to the study of other Italian industries are rare. Mario 
Scalini and Silvia Bianchessi have respectively investigated the proper styles of Florentine 
armor and the arrival of foreign corazzai at the Neapolitan court.27 
Similarly, academics have neglected the technical advancements of artillery, the 
processes of its fabrication, the patterns of its diffusion, and its achievement in battlefields. 
The pioneering works of Angelo Angelucci, Cesare Quarenghi, and Carlo Montù on the history 
of the Italian ordnance were not deepened for decades.28 Only at the beginning of the twenty-
first century Walter Panciera has made interesting suggestions about the Venetian 
“government” of production of both cannons and powder, their use, and their storage.29 In the 
following decades, several other works appeared. An excellent archival studies on the Sienese 
documentation has led Giampaolo Ermini to delineate the career and the products of two 
founders, Agostino de’ Rossi from Piacenza and Giovanni from Zagreb.30 Andrea Bernardoni 
focused exclusively on the theories of Leonardo da Vinci, Francesco di Giorgio Martini, and 
Niccolò Tartaglia, avoiding the actual practices and products of contemporary gunmakers. 31 
26 Silvio Leydi, “Le armi,” in Il rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, IV. Commercio e cultura mercantile, 
ed. Franco Franceschi, Richard Goldthwaite, and Reinhold Mueller (Treviso: Angelo Colla Editore, 2007); 
Emilio Motta, “Armaiuoli milanesi nel periodo visconteo-sforzesco,” Archivio Storico Lombardo 41, no. 1 
(1914), 187-232; Francesco Malaguzzi Valeri, La corte di Ludovico il Moro. IV. Le arti industriali, la 
letteratura, la musica (Milan: Hoepli, 1923), 29-41; Luciana Frangioni, “Aspetti della produzione delle 
armi milanesi nel XV secolo,” in Milano nell’età di Ludovico il Moro (Milan: Il comune, 1983). 
27 Mario Scalini, “L’armatura fiorentina del Quattrocento e la produzione d’armi in Toscana,” in 
Guerra e guerrieri nella Toscana del Rinascimento, ed. Franco Cardini and Marco Tangheroni (Florence: 
EDIFIR, 1990); Silvia Bianchessi, “Cavalli, armi e salnitro fra Milano e Napoli nel secondo 
Quattrocento,”Nuova Rivista Storica 52, n. 3 (1998). 
28 Angelo Angelucci, Documenti inediti per la storia delle armi da fuoco italiane (Turin: Tipografia 
Cassone, 1869); Cesare Quarenghi, “Tecno-cronografia delle armi da fuoco italiane,” in Atti del regio 
istituto d’incoraggiamento alle scienze naturali, economiche e tecnologiche di Napoli 17 (1880), 53-307; 
Carlo Montù, Storia dell’artiglieria italiana (Rome: Rivista d’Artiglieria e Genio, 1934). 
29 Walter Panciera, Il governo delle artiglierie. Tecnologia bellica e istituzioni veneziane nel secondo 
Cinquecento (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2005); ID., “La polvere da sparo,” in Il rinascimento italiano e 
l’Europa, III. Produzione e tecniche, ed. Philippe Braunstein and Luca Molà (Treviso: Angelo Colla Editore, 
2007). 
30 Giampaolo Ermini, “Campane e cannoni. Agostino da Piacenza e Giovanni da Zagabria: un 
fonditore padano e uno schiavone nella Siena del Quattrocento,” in L’industria artistica del bronzo del 
Rinascimento a Venezia e nell’Italia settentrionale, ed. Matteo Ceriana and Victoria Avery (Verona: 
Scripta, 2008), 387-425. 
31 Andrea Bernardoni, “La fusione delle artiglierie tra Medioevo e Rinascimento. ‘Cronaca’ di un 
rinnovamento tecnologico attraverso i manoscritti di Leonardo,” Cromohs 19 (2014), 106-116. 
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Renato Ridella dedicated many of his contributions to several dynasties of founders, like the 
Gioardis, the Merellos, and the Sommarivas from Genova.32 Moreover, the former serviceman 
has often teamed up with archaeologists for the analysis of shipwrecked guns.33 A survey of all 
of these works has been lastly made by Jean-François Belhoste in his essay on late medieval 
European ordnance.34 
Raw metals, in general, received more attention. Marco Merlo and Mario Borracelli have 
written about the Sienese iron works, while Gabriella Piccinni reported the investment of the 
local entrepreneurs in the reopening of several mines.35 The management of a Tuscan copper 
cava has been examined by Guido Pampaloni in his essay on the enterprise of the Marinai 
family.36 Enzo Baraldi and Manlio Calegari, instead, documented the establishment of a new 
ferriera in the Apuan Alps, and the projects of his proprietor, the duke of Ferrara, as well as the 
circulation of metallurgic practices and the recruitment of skilled miners.37 Baraldi has studied 
also the technical innovations in Alpine ironworking, such as new types of furnaces and more 
32 Renato Ridella, “Fonditori italiani di artiglierie in trasferta nell’Europa del XVI secolo,” In Storie di 
armi, ed. Nicola Labanca and Pier Paolo Poggio (Milan: Unicopli, 2009); ID., “Produzione di artiglierie nel 
sedicesimo secolo. I fonditori genovesi Battista Merello e Dorino II Gioardi,” in Pratiche e linguaggi. 
Contributi a una storia della cultura tecnica e scientifica (Pisa: ETS, 2005). 
33 Ships and guns. The sea ordnance in Venice and Europe between the 15th and 17th century, ed. 
Carlo Beltrame and Renato Ridella (Oxford and Oakville: Oxbow Books, 2011); Renato Ridella and 
Francesco Laratta, “Un cannone veneziano fuso nel 1518 per gli Ospedalieri di San Giovanni di Rodi, dal 
mare della Calabria,” Archeologia postmedievale 18 (2014), 63-81. See also I cannoni di Venezia. 
Artiglierie della Serenissima da fortezze e relitti, ed. Carlo Beltrame and Marco Morin (Florence: 
All’Insegna del Giglio, 2013). 
34 Jean-François Belhoste, “Nascita e sviluppo dell’artiglieria in Europa,” in Il rinascimento italiano e 
l’Europa, III. Produzione e tecniche. 
35 Marco Merlo, “Armamenti e gestione dell’esercito a Siena nell’età dei Petrucci. Le armi,” Rivista di 
Studi Militari 5 (2016); Mario Borracelli, “Siderurgia e imprenditori senesi nel Quattrocento fino 
all’epoca di Lorenzo il Magnifico,” in La Toscana al tempo di Lorenzo il Magnifico. Politica, economia, 
cultura, arte (Pisa: Pacini, 1996); Gabriella Piccinni, “Le miniere del senese. Contributo alla messa a 
punto della cronologia dell’abbandono e della ripresa delle attività estrattive,” in La Toscane et les 
Toscans, autour de la Renaissance. Cadres de vie, société, croyances (Aix-en-Provence: Université de 
Provence, 1999), 239-254. See also Aurora Meniconi, “Studi antichi e recenti sulle miniere medievali in 
Toscana. Alcune considerazioni,” Ricerche Storiche 14, no. 1 (1984), 203-226, and Maria Elena Cortese, 
Riccardo Francovich, “La lavorazione del ferro in Toscana nel Medioevo,” Ricerche Storiche 25, no. 2 
(1995), 435-457. 
36 Guido Pampaloni, “La miniera del rame di Montecatini Val di Cecina. La legislazione mineraria di 
Firenze e i Marinai di Prato,” Archivio storico pratese 51, no. 2 (1975). 
37 Enzo Baraldi and Manlio Calegari, “Pratica e diffusione della siderurgia ‘indiretta’ in area italiana,” 
in La siderugie alpine en Italie, ed. Philippe Braunstein (Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, 2001); Manlio 
Calegari, “La mano sul cannone,” in Pratiche e linguaggi. Contributi a una storia della cultura tecnica e 
scientifica, ed. Luciana Gatti (Pisa: ETS, 2005). 
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effective bellows.38 Philippe Braunstein has conducted several studies on the commerce of 
iron in Venice.39 
 
The military reforms of fifteenth-century Italy 
 
This scarcity of literature could be explained by a certain fragmentation of the documentation. 
The Milanese fonds, for example, were dismembered and dispersed in the late eighteenth 
century by Austro-Hungarian archivists. The books of the Aragonese chancery were destroyed 
during the Second World War, a terrible loss for the studies in the history of the Neapolitan 
Kingdom. The fire did not spare also part of the registers written by the Venetian officers 
responsible for the management of ordnance, the provveditori alle artiglierie.  
Indeed, this lack of primary sources for three of the most important states of 
Renaissance Italy has undoubtedly prevented scholars from undertaking further research into 
military topics.40 Only in the last two decades scholars have dealt with the issues of the 
contemporary historiography on warfare, integrating them into more general researches on 
institutions, culture, and society. Different approaches have resulted in a better 
comprehension of the reciprocal influence between military reforms, civic transformations, 
financial innovations, and state consolidation.41 Military institutions have been seen as the 
expression of more complex political projects. 42 The formation of standing armies was 
 38 Enzo Baraldi, “La siderurgia In Italia dal XII al XVII secolo,”in La civiltà del ferro. Dalla preistoria al 
terzo millennio, ed. Walter Nicodemi (Milan: Olivares, 2004); ID.,“Una nuova età del ferro. Macchine e 
processi della siderurgia,” in Il rinascimento italiano e l’Europa. III. Produzioni e tecniche, 199-216. 
39 Philippe Braunstein, “Le commerce du fer a Venise au quinzième siescle,” Studi Veneziani 8 (1966), 
267-302. 
40 Luciano Pezzolo, “La ‘rivoluzione militare.’ Una prospettiva italiana,” in Militari in Età Moderna. La 
centralità di un tema di confine, ed. Alessandra Dattero and Stefano Levati (Milan: Cesalpino, 2006) 32-
59. 
41 Claudio Donati, “Strutture militari degli stati italiani nella prima età moderna: una rassegna degli 
studi recenti,” in Società Italiana di Storia Militare. Quaderno 2000, ed. Piero Del Negro (Naples: Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiane, 2003), 45-53; Alessandra Dattero and Stefano Levati, “La storia militare tra società, 
economia e territorio,” in Militari in Età Moderna, 7-14; Bernhard Kroener, “Stato, società, ‘militare.’ 
Prospettive di una rinnovata storia militare della prima Età Moderna,” in Militari e società civile 
nell’Europa dell’Età Moderna, ed. Claudio Donati and Bernhard Kroener (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007), 11-
21. 
42 Giorgio Chittolini, “Il ‘privato,’ il ‘pubblico,’ lo stato,” in Origini dello stato. Processi di formazione 
statale in Italia fra Medioevo ed Età Moderna, ed. Giorgio Chittolini, Anthony Molho, and Pierangelo 
Schiera (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994), 573. 
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considered as an instrument of internal control and of centralization of the state authority.43 
The construction of modern fortifications, “iron belts” of a “territorial machine,” has been 
studied through the contrasts and the agreements between the regional governments and the 
local communities. 44  The recruitment of mercenaries has been intertwined with the 
“geography of famine” of the rural areas, and with the marginalization and the reintegration of 
soldiers and deserters into city contexts. The difficult coexistence between soldiers and 
civilians has been highlighted by the studies of garrisons and posts.45 The analysis of the 
relationships between rulers and condottieri has been focused on patronage, loyalty, and 
justice. The companies of venturieri, moreover, have been investigated as structured firms, 
well organized by their leaders and their treasurers, according to economic and familiar ties.46 
The daily life of an encampment was reconstructed through the letters of noblemen, 
commissioners, captains, and simple combatants.47 Historians have been interested also in the 
narrations of Renaissance battles in contemporary songs and diaries.48 Moreover, they have 
analyzed the representation of violence, and the warlike performances of jousts and 
43 Maria Nadia Covini, “Guerra e ‘conservazione dello stato.’ Note sulle fanterie sforzesche,” Cheiron 
23 (1995), 67-104. 
44 Ennio Concina, La macchina territoriale. La progettazione della difesa nel Cinquecento veneto 
(Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1983); Giorgio Chittolini, “Il ‘militare’ tra tardo Medioevo e prima Età 
Moderna,” in Militari e società civile nell’Europa dell’Età Moderna, 83-102. 
45 Luciano Pezzolo, “L’archibugio e l’aratro,” Studi Veneziani 7 (1983), 59-80; ID., “Professione 
militare e famiglia in Italia tra tardo Medioevo e prima Età Moderna,” in La justice des familles. Autour 
de la transmission des biens, des savoirs et des pouvoirs, ed. Anna Bellavitis and Isabelle Chabot (Rome: 
École Française de Rome, 2011), 341-366; Franco Cardini, Quell’antica festa crudele (Milan: Arnoldo 
Mondadori Editore, 1995), 78-123. 
 46 Mario del Treppo, “Gli aspetti organizzativi, economici e sociali di una compagnia di ventura 
italiana,” Rivista Storica Italiana 85, no. 2 (1973), 253-75; William Bernardoni, “La compagnia del 
capitano Micheletto Attendolo nella contabilità quattrocentesca della Fraternita dei Laici di Arezzo,” 
Annali aretini 22 (2014), 115-44. 
47 Francesco Storti, “La novellaja mercenaria. Vita militare, esercito e stato nella corrispondenza di 
commissari, principi e soldati del secolo quindicesimo,” Studi Storici 54, no. 1 (2013), 5-39; Maria Nadia 
Covini, “La fortuna e i fatti dei condottieri ‘con veritate, ordine e bono inchiostro narrati’,” in Medioevo 
dei poteri. Studi di storia per Giorgio Chittolini, ed. Massimo della Misericordia, Andrea Gamberini, and 
Francesco Somani (Rome: Viella, 2012), 215-244; Enrica Guerra, Soggetti a ribalda fortuna. Gli uomini 
dello stato estense nella guerre dell’Italia quattrocentesca (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2005). 
48 Andrea Matucci, “‘E farai alcun fiume’. Il mito della battaglia di Fornovo fra Leonardo e 
Machiavelli,” in Les guerres d’Italie. Histoire, pratiques, représentations, ed. Danielle Boillet and Marie 
Françoise Piéjus (Paris: Université Paris 3 Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2002), 103-116; Massimo Rospocher, 
“Songs of war. Historical and literary narratives of the ‘horrendous Italian Wars,’” in Narrating war. Early 
modern and contemporary perspectives, ed. Marco Mondini and Massimo Rospocher (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 2013), 79-97. 
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tournaments.49 Military information has been gathered also from ambassadorial dispatches, 
which reported data and details about the strength and the intentions of rival and allied 
powers, all provided by spies, agents, clients, and merchants.50 Scholars singled out the 
civilization of military customs and the rationalization of the “art” of war, the habits of a bona 
guerra expressed through treatises and biographies. Last but not least, even the condottieri 
were not portrayed as evil brigands anymore, but depicted as professional fighters, courtiers, 
and administrators.51 
With regard to the “art of war,” the old, monumental book of Piero Pieri is still 
remaining unrivalled in the explanation of the evolutions in this period. Pieri, in fact, 
considered the transformations of strategies and tactics before and after the foreign invasions 
of Italy, and, through a punctilious examination of battles and campaigns, he successfully 
confronted the traditional prejudice in favor of the decadence of Italian armies during the 
fifteenth century.52 
An extraordinary synthesis of all of these subjects was proposed by Michael Mallett. His 
Mercenaries and their masters, appeared for the first time in 1974, still represents an 
impressive analysis of the history of war in Renaissance Italy, with a historical scope which 
extends from thirteenth-century companies to sixteenth century battles. Mallett explained not 
only tactics and strategies, but the whole cultural, financial, political context of conflicts, as 
well as their role in the contemporary society. Moreover, he held his attention in the military 
organization of Italian states, to the creation of permanent offices, to the founding of 
49 Paola Ventrone, “Cerimonialità e spettacolo nella festa cavalleresca fiorentina del Quattrocento,” 
in La civiltà del torneo. Giostre e tornei tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna (Narni: Centro Studi Storici di 
Narni, 1990), 35-53; Maria Nadia Covini, “Alcune note su scontri, duelli e giochi militari nella 
documentazione della Lombardia ducale del quindicesimo secolo,” in Agon und Distinktion. Soziale 
Räume des Zweikampfszwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit, ed. Uwe Israel and Christian Jaser (Berlin: Lit 
Verlag, 2016), 134-145. 
50 Francesco Senatore, “La battaglia nelle corrispondenze diplomatiche. Stereotipi lessicali e punto di 
vista degli scriventi,” in La battaglia nel Rinascimento meridionale, ed. Giancarlo Abbamonte, Joana 
Barreto, Teresa D’Urso, Alessandra Perriccioli Saggese, and Francesco Senatore (Rome: Viella, 2011), 
223-240; Scarton, “Costi della guerra e forze in campo nel secolo XV”; Michael Mallett, “Diplomacy and 
war in later fifteenth-century Italy,” in Lorenzo de’ Medici. Studi, ed. Gian Carlo Garfagnini (Florence: Leo 
S. Olschki, 1992), 234-250. 
51 Franco Cardini, “Condottieri e uomini d’arme nell’Italia del Rinascimento,” in Condottieri e uomini 
d’arme nell’Italia del Rinascimento, ed. Mario del Treppo (Naples: Liguori, 2001), 1-10; Maria Nadia 
Covini, “Guerra e relazioni diplomatiche in Italia. La diplomazia dei condottieri,” in Guerra y diplomacia 
en la Europa occidental, 1280-1480 (Pamplona: Gubierno de Navarra, 2005), 163-198; Christine Shaw, 
Barons and castellans. The military nobility of Renaissance Italy (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015). 
52 Piero Pieri, Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana (Turin: Einaudi, 1952). 
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expeditions. Above all, Mallett highlighted the evolution of the relationships between rulers 
and condottieri, and their contrasts in the conduct of campaigns.53 
A decade later, John Hale would have attempted a broader survey of the subject, 
choosing to extend its geographical range to the entire continent. The highly important volume 
on War and society in Renaissance Europe focused mainly on the recruitment process of 
aristocrats, mercenaries, and militiamen, and their return to a civil life. Hale introduced also 
the problem of the direct and indirect economic effects of warfare on communities and 
governments, such as increases in taxation, incentives to production, extensions of the public 
authority. In the preceding years, Hale devoted several essays to the cultural influence of war 
during the sixteenth century, discussing also the intellectual controversy about the use of 
gunpowder.54 
In 1989, the translation of the Mallett’s book on the military organization of Venice 
renewed the scholarly debate about the creation of standing armies and permanent 
magistracies in the fifteenth-century Peninsula. Mallett covered the issues of control, 
enlistment, supplying, and funding troops. He proposed again the themes of the relationships 
between the state and its captains. Furthermore, he overturned the traditional criticism of the 
Italian conservatism in military organization, examining the progresses made by the Most 
Serene Republic in the management and uses of its cavalry, infantry, and artillery.55 
So influential were this works that other volumes on the history of warlike institution 
began to appear. In 1998, Maria Nadia Covini reconstructed “the choices, the orientations, the 
decisions, and the practices” on which the Sforza of Milan based the military administration of 
their duchy and their standing armed force.56 Deriving much of her analysis from vast archival 
sources, Covini discussed the bonds between the court and its soldiers, strengthened by 
salaries, donations, and vassalage. The condotta became an instrument of power, an efficient 
means of consolidating the state, an exchange of benefits and loyalty between the center and 
its peripheries. Covini pondered also on the impact of the war on Lombard society, especially 
53 Michael Mallett, Signori e mercenari. La guerra nell’Italia del Rinascimento, trans. from the 1974 
English edition by Alghisi Princivalle (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006). See also Michael Mallett and Christine 
Shaw, The Italian Wars, 1494-1559 (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 177-217. 
54 John Hale, Guerra e società nell’Europa del Rinascimento, trans. from the 1985 English edition by 
Franco Salvatorelli (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1987); ID., Renaissance War Studies (London: The 
Hambledon Press, 1983). 
55 Michael Mallett, L’organizzazione militare di Venezia nel Quattrocento, trans. from the 1984 
English edition by Enrico Basaglia (Rome: Jouvence, 1989). 
56 Maria Nadia Covini, L’esercito del duca: organizzazione militare e istituzioni al tempo degli Sforza, 
1450-1480 (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medioevo, 1998). 
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on the cities, which negotiated the necessary taxation, and the rural villages, which housed 
soldiers. 
In 2007, Francesco Storti investigated the creation of a “state army” in the Kingdom of 
Naples, during the reign of Ferrante I d’Aragona, and under the command of his son, Alfonso, 
the feared duke of Calabria. This “demanio di gente d’arme” would have been established 
through the incorporation and the confiscation of several cavalry companies of barons and 
vassals, and through the collaboration between the monarchy and the local communities. The 
reform would have allowed the sovereign to disarm temporarily his rebellious nobility, and to 
economize on the recruitment of foreign mercenaries. Storti has showed also the connections 
between the actual royal plans and the theoretical reflections expressed in the military treatise 
of two Neapolitan courtiers, Orso Orsini and Diomede Carafa. Unfortunately, the book did not 
offer a comprehensive analysis of the costs of this new centralized structure, but the 
expenditures on permanent contingents of infantry and light horsemen have been outlined in 
another article of the same author.57 
 
The Machiavellian “orthodoxy”  
 
Only one Italian Renaissance state is still neglected by military historiography, that is, Florence. 
Too often, in fact, the prejudice of Niccolò Machiavelli against mercenaries has been assumed 
to be the reason and the consequence of a supposed decadence of the republican army during 
the fourteenth and the fifteenth century.58 According to William Caferro, the dualism between 
citizen combatants and corrupt condottieri has insidiously turned into a serious prejudice, a 
self-evident explanation, a strict “orthodoxy” that has undoubtedly influenced the studies on 
the whole topic.59 Thus, the relationships between the Commune and its captains have been 
purely analyzed from a perspective of reciprocal diffidence and sneaking suspicion. Statesmen 
57 Francesco Storti, L’esercito napoletano nella seconda metà del Quattrocento (Salerno: Laveglia, 
2007); ID., “Il principe condottiero. Le campagne militari di Alfonso, duca di Calabria,” in Condottieri e 
uomini d’arme nell’Italia del Rinascimento, 327-346; ID., “Fanteria e cavalleria leggera nel Regno di 
Napoli,” Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane 133 (2015), 1-47; Francesco Senatore and Francesco 
Storti, Spazi e tempi della guerra nel Mezzogiorno aragonese (Salerno: Carlone, 2002). 
58 An exhaustive bibliography on the segretario fiorentino can be found in one of the latest works of 
Andrea Guidi, Un segretario militante. Politica, diplomazia e armi nel cancelliere Machiavelli (Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 2009). A partially critical approach to the military, theoretical knowledge of Machiavelli is in 
Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli e il suo tempo (Bologna, Il Mulino, 1964), 253-289. 
59 William Caferro, “Continuity, long-term service and permanent forces. A reassessment of the 
Florentine army in the fourteenth century,” Journal of Modern History 80, no. 2 (2008), 219-251. 
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have often been blamed for their disinterest in military organization, and even for their 
“incomprehension” of the irrational, violent phenomenon of war. Florentines have been 
accused of avoiding personal, active involvement in conflicts, preferring instead to hire 
professional venturieri. The administration of troops has been assessed as haphazard and 
improvised, and the army has been judged as disorganized and inefficient.60 
It is always worth repeating and reminding, however, that “in history, as elsewhere, the 
causes cannot be assumed. They are to be looked for.”61 And the postulate of Florentine 
backwardness seems to have been merely based on the Machiavellian grievances and on the 
classic nostalgia for the armi proprie, rather than on a punctilious research into primary 
sources, into the abundant documentation of the local State Archive. Also the unique volume 
of Charles Bayley on war and society in Renaissance Florence reprised themes and complaints 
of the humanistic literature, reaffirming the distrust of condottieri, and their heavy burden on 
fiscal system.62 
The recent reassessment of the Florentine army in terms of continuity and 
rationalization proposed by Caferro has been a welcome, clever exception to this trend, but its 
problems and its suggestions were not deepened further. Therefore, a radical reconstruction 
of the war like preparations of the Republic is still missing, as a complete examination of its 
two military institution, the extraordinary Dieci di Balìa and the permanent Otto di Pratica. 
Suffice it to say that an article of Andrea Guidi completely ignored the archival practices of 
both these offices, overlooking bookkeeping and resolutions which date from the War of the 
Eight Saints to the exile of Piero di Lorenzo de’ Medici, and stressing, once again, the 
omnipresent, bulky figure of the Machiavelli.63 The chapters dedicated by Guidubaldo Guidi to 
the Dieci, instead, were limited in summarizing roles and assignments of their appointees, and 
in engrossing the formal legislation relative to their posts.64 Hints on these officers could be 
60 Mallett, Signori e mercenari, 134-136; Claudio Finzi, “La guerra nel pensiero politico del 
Rinascimento toscano,” in Guerra e guerrieri nella Toscana del Rinascimento, ed. Franco Cardini and 
Marco Tangheroni (Florence: EDIFIR, 1990), 127-153; Andrea Guidi, Un segretario militante. Politica, 
diplomazia e armi nel cancelliere Machiavelli (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2009).  
61 Marc Bloch, Apologia della storia, o mestiere di storico, 143. 
62 Charles Bayley, War and society in Renaissance Florence. The De Militia of Leonardo Bruni 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961). 
63 Andrea Guidi, “The Florentine archives in transition. Government, warfare and communication,” 
European History Quarterly, 46, no. 3 (2016), 458-479. 
64 Guidubaldo Guidi, Il governo della città-repubblica di Firenze del primo Quattrocento. II. Gli istituti 
‘di dentro’ che componevano il governo di Firenze nel 1415 (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1981), 203-12; ID. 
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retrieved also in the edition of the letters of Lorenzo de’ Medici, but their duties are not well 
profiled, relegated behind the will, the plans, and the personality of the same Magnificent.65 
Nevertheless, a distinction between the responsibility of the council and the behavior of 
Lorenzo has to be made, and Nicolai Rubinstein was aware of “a sort of division of labor” 
between the two, with the firsts “being in charge of the day-to-day conduct of military 
operations,” and the latter “more concerned with long-term issues, and, in particular, with 
secret negotiations.”66 
Little is known about the networks of rulers and soldiers. The famed negative attitude of 
the Republic towards its capitani generali has completely obscured the significant connections 
with other military leaders, such as heads of local factions, neighboring condottieri, and 
bellicose accomandatari of the Commune. Certainly, the works of Patrizia Meli have 
adequately highlighted the bonds between the Magnificent Lorenzo and two foreign 
condottieri, Gabriele Malaspina and Pierandrea di Brando, which revealed private and public 
interests in the region of Lunigiana and in the isle of Corsica. Christine Shaw has illustrated the 
difficult kinship between the Medici family and the Roman powerful clan of Orsini.67 But the 
documentation points out further strong patronage links with the Vitelli of Città di Castello, 
with the counts of Montedoglio and Marsciano, with the marquises of Monte Santa Maria, 
with the lords of Sassetta and Faenza, and with the influential connestabili of Borgo San 
Sepolcro, Arezzo, and Castrocaro. 
The Florentine campaigns, moreover, have been exclusively examined through their 
diplomatic implications and their repercussions on the precarious balance of power of the 
whole Peninsula.68 It is the case, for instance, of the Barons’ War.69 As a matter of fact, the 
Lotte, pensiero e istituzioni politiche nella Repubblica Fiorentina dal 1494 al 1512. II. Gli istituti sovrani e 
di governo (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1992), 787-97. 
65 See, for example, Lorenzo de’ Medici. Lettere, III., ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Florence: Giunti and 
Barbera, 1977).  
66 Nicolai Rubinstein, “Lorenzo de’ Medici. The formation of his statecraft,” in Lorenzo de’ Medici. 
Studi, 62. 
67 Christine Shaw, “Lorenzo de’ Medici and Niccolò Orsini,” in Lorenzo de’ Medici. Studi, 257-279; 
Patrizia Meli, Gabriele Malaspina, marchese di Fosdinovo. Condotte, politica e diplomazia nella 
Lunigiana del Rinascimento (Florence: Firenze University Press, 2008), 23-78; ID., “Un conestabile corso 
al servizio di Lorenzo il Magnifico. Pier Andrea Gentili di Brando,” Ricerche Storiche 42 (2012), 39-56; 
Stephen Epstein, “Storia economica e storia istituzionale dello stato,” in Origini dello stato, 108-109. 
68 Michael Mallett, “Diplomacy and war in later fifteenth-century Italy;” Riccardo Fubini, “Lega italica 
e politica dell’equilibrio all’avvento di Lorenzo de’ Medici al potere,” in ID., Italia quattrocentesca. 
Politica e diplomazia nell’età di Lorenzo il Magnifico (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1994), 185-219.  
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political premises of the Pazzi’s conspiracy has attracted the attention of academics more than 
the resultant conflict.70 The study of the rebellion of Volterra has not differed from this 
historiographical tradition, concentrating on the individual involvement of Lorenzo de’ Medici 
in the repression, on the brutal bloodbath that ended the siege, and, above all, on the peculiar 
economic causes of the revolt, that is, the exploitation of the nearby alum mines.71 
The publication of the correspondence of general commissioners has undoubtedly 
offered particulars of the tasks of officers and warriors, facts about the daily life in 
encampments, and details related to the ongoing operations, but without any systematic 
approach.72 With regard to these commissari, Mallett has openly criticized their “little direct 
experience of war” as well as their provisional appointments, emphasizing the contrast 
between the military unpreparedness and the diplomatic understanding of the ruling elite of 
the capital.73 
Despite the praises of Machiavelli, even the defensive strategies of the Magnificent have 
not been considered by historians, along with the project for securing the borders, the 
expenditures on strongholds, and the relationships between garrisons and civilians. The 
original castles planned by the bottega of Francesco di Giovanni and Francesco d’Angelo have 
rarely entered the debate on the early development of the bastioned fortification. Architects, 
at least, have analyzed the construction of new fortresses of Volterra, Monte Poggiolo, 
Sarzana, Sarzanello, Pietrasanta, Poggio Imperiale, and Firenzuola, built for the purpose of 
“keeping and fighting foes at distance” during the last quarter of the fifteenth century.74 
69 Humfrey Butters, “Florence, Milan and the Barons’ War,” in Lorenzo de’ Medici. Studi, 281-308; ID., 
“Lorenzo and Naples,” in Lorenzo il Magnifico e il suo mondo, ed. Gian Carlo Garfagnini (Florence: Leo S. 
Olschki, 1994). In the same miscellany, see also Melissa Bullard, “In pursuit of honore et utile. Lorenzo 
de’ Medici and Rome,” 125-126.  
70 Lauro Martines, April blood. Florence and the plot against the Medici (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003); Riccardo Fubini, “La congiura dei Pazzi. Radici politico-sociali e ragioni di un fallimento,” in 
ID., Italia quattrocentesca, 100-104; John Najemy, A history of Florence (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 352-
361. 
71 Enrico Fiumi, L’impresa di Lorenzo de’ Medici contro Volterra (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1948). 
72 Elisabetta Scarton, “Giannozzo Manetti, commissario in campo. Le istruzioni dei Dieci di Balìa,” Atti 
e memorie dell’Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere 76 (2011), 81-202; Commissioni di Rinaldo degli 
Albizzi per il Comune di Firenze dal 1399 al 1433, ed. by Cesare Guasti (Florence: Coi tipi di Mariano 
Cellini e Compagni, 1867). 
73 Mallett, “Diplomacy and war in later fifteenth-century Italy,” 240; ID., Signori e mercenari, 134.  
74 Niccolò Machiavelli, Storie fiorentine (Florence: Per Bernardo di Giunta, 1532), 213r; Daniela 
Lamberini, “Architetti ed architettura militare per il Magnifico,” in Lorenzo il Magnifico e il suo mondo, 
407-425; John Hale, “The early development of the bastion. An Italian chronology,” in ID., Renaissance 
War Studies, 1-29. 
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The “magnificent” administration 
Besides, the historiography on Renaissance Florence has mainly focused on other topics, as 
politics and economy. Scholars have studied the establishment of a permanent diplomatic 
corps,75 the formation of the criptosignoria of the Medici,76 the consolidation of the regional 
state,77 the rise of merchant bankers,78 the development of textile industries,79 and the 
general trends of production and trades in Tuscany.80 However, all of these themes could not 
be entirely separated from the military fortunes of the Republic. As John Hale observed, 
conflicts “played a role which, if thought away, radically maims the understanding of the social 
experiences in those years.”81 
75 See the indispensable works of Riccardo Fubini, as Quattrocento fiorentino. Politica, diplomazia, 
cultura (Pisa: Pacini, 1996); ID., Italia quattrocentesca; ID., “Diplomacy and government in the Italian 
city-states of the fifteenth century,” in Politics and diplomacy in early modern Italy. The structures of 
diplomatic practices, ed. Daniela Frigo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); ID., “Classe 
dirigente ed esercizio della diplomazia nella Firenze quattrocentesca. Rappresentanza esterna e identità 
cittadina nella crisi della tradizione comunale,” in I ceti dirigenti nella Toscana del Quattrocento 
(Impruneta: Papafava, 1987). 
76 See, for example, Nicolai Rubinstein, Il governo di Firenze sotto i Medici, trans. from the 1966 
English edition by Michele Luzzati (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1971); Dale Kent, The rise of the Medici 
faction in Florence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); The Medici. Citizens and masters, ed. Robert 
Black and John Law (Florence: The Harvard University Center for Italian Renaissance Studies, 2015).  
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This can be seen in the case of internal affairs, during the whole Quattrocento. The early 
crisis accentuated the “civic humanism” of Florentine intellectuals, their patriotic defense of 
republican liberty against “evil tyrants.” 82 The long campaign against Milan, moreover, 
coincided with the affirmation of the Albizzi’s faction, which fell into decline soon after the 
failed capture of Lucca. The sudden, unconditional surrender to the French army of Charles VIII 
represented the trigger for the end of the Medici’s regime. The wearing war against the Pisan 
rebels exacerbated the city political turmoil in the last years of the century.83 
The diplomatic victory in the Pazzi’s War, above all, had significant consequence for the 
republican institutions, allowing the Magnificent to start a general oligarchic reform, 
concentrating several constitutional powers in his hands. Through the powerful, restricted 
Consiglio dei Settanta, Lorenzo could influence all the decisions on domestic politics. His 
membership in the Diciassette Riformatori guaranteed the control over public economy. 
Thanks to his patronal role, moreover, he could manipulate the new permanent magistracy of 
the Otto di Pratica, the council charged with managing the military organization and the 
foreign policy of the Commune.84 
The conflict, hence, not only tested the cohesion of the regime, but contributed to its 
strengthening. In the aftermath, the position of the inner circle of clients, the combination of 
public and private interests, and the personalistic statecraft of the Magnificent was 
significantly emphasized. The installation of the “tyrant” led also to a fierce rivalry between 
“Caesar” and part of the upper and middle classes of the capital. The excluded and 
marginalized members of important Florentine families expressed strong opposition to his 
“arrogance.”85 His supporters, on the contrary, beneficed also from the high rates of numerous 
short-term loans, consolidating their position inside the ruling “financial oligarchy.”86 Loyal 
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bankers and devoted merchants conceded these prestanze especially in wartime, permitting 
the government to collect large sums of ready cash.87 According to John Najemy, the early 
Milanese wars represented “the beginning of the commune’s dependence on its wealthiest 
citizens.”88 After the Pazzi’s plot, more than three hundred thousand golden florins were 
annually borrowed from the citizenry. In 1495, four hundred thousand golden florins were 
accumulated “for preserving freedom.”89 
Although financiers made profits on their agreements with the Commune, the small 
investors often faced the insolvency of the public investment funds, that is, the monte comune 
and the monte delle doti.90 The government, in fact, frequently failed to pay interest on their 
obligations, earmarking money for waging wars. The Republic did not returned the entire sum 
advanced for the campaigns against Filippo Maria Visconti, equal to one million golden florins. 
One hundred thousand golden florins were diverted from repayments to the salaries of troops, 
in 1472. In 1480, above all, the enemy invasion led to a major financial crisis, and the state was 
under the threat of bankruptcy.91 
These “bad times” required determined efforts and drastic measures to raise the 
“inelastic” public revenues and to confront the “limitless” growth of military expenditures. The 
tax burden escalated sharply since the first decades of the century.92 The protracted conflict 
against the Milanese army compelled the Republic to promulgate a general survey on the 
business investments, the holding in public debt, and the real property of the inhabitants of 
the whole Dominio. Decreed for the first time in 1427, the catasto was revived in 1431 and in 
1433, in an effort to defeat the Sienese and Lucchese resistance. The Neapolitan pressure on 
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the southern borders, in 1451, solicited the tassa dei traffichi on the capital of partnerships. A 
new catasto was levied in 1480, after the disastrous retreat from Poggio Imperiale and the loss 
of Colle Valdelsa. The reconquest of Pisa urged the imposition of the decima, an annual tithe 
on the incomes from immovable possessions, owed by citizens and peasants.93 
According to contemporary diarists, Florentines were “dismayed” and “displeased” for 
the heavy taxation, the major cause of the “decay of the city.”94 But the price of warfare was 
actually overexpanding. The attempts to centralize its management, the necessity to maintain 
a large number of soldiers, and the prolonged duration of operations, affected its costs. From 
June 1452 to December 1453, the defense against the Neapolitan troops was subsidizes with 
about six hundred thousand golden florins.95 The four-week siege of Volterra required forty-
four thousand golden florins.96 For the conquest of Sarzana, in 1487, the Pisan officers paid ten 
thousand golden florins just for the provisions for ammunitions.97 A decade later, the Dieci 
spent more than two hundred thousand golden florins on a six-month operations against the 
Pisan rebels.98 From 1495 to 1499, the same war drained away one million golden florins.99 
Last but not least, these wars hindered local and interregional trades. The Milanese 
blockade on Pisa caused “much worry throughout the city, because if wool does not get here, 
there is no work in Florence, and the city is practically under siege.”100 Chronicles reported the 
closing down of several banchi and botteghe during the Pazzi’s War, and the deep recession of 
the city economy. At the eve of his Italian campaign, Charles VIII posed menaces to Florentine 
merchants resident in France, trying to force Piero de’ Medici into breaking off his alliance with 
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king Ferrante.101 The business of the various branches of the Medici bank declined or 
prospered following the disagreement with Venice, Naples, and Rome.102 
The ammunition of the Republic 
Beyond the discussion over the prosperity or the hardship of Florentine markets during the 
Laurentian age, the concrete effect of military matters on the public finance is undeniable. 
Gene Brucker, Richard Goldthwaite, Bruno Dini, Anthony Molho, and many other historians 
affirmed that war contributed, directly or incidentally, to modify fiscal policies, to worsen the 
problem of the public debt, and to stabilize economic relationships based on political 
dependences. The condition of state incomes, and the solutions to fund army, have been 
deeply analyzed. Notwithstanding, several questions on expenditures proper to warfare are 
still unanswered, or not asked at all.  
For example campaigns stimulated the demand for purveyance, with clear benefit to the 
economy. Many Florentines, from weavers to woodworkers, from stonemasons to bricklayers, 
from bakers to saddlers, had opportunities for gain. In general, the manufactures and the 
trades in arms thrived.103 Mercenary companies had to equip their knights with a large variety 
of pieces of armor, such as armets, cuirasses, gauntlets. Usually, most of their captains sought 
the best steel from the prestigious Lombard workshops, which could have guaranteed tested, 
bolt-resistant wares. The lances and the clothes, instead, were sold by local makers. 
Infantrymen searched out their second-hand crossbows and their used helmets in the shops of 
small retailers, or purchased their new cuirasses from merchants and artisans directly in the 
encampment.  
The most relevant customer of all was undoubtedly the Signoria, with its significant, 
massive requests for raw material and finished products. According to an appointee, besides, 
“our soldiers would be useless, if we did not supply them with arms.”104 The Dieci di Balìa and 
the Otto di Pratica were responsible for the provisions of regular garrisons and permanent 
armies. Two of their members were given the remit to negotiate with craftsmen about 
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quantities and payments. 105  The overseer was in charge of the drafting of purchase 
agreements, and of the revision of the accountancy.106 By the end of the century, one of his 
assistants, along with the two guardians of the arsenals, were registering and inventorying “all 
the ammunitions acquired and dispatched by order of our lordships.”107 
The officers commissioned portable firearms, heavy ordnance, and gunpowder, making 
the production of artillery a sort of state monopoly. They controlled imports and exports of 
“war stuff,” and fixed the prices of several items, and rented facilities and caves. The Otto 
spent considerable sums in public workshops, and signed many contracts with practitioners 
from all over the continent. The Dieci organized an efficient putting-out system for the 
fabrication of arrows, and as well amassed sizeable reserves of raw materials, such as 
saltpeter, copper, tin, and iron. But, if the Republic could not properly manage warfare, if its 
rulers could not even comprehend this “violent phenomenon,” why ever did the government 
cope with ammunitions? If the military institutions arranged conflicts carelessly and 
irrationally, why did they invest vast amounts of capital in these venture? And, if the troops 
were fraudulent and idle, why did they were armed with expensive, advanced, lethal 
instruments?  
The original answers to these fundamental questions will be at the core of this 
dissertation, which will combine the economic and the political features of the Florentine 
military administration. Evaluating the impact of conflicts on commerce and production, and 
the involvement of the state in these affairs, this thesis will aim to reevaluate and reassess the 
choices, the orientations, and the decisions of the Commune, testing the current assumption 
about the backwardness of the armies of Marzocco. Moreover, this research wants to offer a 
first, valuable contribution to the study of the Italian Renaissance arms manufacture, 
presenting the state interest in warlike innovations, and highlighting the participation of 
artisans in the preparations of campaigns. 
Thus, the first article, Some notes on the archives of the military institution of 
Renaissance Florence, will introduce the structure of the two military offices of the Republic, 
the Dieci di Balìa and the Otto di Pratica, reconstructed through a careful examination of their 
archival documentations. The daily registrations of treasurers, secretaries, and commissioners, 
will illustrate the practices and the organization of these two permanent, alternate 
105 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 6, 181v. 
106 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 31, 17v. 
107 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 8, 1r. 
26
institutions, during the last quarter of the fifteenth century. These “heterodox” primary 
sources will demonstrate that the Republic could operate warfare efficiently and effectively, 
rationally and coherently, in spite of the “orthodox” backwardness preached by generations of 
scholars. The accounts, above all, will reveal facts and numbers of the contracts, of the 
relationships between rulers, soldiers, and artisans, highlighting the attempts to create a 
regular army through peculiar processes of enlistment and equipment.  
The second paper, Craftsmen, artillery, and war production in Renaissance Florence, will 
approach the matter of production during the entire fifteenth century, from the early wars 
against Filippo Maria Visconti to the late hostilities with the rebel Pisans. The interest of the 
Signoria in the military will be confirmed by its management of war production. The public 
demand, in fact, would have played a leading role in the stimulation of the market and in the 
introduction of technical changes. As for them, the numerous artisans employed in fabricating 
munitions would have been able to imitate and to assimilate innovative tools and new 
weapons, reaching excellent qualitative standards and sufficient quantitative yields. Firearms, 
especially, would have received the most attention from politicians and craftsmen. 
The third essay, Geografie della Guerra nella Toscana del Rinascimento, will focus on the 
private workshops of these practitioners, diffused throughout the whole territory, due to the 
diverse specializations of towns and the different accessibility to natural resources. The 
intervention of the central government will be visible also in the integration of this polycentric 
manufacture, a circulation of merchandise coordinated by the local officers through 
regulations and negotiations. Other orders would have concerned the construction of public 
facilities and new warehouses in Florence and in Pisa, so as to facilitate the concentration, and 
the distribution of ammunitions to armies and garrisons. For fulfilling these critical function, 
the Republic would have contacted and contracted smiths, carpenters, engineers, gunners, 
and founders. 
The fourth chapter, I “maestri dell’artiglieria” nell’Italia del Rinascimento, will precisely 
discuss the institutional efforts to attract the skilled labor of gunmakers, comparing the 
policies of the principal Italian states. From Milan to Rome, from Florence to Naples, in fact, 
the authorities would have tried to enhance the production of the indispensable heavy 
artillery, gathering in their arsenals as many specialists as possible. The contribution of these 
master would have exceeded the simple fabrication of bombards. Confronting their practical 
experiences, enriching their empirical knowledge, these maestri di getto would have created 
innovative machines and original methodologies, often meeting the needs of captains and 
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commissioners. During long travels, by means of cultural exchanges, they would have 
disseminated several military “open techniques,” available for each of their employer. 
The fifth part, The life of a Renaissance gunmaker, will deepen the understanding of the 
careers of these skillful, clever masters. The study will rely on the sound, thirty-year 
documentation left by a prominent Florentine artisan, Bonaccorso di Vettorio Ghiberti, the 
grandson of the illustrious Lorenzo di Cione. His notebooks will provide important details 
about the formation in the family foundry, and the collaborations with artists, engineers, and 
soldiers. His accounts will have data on the actual metal works, the bells, the statues, and the 
guns realized for several signori. His drawing, above all, will allow a survey of the casting 
techniques of both traditional Italian bombards and new French cannons. 
The sixth section, “This French artillery is very good and very effective,” will return to 
comparative themes, analyzing the technological premises and the productive consequences 
of the assimilation of the infamous royal guns into Italian warfare, the “diabolical devices” 
which impressed chroniclers and captains. The shocks of the Neapolitan campaign would have 
produced many, main departures for the artillery manufacture and the procurement of 
ammunitions, based on the previous, widespread experimentations of gunmakers. The 
institutions of the whole Peninsula would have rapidly commenced to develop firearms similar 
in mobility, power, and effectiveness to the pieces of the foreign invaders. These replicas and 
these hybrids would have proved the aptitude for innovating of statesmen and founders, who 
could adopt and adapt immediately the new weapons, accelerating the gradual evolution of 
the customary gunnery, and fostering further, substantial improvements in the industries of 
ordnance, cannonballs, and carriages. 
The seventh publication, Supplying the army, will examine a concrete case study, that is, 
the equipment of the Florentine troops during the war in the Pisan countryside, one of the first 
Italian campaigns to be radically influenced by the appearance of the Transalpine technology. 
The findings will illustrate the various, numerous necessity of the “mobile city” of a 
Renaissance army, underlining, once again, the direct, strong connections between tactic, 
strategy, and production. The innovations in weaponry, in fact, would have brought several, 
significant changes not only in poliorcetics. In the course of that single summer, the waging of 
the artillery warfare would have multiplied the requests for weapons and ammunitions. This 
impact on the supply chains would have compelled statesmen, soldiers, and artisans to cope 
adequately with a new, demanding logistics of conflicts. 
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Lastly, the concluding The siege of Pisa will summarize all of the preceding aspects. The 
attempts at seizing the rebel city will be indicative of the endeavor of the Commune to 
manage the fabrication and the commerce of materiel. During this operation, the Republic 
would have deployed all of its firepower, straining the capacity of its gunpowder makers, and 
mobilizing every single founder of the capital. On this occasion, the entire military organization 
would have effectively reacted to the solicitations of this impressive enterprise, keeping a 
force of about fifteen thousand men. The Signoria would have made every financial, bellicose, 
and productive effort to win the battle, and to end a wearing, long war. 
The “revolutionary challenge” 
Despite these struggles to supply its army, the Republic was incapable of establishing a self-
sufficient arms manufacture. Its captains preferred to rely upon the imports from Lombardy of 
thousands steel products, as breastplates, helms, and arrowheads. The Machiavellian militia 
was equipped with petti and celate purchased in Brescia.108 Over the whole century, the 
catasti registered a drastic decrease in the workshops of makers of cuirasses and swords, that 
is, the spadai and the corazzai. The plans to develop an armor industry in Pisa failed, due to a 
lack of a strong political will. 109 At the end of the century, Florentine ironworks were 
technologically limited and quantitatively insignificant, even compared to the ferriere of the 
near Sienese state, promoted and managed by local rulers.110 This problem was particularly 
evident in the first years following the introduction of iron cannonballs, when the Dieci di Balìa 
were compelled to hire external practitioners for increasing the output, or to acquire forged 
and cast missiles from their allies.  
The promulgation of several laws for regulating and promoting the opening of new 
mines would not have had any positive effect on the sector.111 On the long term, this scarcity 
of iron probably prevented the expansion of several city businesses, hindering any 
entrepreneurial aptitude. Smiths did not sell portable firearms abroad, even if they could 
fabricate thousands scoppietti per month, in case of necessity. The most prominent masters, 
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enriched by the state commissions, preferred to invest their profits in public debt or in real 
estates.112 
The situation was worsened by the disinterest of Florentine mercatanti in weapons 
market. Their brokerage, on the contrary, was restricted to the most lucrative metals and 
minerals. The firms of Soderini, Strozzi, and Capponi sold the expensive copper to the Signoria, 
while the banks of Pitti, Berti, and Bardi dealt in the precious saltpeter. In both trades were 
involved also the Medici, as rulers and as merchants. 
Hence, even in this market, Marzocco was completely dependent on its international 
commercial network for the necessity of raw materials. This characteristic was evident above 
all in the artificial manufacture of the primary component of gunpowder. The Commune was a 
latecomer to this industry, with the first public nitrary opened only at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century.113 And, considering the overall Italian progresses in the field, this delay was 
undoubtedly a major, severe fault. 
Florence, moreover, was a modest, peripheral center of exportation of finished goods, 
which “consisted of those few thing the city could produce utilizing the natural and human 
resources at hand.”114 The Pistoiese spear producers could take advantage of the timber of the 
surrounding mountains for retailing their goods in Lucca, Siena, and Bologna. The leather 
workers of Borgo Sansepolcro could sell their saddles thanks to the local animal fairs. As for 
them, the Dieci and the Otto could only exploit, integrate, and favor the specializations of 
these minor towns, according to common policy of productive complementation adopted by 
the republican government.115 
Although the constraints, the two military councils relentlessly pursuit excellence in the 
production of artillery. Experimentations on design, material, and propellant of guns were 
carried throughout the whole century, and especially in its first decades, with the tests of 
organ guns, cast iron pieces, and corned powder. The advancement of Florentine ordnance 
would have been strongly supported by the various politiques techniques of the government, 
which looked after the exemption from duties for materiel, the construction of public 
workshops and roomy arsenals, and the punctual, adequate, free supply of metals for their 
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gunmakers. The state incentivized also the migration of several foreign founders, in order to 
foster innovation and introduce new armaments, according to the existing practices of 
technological transfer and industrial development.116 Similarly, they backed the formation of 
an informal, artistic, local school of gunnery, mostly composed by renowned bronze sculptors. 
Besides beautiful statues, in fact, Maso di Bartolomeo, Pasquino da Montepulciano, Andrea del 
Verrocchio, Leonardo da Vinci, and Bonaccorso Ghiberti would have realized massive, fine 
bombards, too. 
The research will determine that the Republic actually “desired perfection” for its 
guns.117 The state actively pursued significant policies of support for crafts indispensable to 
defend the republican “freedom” and to increase the warlike “reputation.” The Dieci and the 
Otto sponsored technical changes, granted privileges to skilled labor, maintained 
infrastructures, controlled the traffic of various wares, and obtained the full cooperation of 
merchants and artisans. They imitated exactly the same initiatives reserved for the textile 
sector, the most important city industry.118 The influence of usual entrepreneurial schemes 
was apparent also from the general military accountancy, modeled on the bookkeeping of 
contemporary private businesses.119 
All the Florentine attempts to improve the arms management are emblematic of the try 
of the other Italian Renaissance powers. Since the first half of the century, in fact, the diffusion 
of artillery would have imposed the creation of special offices, entrusted with the purchasing 
of gear and with the dispatching of ammunitions. Governments appeared to be very interested 
in tracking down useful products, as more durable powder, more resistant guns, and more 
mobile carriages. The trade of saltpeter would have involved diplomats, secretaries, and 
princes. Rulers had also to affirm their monopoly in the fabrication of firearms.120 And the 
same courts would have promoted innumerable opportunities for the dissemination of 
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technologies, creating the “trading zones” of arsenals and uffici, “where people from different 
backgrounds could communicate in substantive ways.”121 
Besides, the state customers could attained new weaponry exclusively through a fruitful 
collaboration with their “engineers,” through the versatile ingenuity of their gunmakers, 
through the frequent gatherings of their able craftsmen, through the enterprising habits of 
their practitioners. Within warehouses and foundries, a technical Renaissance was steadily 
spreading, permitting the free circulation of original ideas, the slow transformation of 
empirical knowledge, the lively debates about errors and successes, machineries and variables, 
theories and practices.122 
All of these “cumulative interconnections,” the synergies between public institution and 
private individuals, and the creation of this “unified technological space”, would have made 
possible the immediate proliferation of the French ordnance in the receptive political, 
economic, and cultural context of the Italian Quattrocento.123 According to the Sienese master 
Vannoccio Biringuccio, “the moderns, today, proceed to fabricate artillery more intelligently 
and with greater reason, because many experiments have enlightened them.”124 After these 
gradual trials, however, the burst of gunmaking activities would have had serious 
repercussions on the whole complex of Italian warfare, in the course of a sole decade. 
Apart from the actual effectiveness of the new weapons,125 the logistical system would 
have undergone extensive modifications, due to a systematic increase in the demand of guns, 
powder, missiles, and carts. Condottieri would have requested more and more cannons, 
culverins, and falcons. Authorities should have arranged timely provisions for their troops, 
reorganizing the whole commodity chain, from the exploitation of natural resources to the 
distribution of weapons. Officers could not have improvised haphazard solutions to maintain 
121 Long, Artisans, practitioners, 94-96; Guido Guerzoni, “Novità, innovazione e imitazione. I sintomi 
della modernità,” in Il Rinascimento italiano e l’Europa. III. Produzione e tecniche, 67-72; Hilaire-Perez 
and Verna, “Dissemination of technical knowledge,” 550; Rosenberg, “Economic development,” 168. 
122 Gille, Leonardo e gli ingegneri del Rinascimento, 8-9; Luca Molà, “Inventors, patents, and the 
market for innovations,” History of technology 32 (2014), 25. 
123 Stephan Epstein, “Labour mobility, journeyman organizations and markets in skilled labour in 
Europe, 14th-18th centuries,” in Le techniciens dans la cité en Europe occidentale, 1250-1650, ed. 
Mathieu Arnoux and Pierre Monnet (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2004), 251; Angus Buchanan, “The 
structure of technological revolution,” History of technology 16 (1994), 209. 
124 Vannoccio Biringuccio, Pirotechnia (Venice: Per Comin da Trino di Monferrato, 1558), 79rv. 
125 Pepper, “Castles and cannon in the Naples campaign,” 289-291; George Raudzens, “War-winning 
weapons. The measurement of technological determinism in military history,” The Journal of Military 
History 54, no. 4 (1990), 407-408. 
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and to deploy the new technology in an adequate manner.126 They rather had to combine 
appropriately the “government of artillery” with the “governance of production.” 
Therefore, the problematic equipment of the armies would have imposed careful 
planning and preventive actions, and the states would have responded with the same resolute 
interventions already made in health regulations, fiscal reforms, and military organization. 
From this perspective, the questioned “military revolution” should perhaps be recast, for the 
late fifteenth century, in a more modest frame, that is, another “revolutionary challenge” in 
terms of administration, credit, and procurement, a process with connections with a broader 
sociopolitical change, during the long-lasting rise of the modern state.  
126 Frank Tallett and David Trim, “‘Then was then and now is now.’ An overview of change and 
continuity in late-medieval and early-modern warfare,” in European Warfare, 1350-1750, ed. Frank 
Tallett and David Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 23-26; Baraldi, “Una nuova età 
del ferro,” 214-216. 
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In the last decades, the analysis of the Florentine Renaissance military institutions has often 
been a simple restatement of the traditional Machiavellian juxtaposition of citizen militia and 
mercenary companies. Tuscan statesmen have been often blamed for the decadence of their 
militia, for their distrust of soldiers, and even for the ‘incomprehension’ of the ‘violent’ war 
phenomenon. 1  In one of his essay on Renaissance warfare, William Caferro has affirmed, with 
good reason, that ‘this schema has achieved the status of orthodoxy’, a genuine, unavoidable, 
and ineradicable prejudice.2  
This conviction it is far more surprising, considering that the Dieci di Balìa and the Otto 
di Pratica have been always praised, instead, for their diplomatic achievements, for the 
networks of their ambassadors, for their crucial role in the preservation of the ‘peace of Lodi’.3 
1 Michael Mallett, Signori e mercenari. La guerra nell’Italia del Rinascimento, Alghisi Princivalle, trans. 
(Bologna 2006), 120 and 134-36; id., L’organizzazione militare di Venezia nel Quattrocento, Enrico 
Basaglia, trans. (Rome 1989), 256-57; Piero Pieri, Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana (Turin 1970), 
262-63; John Hale, Guerra e società nell’Europa del Rinascimento, Franco Salvatorelli, trans. (Rome and
Bari 1987), 6; Stephan Epstein, ‘Storia economica e storia istituzionale dello stato’, in Giorgio Chittolini,
Anthony Molho, and Pierangelo Schiera, eds, Origini dello stato. Processi di formazione statale in Italia
fra medioevo ed età moderna (Bologna 1994), 108-09; Claudio Finzi, ‘La guerra nel pensiero politico del
Rinascimento toscano’, in Franco Cardini and Marco Tangheroni, eds, Guerra e guerrieri nella Toscana
del Rinascimento (Florence 1990), 141.
2 William Caferro, ‘Continuity, long-term service, and permanent forces. A reassessment of the 
Florentine army in the fourteenth century’, The Journal of Modern History, 80, 2 (2008), 219-223. 
3 Riccardo Fubini, Italia quattrocentesca. Politica e diplomazia nell’età di Lorenzo il Magnifico (Milan 
1994); id., Quattrocento fiorentino. Politica, diplomazia, cultura (Pisa, 1996); id., ‘Diplomacy and 
government in the Italian city-states of the fifteenth century’, in Daniela Frigo, ed, Politics and diplomacy 
in early modern Italy. The structures of diplomatic practices (Cambridge 2000); id. ‘Classe dirigente ed 
esercizio della diplomazia nella Firenze quattrocentesca. Rappresentanza esterna e identità cittadina 
nella crisi della tradizione comunale’, in I ceti dirigenti nella Toscana del Quattrocento (Impruneta 1987); 
Guido Pampaloni, ‘Gli organi della repubblica fiorentina per le relazioni con l’estero’, Rivista di studi 
politici internazionali, 20 (1953); Giuseppe Vedovato, Note sul diritto diplomatico della repubblica 
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Nevertheless, these two offices are still judged ‘backward,’ even in spite of the recent 
progresses of the Italian historiography in the study of the connections between politics and 
army, of the influence of conflicts upon the construction and the consolidation of territorial 
powers. 
In the last two decades, in fact, several scholars have dealt with the issues of the 
Renaissance warfare of the Peninsula. Michael Mallett’s book on the military organization of 
Venice, for example, overturned the traditional criticism of the Italian conservatism in military 
organization, examining the progresses made by the Most Serene Republic in the management 
and uses of its cavalry, infantry, and artillery.4 Francesco Storti investigated the creation of a 
‘state army’ in the Neapolitan kingdom, established through the incorporation and the 
confiscation of several baronial companies, and through the collaboration with many local 
communities.5 Maria Nadia Covini has discussed the bonds between the Milanese court and its 
soldiers, strengthened by salaries, donations, and vassalage. In Lombardy, the condotta 
became an efficient means of consolidating the state, an exchange of benefits and loyalty 
between the center and its peripheries.6 
In general, these different approaches have resulted in a better comprehension of the 
reciprocal influence between military reforms, civic transformations, financial innovations, and 
state consolidation.7 Military institutions have been seen as the expression of more complex 
political projects, and the formation of standing armies was considered as an instrument of 
internal control and of centralization of the state authority.8 The construction of modern 
fortifications, “iron belts” of a “territorial machine,” has been studied through the contrasts 
and the agreements between the governments and their subjects.9 The recruitment of troops 
fiorentina (Florence 1946); Elisabetta Scarton, Giovanni Lanfredini. Uomo d’affari e diplomatico 
nell’Italia del Quattrocento (Florence 2007). 
4 Mallett, L’organizzazione militare di Venezia nel Quattrocento. 
5 Francesco Storti, L’esercito napoletano nella seconda metà del Quattrocento (Salerno 2007). 
6 Maria Nadia Covini, L’esercito del duca. Organizzazione militare e istituzioni al tempo degli Sforza 
(Rome 1998). 
7 Claudio Donati, ‘Strutture militari degli stati italiani nella prima età moderna: una rassegna degli 
studi recenti’, in Piero Del Negro, ed, Società Italiana di Storia Militare. Quaderno 2000 (Naples 2003), 
45-53; Bernhard Kroener,’“Stato, società, militare. Prospettive di una rinnovata storia militare della 
prima Età Moderna’, in Claudio Donati and Bernhard Kroener, eds, Militari e società civile nell’Europa 
dell’Età Moderna (Bologna 2007), 11-21. 
8 Giorgio Chittolini, ‘Il privato, il pubblico, lo stato’, in Origini dello stato, 573; Maria Nadia Covini, 
‘Guerra e conservazione dello stato. Note sulle fanterie sforzesche’, Cheiron, 23 (1995), 67-104. 
9 Giorgio Chittolini, ‘Il militare tra tardo Medioevo e prima Età Moderna’, in Militari e società civile 
nell’Europa dell’Età Moderna, 83-102; Enrica Guerra, Soggetti a ribalda fortuna. Gli uomini dello stato 
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has been intertwined with the ‘geography of famine’ of rural areas.10 The analysis of the 
relationships between rulers and mercenaries, moreover,  has been focused on patronage, and 
the companies of venturieri have been investigated as structured firms, well organized by their 
leaders and their treasurers. Even the condottieri were not portrayed as evil brigands 
anymore, but depicted as courtiers and administrators.11 Lastly, military information has been 
gathered from ambassadorial dispatches, which reported details about the strength and the 
intentions of rival and allied powers, with data provided by spies, agents, and merchants.12  
This increasing debate has undoubtedly benefited from the international, contemporary 
researches on warfare management. The impact of conflicts on European societies was valued 
through the rise of modern states and the affirmation of bureaucratic apparatuses, the 
transformations of army organizations, the imposition of enduring fiscal measures and the 
consequences for the economy, the modifications in political thought and in diplomatic 
policies, as well as the procurement of weapons and the technological advancement of the so-
called ‘military revolution’.13 
Developing from these broader suggestions, this contribution aims to reconstruct the 
archives of the two Florentine military institutions, in order to examine their complex, wide 
estense nelle guerre dell’Italia quattrocentesca (Milan 2005); Ennio Concina, La macchina territoriale. La 
progettazione della difesa nel Cinquecento veneto (Rome and Bari 1983);  
10 Luciano Pezzolo, ‘L’archibugio e l’aratro’, Studi Veneziani, 7 (1983), 59-80; id., ‘Professione militare 
e famiglia in Italia tra tardo Medioevo e prima Età Moderna’, in Anna Bellavitis and Isabelle Chabot, eds, 
La justice des familles. Autour de la transmission des biens, des savoirs et des pouvoirs (Rome 2011), 
341-366; Franco Cardini, Quell’antica festa crudele (Milan 1995), 78-123. 
11 Mario del Treppo, ‘Gli aspetti organizzativi, economici e sociali di una compagnia di ventura 
italiana’, Rivista Storica Italiana, 85, 2 (1973), 253-75; William Bernardoni, ‘La compagnia del capitano 
Micheletto Attendolo nella contabilità quattrocentesca della Fraternita dei Laici di Arezzo’, Annali 
aretini, 22 (2014), 115-44; Franco Cardini, ‘Condottieri e uomini d’arme nell’Italia del Rinascimento’, in 
Mario del Treppo, ed, Condottieri e uomini d’arme nell’Italia del Rinascimento (Naples 2001), 1-10; 
Christine Shaw, Barons and castellans. The military nobility of Renaissance Italy (Leiden and Boston 
2015). 
12 Elisabetta Scarton, ‘Costi della guerra e forze in campo nel secolo XV tra verità storiografiche e 
manipolazione dell’informazione’, Revista Universitaria de Historia Militar, 6, 11 (2017), 23-42; Michael 
Mallett, ‘Diplomacy and war in later fifteenth-century Italy’, in Gian Carlo Garfagnini, ed, Lorenzo de’ 
Medici. Studi (Florence 1992), 234-250. 
13 See, for example, Hale, Guerra e società nell’Europa del Rinascimento; Frank Tallett and David 
Trim, eds, European warfare, 1350-1750 (Cambridge 2010); Frank Tallett, War and society in early-
modern Europe (London 1992); Philippe Contamine, ed, War and competition between states (Oxford 
2000); Geoffrey Parker, The military revolution. Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800 
(Cambridge 1988); Jeremy Black, A military revolution? Military change and European society, 1550-
1800 (Atlantic Highlands 1991); Clifford Rogers, ed, The military revolution debate. Readings on the 
military transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder 1995). 
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range of activities during the second half of fifteenth century, before the admission of Niccolò 
Machiavelli to the republican chancery, and, above all, before the passing of the law that 
limited definitively the power of the Dieci di Balìa, in September 1500.14 These registers are all 
kept in the State Archive of Florence, and are extremely useful for understanding the structure 
of the offices, the management of the troops, the enlistment of soldiers, the relationships 
between condottieri and rulers, the construction of new fortifications, the manufacture of 
ammunitions, and the expenditures on the whole res militaris.  
 
Resolutions, contracts, and allocations  
 
The Dieci were the ten officials extraordinarily elected in times of war, chosen among the 
members of the Council of the Hundred, and approved by the Signoria.15 They had a specific 
authority, the balìa, over the foreign policy and the conduct of campaigns, ‘pro defensione, 
securitate et conservatione statutis et libertatis civitatis Florentiae, et pro defensione et tutela 
subditorum, adherentium, sequacium ac federatorum ipsius populi et communis, et ad offesam 
inimicorum suorum vigore eorum potestatis, arbitrii et baliae’.16 Their appointment lasted 
generically for six months, and cannot be declined.17 The Dieci di Balìa were in charge during 
the prolonged conflict against the Visconti, in the years of the Aragonese incursions into the 
Tuscan coast, for the battle of Riccardina, and after the Pazzi’s conspiracy. 
The oligarchic reforms of Lorenzo de’ Medici, in 1480, led to the institution of another 
but permanent office, the Otto di Pratica. These eight men were chosen personally by the 
head of the Florentine regime among his inner circle, and formally voted in the Council of the 
Seventy. Every semester, the closest friends of the Magnificent alternated with his clients and 
relatives, among which were Tommaso Soderini, Jacopo and Luigi Guicciardini, Bongianni 
Gianfigliazzi, Bernardo del Nero, Maso degli Albizi, Niccolò Capponi, Guidantonio Vespucci, 
14 This provvisione, in fact, subordinated the autonomy of the Dieci to the approval of the Signori, 
depriving the officers of the possibility to declare war, to nominate new commissioners, and to increase 
the number of companies and soldiers. See Giorgio Cadoni, Lotte politiche e riforme istituzionali a 
Firenze tra il 1494 e il 1502 (Rome 1999), 133-36; Francesco Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, ed. by Piero 
and Luigi Guicciardini (Florence 1859), 235-36; Piero Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., ed. by Andrea Matucci 
(Florence, 2005), 394. 
15 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 21, IIrv. 
16 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 27, 10r. 
17 Guidubaldo Guidi, Il governo della città-repubblica di Firenze del primo Quattrocento. II. Gli istituti 
‘di dentro’ che componevano il governo di Firenze nel 1415 (Florence 1981), 203-12. 
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Bernardo Rucellai, Francesco Valori, and Pierfilippo Pandolfini.18 At the outbreak of a war, 
however, a member of the arti maggiori and a representative of arti minori were added to the 
Otto, re-forming again the Dieci.19 During the following decade, the latter would have relieved 
the firsts in several occasions, such as the war of Ferrara, the siege of Pietrasanta, and 
retaliation against Rome for the papal support of the conspiracy of the barons. 
With the fall of the Medici’s criptosignoria and the republican restoration, in 1494, the 
Dieci became the guarantors of ‘peace and freedom’, the sole, powerful military institution of 
the Commune, capable of influencing both the foreign and the domestic policies of the city.20 
But this accumulation of responsibilities, and this unprecedented leverage, were also 
determined by several major alteration in the contemporary political situation. The passage of 
Charles VIII through Tuscany, in fact, would have had considerable effects on the military 
mobilization  and the diplomatic strategies of the state. The revolt of Pisa against the ‘evil 
tyranny’ of its rulers, and the opening of a new front inside the same Florentine borders, 
would have compelled the Dieci to adopt and to develop new solutions to a permanent 
conflict, during the years of the first Italian Wars.  
 
In any case, for accomplishing their numerous duties, the officials could rely on the solid 
experience of their chancellery. Giovanni della Valle, Filippo Redditi, Francesco di Barone, 
Alessandro Braccesi, Luca Ficini, Ottaviano from Ripa, Jacopo di Ruffino, Raffaello Fedini, and 
Agostino Vespucci secured a certain administrative continuity. In fact, they had already worked 
as notaries and secretaries for the former Otto di Pratica, often coordinated by the principal 
chancellors of the Signoria, as Bartolomeo Scala and Francesco Gaddi.21  
During the last quarter of the century, this staff had to supervise the daily tasks of their 
superiors. The two archival series of ricordanze and sommari reveal the frenetic, hectic 
activities of Machiavelli’s predecessors. On these daybooks, in fact, the secretaries wrote 
down the ‘accounts of the pending facts’, such as arrivals and consignments of ammunitions, 
purchases of raw materials, cash down payments to smiths and carpenters, notes of 
18 Nicolai Rubinstein, The government of Florence under the Medici (Oxford 1997), 226-232. 
19 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 25, 9r-10v. 
20 Guidubaldo Guidi, Lotte, pensiero e istituzioni politiche nella Repubblica Fiorentina dal 1494 al 
1512. II. Gli istituti sovrani e di governo (Florence 1992), 787-97; Cadoni, Lotte politiche e riforme 
istituzionali a Firenze, 101-75. 
21  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, 320r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 30, 84v-86r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte 
e stanziamenti, 3, 11r, 47v.  
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diplomatic dispatches, requests of condottieri, complaints of subjects, transfers of artisans and 
infantrymen, and reports of spies and envoys.22  
In September 1486, one of the chancellors reminded laconically to a commissioner that 
‘a vigorous war attains a better peace’. Other lines concerned a selling of nineteen tons of 
saltpeter from the Medici bank to the Otto di Pratica, or the supplies of firearms for the towns 
of the Florentine Dominio. A couple of years later, a colleague annotated stage by stage the 
construction of the citadel of Sarzana, from the carving of the wooden model to the excavation 
of the moats, from the measurements of walls to the salaries of bricklayers, sketching also the 
entire plan of the fortress.23 
 The contracts between the officers and the architects for similar building site were also 
regularly transcribed in the books of resolutions. In 1479, several bricklayers labored in 
Montevarchi, in Pisa, in Colle Valdelsa, and on the hill of the Poggio Imperiale. Domenico di 
Francesco, nicknamed Capitano, received about three hundred florins for his works.24 In April 
1485, the Dieci commissioned Francesco di Giovanni and Francesco d’Angelo, better known as 
Francione and Cecca, to repair and widen the castle of Pietrasanta, ‘in such a way that they can 
be praised by all the perfect masters’. The officers commissioned also the construction of 
‘round’ or ‘square’ towers, parapets, and battlements, fixing moreover the date of completion, 
the penalty clauses, and the remuneration for the two associates.25 The Florentine defensive 
policy, and the interest of Lorenzo de’ Medici in the fortification of the state borders, led soon 
to other tenders.26 
 
The aforementioned Bernardo Corbinelli, Francesco di Giovanni, Domenico 
di Francesco, and Francesco d’Angelo, undertake to build the new walls of 
the fortress of Sarzana, with a remuneration of four soldi for every sixty 
square centimeters of construction. These master promise lay the 
22 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Ricordanze, 7, 3r, 27v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Ricordanze, 8, 59r, 62; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Sommari di missive e responsive, ricordi, 1, 2v, 5v, 10v, 31r, 58r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Sommari di 
missive e responsive, ricordi, 2, 20v, 22r, 65r. 
23 ASF, Otto di pratica, Minutari di missive e ricordi, 1, 3r-145v. ASF, Otto di pratica, Ricordanze, 1, 6r, 
23v. 
24  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, 190rv; ASF, Miscellanea 
repubblicana, 6, 195, 180r. 
25 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 24, 107v-109v. 
26 Daniela Lamberini, ‘Architetti e architettura militare per il Magnifico’, in Gian Carlo Garfagnini, ed, 
Lorenzo il Magnifico e il suo mondo (Florence 1994), 407-425. See also Niccolò Machiavelli, Storie 
fiorentine (Florence 1532), 213r.  
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foundations at their expenses, while the Otto di Pratica, or the Dieci di Balìa, 
have to supply them with mortar, ashlars, and tools.  
The empty spaces between battlements and parapets will be calculated as if 
they were solid. 
For digging moats, from four to five meters deep, the masters will receive 
one soldo and four denari for every sixty cube centimeters of excavation.  
All the walls that are thirty centimeters thick will be measured as if they 
were sixty centimeters thick […]. 
The empty spaces under the vaults will be calculated as if they were solid. 
The masters can use, without any payment, all the stones that belong to the 
Republic, that is, the rubble of dismantled towers and collapsed walls, within 
or outside the city of Sarzana.  
The empty spaces of doors, windows, arrowslits, and embrasures for 
bombards, will be considered as if they were solid. 
The masters have to erect the walls using only good and serviceable gravel, 
collecting it from wherever they want, including the banks of the Magra 
river.  
The masters are obliged to realize these walls usefully, like capable 
craftsmen, according to the heights and the widths of the model accepted 
by the Otto di Pratica.  
The masters come to an agreement with the office to keep the ordered 
schedule for the construction. 
The present Otto di Pratica and their successors, or the Dieci di Balìa, have 
to pay the masters regularly, so that time cannot be wasted. 
 
Other arrangements were made with stonecutters for ‘faciendas et fabricandas’ ashlars. 27  
Besides, all the bargains with craftsmen are contained in these volumes. In January 
1493, for example, the Otto agreed with Johannes from Augsburg on the fabrication of bronze 
guns in the foundry of the ‘old citadel’ of Pisa.28 
 
Master Giovanni should make and cast all the undermentioned guns, priced 
at seventy lire every three hundred and forty kilograms of molten metal. He 
would purchase tools at his expenses, and the Otto di Pratica would supply 
the raw material, according to custom. The weight loss of these castings 
should not exceed the seven percent.  
Every time he was requisitioned, master Giovanni should manufacture full 
bombards in one, or two, or three pieces, with a shot weight of one hundred 
and thirty-five kilograms or more […]. Giovanni promise to the Otto to 
realized all these firearms honestly and loyally, like a skillful and capable 
craftsman. 
 
27 ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte e stanziamenti, 2, 10r-11v, 21r-22v, 43v-44v. 
28 ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte e stanziamenti, 5, 96v-97r. 
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In December 1498, instead, three foreign masters were hired to realize weapons and 
projectiles in the town of Pistoia, trying to remedy the shortages of the preceding summer, 
and to foster this indispensable production.29  
 
Giovanni di Piero from Piedmont, Lancillotto di Voglino from Pistoia and 
Antonio di Giovanni from the Holy Roman Empire are engaged to fabricate 
cast iron shot, hand guns and harquebuses, and spingards, in Pistoia. The 
price for thirty-three kilograms of wrought iron are fixed, respectively, at 
thirteen, twenty, and eighteen lire.  
We will to advance to them fifty golden florins.  
 
A similar settlement was signed in 1499 by two of the most important gunpowder makers of 
the Republic, Piero di Zanobi, called Zucca, and Jacopo di Corso, also known as Baia, entrusted 
with the monthly manufacture of five tons of propellant in the public facilities of the capital. As 
for them, the Dieci provided their artisans with all the ‘supellectilibus actis ad dictum 
exercitium pulveris fiende’. In the following years, Zucca and Baia would have renewed this 
‘conducta pulveris’, with an obligation ‘to go and to stay’ where the Dieci ordered them, and 
with a salary of six florins per week.30  
The Florentine officers employed also masters of gunnery and engineering. The registers 
listed bombardieri coming from the whole European continent. Germans, Frenchmen, Greeks, 
Italians, boasted their abilities in aiming ordnance, in refining saltpeter, in repairing rotten 
firearms, and in constructing terrepleins and defenses for the batteries.31 Experience and skills 
belonged also to ingegneri. The aforementioned Cecca was capable of carving carts for heavy 
bombards, fabricating mobile shelters for walls and towers, and crafting incendiary missiles. 
For more than fifteen years, Filippo di Giovanni, called Pippa, was a gunner, a carpenter, and a 
gunpowder maker. The omnipresent Giovanni di Demetrio worked on several coastal 
fortifications in the last years of the century, along with Giuliano da San Gallo. Even an elderly 
29  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, 12v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 47, 61r. 
30 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 35, 15v-16r, 64v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, 52v. 
31 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, ff. 33v-35r, 61r, 107v-108v, and 
173v. 
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Francesco di Giorgio Martini offered his services to the Florentine Republic in 1498, during the 
victorious campaign in the Pisan countryside.32  
In 1479, also Leonardo da Vinci was sent in San Gimignano, in his capacity as military 
engineer.33 With regard to Renaissance artists, Maso di Bartolomeo stored in Florentine 
arsenals five bronze heavy pieces, in 1452.34 Thirty years later, the Commune commissioned 
the ‘master of bombards’ Andrea del Verrocchio to cast a ‘beautiful and good’ gun for the 
siege of Pietrasanta. It was a giant firearms of three pieces, and weighed seven tons and a 
half.35 One of his disciples, Lorenzo di Credi, sold instead several tools for castings to the 
government, on the occasion of the opening of a new public foundry in the central city area of 
the Sapienza, in January 1495.36  
 
The series of deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti contains, above all, a large amount of 
data and information about the republican army. The registers of condotte, for example, 
consist specifically of clauses of contracts between the Dieci and the captains of infantry and 
cavalry companies, that is, connestabili and condottieri. These legal documents specified the 
duration of the service, the number of soldiers, the monthly or annual salary, always 
distinguishing periods of peace from times of war. For the drafting of these papers and for the 
collection of their money, the captains were obliged to nominate a secretary approved by the 
government. This right-hand man would have stayed in Florence, looking after the 
relationships between his master and the Commune.37  
In the second half of the century, an average condotta for a connestabile provided for a 
renewable monthly hiring, a personal remuneration according to the dimension of his troop, 
and a wage of fourteen lire and seventeen soldi for each infantryman.38 Regarding the ranks of 
a company, they were generically subdivided into connestabile, double paid ‘corporals’, and 
32 ASF, Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 27, 231r, 275r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 42, 138r; ASF, Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 43, 72v; ASF, Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 44, 103r. 
33 ASF, Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, 211r.  
34 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 20, 113v, 219r. 
35 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 23, 78v, 79r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 30, 249v. 
36 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 31, 149v. 
37 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 24, 76v-77r. 
38 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, 11rv. 
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simple soldiers. In 1498, the dense brigade of Vitellozzo Vitelli had also a ‘captain of the flag’, a 
‘lieutenant’, a ‘governor’, a ‘standard bearer’ and a ‘drummer’.39  
Some of the principal heads were Niccolò Vitelli from Città di Castello, Scaramuccia from 
Santa Croce d’Arno, Pasqua di Domenico from Arezzo, the marquis Gabriele Malaspina from 
Fosdinovo, Giovanni della Vecchia from Lodi, Antonello from Pontassieve, Borgo di Matteo 
Rinaldi from Florence, the count Cecco from Montedoglio, Riccio from Campogialli, and the 
count Piero from Monte Santa Maria. A contract after another, they served the Republic for 
ten, twelve, fifteen years, or even more.40 Ciriaco di Matteo from Borgo San Sepolcro, for 
example, started his career in 1467, along with fifty companions. In 1499, he was the leader of 
six hundred men, and one of the most praised Italian connestabili.41 Many fighters pursued 
similar careers, such as Donato del Biondo from Arezzo, Gnagni di Piccone from Borgo San 
Sepolcro, Carlo from Cremona. Someone could also be nominated as ‘capitaneum generalem 
et ducem peditum militiae florentinae’, like Andrea di Matteo from Borgo San Sepolcro, who 
was appointed to this title by the Otto di Pratica in February 1482, ‘considering his admirable 
virtues, his mastery in the art of war, and his utmost and longtime fidelity’.42  
As in the fourteenth century, Florence employed its infantrymen on short term 
agreements, but the permanence of its ‘battle-hardened veterans’ lasted long, assuring a 
certain continuity of leadership in the management of the army.43 Frequently, besides, the 
military units survived the replacement of individual members. The companies of dead 
captains were often split between their sons. It is the case of Gilio from Cortona, Vecchia from 
Lodi, Ugolino from Montedoglio, Pasqua from Arezzo, and many others.44 Furthermore, 
corporals could create their own brigades in the encampment, leaving the ranks of their 
former masters.45  
39 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 14, 284r-287r. 
40 See, for example, ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, 31r-102r; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 30, 142r-152v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, 
condotte e stanziamenti, 43, 2r-3r. 
41 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, 18r; ASF, Miscellanea repubblicana, 
6, 195, 163r; Marino Sanudo, Diari, II., ed. by Guglielmo Berchet (Venice 1879), 942. 
42 ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte e stanziamenti, 1, 51r. 
43 Caferro, ‘Continuity, long-term service, and permanent forces. A reassessment of the Florentine 
army in the fourteenth century’, 229-37. 
44  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 33, 26r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 34, 48r, 57r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 36, 21r, 25r, 26r, 33r, 34r, 156r. 
45 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 28, 245v. 
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The majority of these soldiers came from the whole Tuscany, and especially from the 
regions of Borgo San Sepolcro, Arezzo, Anghiari, Cortona, and Pisa, and from the mountains of 
Casentino and Pistoia. Also Florentine citizens were recruited, or offered themselves as 
volunteers. Mario Vettori, Cornelio Peruzzi, Antonio Strozzi, Bernardo degli Albizi, Benedetto 
Altoviti, Francesco Tosinghi, Girolamo Guicciardini, all belonged to the cadet branches of some 
of the most important city families.46 Due to the alliance with Giovanni Bentivoglio, numerous 
Bolognese infantrymen served in the Republican army too. From abroad, moreover, came 
several companies of Spaniards, Albanians, Sicilians, and Corsicans. Among their leaders were 
Alfonso and Leonardo Magnares, and Pier Andrea Gentili di Brando, a personal friend of the 
Magnificent Lorenzo.47 Several German and French hand gunners, instead, were recruited in 
1479.48 Swiss pikemen appeared in rolls only in 1497, when three hundred mercenaries 
garrisoned Leghorn, causing numerous problems and costing too much money. Their heads, 
Ridolfo Groffo and Antonio Binder, were demobilized in a hurry. During the same years, the 
Dieci hired also four hundred Gascons, and another foreign troublemaker, Giovanni Guerrieri, 
also known as ‘captain fighter’.49  
Alongside trained infantry, the Florentine officers could rely also on conscript subjects, for 
their army, and long before the institution of Machiavellian militia. Already in 1450s, the local 
officers had to choose among the men ‘magis apti meliusque armis sint muniti’ of their district, 
searching them ‘door to door’ on the eves of sieges and assaults.50 Usually, these hundreds 
men were sent in the encampments by the podestà, vicari, and capitani of Pistoia, Poppi, 
Scarperia, Prato, Castrocaro, and Arezzo.51  
Furthermore, the resolutions underline the relationships between the Dieci, the Otto, and 
their condottieri. Michael Mallett has described this association as distrustful and suspicious.52 
46 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 33, 24v-48r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, 117r; Luca Landucci, Diario fiorentino, ed. by Iodoco del 
Badia (Florence 1969), 98.  
47 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, 164r-165v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 28, 241r-245v; Patrizia Meli, ‘Un conestabile corso al servizio di 
Lorenzo il Magnifico’, Ricerche storiche 52, 1 (2012), 39-56. 
48 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, 38v. 
49 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 42, 34v-35v, 55v, 57v, 69r, 70r; ASF, 
Miscellanea repubblicana, 3, 91, 1v-2r.  
50 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 20, 76r. 
51 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 34, 113v, 116r. 
52 Mallett, Signori e mercenari, 69, 134; id., L’organizzazione militare di Venezia nel Quattrocento, 
256-57.  
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Notwithstanding, the registers of condotte testify several long-lasting links between the 
government and its men-at-arms. In 1498, for example, the count Rinuccio from Marsciano 
could vaunt sixteen years of uninterrupted career in the army, resulted in an appointment as 
‘general governor’, a contract for two hundred and five knights, and the patronage of several 
magnates of the capital. His father, Antonio, had also served the Dieci during the wars with 
Siena and Genoa.53 The Vitelli family, instead, was helped by Lorenzo de’ Medici to reconquest 
its stronghold of Città di Castello, in 1482. Several of its members, as Niccolò, Camillo, 
Giovanni, Paolo, and Vitellozzo, fought for Florence in the course of two decades. Paolo, above 
all, became the general captain of the Republic, in May 1498, in praise of his ‘virtue and 
experience’, and with ‘honor, convenience, benefit, and reputation of our state’.54 
In 1485, instead, six years after his fist condotta, was the turn of Nicola Orsini, count of 
Pitigliano, to be nominated capitano generale, thanks to his ties with the Magnificent and the 
Roman Curia.  
 
In primis, the magnificent Nicola Orsini from Pitigliano, count of Sovana, is 
declared to be hired by the excellent Florentine Republic, under all the 
terms, pacts, and agreements of the present contract.  
Considering the virtue and the experience in rebus militaribus of the 
aforementioned count, he is declared to be appointed as the general 
captain of all the cavalrymen and the infantrymen of the excellent 
Florentine Republic, which have to obey him as their real and legitimate 
captain, with no exceptions. Furthermore, is declared that the title of 
general captain implies all the honors, pre-eminences, dignities, and 
prerogatives of the other past general captains of the excellent Florentine 
Republic, as the insignia and the baton. 
Item, the aforementioned count, along with his state, subjects, and vassals, 
is declared to be under the protection and the guardianship of the excellent 
Florentine Republic, throughout the whole term of the present condotta. 
The excellent Florentine Republic promises, bona fide et toto posse, to 
defend the aforementioned count, his state, his subjects, and his vassals, 
from all of his enemies. 
Item, the condotta of the aforementioned, magnificent count is declared to 
last three years, starting from the first day of March 1485. Any possible 
annual prolongation had to be asked at least three months before the 
expiration of this contract. 
53 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 27, 110v-115v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, 2v-3r. 
54  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, 31r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 24, 58v-59r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 27, 250v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 43, 98v-99v, 111v. 
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The salary of the aforementioned count is declared to amount to thirty 
thousand florins, in time of war, under the express condition that he will 
serve the excellent Florentine Republic with one hundred and ninety lances 
and forty light horses among mounted crossbowmen and stradiotti. Every 
lance has to be composed of four men and four horses, including a good and 
strong animal for the man-at-arms. The knights have to be expert and 
experienced in the profession of arms, according to the customs of Italian 
companies. 
However, in times of peace, the aforementioned, magnificent count is 
declared to be remunerated fifteen thousand florins, and has to maintain 
one hundred men-at-arms and twenty light horses among mounted 
crossbowmen and stradiotti. 
Item, the aforementioned wages has to be paid in silver grossoni, with a 
deduction of six and a half percent […]. 
Item, a prestanza of six monthly salaries has to be advanced to the 
aforementioned, magnificent count, in times of war. During campaigns, he 
has to receive the rest of his annual wage every two months. 
Once a year, within forty days after the receipt of the prestanza, the 
Signoria, or the Dieci di Balìa, or the Otto di Pratica, could request from him 
a roll of his company. The reviews of men, weapons, and horses, instead, 
have to be carried out whenever the officials ordered them […]. 
Item, is declared that the aforementioned count, faithfully and toto posse, 
with his person and his company, has to serve the excellent Florentine 
Republic, going, staying, fighting, and riding wherever and whenever its 
officials ordered him, and against any king, prince, baron, and lord, city, 
castle, and company, and men, whatever their dignities, conditions, and pre-
eminencies. The count swears to obey all the commands of the Signoria, of 
the Dieci di Balìa, of the Otto di Pratica, and of all their general 
commissioners.  
 
Other terms of this long contract concerned immunities, exemptions, rewards, and prisoners. 
With similar pacts, in the same year, also Gentile, Virginio, Giulio, and Giampaolo Orsini 
followed their relative in Tuscany. 55  
Other neighboring lords were involved in this politics of recruitment and alliance, in order 
to secure the borders of the Florentine territory.56 Jacopo IV Appiano from Piombino, Annibale 
and Ercole Bentivoglio from Bologna, Giampaolo, Guido, Astorre, and Ridolfo Baglioni from 
Perugia, Ottaviano, Astorre, and Galeotto Manfredi from Faenza, Ottaviano Riario from Forlì, 
Costanzo Sforza from Pesaro, and the dukes of Urbino, Federico and Guidubaldo from 
Montefeltro, were repeatedly hired during the last quarter of the century. 
55  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 25, 71rv; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 30, 100v-106r, 114r-118r; Christine Shaw, ‘Lorenzo de’ Medici 
and Niccolò Orsini’, in Gian Carlo Garfagnini, ed, Lorenzo de’ Medici. Studi (Florence 1992), 257-79. 
56 Machiavelli, Storie fiorentine, 213r. 
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Their companies were organized into ‘lances’, or ‘helmets’, or ‘cuirasses’, each comprising 
‘one men-at-arms, one mounted squire, one light horseman, and a transporter for the 
luggage’, according to the Italian practices.57 Eighteen, twenty, twenty-five, or thirty heavy 
knight formed a squadron. These ranks were composed of veterans, relatives, sons, friends, 
clients, recommended soldiers, all coming from the whole Peninsula.58 During campaigns, 
every man-at-arm was on a salary of one hundred florins per year, always according to 
contemporary customs. Their heads, instead, received a proper remuneration, a piatto, 
depending on their fame and their skills, and a presta, a payment in advance, for arming their 
brigade.  
The duration of the condotta varied from one to five years, and the number of heavy 
knights between ten and two hundred and fifty. On the whole, Florence could have at its 
disposal several hundred lances. In the spring of 1479, they were one thousand and sixty-five, 
excluding the allied cavalry. In 1486, nine hundred and ninety-five. During the war against 
Pisan rebels, they amounted to eight hundred.59 Along with men-at-arms, the Dieci and the 
Otto enlisted also several contingents of light cavalry, and especially numerous mounted 
crossbowmen, employed in explorations, escorts, and sacks. Each balestriere a cavallo earned 
five florins per month.60 Two hundred florins, instead, was the wage for forty stradiotti, the 
frightening, ruthless Albanian mercenaries. The brigades of Michele Musacchio and Dimitri 
Progazononos remained on the Florentine rolls for more than a decade.61  
 
The contracts of men-at-arms provided also for exemption from duties, for free hay and 
firewood, and, above all, for free quarters. Contrarily to other Italian states, the problem of 
barracks seemed to be not so nagging, for the Dieci and the Otto. Usually, the cavalry 
companies were ordered to stay in the plains nearby Arezzo and Pisa, that is, Valdiserchio, 
57 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, 92r, 102v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 43, 99v-100r. 
58 del Treppo, ‘Gli aspetti organizzativi, economici e sociali di una compagnia di ventura italiana’; 
Pezzolo, ‘Professione militare e famiglia in Italia tra tardo medioevo e prima età moderna’, 352-61. 
59 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, 80r-81v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti,28, 184r-188r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 48, 2rv. 
60 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, 7rv. See also Pieri, Il Rinascimento e 
la crisi militare italiana, 371-72. 
61  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 30, 150r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 45, 169v. 
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Valdichiana, and Valdarno, where ‘dictas gentes commodius possa morare’. 62  Officers 
examined ‘diligently’ the quantity of troops and horses that towns and cities could 
accommodate, while commissioners preceded marching brigades in order to prepare and 
assign the stanze. They tried to avoid disparity in distributions of brigades, complaints of the 
subjects, and dishonest and criminal behaviors of both inhabitants and soldiers, such as raising 
of prices on local markets, blackmails, and request for money. They rather encouraged 
‘friendly manners’, but with scarce results.63 The compagnie of the neighboring condottieri 
were often, astutely sent back in the territories of their leaders and lords, saving money and 
preventing protests. 
The infantry companies, instead, were reduced to thirty, forty elements, during winters, 
and entrusted with the garrison of several castles and villages, from Fivizzano, in Lunigiana, to 
Valiano, on the Sienese border. In the zones behind the front, their number could be increased 
until one hundred and fifty men, according to the strategic relevance of the post. Florence and 
Pisa had a proper guard, as well as the principal citadels of Sarzana, Pietrasanta, Leghorn, 
Volterra, Arezzo, and Cortona.64 All of these fortifications, ‘secundum ordinamenta’, were 
regularly inspected by two members of the Otto or the Dieci, ‘pro muniendo et providendo de 
munitionibus et victualiis’. The officers consulted rettori and connestabili, compiled inventories 
of weapons and rations, noted the necessary repairing, and wrote down the ability of the 
defenders. In 1489, Niccolò Ridolfi and Lorenzo Carducci visited fifty-six fortresses on the 
frontiers with Romagna, Umbria, and Liguria. A similar task was accomplished in the following 
years by Pierantonio Soderini, nominated general commissioner on purpose.65 
As in encampments as in towns, knights and foot soldiers were also frequently reviewed 
by the ‘ordinary’ inspectors of the Republic. During the whole century, this rassegna was 
composed by an official of the Condotta, a notary, a blacksmith, and a servant, ‘ad scribendum 
62 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 45, 82v-83r, 168v. 
63  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 21, 107v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 24, 138v, 140rv, 143v-144r, 156rv, 182r. 
64 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 25, 40r-44r, 226v-227v; ASF, Otto di 
pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte e stanziamenti, 3, 20r, 22v; ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, 
partiti, condotte e stanziamenti, 5, 71r-88r. 
65  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 21, 163v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 24, 73v-74r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte 
e stanziamenti, 1, 52v; ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte e stanziamenti, 3, 75rv; ASF, 
Miscellanea repubblicana, 6, 205, 1r-31v. 
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comitivas’.66 This squad had to verify the presence of the entire brigade of a condottiero or a 
connestabile, checking the quality of its armaments, the brands of horses, and the state of 
men.67  
 
We have hired again Leonardo di Niccolò from Florence, along with thirty 
companions. Now, you have to write a list of these men, specifying their 
names, their patronymics, and their birthplaces, and describing their marks, 
their hair, and their beards. You must not accept local inhabitants nor boys. 
We desire to have at our disposal adequate men, who are worth their pay of 
two florins. 
 
Also the regulations on the conduct of garrisons were strict, regulating the activities of the 
troops and the relationships between civilians and soldiers. 
 
The brigade must not leave the castle without your permission, and only a 
man in ten can stay the night outdoors. The absentees must be punished 
with by fines, or even by removal. 
When the reviewers arrive, you have to ring the bell of the fortress for a 
quarter of an hour. After this time, the missing soldiers will incur penalties. 
These infantrymen must not work in the shops nor in the markets of the 
city.  
 
The reports of the rassegna were then used for eliminating ‘useless pay’, and demobilizing 
several infantrymen ‘de minus utilis et sufficientibus’.68  
 
Lastly, the books of resolution permit to reconstruct the whole structure of the 
Florentine institutions, through the elections and the appointments of its employees, like the 
‘overseer’, the provveditore. He was in charge of the relationships with the manufacturers of 
ammunitions, the drafting of purchase agreements, and the revision of the accountancy. At 
the end of the century, due to the increased war demand, he was helped by two 
66 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 20, 6v, 8v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 43, 49v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 50, 105v. 
67  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 25, 32r; ASF, Otto di pratica, 
Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte e stanziamenti, 5, 12r. 
68 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 25, 227rv; ASF, Otto di pratica, 
Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte e stanziamenti, 3, 3r, 18v, 22v, 
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sottoprovveditori, who were particularly responsible for acquiring and inventorying 
ammunitions.69 
In those years, in the capital worked also the keepers of the arsenals, that is, the 
gunpowder facility on the southeastern bank of the Arno, and the ‘arce Notomiae’, the 
‘lookout tower’ placed on the opposite side of the river. The Dieci assigned Michele di Jacopo 
di Baldino Compagni to reside in the turret, to test new guns, to weigh saltpeter and 
gunpowder, to review the artillery of the republican fortresses, to consign arms and armor to 
the army, and to buy materiel retail. His colleague, Gaspare di Antonio Pasquini, was elected in 
April 1485, and was still serving in June 1499.70 Additional ‘ministri supra munitionibus’ were 
temporarily nominated during the whole Quattrocento, in times of war.71 
Many other ‘ministers’ were present in the encampments, in most cases entrusted with 
the equipment of the troop. These ‘particular commissioners’ were assigned ‘ad levandum et 
conducendum in castra armorum ductores’, ‘ad scribendum et rassignandum milites tam 
equestres quam pedestres’, ‘ad providendum de victualiis’, and ‘ad dandum stationes’.72 They 
provided for the distribution and the sale of ammunitions, the quarters of troops, the daily 
cash payments to soldiers and craftsmen, the satisfaction of condottieri and connestabili, the 
management of ordnance, the control over intractable pioneers and conscripts. Above all, they 
supervised the indispensable supplies of food and hay, arranging nourishment markets, the so-
called canove, facilitating the influx of bread and wine from the surrounding villages, and 
coordinating transporters, bakers, and peasants. 73  The justice, instead, was abruptly 
administered by a ‘jailer’, an aguzzino, and his twenty or thirty companions, including an 
executioner.74 For the ‘mobile city’ of their army, the Dieci paid also chaplains and doctors. The 
sources of 1498 register a priest and six ‘barbers’ and surgeons.75  
69 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 31, 17v; Guidi, Lotte, pensiero e 
istituzioni politiche nella Repubblica Fiorentina dal 1494 al 1512. II. Gli istituti sovrani e di governo, 787-
97. 
70  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 25, 213r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, 77r. See also Fabrizio Ansani, ‘Geografie della guerra nella 
Toscana del Rinascimento. Produzione di armi e circolazione dei pratici’, Archivio Storico Italiano, 651 
(2017), 81-83. 
71 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 20, 112r, 236v. 
72 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 45, 89v, 95v, 135v, 168v. 
73 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 30, 228r-286r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 35, 97r-98r. 
74  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, 103v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 41, 43v. 
75 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, 33v-34r. 
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The responsible for all of these appointees were the commissari generali, the ‘general 
commissioners’ of the Republic. The Dieci and the Otto conferred on them ‘the same absolute 
authority’ of the offices, a ‘potestas in rebus tantum ad bellum, bonam custodiam et 
munitionem locorum et passuum spectantibus’, as in the whole Florentine territory as 
abroad.76 These plenipotentiary had full powers to take actions and make decisions, to order 
and solicit, to hire and negotiate on behalf of the state. They belonged to the most influential 
and eminent families of the capital, now linked with the regime, now associated with the 
various city factions. Mallett has expressed serious doubts about their preparation and the 
continuity of their duties, but the documentation highlights a recurrent selection of the most 
trained and experienced men as leaders of military enterprises.77 It is the case, for example, of 
Piero Capponi, Piero Vettori, Pierfilippo Pandolfini, Bongianni Gianfigliazzi, Piero Corsini, 
Antonio Giacomini, Luca degli Albizzi, Jacopo and Luigi Guicciardini, who were directly involved 
in the direction of the principal campaigns of the last three decades of the century, from the 
siege of Volterra to the Pisan war, from the conquest of Sarzana to the invasion of Lazio. They 
were acquainted with the first condottieri of their time, such as Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, the 
‘duke of Calabria’ Alfonso of Aragon, Federico from Montefeltro, Nicola Orsini, Paolo Vitelli.78 
The republican general commissioner had undoubtedly a wide knowledge of conflicts and their 
issues, apart from the official duration of their task.  
 
Allocations, incomes and expenditures, and debtors and creditors 
 
If money were the proverbial ‘nervus belli’, one of the key figures of the Dieci di Balìa was 
certainly their treasurer, the camerlengo, or camerario, chosen from the city merchant 
bankers.79 Among these magnates were Piero Mellini, Francesco Scarfi, Filippo Ginori, Alfonso 
Strozzi, Benedetto del Giocondo, and Carlo Gondi, all belonging to influent Tuscan companies. 
They administered the considerable military funds of the Florentine state, collected from 
public debt, tax farming, forced loans, voluntary offers, catasti and decime, fines and 
76 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 45, 155v. 
77 Mallett, Signori e mercenari, 134-35. 
78  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, 213r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 24, 89r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 30, 286r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 36, 193v, 196r, 197v; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 37, 1r-46v; ASF, Balìe, 34, 3v, 5r;  
79 Guidi, Lotte, pensiero e istituzioni politiche nella Repubblica Fiorentina dal 1494 al 1512. II. Gli 
istituti sovrani e di governo, 796. 
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deductions from soldiers’ wages. In urgent needs of money, they also had to personally 
advance hundreds of florins.80  
At the present, the scrupulous, quotidian work of camerlenghi is cataloged in various, 
numerous registers. The allocations, the stanziamenti, are included in the aforementioned 
deliberazioni. The records of incomes and expenditures and the books of debtors and 
creditors, instead, are part of two distinct archival series, that is, the entrata e uscita and the 
debitori e creditori of the Dieci. The Otto di Pratica, on the contrary, have not produced any 
significant volume of accountancy. Their office, in fact, did not comprise a treasurer, but only a 
simple ‘depositor’, a depositario. The ‘cashier’, the cassiere of the Camera del Comune 
managed their finances, along with expenses and revenues of the whole Republic.81  
 
Written by chancellors, the stanziamenti were brief, concise notes of the payments 
made by the Dieci, divided in two major categories. The first group concerned the personnel, 
condottieri, connestabili, gunners, engineers, and guards, whose salaries had to be obligatory 
approved by the Signoria. The second one included the wages of secretaries, commissioners, 
envoys, craftsmen, transporters, reimbursement for extraordinary remittances, and the 
procurement of arms, equipment, and food.82  
The books of allocations itemized the price of services and products, declaring the 
figures of raw materials and ammunitions, the cost of the rent of mules and oxen, as well as 
the remunerations for the ministri and the length of their appointments. A commissario 
generale, for example, could earn sixteen lire and thirteen soldi per day. A provveditore 
received four florins every month, the camarlingo seven florins, the keepers of magazines two 
florins. In the encampments, a carpenter could earn six florins, a doctor ten florins, a stone 
cutters five florins, a baker thirty lire, a spy up to twenty-five florins. But the examples, in 
general, are innumerable. Goods had different prices, according to their material, their 
availability, their demand. A solid cart for cannons had an average value of three florins, a 
breastplate of six florins and a half, a bronze spingard of fifteen florins, thirty-three kilograms 
of refined saltpeter of fifty florins, a spear of sixteen soldi, and so on. The counts could include 
also nails, harquebuses, wooden grips, hoes, shovels, ramrods, horseshoes, harnesses, 
80 Anthony Molho, ‘Lo stato e la finanza pubblica. Un’ipotesi basata sulla storia tardo medioevale di 
Firenze’, in Origini dello stato, 235-44.  
81 Lorenzo Tanzini, ‘Il più antico ordinamento della Camera del Comune di Firenze. Le provvisioni 
canonizzate del 1289’, in Annali di Storia di Firenze 1 (2006), 139-40. 
82 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, 1r. 
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saddles.83 The spending was increased also by the gifts for foreign ambassadors and the 
celebrations for the arrivals of important guests, by the constant monetary requests of 
Florentine envoys, by the rewards for troops and luxury armor for captains, by the subventions 
for wounded soldiers, by the expensive textiles for flags and insignia, by the compensation for 
dead horses and captured beasts of burden, by the corruption of enemy officers, by the 
decryption of letters in cipher, by new projects for fortifications, by the widening of arsenals, 
by the continuous reconstruction of the port of Leghorn, by the countless, little, leather bags 
necessary for transporting money, by the exchanges rates of the different currencies, by the 
maintenance of artillery, by the postal services, by the recruitment of pioneers, by the 
purchases of new furnishing and new jotters for the chancery, and by the pay of both capitano 
della piazza and capitano del contado, that is, respectively, the guard of the capital and the 
‘police’ of its whole dominion.84  
The costs of the daily management of an encampment were written by commissari 
generali and camerlenghi di campo on separate accounts, subsequently handed to the general 
treasurer.85 The sole surviving volume of this kind listed the salaries of gunners, woodworkers, 
smiths, mule and ox drivers, stone cutters, bricklayers, boatmen, and postmen, all present in 
the camp of Pontedera during the summer of 1496. Moreover, it contains the condotte drawn 
up by the commissioners, and the monthly payments for the officials employed on food, guns, 
transportations, and pioneers.86  
In 1480s, accountants were present also in the zones behind the front, where the 
supplies were produced, stored, and dispatched. At the time of the siege of Pietrasanta, the 
customs officer of Pisa, Francesco Cambini, registered ‘what I have bought and from who, who 
has paid, where I have send everything, and who has received it’, compiling twelve notebooks, 
83  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 27, 220v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 41, 160v-161r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 46, 123v-124r, 128r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, 100v, 
118v, 124v.  
84 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 27, 250rv, 251v, 257r, 258r, 263r, 265r, 
268v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 30, 202v-203r, 206r-208r, 218v, 225v-
226r, 233v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 33, 119v-120r, 133r; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 34, 91r, 141r-143r, 260v-265r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 43, 40v, 52v,84r, 90r 
85  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 34, 117r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 41, 83r. 
86 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 38, 1r-42v. 
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a ledger, and a résumé. In 1486, in Montepulciano, Bartolo Tedaldi noted all the consignments 
of wheat and bread ordered for the army stationed in Bracciano.87  
 
Like the balance sheets of contemporary business company, the accounting of the 
Florentine military institutions was precise and analytical. It consisted of several, different 
registrations, with numerous cross-references, in order to facilitate calculations and audits, 
payments and settlements. The allocations approved by the government, for example, were 
transcribed on the books of incomes and expenditures, now summarizing, now detailing the 
information. These libri were periodically examined by two state accountants, the sindaci del 
Monte, and were personally compiled by the camerlenghi.88 The treasurers, moreover, could 
compare the data with the chronological entries of their general journals, the so-called 
quaderni di cassa.89 Also the overseers had their proper giornali, which contained contracts, 
promises, memoirs, minor expenses, and inventories of the chancery of the Dieci.90  
In the last years of the century, the provveditore and the keepers of the arsenals 
archived also the accounts of several artisans, merchants, and commissioners. The subjects of 
these libri dei conti are obviously the most disparate. In July 1499, for example, Francesco 
Spina reported the costs of four hundred and sixty cast iron cannonballs and eight hundred 
and eighty wrought iron shot. In the same weeks, Ludovico di Niccolò wrote down the rent of 
an ironwork in Colle Val d’Elsa. Michele di Jacopo di Baldino Compagni noted all the 
transactions of tiles and beams for the roof of the tower of Notomia, and all the names of the 
bricklayers and carpenters and transporters that had collaborated with him on the 
construction. Other conti concerned the supplies of raw materials for the craftsmen of the 
public workshops, the procurement of steel bolts and bronze culverins, the wages of soldiers, 
technicians, and spies, and even the trades of hammers, nails, reams, wires.91  
Furthermore, the earnings of practitioners are also testified by the books of debtors and 
creditors, compiled by the overseers using a double-entry bookkeeping system.92 Thanks to 
87 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 10, 1r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 11, 6r. 
88 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 8; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 13; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Entrata e uscita, 30. 
89 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 12; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 41, 1r. 
90 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 23, 1r, 192r, 382r. 
91 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 13, 156v-160v, 179r-180r, 190v-191r, 237v-239r; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Entrata e uscita, 26, 195r-204r, 208rv, 320r, 320v-321r, 321v-347v. 
92 For the relations between business and warfare, see John Hale, Guerra e società nell’Europa del 
Rinascimento, 236-49; William Caferro, ‘Warfare and economy in Renaissance Italy’, The Journal of 
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these registers, above all, it is possible to analyze the global expenses of the Dieci di Balìa, their 
investments in single sectors, and the trends of their expenditures. At the end of every 
volume, in fact, a balance sheet states the amount of money disbursed by the officers during 
their semester. From June to December 1498, during the offensive against the Pisan rebels and 
their Venetian allies, the officials spent about two hundred thousand and forty-three thousand 
golden florins.93 
 
Postmen, 1600 golden florins 
Minor expenses, 277 golden florins 
Spies, 1166 golden florins 
Ammunitions, 6056 golden florins 
Transports, 2239 golden florins 
Pioneers, 73 golden florins 
Garrisons, 625 golden florins 
Staff of the office, 740 golden florins 
Condottieri and men-at-arms, 34311 golden florins 
Mounted crossbowmen, 5306 golden florins 
Interests, 258 golden florins 
Connestabili and infantrymen, 66739 golden florins 
Commissioners, 4916 golden florins 
Gunners, 1425 golden florins 
Artisans, 5133 golden florins 
Extraordinary expenses, 2915 golden florins 
Back debts, 109735 golden florins 
 
In times of war, the salaries of cavalrymen and foot soldiers multiplied the overall costs. The 
wages for the operation against Volterra, in 1472, amounted to thirty-two hundred golden 
florins. For resisting the assaults of the Imperial army, in 1496, the Dieci paid their troops more 
than one hundred thousand and thirty thousand golden florins. For the siege of Pisa, in 1499, 
the connestabili only came to fifty-eight thousand golden florins.94 Regarding this campaign, 
the chronicler Piero Parenti calculated that the conflict had a daily cost of one thousand and 
six hundred florins.95 According to the official accounting of the government, one million and a 
half golden florins were the price of five years of wearing fights.96  
Interdisciplinary History, 39, 2 (2008), 198-200; Enzo Baraldi, ‘Una nuova età del ferro. Macchine e 
processi della siderurgia’, in Philippe Braunstein and Luca Molà, eds, Il rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, 
III. Produzione e tecniche (Treviso 2007), 214-16. 
93 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 39, 293r. 
94 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 20, 94v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 29, 247r, 
252r, 254r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 45, 329v. 
95 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., 186, 190, and 194. 
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These ‘bad times’ required determined efforts and drastic measures to raise the public 
revenues. The tax burden escalated sharply since the first decades of the century.97 The 
Neapolitan pressure on the southern borders, in 1451, solicited the tassa dei traffichi on the 
capitals of partnerships. After the disastrous events of 1480, the Republic promulgated a new 
catasto, a general survey on the business investments, the holding in public debt, and the real 
property of the inhabitants of the whole Florentine dominion. The reconquest of Pisa, in 1495, 
urged the imposition of an annual tithe on the incomes from immovable possessions of 
citizens and peasants.98 
The expanding price of warfare, besides, was contributing to worsen the problem of the 
public debt, thus stabilizing economic relationships based on political dependences. In fact, 
during wartime, loyal bankers and devoted merchants could concede short-term loans, the so-
called prestanze, consolidating their position inside the ruling ‘financial oligarchy’, and 
permitting the government to collect large sums of ready cash.99 According to John Najemy, 
the early Milanese conflicts represented ‘the beginning of the commune’s dependence on its 
wealthiest citizens.’100 After the Pazzi’s plot, more than three hundred thousand golden florins 
were annually borrowed from the citizenry. In 1495, four hundred thousand golden florins 
were accumulated ‘for preserving freedom.’101 
Although financiers made profits on their agreements with the Commune, the small 
investors often faced the insolvency of the public investment funds, that is, the monte comune 
and the monte delle doti. The government, in fact, frequently failed to pay interest on their 
96 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 15, 178v, 315r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 29, 255v; 
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obligations, earmarking money for waging wars. One hundred thousand golden florins, for 




In 1498, a general commissioner lamented that ‘soldiers would be useless, if we did not supply 
them with arms’. In those months, the equipment of eight thousand men compelled the Dieci 
to buy thirty-two bronze pieces of heavy artillery, as well as dozens hand guns, hundreds shots 
of various forms, thousands darts, and several tons of saltpeter and gunpowder.103  
The purchases and the consignments of these weapons were annotated on two 
different records. The first, written by the keepers of the magazines or by one of the two 
sottoprovveditori, was a ‘book of incomes and expenditures for ordnance, ammunitions, food 
supplies, and transporters’, a journal with chronological entries and detailed information about 
the quality of the armament. The second, instead, was compiled by the other 
sottoprovveditore, and was a volume of debtors and creditors, intended exclusively for arms. It 
contained reports on the output levels of the Florentine workshops, the exact number of 
spears, cuirasses, carts, harquebuses, bobbins of bowstring, barrels of powder, sacks of nitrate, 
spingards, and cannons, traded with the Republic by dealers and craftsmen. 
The inventories and data of the series of the munizioni document all the branches of this 
lively industry, and also their connections with the market of the Peninsula, through the 
negotiations of ambassadors and the commerce of local and foreign merchants.104 Moreover, 
they underline the role of the state in introducing innovative tools, in fostering technical 
developments, and in encouraging the migrations of practitioners towards the capital. Already 
in 1430s, Florentine gunmakers experimented with cast iron guns, ‘organ’ firearms, bronze 
breeches, and corned powder.105 Twenty years later, the tradition of artistic bronze sculpture 
was helping the fabrication of giant bronze bombard to progress. In 1484, the principal 
Florentine bombarda could fire an impressive stone missile weighing two hundred and thirty 
102 Anthony Molho, ‘Debiti pubblici ed interessi privati nella Firenze tardomedievale’, in La Toscana 
al tempo di Lorenzo il Magnifico. Politica, economia, cultura, arte (Pisa 1996), 825-838 and 850-854; Id., 
‘The state and public finance. A hypothesis based on the history of late medieval Florence’, The Journal 
of Modern History 67 (1995), 97-135. 
103 Fabrizio Ansani, ‘Supplying the army. 1498. The Florentine campaign in the Pisan countryside’, to 
be published in The Journal of Medieval Military History. 
104 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, 355rv, 394v. 
105 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 1, XLVIIIIr, Lv, 144v, 161r. 
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kilograms. And when Charles VIII descended into Italy, in 1494, the Dieci immediately 
commissioned several new cannons, assimilating the patterns of the renowned French royal 
ordnance in the city production. Furthermore, the officers invited Transalpine and Lombard 
masters to collaborate with their artisans.106  
This public interests in arms procurement can be deduced also from the involvement of 
the principal Florentine banks in the supplies of raw material. The companies of Bardi, 
Capponi, and Berti frequently sold large amount of copper to the military offices. As a ruler, as 
a merchant, and as a member of the Otto di Pratica, Lorenzo de’ Medici was aware of the 
necessity of making the sale of saltpeter a sort of monopoly of his firm and of his 
government.107 He tried also to establish new armor industries in Pisa, a few months before his 
death, in collaboration with Tommaso Marinai, the owner of several mines in the region of 
Montecatini.108 In 1485, instead, the Magnificent effectively ordered the construction of a 
foundry in the centre of Florence, entrusting it to one of the most famous Italian gunmaker of 
the late fifteenth century, Alberghetto Alberghetti from Ferrara.109  
This furnace of the Sapienza was not the only public facility of the Republic. For the 
whole century, on the contrary, the manufacture of arms and armor was polycentric, 
complementary, and integrated. Weapons factories were opened in Pisa in 1480s. Smiths 
labored in the vicinity of the capital, in Grassina, in Villore, in Ricorboli, and in Figline, 
producing arrowheads and scoppietti. Woodworkers cut the shafts of uncountable arrows in 
the forest of Pratomagno, nearby Arezzo. The ironworks of Colle Val d’Elsa realized metal 
projectiles. Mills for the powder were present in Leghorn. Pistoiese spears were bought also in 
Lucca and in Siena. Aragonese companies purchased pavises, shields, and leather articles in 
Borgo Sansepolcro. 
By the end of Quattrocento, figures leave the impression of an high, improved 
productivity. At the eve of the French invasion, in 1494, the mills of Florence and Pisa could 
fabricate more than thirty thousand kilograms of powder. One year later, the most important 
smith of the capital, Baldassarre di Giovanni, could made three hundred and fifty harquebuses, 
thirty scoppietti, and fifty spingards in his bottega. During the summer of 1498, the Republican 
gunmakers manufactured about thirty cannons. The Florentine arsenals, besides, were kept up 
to date. In 1472, Volterra was attacked with eight, giant bronze guns. In 1479, during the 
106 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, 32r. 
107 ASF, Otto di pratica, Munizioni, 1, 15v. 
108 ASF, Carte Riccardi, 816, 98. 
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Neapolitan invasion of the southern borders, the Dieci could dispatch two thousand hand guns 
and seven hundred spingards, securing three hundred and twenty-nine towns. In 1499, the 
Florentine camp was provided with more than thirty tons of gunpowder and about eighty 




The analysis of the numerous tomes of the correspondence of the Dieci and the Otto 
highlights, once again, all the activities and all the interests of both the institutions. The series 
of missive contain the commands, suggestions, and complaints sent from the Palazzo dei Priori 
to captains, commissioners, and servants. The notorious books of legazioni and commissarie, 
instead, include the instruction for ambassadors and envoys. Last but not least, the responsive 
give voice to the daily duties of commissari and rettori, connestabili and condottieri, 
comprising news from the encampments, agreements with merchants, descriptions of battles 
and sieges, plans for campaigns, requests of money, orders of ammunitions, failures and 
defeats, and all the various issues of Renaissance wars. 
Therefore, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the administration of the newer 
and the older military institutions, the Nove Conservatori di Ordinanza e Milizia and the Dieci 
di Balìa, could rely on firm practices. Since 1494, in fact, the restoration of the Republic, the 
necessity of more transparency in the governance of military affairs, the long war against Pisa, 
and the continuous dangers to the same existence of the Florentine state, had compelled the 
officers to enhance their former archival management and to accelerate the creation of a 
larger communication network. 111  As described on the previous pages, however, the 
production of documentation had already been increased by the formation of permanent 
offices, in 1480. Besides, the concepts and the formulas of the registers of munizioni, 
deliberazioni, entrata and debitori were not an unusual novelty, at that time. On the contrary, 
their structure dated back to the first decades of the Quattrocento. In the fonds of the ‘decem 
commissaris et offitialibus guerre communis Florentiae’ it is possible to find accounts and 
110 For the production and the procurement of arms in fifteenth-century Florence, see Fabrizio 
Ansani, ‘Craftsmen, artillery, and war production in Renaissance Florence’, Vulcan, 4 (2016), 1-22; id., 
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the late fifteenth century’, Technology and Culture, 58, 3 (2017), 749-80; id., ‘Geografie dalla guerra’, 73-
117. 
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resolution for the siege of Lucca in 1430, for the battle of Anghiari in 1440, and even letters 
from 1384, the year of the purchase of the city of Arezzo.  
The abundance, the continuity, and the content of these sources refute the biases of the 
traditional, historiographical ‘orthodoxy’. They indicate that Florentine statesmen did not treat 
with thoughtlessness and improvisation wars which could have hindered the commerce of 
their banks, or menaced the sacred freedom of the Republic. They managed attentively not 
only the hostilities, but also their social, economic, and political dynamics . Thus, the periodical 
crisis of the public debt bolstered the unity of the oligarchy.112 In the same way, the condotte 
strengthened existing patronage links, permitting an indirect control over the ruling factions of 
the peripheral towns of the Dominion, and securing the hold on the surrounding minor 
lords.113  
The policies of officers were not backward, nor inefficient, considering, above all, their 
consciousness of ‘being the fifth power of Italy’ and the modesty of their military purposes.114 
On the contrary, the large sums invested on warfare, the precision of the accounting, confirm 
their regard for conflicts. The whole administration became more systematic and more 
professional, in order to collect larger revenues and cover the heavy costs of campaigns.115 
And numerous contracts revealed the willingness to support a permanent army and the 
intention to innovate the technology of its weapons.116 
This efficiency in procurement and recruitment, however, did not always resulted in 
success. Victories and defeats, in fact, were determined by different factors. During the Pazzi’s 
War, the Venetian aid of the was inconsistent with the pressing requests of the Commune. This 
scarcity of troops, along with the lack of a strong military guide, allowed the enemy to seize 
numerous border towns.117 The precarious situation was worsened also by the outbreak of the 
plague. And the invasion, above all, led to a major financial crisis, with the state under the 
threat of bankruptcy.118 
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But this interdependency between politics, diplomacy, and economy could be illustrated 
by numerous examples. In 1484, the delay in capturing Pietrasanta was caused by the 
hesitation of the Neapolitan ally in sending the fleet in the Genoese waters, thus preventing 
the arrival of hostile reinforcements.119 In 1494, the French menace to Florentine merchants 
influenced Piero de’ Medici to surrender to Charles VIII.120 After the revolt of Pisa, the conflict 
against the insurgents was conditioned by internal upheavals and external isolation.121 In 1499, 
the siege of the rebel city failed due the alleged treason of the general captain, aroused by the 
meddling of Venice and Milan.122 In 1500, another attempt went wrong, when the Swiss and 
the Gascon mercenaries mutinied, capturing the Florentine commissioner. The soldiers were 
bemoaning the shortage of food and the deferment of payment. However, chroniclers accused 
commanders and warriors of behaving cheerfully towards the foes, reporting their ‘malice’ 
towards their masters.123    
Therefore, more than their achievements, the inevitable faults of Florentine officers 
should be judged without preconceptions, contextualizing errors and avoiding postulates. 
Hypotheses and explanations have to be proved. And, as Marc Bloch said, ‘in history, as 
elsewhere, the causes cannot be assumed. They are to be looked for’.124 
 
119 Humfrey Butters, ‘Lorenzo and Naples’, in Lorenzo il Magnifico e il suo mondo, 148. 
120 Piero Parenti, Storia fiorentina, I., 80-81; id., Storia fiorentina, II., 283. 
121 Bartolomeo Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, ed. by Giuliana Berti (Florence 1994), 233-255. See also 
Cadoni, Lotte politiche e riforme istituzionali a Firenze. 
122 ASF, Signori e collegi, Deliberazioni in forza di ordinaria autorità, 101, 89rv; Consulte e pratiche 
della Repubblica Fiorentina, 1498-1505, I., ed. by Denis Fachard (Geneva 1993), 228. 
123 Biagio Buonaccorsi, ‘Delle cose fatte da Luca di Antonio degli Albizzi e dell’assalto dato a Pisa dai 
fiorentini con le genti francesi’, Archivio Storico Italiano, 4, 2 (1853), 407-417; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, 
II., 367-374; Piero Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, ed. by Giuliana Berti, Michele Luzzati, and Ezio 
Tongiorgi (Pisa 1982), 110-113; Niccolò Machiavelli, Legazioni. Commissarie. Scritti di governo, I., ed. by 
Fredi Chiappelli and Jean-Jacques Marchand (Rome: 1971), 379-384.  
124 Marc Bloch, Apologia della storia, o mestiere di storico (Turin 1998), 143. 
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Appendix 1. Members of the military offices of the Florentine Republic, 1480-1499 
 
Otto di Pratica, April 1480 Otto di Pratica, October 1480 
Tommaso di Lorenzo Soderini Luigi  di Piero Guicciardini 
Jacopo di Piero Guicciardini Piero di Francesco Mellini 
Giovanni d’Antonio Serristori Antonio di Taddeo Taddei 
Girolamo Morelli Antonio di Puccio Pucci 
Bongianni di Bongianni Gianfigliazzi Roberto di Francesco Leoni 
Piero di Nicolò Malegonnelle Antonio di Leonardo de’ Nobili 
Angelo di Lorenzo della Stufa Bernardo di Neri del Nero 
Bernardo di Giovanni Buongirolami Maso di Luca degli Albizi 
  
Otto di Pratica, April 1481 Otto di Pratica, October 1481 
Niccolò di Giovanni Capponi Luigi Guicciardini 
Bernardo di Tommaso Corbinelli Antonio di Lorenzo Ridolfi 
Giovanni di Antonio Serristori Francesco di Giovanni Dini 
Giovanni di Taddeo dell’Antella Antonio di Puccio Pucci 
Bongianni di Bongianni Gianfigliazzi Roberto di Francesco Leoni 
Pietro di Giovanni Minerbetti Antonio di Leonardo de’ Nobili 
Bernardo di Giovanni Buongirolami Ugolino di Niccolò Martelli 
Lorenzo di Piero de’ Medici Maso di Luca degli Albizi 
  
Dieci di Balìa, September 1482 Dieci di Balìa, May 1483 
Tommaso di Lorenzo Soderini Tommaso di Lorenzo Soderini 
Antonio di Lorenzo Ridolfi Antonio di Lorenzo Ridolfi 
Bernardo di Giovanni Buongirolami Bernardo di Giovanni Buongirolami 
Piero di Francesco  Mellini Piero di Francesco  Mellini 
Niccolò di Giovanni Capponi Niccolò di Giovanni Capponi 
Piero di Lutozzo Nasi Piero di Lutozzo Nasi 
Jacopo di Piero Guicciardini Jacopo di Piero Guicciardini 
Pierfilippo di Giannozzo Pandolfini Pierfilippo di Giannozzo Pandolfini 
Antonio di Bernardo Dini Antonio di Bernardo Dini 
Michele di Corso delle Colombe Michele di Corso delle Colombe 
  
Dieci di Balìa, April 1484 Dieci di Balìa, November 1484 
Tommaso di Lorenzo Soderini Tommaso di Lorenzo Soderini 
Antonio di Lorenzo Ridolfi Antonio di Lorenzo Ridolfi 
Bongianni di Bongianni Gianfigliazzi Antonio di Taddeo Taddei 
Pietro di Francesco Mellini Niccolò di Giovanni Capponi 
Antonio di Bernardo Dini  Antonio di Leonardo de’ Nobili 
Niccolò di Giovanni Capponi Jacopo di Piero Guicciardini 
Antonio di Puccio Pucci Pierfilippo di Giannozzo Pandolfini 
Jacopo di Piero Guicciardini Antonio di Bernardo Dini 
Pierfilippo di Giannozzo Pandolfini Michele di Corso delle Colombe 






Dieci di Balìa, April 1485 Dieci di Balìa, October 1485 
Tommaso di Lorenzo Soderini Antonio di Lorenzo Ridolfi 
Antonio di Lorenzo Ridolfi Bernardo di Filippo del Nero 
Antonio di Taddeo Taddei Michele di Corso delle Colombe 
Niccolò di Giovanni Capponi Francesco di Piero Dini 
Antonio di Leonardo de’ Nobili Giovanni di Antonio Serristori 
Jacopo di Piero Guicciardini Antonio di Bernardo Dini 
Pierfilippo di Giannozzo Pandolfini Antonio di Leonardo de’ Nobili 
Antonio di Bernardo Dini Jacopo di Piero Guicciardini 
Michele di Corso delle Colombe Antonio di Taddeo Taddei 
Piero di Francesco Mellini Pierfilippo di Giannozzo Pandolfini 
  
Dieci di Balìa, March 1486 Otto di Pratica, July 1487 
Antonio di Lorenzo Ridolfi Guidantonio di Giovanni Vespucci 
Bernardo di Filippo del Nero Angelo di Ottone Niccolini 
Michele di Corso delle Colombe Niccolò di Giovanni Capponi 
Francesco di Piero Dini Jacopo di Pietro Guicciardini 
Giovanni di Antonio Serristori Maso di Luca degli Albizi 
Antonio di Bernardo Dini Ruggero di Niccolò Corbinelli 
Antonio di Leonardo de’ Nobili Francesco di Filippo Valori   
Bernardo di Giovanni Rucellai  Niccolò di Michele Dini 
Antonio di Taddeo Taddei  
Pierfilippo di Giannozzo Pandolfini  
  
Otto di Pratica, January 1488 Otto di Pratica, July 1488 
Francesco di Piero Dini Guidantonio di Giovanni Vespucci 
Antonio di Leonardo de’ Nobili Angelo di Ottone Niccolini 
Giovanni di Antonio Serristori Niccolò di Giovanni Capponi 
Maso di Niccolò degli Alessandri Antonio di Taddeo Taddei 
Bernardo di Neri del Nero Jacopo di Piero Guicciardini 
Pierfilippo di Giannozzo Pandolfini Maso di Luca degli Albizi 
Niccolò di Luigi Ridolfi Bernardo di Giovanni Rucellai 
Antonio di Bernardo Dini Michele di Corso delle Colombe 
  
Otto di Pratica, January 1489 Otto di Pratica, July 1489 
Francesco di Piero Dini Angelo di Ottone Niccolini 
Maso di Niccolò degli Alessandri Antonio di Taddeo Taddei 
Giovanni di Antonio Serristori Niccolò di Giovanni Capponi 
Piero di Lutozzo Nasi Bernardo di Neri del Nero 
Ridolfo di Pagnozzo Ridolfi Lorenzo di Angelo Carducci 
Francesco di Filippo Valori Pierfilippo di Giannozzo Pandolfini 
Antonio di Bernardo Dini Niccolò di Luigi Ridolfi 










Otto di Pratica, January 1490 Otto di Pratica, July 1490 
Pietro di Boccaccino Alamanni Angelo di Ottone Niccolini 
Francesco di Piero Dini Antonio di Piero Malegonnelle 
Giovanni di Antonio Serristori Antonio di Taddeo Taddei 
Jacopo di Piero Guicciardini Niccolò di Giovanni Capponi 
Maso di Luca degli Albizi Maso di Niccolò degli Alessandri 
Francesco di Filippo Valori Bernardo di Neri del Nero 
Bernardo di Giovanni Rucellai Niccolò di Luigi Ridolfi 
Antonio di Bernardo Dini Michele di Corso delle Colombe 
  
Otto di Pratica, January 1491 Otto di Pratica, July 1491 
Guidantonio di Giovanni Vespucci Angelo di Ottone Niccolini 
Giovanni di Antonio Serristori Francesco di Piero Dini 
Piero di Lutozzo Nasi Bernardo di Neri del Nero 
Maso di Luca degli Albizi Ruggero di Niccolò Corbinelli 
Niccolò di Andrea Sacchetti Pierfilippo di Giannozzo Pandolfini 
Bernardo di Giovanni Rucellai Niccolò di Luigi Ridolfi 
Paolantonio di Tommaso Soderini Lorenzo di Piero de’ Medici  
Antonio di Bernardo Dini Michele di Corso delle Colombe 
  
Otto di Pratica, January 1492 Otto di Pratica, July 1492 
Antonio di Piero Malegonnelle Francesco di Piero Dini 
Giovanni di Antonio Serristori Bernardo di Neri del Nero 
Maso di Niccolò degli Alessandri Lorenzo di Piero Davanzati 
Domenico di Carlo Pandolfini Lorenzo di Angelo Carducci 
Bernardo di Giovanni Rucellai Pierfilippo di Giannozzo Pandolfini 
Giuliano di Francesco Salviati Niccolò di Luigi Ridolfi 
Paolantonio di Tommaso Soderini Piero di Lorenzo de’ Medici 
Antonio di Bernardo Dini  Michele di Corso delle Colombe 
  
Otto di Pratica, January 1493 Otto di Pratica, July 1493 
Antonio di Piero Malegonnelle Pietro di Boccaccino Alamanni 
Giovanni di Antonio Serristori Tommaso di Andrea Minerbetti 
Maso di Niccolò degli Alessandri Angelo di Ottone Niccolini 
Francesco di Filippo Valori Francesco di Pietro Dini 
Bernardo di Giovanni Rucellai Bernardo di Neri del Nero 
Giuliano di Francesco Salviati Domenico di Carlo Pandolfini 
Paolantonio di Tommaso Soderini Niccolò di Luigi Ridolfi 
Antonio di Bernardo Dini Piero di Giovanni Pieri 
  
Otto di Pratica, January 1494 Otto di Pratica, July 1494 
Antonio di Piero Malegonnelle Bernardo di Neri del Nero 
Giovanni di Antonio Serristori Matteo di Giovanni Canigiani 
Maso di Niccolò degli Alessandri Niccolò di Carlo Federighi 
Lorenzo di Piero Davanzati Mariotto di Piero Rucellai 
Niccolò di Andrea Sacchetti Pietro di Bertoldo Corsini 
Francesco di Filippo Valori Niccolò di Luigi Ridolfi 
Paolantonio di Tommaso Soderini Piero di Jacopo Guicciardini 
Antonio di Bernardo Dini Michele di Corso delle Colombe 
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Dieci di Balìa, December 1494 Dieci di Balìa, June 1495 
Francesco di Luca degli Albizi Pietro di Niccolò Del Benino 
Pietro di Bertoldo Corsini Matteo di Giovanni Canigiani 
Jacopo di Giovanni Pandolfini Francesco di Ciriaco Pepi 
Pietro di Francesco Vettori Andrea di Niccolò Giugni 
Lorenzo d’Anfrione Lenzi Jacopo di Angelo Acciaiuoli 
Lorenzo di Matteo Morelli Filippo di Lorenzo Buondelmonti 
Paolantonio di Tommaso Soderini Francesco di Santi Ambrogi 
Pietro di Jacopo Guicciardini Gino di Giuliano Ginori 
Pietro di Giovanni Pieri Vieri di Cambio di Vieri de’ Medici 
Lorenzo di Niccolò Benintendi Mazzeo di Giovanni Mazzi 
  
Dieci di Balìa, December 1495 Dieci di Balìa, June 1496 
Bernardo di Lutozzo Nasi Domenico di Baldassarre Bonsi 
Baldassarre di Bernardo Brunetti Bernardo di Filippo del Nero 
Paolantonio di Tommaso Soderini Piero di Giovanni Pieri 
Alamanno di Filippo Rinuccini Matteo di Onofrio del Caccia 
Lorenzo di Matteo Morelli Giuliano di Francesco Salviati 
Pietro di Niccolò Popoleschi Guidantonio di Giovanni Vespucci 
Piergiovanni di Andrea Ricasoli Domenico di Bernardo Mazzinghi 
Francesco di Filippo Valori Ludovico di Antonio Masi 
Pierfilippo di Giannozzo Pandolfini Francesco di Antonio Taddei 
Francesco di Andrea Romoli Giuliano di Giovanni Marucelli 
  
Dieci di Balìa, December 1496 Dieci di Balìa, June 1497 
Antonio di Simone Canigiani Francesco di Lorenzo Gualterotti 
Piero di Bertoldo Corsini Tanai di Francesco de’ Nerli 
Battista di Giovanni Serristori Matteo di Onofrio del Caccia 
Francesco di Martino Scarsi Michele di Bernardo Nicolini 
Lorenzo di Anfrione Lenzi Clemente di Cipriano Sernigi 
Pierfilippo di Giannozzo Pandolfini Bernardo di Giovanni Rucellai 
Taddeo di Agnolo di Zanobi Gaddi Gino di Giuliano Ginori 
Tommaso di Paolo Morelli Francesco di Filippo Valori 
Antonio di Sasso Sassi Mauro di Antonio Fantoni 
Jacopo di Bongianni Mini Marco di Giovanni Baroncini 
  
Dieci di Balìa, December 1497 Dieci di Balìa, June 1498 
Giovanbattista di Luigi di Lorenzo Ridolfi Benedetto di Tanai di Francesco de’ Nerli 
Paolantonio di Tommaso Soderini Bernardo di Carlo di Zanobi da Diacceto 
Antonio di Giovanni Giugni Clemente di Francesco Cerpelloni 
Giuliano di Francesco Salviati Francesco di Andrea di Nofri Romoli 
Domenico di Giovanni Bartoli Giovanni di Antonio di Dino Canacci 
Domenico di Bernardo Mazzinghi Jacopo di Giannozzo Pandolfini 
Pierfrancesco di Francesco Tosinghi Piero di Daniele degli Alberti 
Luigi di Angelo della Stufa Piero di Niccolò Popoleschi 
Giovanni di Francesco Puccini Ridolfo di Pagnozzo Ridolfi 






Dieci di Balìa, December 1498  
Antonio di Sasso Sassi  
Battista di Giovanni Serristori  
Clemente di Cipriano Sernigi  
Domenico di Baldassarre Bonsi  
Giovanni di Giannozzo Manetti  
Giuliano di Leonardo Gondi  
Guidantonio di Giovanni Vespucci  
Luca di Antonio degli Albizi  
Paolo di Francesco Falconieri  
Zenobi di Bartolomeo del Zaccaria  
 
Sources: ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 25, ff. 11r, 171v, 197r, 
214r, 225v and 232r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 33, f. 1r; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 36, f. 226vr; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 41, f. 165v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte 
e stanziamenti, 42, f. 1r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 43, f. 1r; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, f. 1r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, f. 1r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, 
condotte e stanziamenti, 1, ff. 1r, 15r, 31r, and 38r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, 
condotte e stanziamenti, 2, ff. 1r, 17r, 40r, and 66r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, 
condotte e stanziamenti, 3, ff. 1r, 30r, 53r, and 67r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, 







Figure 1. A dismantled bombard, sketched by Bonaccorso Ghiberti in 1480s 
Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Banco rari, 228 
Drawing by Angela Marino 
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A supposed Florentine backwardness in military organization during the fifteenth century has 
been a historiographical paradigm for centuries (Mallett 2006, 134–36; Mallett 1989, 256–57; 
Hale 1987, 64; Epstein 1994, 108–109). According to William Caferro (2008a, 219–23), this 
proposition “has achieved the status of orthodoxy.” Niccolò Machiavelli’s condemnation of 
mercenaries and his nostalgia for citizen armies have conditioned generations of scholars: 
cowardly captains and corrupt soldiers rather than foreign invaders are seen as responsible for 
the irreversible decline of the early modern Italian peninsula (Puddu 1975, 61–67). Florentine 
politicians have been repeatedly blamed for their lack of interest in warfare and for their 
“incomprehension” of the “irrational, violent phenomenon” of war (Finzi 1990, 141). Only in 
recent decades have a few important studies attempted to reevaluate the military institutions 
of the Italian Renaissance states (Mallett 1989; Covini 1998; Storti 2007). After Milan, Naples, 
and Venice, however, is a similar analysis possible for Florence, the birthplace of Machiavelli, 
the author of Il Principe? 
A review of the evidence from Florentine sources concerning military production during 
the fifteenth century can help to answer the question. The need for specific studies of the 
economic implications of Renaissance wars has been asserted by several scholars (Caferro 
2010, 165; Goldthwaite 2009, 400–402), though the negative economic effects of these 
conflicts have already been well documented in medieval and early modern chronicles. The 
Storia fiorentina of Piero Parenti (1450–1519) and the Diario of Luca Landucci (1437–1516) 
highlight the major problems caused to agriculture and commerce by soldiers. Landucci (1969, 
97–98) also underlined the heavy taxation imposed by Florentine government for the financing 
of the Pisan campaign in 1495. Another consequence of war in the late Middle Ages was the 
improvement of fiscal systems (Hale 1987, 257–80) since the maintenance of armies was the 
most expensive endeavor of the Italian states (Caferro 2008b, 169). 
Paid troops, however, could not fight without weapons. Alongside the tax  system, war 
production can be actually considered a useful sign of military organization and its 
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management – its “governance” – can reveal campaign planning in terms of credit, enlistment, 
supplies, and armaments (Panciera 2005). Firearms will be the particular focus of this article, 
stressing more their economic dimension as manufactured goods than their use in battles and 
sieges. Undoubtedly, from their appearance in the fourteenth century, guns were becoming 
more prominent in warfare, in spite of their high costs, low mobility, and lack of precision 
(Hale 1987, 41–47). By the second half of the fifteenth century, cannon and harquebuses were 
probably stored in every arsenal of the continent, especially in France and Burgundy 
(Contamine 2011, 197–213). But were those guns the same as a hundred years before? The 
spread of artillery certainly brought about continuous experimentation in their production 
(Belhoste 2007, 325–42). Innovations were made in the materials, dimensions, safety, and 
mobility of the pieces. Lead and iron cast shot replaced stone projectiles. Black powder was 
made granular (“corned”) and it became more powerful and more resistant to moisture than 
the past (Hall 1997, 87–95). 
Historians of the military revolution have affirmed for years that this progress was 
constant and linear, with clear repercussions on infantry tactics and fortifications (Parker 2005, 
23–70). In reality, despite the vast mobilization of scientific and technical resources, the 
process was slow, full of interdependent changes, attempts, failures, and second thoughts 




Even if economic and military historians have largely ignored them, the sources for examining 
the development of Florentine factories are numerous. The well-known catasto of 1427 
(Herlihy and Klapish-Zuber 1985), alongside the decima repubblicana of 1495 and other fiscal 
records, provide information on the wealth of craftsmen and the tools of their botteghe. The 
documentation of the guilds of smiths (fabbri), armorers (corazzai), and apothecaries (speziali) 
is useful for understanding the regulations of production and market, the membership and the 
working relationships of the artisans (Degrassi 1998, 95–152). The registers of two Florentine 
military institutions, the Dieci di Balìa and the Otto di Pratica, played a predominant role in this 
research: the Dieci di Balìa was the council of ten officials elected in time of war during the first 
half of the century and the Otto di Pratica was a permanent office responsible for warfare and 
diplomacy created in 1480 by Lorenzo de’ Medici after the Pazzi conspiracy. In the following 
years, the Dieci occasionally took over the tasks of the Otto at the outbreak of a war 
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(Rubinstein 1971, 238–45). Only after the Medici regime collapsed, was the “republican” Dieci 
totally restored in December 1494 (Cerretani 1994, 221). Despite those political upheavals, 
their documentation is still plentiful. Their registers of munitions (munizioni), resolutions 
(deliberazioni), and letters (missive and responsive) offer an opportunity to underline not only 
the real use of weapons in encampments and fortresses, but, above all, the leading role of 




One of the most important changes in Renaissance war production concerned the 
indispensable propellant of artillery: gunpowder (polvere). “Far and away this invention 
surpassed other harmful devices,” affirmed  Vannoccio Biringuccio in his Pirotechnia (1558, 
152r). When it was used, however, the powder went literally up in smoke. From an economic 
point of view, this was its best aspect: continuous replacement and constant production were 
necessary for supplying armies and garrisons. In Renaissance Florence, mixing sulfur, charcoal, 
and saltpeter was entrusted to some members of the guild of speziali (Dieci, Munizioni, 4, 90r; 
for further information on this guild, see Ciasca 1927), apothecaries, and spices dealers (Arte 
dei Medici e Speziali, 4, 20v–21r). 
Almost two generations of the Formiconi family contributed to the charges of Florentine 
firearms, and, for more than 70 years, several members of the Barducci family were masters of 
powder fabrication (maestri di polvere). The sons of Stagio Barducci, Lorenzo and Giovanni, 
were the major manufacturers at the outbreak of the war with Lucca, in 1429. They produced 
more than 20,000 libbre of powder at the beginning of 1431 (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, 133r; a 
Florentine libbra was approximately equal to 340 grams, so this was 6,800 kg of powder). In 
spite of all their efforts, it was not enough to meet the state demand. The prolonged conflict 
with the Filippo Maria Visconti, Duke of Milan, opened the market to other competitors, such 
as Vannuccio di Andrea di Berto and Giano Biurg, the latter probably a German artisan (Dieci, 
Munizioni, 1, 115v). The earnings opportunity could be quite attractive for newcomers: 6 
florins was the value set by the Dieci for every 100 libbre of powder (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, 81v). 
Considering their account for 17,000 libbre [5,780 kg], in just six months Vannuccio and Giano 
earned a great amount, more than a thousand florins (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, 144v). 
Moreover, military officers contributed more than merely money, periodically providing 
maestri with saltpeter, sulfur, and charcoal, and then subtracting the cost of those raw 
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materials from the price of the end product (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, 127v). From December 1498, 
Bonarrigo di Matteo from Artimino and Nonni di Giovanni supplied Florentine arsenal with 
several thousand libbre of willow and hazel charcoal (Dieci, Entrata, 30, 67v–188r; Dieci, 
Munizioni, 9, 177r). The price was fixed at 3 lire per 100 libbre (Dieci, Entrata, 30, 160v; a 
Florentine lira equaled 20 soldi, and 9 soldi corresponded approximately to the daily rate for 
unskilled workers during all the century. See Goldthwaite 2009, 364). Sulfur cost 4 lire per 100 
libbre (Dieci, Entrata, 15, 71r) and was usually purchased from small retailers, such as merciai 
(Dieci, Debitori, 25, 75v) and vetturali (Dieci, Entrata, 30, 105v). The charcoal and the sulfur 
were sent to mills for grinding (Dieci, Entrata, 23, 398r) and officials gave the ground materials 
(charboni macinati and zolfo macinato) to gunpowder makers, along with rough (soro, 
rossellino) or refined (rafinato) saltpeter. Masters had only to provide the vats, ladles, and 
brooms, and then buy firewood, vinegar, soap, oil, and other commodities necessary for the 
production of the powder and the functioning of their workshops (Dieci, Munizioni, 9, 121r–v). 
This provision continued for the entire century. In 1490, the son of Lorenzo Barducci, 
Stagio, and another apothecary, Giovanni Formiconi, received a payment from the Otto for 
“powder credits,” with a deduction for “saltpeter debits” (Otto, Munizioni, 1, 11v; polvere data 
and salnitro auto). A decade of wars with Naples (1478–1480), Venice (1482–1484), Rome 
(1485–1486), and Genoa (1486–1487) greatly increased Florentine requirements for 
gunpowder, forcing the state to build a new, public workshop (Dieci, Entrata, 8, 74v) and to 
entrust production to five or six other masters. The consumption grew to such massive 
amounts that it exceeded the skill base and the productive facilities of apothecaries, even 
though on the eve of French invasion, in the autumn of 1494, Giovanni Formiconi was still 
producing tons of corned powder, dispatched to Pisa, Barga, Firenzuola, and other border 
towns (Otto, Munizioni, 1, 53r–68v). In August 1495, Jacopo di Corso, called Baia, and Piero di 
Zanobi, called Zucca, signed a contract for the supply of gunpowder (conducta pulveris) with 
the Dieci di Balìa, becoming the most prominent masters of the Republic (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 
35, 16r). Five years later, their workshop had 7 millstones for the powder, 4 copper boilers, 
and 22 tubs for the saltpeter (Signori, Condotte, 18, 124v). Moreover, carpenters made their 
appearance in the registers of military officers, as when Bartolomeo Banchini started to mix 
powder and to refine saltpeter in 1498 (Dieci, Entrata, 23, 324r). In the previous years, he 
seems to have crafted only carts, boxes for darts, and wooden beams (Dieci, Entrata, 14, 
240v). Filippo di Giovanni, called la Pippa, was a carpenter, a military engineer (Dieci, 
Deliberazioni, 33, 49r), and a gunner (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 39, 111r), before starting to work 
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with Jacopo di Corso in 1499 (Dieci, Entrata, 30, 41v). Giovanni di Corso (called Baino), the 
brother of Jacopo, served in Livorno as a gunner and gunpowder maker in 1500 (Signori, 
Condotte, 17, 207r). 
The production itself was becoming polycentric. Baia worked in Romagna in 1494 (Otto, 
Munizioni, 1, 60r). In July 1499 he was sent into the Florentine encampment during the siege 
of Pisa (Signori, Missive, 21, 51r). Two years before, Jacopo and his workmate went to Livorno 
to increase the local supplies (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 44, 122r). Zucca returned twice in the 
coastal town during 1498 (Dieci, Entrata, 25, 1v; Dieci, Entrata, 27, 25v). A contract of 1499 
specified the obligation for Jacopo and Piero “to go and to stay” where the Dieci ordered 
them, with a monthly salary of 12 florins and a monthly commission for 14,000 libbre [4,760 
kg] of powder (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 46, 12r). At that time, gunpowder was also produced in 
Castrocaro (Dieci, Entrata, 30, 71r and 187r). 
By the end of the century, therefore, production figures leave the impression of high 
levels of output. In the first six months of 1495, Stagio Barducci and his son Giovanni, Jacopo di 
Corso, Piero di Zanobi, and Giovanni Formiconi fabricated 104,261 libbre [nearly 35,500 kg] of 
powder (Dieci, Munizioni, 5,  1r–65r). The Florentine camp was provided with more than 
25,000 libbre [8,500 kg] during May 1499 alone (Dieci, Entrata, 30, 147v–148r). In the summer 
of the same year, Piero di Zanobi produced 65,160 libbre [22,150 kg] of the precious propellant 
(Dieci, Entrata, 30, 246r), often working through the night (Dieci, Entrata, 30, 188v–189r and 
194v). Gunpowder makers were active in Florence, in encampments, and in strategically 
important cities. Qualitatively, they could reach the contemporary standards of northern 
European masters. The 1431 register of munitions reports the existence of the polvere 
mezzana (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, 144v), a particular type of powder which may have been that 
“new” granular, “corned” powder which was affirmed at that time in Germany and the Low 
Countries as more explosive and more durable (Howard, 1996, 4). It was obtained by stamping 
the raw ingredients to reduce particles to roughly uniform size and mix them thoroughly, then 
adding a liquid and shaping the resulting paste into lumps. Those lumps were subsequently 
dried and crushed in grains: a method described forty years later by Francesco di Giorgio 
Martini (1439–1501) for preserving powder on long campaigns (1841, 248). The archival 
records of the 1490s increasingly point out the differences between the types of powder. The 
corned powder was the polvere fina “for portable firearms” produced by Jacopo di Corso and 
Piero di Zanobi, and the polvere sottile of Giovanni Formiconi was probably corned too (Dieci, 
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Deliberazioni, 35, 16r; Otto, Munizioni, 1, 53v). However, to avoid the explosion of guns, less 




Small firearms and giant bombards were fabricated by smiths. In the 1430s, Florentine masters 
had already produced dozens of cannons for the Dieci. Even while trebuchets were still 
employed during the siege of Lucca (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, XVIIIr), the rate of spread of artillery 
was increasing rapidly. Hundreds of hand cannons (scoppietti) were sent to Tuscan towns in 
those years and the purchase of these portable firearms outnumbered the sale of crossbows in 
the first months of 1431 (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, 321v–322r). The powder of Lorenzo and Stagio 
Barducci was used for charging several new cannons. Thirty hand cannons and eleven 
bombards were bought from Antonio di Domenico in Grassina, a village in the vicinity of the 
capital (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, 103v). Tinaccio di Piero’s workshop, at the city gate of San Niccolò, 
made 113 hand cannons, 41 bombards, and 257 libbre of bullets, for which the Dieci owed him 
2,468 lire in May 1431 (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, 158v and 3, 209v). Until 1432 he received orders for 
guns and ramrods (paletti di ferro da scoppietti cioè da carichargli), and for repairing damaged 
cannons (Dieci, Munizioni, 2, 238r). He also collaborated with another smith, Michele di Jacopo 
delle Volte, on the fabrication of a giant bombard of approximately 4,000 libbre [1,360 kg] 
(Dieci, Munizioni, 1, XLVIIII). The workshop of Michele di Jacopo and his son, Simone, situated 
in the district of San Donato de’ Vecchietti, was probably the most active center for the 
production of Florentine artillery. In his catasto statement, Michele declared a taxable income 
of 5,209 florins. Four years later, in 1431 his credit account amounted to 4,349 lire, the price of 
231 hand guns and 60 bombarde of various weights, materials, and dimensions, such as 
bombardelle, bombarde mezane, and bombardine pichole (Catasto, 77, 18; Dieci, Munizioni, 1, 
161r). 
Alongside those principal workshops, other smiths made deals with the Dieci. Some of 
them were specifically gunmakers, bombardieri, or maestri di bombarde, like Bindo di Nanni 
from Castelfranco, Piero di Bartolo from Casoli, Mariotto di Bartolomeo from Arezzo, or 
Michele di Bartolomeo from Barga (Dieci, Munizioni, 4, 9v and 3, 12r). The variety of their 
birthplaces was not an exception: Santi di Domenico came from “the valley of the river Garza” 
(Valdigarza) near Brescia, and Maso di Matteo from Perugia. Many other craftsmen were born 
in small Tuscan villages before moving to Florence (Dieci, Munizioni, 1). 
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Obviously, this market thrived in the course of a few decades. In the 1430s production 
was already variegated. Small cannons of fifteen libbre were put beside guns of hundreds or 
thousands libbre. Michele di Jacopo tested cast iron (ferro colato) for the making of three 
single-piece bombards (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, XLVIIIIr). Michele and Piero di Tinaccio used the 
expensive, resistant cast bronze for the posterior barrel (cannone) of their gun, while the 
anterior (tromba) was made in forged iron (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, XLVIIIIr). Bronze and iron were 
employed in the making of hand cannons (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, 116v). Piero di Tinaccio 
manufactured a four-barrel bombard, a so-called “organ cannon,” with a thousand libbre of 
iron (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, Lv; una bonbarda di ferro colla tronba lungha a modo di cerbottana et 
con quattro cannoni). Taken together, these results suggest that experimentations and 
innovations were the norm in Florence. The use of cast iron also suggests the existence of a 
“Genoese” furnace in the vicinity of the city, suggesting a general improvement in Tuscan 
ferrous metallurgy (Nesti and Tognarini 2003, 70–80; Baraldi 2004, 158–84). Only the prices 
did not change: between 5 and 7 soldi for every libbra of ironwork, 8 soldi for every libbra of 
iron hand cannons, 8 lire for every bronze hand cannon, 9 soldi for every libbra of cast bronze. 
Several new models were soon introduced to the battlefield. The improvements in 
gunpowder permitted a differentiation of pieces, shapes, and uses for obtaining better results 
and greater mobility. The ordnance listed by Francesco di Giorgio Martini (1841, 245–47) in his 
treatise were actually produced in Florence in the 1480s and 1490s. From the longer to the 
shorter, they were: 
 
basilisks, with a length of 25 feet and a shot weight of 20 libbre 
bombards, 20 feet and 300 libbre 
passavolanti, 18 feet and 16 libbre 
cortane, cortali, cortaldi, 12 feet and 100 libbre 
mezzane, 10 feet and 50 libbre 
cerbottane, 9 feet and 3 libbre 
spingarde, 8 feet and 15 libbre 
mortars, 6 feet and 300 libbre 
 
Handguns of the day were known as harquebuses or hand cannons (Ridella 2005, 77–92; 
for an English nomenclature of late fifteenth-century Italian artillery, see Pepper 1995, 292–
293). The word archibugi seems to have appeared in Florentine documentation for the first 
time in April 1484, when 12 portable firearms were sent to Sarzanello (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 27, 
234r). The sources for the preceding decade are extremely scarce, but there is evidence of an 
increasing use of portable firearms during the campaign of 1478 (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 22, 38v). 
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Hand cannons and harquebuses were still produced in 1495 by the Florentine smith 
Baldassarre di Giovanni: 30 of the older type, and 300 of the newer (Dieci, Munizioni, 5, 3r–
65r). A single iron hand cannon cost 52 soldi (Dieci, Munizioni, 5, 3r) while iron harquebuses 
were priced at 400 soldi for every 100 libbre of wrought iron (Dieci, Munizioni, 5, 39r). 
Considering the weight of a single harquebuse (typically 25 to 35 libbre, and therefore 100–140 
soldi, not including the wooden grip [manico], that was separately itemized at 15 soldi; Dieci, 
Entrata, 15, 67v–86r), they would seem to have cost more than a hand cannon. Indeed, in May 
1495, the Dieci even purchased one presumably high-grade harquebuse for 160 soldi (Dieci, 
Munizioni, 5, 4r). In the workshop of Zanobi and Giovambattista di Francesco, however, 
harquebuses were definitely replacing hand cannons in 1495 (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 33, 171r). In 
1496 the Dieci acquired 300 new harquebuses (Dieci, Munizioni, 6, Iv–IIr) and only 60 new 
hand cannons (Dieci, Munizioni, 6, 142v). 
In any case, the most important partner of Dieci for the supplying of iron, munitions, and 
portable firearms was undoubtedly Baldassarre di Giovanni (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 42, 129r–
132r; Dieci, Munizioni, 5, 3r–65r; Dieci, Debitori, 28, 76v–77r), who manufactured numerous 
small guns, the spingarde, and a pair of iron bombards (Otto, Munizioni, 1, 61v; Dieci, Entrata, 
15, 262v). Moreover, he was entrusted with building the gallows for the execution of the 
“prophetic” Dominican friar and preacher, Girolamo Savonarola (Dieci, Entrata, 26, 56r). These 
collaborations would have been fruitful, for Baldassarre: according to his statement of income, 




Forged iron gradually came to be used only for the fabrication of smaller firearms such as 
harquebuses, hand cannons, and spingarde (Hall 1997, 93). In the second half of the 
Quattrocento, several new craftsmen were working in Florentine arsenals: the maestri di getto, 
experts in bronze fusion and makers of cannons and, often, statues and bells. Compared with 
wrought iron bombards, their cannon were undoubtedly stronger and safer. A single-piece cast 
bronze gun could better contain the explosions generated by larger powder charges, 
increasing the range of shot and diminishing the risks for gunners (Biringuccio 1558, 79r; 
Panciera 2005, 120). Furthermore, their pieces were more easily transported (Calegari 2005, 
71–72). 
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Alberghetto Alberghetti from Ferrara, one of the most important Italian gunmakers 
(Panciera 2005, 163), made several bronze spingarde in 1485 (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 30, 260v). 
The German artisan Giovanni from “Auspurch” (i.e., Augsburg) started his career in Lunigiana 
as a gunner. In 1485 he repaired a bombard in Pietrasanta (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 24, 105v). 
Here, one year later, he cast a gun of 14,000 libbre [4,760 kg], called la Felice (Dieci, 
Deliberazioni, 30, 259v). Giovanni manufactured the Marzocchina during the siege of Sarzana 
in 1487 (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 28, 293r). In 1489 in Pisa he made a giant basilisk (basilisco) of 
two pieces from 16,000 libbre [5,440 kg] of bronze and 2 single-piece heavy guns (cortaldi), 
earning for those three guns 1,692 lire (Otto, Munizioni, 1, 9v). He was still in Pisa in 1492, and 
there he was paid by the Otto for 2 bells, 2 bombards, and 90 bronze harquebuses (Otto, 
Munizioni, 1, 33r). Bronze handguns seems to have been relatively unusual pieces, though 
eleven bronze harquebuses (archibugi di bronzo) were listed along with other iron ones in a 
1496 inventory of ammunition of Livorno (Dieci, Entrata, 16, 298r). In 1502, some still 
remained in Florentine arsenals (Dieci, Munizioni, 8, 22r). Francesco from Asti even fabricated 
two brass harquebuses (archibusi di ottone) in 1500 (Dieci, Entrata, 30, 106v). 
In any case, portable firearms were not specified in the contract that magister Iohannes 
de Uspurch teuthonicus signed with the Otto di Pratica in January 1493. Instead, he offered the 
following to officials: 
 
bombards, with a shot weight of 400 libbre or more 
half-bombards, 200 libbre or more 
quarter-bombards, 100 libbre or more 
eighth-bombards, 40 libbre or more 
bombards da ripari for castles and city walls, from 15 to 25 libbre 
passavolanti, cortaldi, or basilischi, 100 libbre 
half-passavolanti, cortaldi, or basilischi, from 50 to 100 libbre  
quarter-passavolanti, from 25 to 50 libbre 
serpentine, from 5 to 25 libbre 
spingarde, from 5 to 6 libbre 
 
The price of those cannons was 70 lire for every 1,000 libbre of cast bronze (Otto, 
Deliberazioni, 5, 96v–97r). In 1499 Giovanni moved from Pisa to Florence, hired again by Dieci. 
He received a monthly salary of 12 florins, with the same clauses of the previous contract 
(condotta): both the 70 lire and the free provisions of metal raw materials (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 
46, 20r). 
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At that time, Florentine production of bronze cannons was increasing. Lorenzo di 
Giovanni Cavaloro, another magister gettuum, sold spingarde and bombards to military 
officers (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 33, 171v). Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Bartoluccio, better known as 
Bonaccorso Ghiberti, cast 1 bombard and 2 passavolanti in 1496 (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 34, 
212r). In 1498, the Dieci ordered him to build a new furnace in his workshop for “easier and 
better melting” (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 48, 145r; perché possi fare i getti migliori et più 
comodamente). Bonaccorso, who also served the army as an engineer (Scaglia 1976, 486), 
produced a book of assorted drawings and texts, the zibaldone (Codex Banco Rari 228). The 
sketches of this book almost certainly reflected the guns that Bonaccorso produced in his 
foundry: single-piece, bronze, small cannons, mounted on carriages and equipped with 
trunnions (Gille 1972, 116). Significantly, his notes included a reference to French methods of 
manufacturing artillery, related to the diameter of the shot: small guns were cast with the rear 
part of the barrel thick as their bore, while the same part of heavy cannons had a thickness of 
twice the measure of their caliber (Banco Rari 228, 88r). 
The lethal modern cannon, made infamous in the French artillery of Charles VIII, were in 
fact the new standard of excellence (Santi Mazzini 2006, 251–52). To reassert his claim on the 
Kingdom of Naples, Charles made his way down the Italian peninsula in 1495, destroying 
enemy fortresses along the way (Parenti 1994, 177). The “impregnable” castle of Montefortino 
was crushed in just one day, causing astonishment and fear among contemporaries (Dieci, 
Missive, 31, 173r). According to Francesco Guicciardini (1971, 79), those guns were devices 
more “diabolic than human” (più tosto diabolico che umano instrumento). For these reasons, 
French cannons became immediately famous. “This French ordnance is very good and very 
effective,” wrote the Dieci in March 1495 (Dieci, Missive, 32, 79r–v; queste artiglierie franzesi 
sono molte buone et fanno grandi effecti). For these reasons, above all, the military officers of 
the Republic decided to manufacture those weapons in Florence. 
In January 1495, the Dieci started construction in the city’s center of a new foundry “for 
casting bombards and other pieces” (Dieci, Munizioni, 5, 17r). The furnace was located in the 
semi-abandoned area of the Sapienza, the college projected 70 years earlier by Niccolò da 
Uzzano for the Florentine university (Ferretti 2009, 93–96). Bricklayers and carpenters built the 
workshop in three weeks. Before mid-February the casting pit was dug, and the furnace 
“walled up” (Dieci, Munizioni, 5, 25r). A few days later, 8,000 libbre [2,720 kg] of copper and 
700 libbre [238 kg] of tin arrived in Sapienza (Dieci, Munizioni, 5, 32r). Baldassarre di Giovanni 
provided iron (Dieci, Munizioni, 5, 28v). On 17 March, the first ever French-style cannon 
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produced in Florence was sent to the Pisan encampment (Dieci, Missive, 32, 79v): a bronze 
cortaldo a la franzese (Dieci, Munizioni, 5, 38r), put on a small cart “according to French 
custom” (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 33, 245r; in curribus more gallico). 
The designers of the cannon were master Francesco di Bartolomeo Telli and Simone di 
Bronzi (Dieci, Munizioni, 5, 15v). In January, before the opening of the foundry, the Dieci 
ordered Francesco to reach Castrocaro and join the French gunners and gunmakers that 
garrisoned the town for observing, measuring, and drawing their cannons (Dieci, Missive, 31, 
81r). Considering the results, the apprenticeship of Francesco was extremely successful. His 
drawings could have been a sort of guidebook for the following casting processes and for the 
reproduction of French guns (Degrassi 2005, 82–83). Based on a solid and reliable tradition, 
the assimilation of new techniques in Florentine production was about to start, as testified by 
Ghiberti’s zibaldone. The bronze cortaldo demonstrate that the Republic in the 1490s had the 
men, the knowledge, and the tools for acquiring innovations and reaching excellent qualitative 
levels in gun production. 
 
Bronze cannon as art 
 
The significance of the Florentine tradition was not exclusively a heritage of smiths and maestri 
di getto during those years. In the capital of the Renaissance, alongside the professional 
gunmakers artists were involved in the casting of fine-looking, yet still lethal, ordnance. After 
his collaboration with Brunelleschi and Michelozzo, Maso di Bartolomeo, also known as 
Masaccio, became a military engineer and a gunmaker, a magister bombardarum, in the 1450s 
(Pardo 2001, 230–31; Dieci, Deliberazioni, 20, 219r). According to his account book, ordnance 
pieces were the most expensive objects that he produced (Codex Baldovinetti 70; Maso di 
Bartolomeo 1894). Pasquino di Matteo from Montepulciano was one of his disciples. During 
his career as bronze sculptor, he also knew the artists Filarete, Desiderio from Settignano, and 
Andrea del Verrocchio. He cast two spingarde in his hometown during 1479 (Dieci, 
Deliberazioni, 23, 79r). In 1482 he served as a gunner in Città di Castello and Citerna. Two 
years later he worked as gunmaker (bombardiere) in Pisa and Sarzanello (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 
27, 257v and 276r). Even Andrea del Verrocchio manufactured a bombarda grossa for Lorenzo 
de’ Medici in 1484. It was a giant bronze gun of three pieces, and weighed more than 20,000 
libbre [6,800 kg] (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 30, 240v). In 1480 Andrea was even cited as a master in 
casting cannons (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 23, 79r) and years later, one of his most talented 
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apprentices, Leonardo da Vinci, offered his works to the Duke of Milan, boasting his ability to 
make beautiful and useful cannons (Gille 1972, 152–53). 
Verrocchio’s bombard might appear obsolete when measured against contemporary 
French ordnance, but it demonstrates the considerable skills in bronze casting of the 
Florentine master, even while its giant dimensions obviously contrast with the European 
tendency towards lighter and more mobile pieces. But was this technical marvel so unrelated 
to the Italian context?  A more massive bombard called Galeozesca Vittoriosa was fabricated 
for the Milanese army in 1472: it weighed 2 tons more than the bronze cannon of Verrocchio 
(Belhoste 2007, 331). A 1478 Sienese bombard weighed more than 8 tons, the Aragonese army 
used a giant bombard in Naples in 1495, and even Venetian gunmakers cast giant pieces during 




Artists and craftsmen needed raw materials for their creations. Yellow sulfur (zolfo giallo) used 
for manufacturing gunpowder was mined in quarries near Volterra, in the volcanically active 
area of Larderello (Otto, Deliberazioni, 5, 50r; Giovannelli 1613, 62). It was also acquired in 
Sicily, in Pozzuoli, or in the neighboring state of Siena (Biringuccio 1558, 25v–26r). Saltpeter, in 
contrast, was not so abundant in nature. Its artificial production probably began in the first 
quarter of the fifteenth century (Hall 1997, 74–79). In Italy the richest organic deposits were 
found in the southern region of Puglia, where several sources of nitrates were still exploited 
during the eighteenth and the nineteenth century (Bianchessi 1998, 572–73; De Sanctis, 2010). 
In the spring of 1481, the gunpowder maker Giovanni Formiconi was in Puglia with an export 
license (licenza di tratta) for saltpeter, granted by the king of Naples (Otto, Deliberazioni, 1, 
33r). It is likely that, after the peace and the alliance of 1480, Florence and Naples began 
commerce in the precious nitrate, as we know they did for raw silk and other agricultural 
products (Goldthwaite, 2009, 140). In any case, during the 1480s, the Medici bank was the sole 
agent for saltpeter. As a ruler and as a merchant, Lorenzo the Magnificent had several 
interests in making its sale a sort of public monopoly. The records of the Otto listed dozen of 
trades of the indispensable compound between 1488 and 1494. The price was fixed at 35 
florins per 1,000 libbre of raw saltpeter, and at 50 florins for the same quantity of refined 
substance (Otto, Munizioni, 1, 53v). In the first months of 1491, the credit of Medici bankers 
amounted to 2,645 florins for 59,916 libbre [20,370 kg] of saltpeter (Otto, Munizioni, 1, 15v). 
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The French invasion changed the situation: the banishment of Piero de’ Medici and the 
crisis of the Aragonese kingdom compelled the Republic to buy saltpeter in Liguria, Romagna, 
and Marche (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 33, 105r; Debitori, 28, 40v; and Munizioni, 9, 186r). The 
Genoese merchant David Lomellino sold 26,802 libbre [9,100 kg] of saltpeter to Dieci di Balìa in 
1503 (Dieci, Munizioni, 8, 167r). Benedetto Buonvisi, a Lucchese banker, dispatched to 
Florence 14,979 libbre [5,100 kg] in July 1499. One month later, Leonardo Strozzi sent to the 
Signoria 18,540 libbre [6,300 kg] from Rimini (Dieci, Entrata, 30, 180v). From 1498 to 1502, 
another Florentine merchant, Piero di Matteo Berti, provided republican maestri di polvere 
with several thousand libbre of saltpeter (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 48, 124v; Dieci, Signori, 
Condotte, 17, 248v; Dieci, Munizioni, 8, 12v). In January 1498, 98 florins were paid to Angelo 
Bardi for 2,000 libbre [680 kg] (Dieci, Debitori, 30, 16v). In August of the same year, the 
Florentine ambassador in Rome, Francesco Gualterotti, signed a deal with the Sienese banker 
Giulio Spannochi for a supply of 25,000 libbre [8,500 kg] of refined material (Dieci, Entrata, 23, 
351v). Contemporaneously, the Dieci tried to enhance the production of artificial saltpeter 
inside the borders of the Republic. In 1496 Florentine officials made a business agreement 
(merchato di salnitro) with Antonio di Jacopo from Faenza, lending him 40 florins for 
establishing a saltpeter factory (nitriera) in Castrocaro (Dieci, Debitori, 28, 40v). In 1502 
Salvatore from Fermo and Giovanni from Incisa were saltpeter makers (maestri di salnitro) in 
Arezzo (Dieci, Munizioni, 9, 168v). 
The provenance of metals is uncertain. In the fifteenth century, iron mines were active 
in Piombino (Meli and Tognetti 2006, 89–104) and in the mountains of Casentino (Melis 1989, 
192–97). Recent research has suggested that Tuscany had the resources to be self-sufficient in 
iron (Goldthwaite 2009, 17). According to Ciasca (1927, 438–40), tin, copper, and lead were 
imported from northern Europe, in particular from England and Poland. In the 1480s the 
Republic promulgated several laws for regulating and promoting the opening of new mines 
(Provvisioni, Carte di corredo, 26, 113r). Tons of copper arrived in Florence during the last 
years of the Medici regime (Otto, Munizioni, 1). The enterprise of Montecatini, managed by 
some of the most prominent Florentine oligarchic families, was successful in copper mining 
(Pampaloni 1975; the complaints that Paolantonio Soderini wrote about this quarry in his 
statement of income are not very believable: see Decima, 9, 1155r). Recycling used metals is 
also testified in the sources through the entire century (Dieci, Munizioni, 1; Deliberazioni, 27, 
231v and 30, 252v). Bronze, however, remained one of the most expensive materials: 24 lire 
for every 100 libbre, while iron cost only 7 lire for the same quantity and lead 8 lire per cento 
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(Dieci, Deliberazioni, 31, 124r). Tin at about 40 lire per cento and copper for as much as, in 
1492, 45 florins per 1,000 libbre (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 30, 240r; Otto, Munizioni, 1, 21r) drove 
the cost of bronze to much higher. 
Finally, timber was needed in all steps of munitions’ manufacture and use. Trees were 
cut everywhere and forests were exploited indiscriminately due to the increase of the 
production of artillery (Morelli 2007, 468–69). The charcoal derived from softwoods (pine, 
elder, hazel, or willow) was one of the three major component of gunpowder, with sulfur and 
saltpeter (Biringuccio 1558, 153v). Beech and chestnut were required for  stoking furnaces and 
for casting metals (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 30, 209v; Baraldi 2007, 205–208). Gun-laying systems, 
the so-called “ladders” (scale) and “stumps” (ceppi), were made of elm (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 
34, 211v). Gun carriages were entrusted to carpenters (Dieci, Munizioni, 5, 45r), and thousands 
of barrels were used for transporting saltpeter and gunpowder (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 33, 246v). 
 
Other war materiel 
 
Florentine war production, however, was obviously not limited to firearms. The Dieci and the 
Otto, in fact, continuously bought materiel of various sorts for supplying castles, fortresses, 
cities, armies, and, sometimes, fleets. Pavises (targoni) were mainly commissioned to artisans 
of San Sepolcro (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 33, 180r). Purchases of spears are often noted down in 
officers’ registers. In the 1430s Matteo di Benedetto sold more than 5,000 lances for knights 
(da chavallo) and infantrymen (da piè) to the commune (Dieci, Munizioni, 2, 58r). The high 
number of soldiers maintained by Republic at the time of Pisan wars increased the demand of 
those weapons. Pistoia, at that time, was the center of production. Pace di Pippo and Donato 
di Giuliano were the suppliers for several companies (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 48). 
Firearms, moreover, were useless without shot. Lead was adopted for small bullets, 
mainly for scoppietti and spingarde (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 27, 226v; Deliberazioni, 24, 103r). In 
1502 Francesco Telli was entrusted with casting lead shots (palle di piombo) for bronze 
cannons (Signori, Condotte, 18, 134r). Stone was used for the shot of bombards. Stone-cutters 
worked incessantly in encampments from the beginning to the end of the century. They were 
under the walls of Lucca, in the zone behind the front in 1478, in Lunigiana, and with the army 
during the Pisan campaign (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, 125v; Deliberazioni, 22, 195r; Deliberazioni, 30, 
214r; and Deliberazioni, 34, 209r, respectively). The major quarry was sited near the gorge of 
Golfolina (Dieci, Missive, 31, 123v). In 1499, “two stone balls covered with lead” (due pallottole 
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di sasso choperte di piombo) were sent to the Florentine encampment (Dieci, Entrata, 30, 
135v). During the 1483 siege of Sarzana, the Dieci experimented with 12 shells of “fire” for 
burning the town. Those pallottole di fuochi lavorati were cast as hollow spheres filled with 
“black” and “Greek” pitch, oil, sulfur, paint, turpentine, saltpeter, verdigris, cotton wool, tow, 
twine, and wax (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 27, 266v). The maker of these projectiles was Francesco 
d’Agnolo, called la Cecca, one of the most brilliant military engineers of the Florentine Republic 
(Vasari 1568, I, 440–47). Eleven years later, the innovations of French cast-bronze artillery was 
accompanied by the introduction of more efficient cast-iron shot (Calegari 2005, 64–65). Iron 
shot was cheap and easily reproducible, with better aerodynamic and ballistic performances 
than stone ammunition (Hall 1997, 93–94). According to contemporary chroniclers, those 
cannonballs were unknown to Italian warfare (Guicciardini 1971, 78; Ferraiolo 1987, 81), but 
Florentine masters could readily assimilate the new technology. Giuliano d’Andrea, a stone-
cutter, was commissioned to sculpt a mold for shot in June 1495 (Dieci, Entrata, 14, 10v). 
Other molds were made by Tommaso Marinai (Dieci, Munizioni, 5, 37r), one of the owners of 
the Montecatini copper mine and of the iron mine of Volterra (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 34, 213v). 
Production, managed by Tommaso himself, started in March in the ironworks of Colle Val 
d’Elsa (Dieci, Missive, 32, 96r). In 1498 the Dieci hired two masters, Giovanni di Piero from 
Piemonte and Antonio di Giovanni from Germany, for casting iron shot in Pistoia (Dieci, 
Deliberazioni, 46, 12v). Every gunmaker and every bell founder of Florence was mobilized 
(Dieci, Entrata, 30, 170v–174v), while the Signoria tried to foster production of iron 
cannonballs (Signoria, Condotte, 17, 27r). According to Piero Parenti (1994, 280) and to the 
anonymous chronicler of La guerra del Millecinquecento (1845, 367), in the summer of 1499 
the army was even provided with cast-bronze cannonballs during the siege of Pisa, due to the 
lack of iron shot (Signori, Missive, 21, 52v). 
 
Replacing military technology 
 
In the 1490s, however, other sectors were slowly declining. The sale of crossbows seems to 
diminish in step with the affirmation of hand cannons and harquebuses. If the books of 1431 
mentioned several makers and five or six shapes of balestre (Dieci, Munizioni, 1), later sources 
cite no significant trade in new crossbows. The purchases of a large quantity of cords for 
crossbows – thousands and thousands of ghavette di filo fiandresco per balestre – reveals, 
instead, a vast use of private weapons (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 48, 126r). Even Florentine 
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armourers did not benefit from public orders. The promising industry of the first half of 
Quattrocento did not last long. The catasto of 1427 listed 20 armorers (Caferro 2008b, 199), 
who were capable of competing with the well-known Lombard masters. Many stylistic 
improvements distinguished a very lively market in armor, helmets, and luxury arms. 
Florentine weapons merchants (armaiuoli) exported those products to France, Spain, and 
England (Scalini 1990, 113–17). However, by the third quarter of the century, Tuscan wares 
conformed to Lombard trends. Lorenzo de’ Medici preferred to buy cuirasses for the garrison 
of Pisa directly in Brescia, and Milanese armor was still arriving in Florence in 1487 and 1496 
(Dieci, Deliberazioni, 30; 42, 120v; and 36, 234v). The captain Paolo Vitelli and his brother 
Vitellozzo wore Lombard steel, as probably did almost all condottieri of those decades 
(Canestrini 1851, 246; Del Treppo 1973, 253–56). Infantrymen often equipped themselves with 
second-hand armor. Old and well-worn pieces were as durable as new ones (Leydi 2007, 173). 
Soldiers could purchase cuirasses in camp (Otto, Missive, 6, 4r) or in the shops of Florentine 
merciai, retailers of helmets (bacinetti, crestate, cervelliere), gauntlets, mail, swords, spears, 
and daggers as well as things of everyday usage, such as hats, bags, guitars, keys, gloves, 
lanterns, hoes, and pots (Arte dei Medici e Speziali, 4, 66r–67r). 
Furthermore, these retailers traded in arrows. Domenico di Niccolò sold more than 
40,000 “small” and “medium” crossbow quarrels in 1494 (Otto, Munizioni, 1, 49r–70r). Those 
bolts offer a particularly interesting case study. During the Milanese war, several craftsmen 
were employed in the fabrication of quarrels (passatoi) for goats-foot lever (da ghanba) and 
for windlass (cianfogna) crossbows (Dieci, Munizioni, 4, 40v–77r; for the different typologies of 
loading systems, see Gelli 1900, 111). Even if the commune did not commission new 
crossbows, the volume of this production remained impressive in the last quarter of the 
century. In 1489, 116,000 steel darts (verrettoni) moved in and out of Florentine warehouses 
(Otto, Munizioni, 1, 5r–9r). Eight years later, the Dieci purchased 40,000 medium, 2,000 thick, 
and 7,000 “olive leaf” darts (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 42, 128v). The capacity to produce such large 
numbers of projectiles may be explained by their complex production cycle. It was a sort of 
putting-out system (Malanima 1997, 273–77), where military officers played the role of central 
agents (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, 196r). The early sources highlight every step of the process, with 
many artisans acting as subcontractors that fabricated the final products in their workshops or 
houses. Woodcutters produced the shafts (asticciuole) in the forest of Pratomagno (Dieci, 
Munizioni, 4, 22r). Smiths forged arrowheads (ferri) in Florence and in the town of 
Montefioralle, in the Chianti region. Donato di Iacopo gave to the Dieci 14,000 ferri between 
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June and October 1432 (Dieci, Munizioni, 4, 5r). Frosino di Stefano sold 34,000 pieces (Dieci, 
Munizioni, 1, 138v). Even the gunmaker Michele di Jacopo delle Volte was involved in this 
business (Dieci, Munizioni, 4, 2r). Lastly, shafts and arrowheads were fixed by assembly 
workers (inastatori), while fletchers (impennatori) bound the feathers (Dieci, Munizioni, 2, 
228r). Parchment (charta pechora) was used for the production of darts for mounted 
crossbowmen (Dieci, Entrata, 30, 97v and 185r). For assembly workers and fletchers, making 
bolts was often an alternative source of income, as it seems to have been for Piero di Giovanni, 
whose trade was that of a cembolaio, a manufacturer of musical instruments (Dieci, 
Deliberazioni, 31, 140v). Marietta di Jacopo made arrows in her own home (Dieci, 
Deliberazioni, 34, 213v). Antonio, Giovanni, and Santi dei Nonni were miniaturists and 
goldsmiths, but they turned into “professional” inastatori and impennatori by the end of the 
century (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 48, 174r; Decima, 33, 163r and 374r).  
In the last 20 years of the fourteenth century, one of the most important stakeholders in 
the business of materiel, including arrows, was Baldo di Giovanni from Careggi. His first trade 
was registered in January 1486, when he received 180 florins for 18,000 bolts (Dieci, 
Deliberazioni, 30, 259r). After that, his affairs multiplied. In August 1492, he was creditor with 
the Otto for about 125,000 libbre [42,500 kg] of copper. Two years later, Baldo sold to officers 
tin, brass, copper, quarrels, harquebuses, steel crossbows, and even four spingarde and 1,000 
Brescian cuirasses (Otto, Munizioni, 1, 32r and 1, 45v–68v). Similar deals were made with the 
Dieci in the late 1490s. Between June and December 1495, more than 60,000 passatoi and 
about 50,000 arrowheads went through Florentine customs (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 33). He  
received another allocation in 1496 for 139,625 ferri, 12 spingardoni, and 70 Brescian 
breastplates (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 36, 234v). In this city of Venetian state,  Baldo also  
collaborated with the master Agnolo di Filippo for the production of many munitions, 
negotiating moreover several copper deals with Antonio and Gervaso Battelli (Dieci, 
Deliberazioni, 48, 125v and 34, 112r). 
But who was Baldo di Giovanni? The sources do not help to reconstruct perfectly his role 
in the market. In 1472 he matriculated in the guild of smiths (Arte dei fabbri, 5, 10r), but in the 
records of the Dieci and the Otto he is often cited as a transporter. In 1496, for example, he 
was entrusted for delivering two lions given as a present to the king of France (Dieci, 
Deliberazioni, 34, 116v). His omnipresence excludes the possibility that he was simply a driver 
of carts. At the same time, the volume of his transactions suggests that he could not 
manufacture all those wares alone. Was he a merchant? A passage from the record of the Otto 
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seems to negate this hypothesis. The copper delivered in February 1492 did not belong to 
Baldo, but rather to Bartolomeo Bartolini and other bankers (Otto, Munizioni, 1, 43r). This 
findings indicates that Baldo was not the owner of the arms that he handled—or at least not 
the only one. Nevertheless, Baldo was probably a business agent between increasing public 
demand and foreign supply. 
In any case, the Lombard commerce of Baldo di Giovanni offers the opportunity to 
tackle another set of problems. The trade of materiel was a “difficult” kind of commerce. 
Weapons were “strategic” goods for states, and foreign policy, conflicts, and alliances, could 
undoubtedly condition the market (Leydi 2007, 171–72). At the beginning of the century, the 
imports of Milanese armor were stopped by the war against the Visconti (Scalini 1990, 82). The 
statute of the armorers forbade commerce with enemies (Camerani Marri 1957, 32–33). In 
1495 Florentine officers bought goods for 607 florins and 1,686 lire in Brescia (Dieci, 
Deliberazioni, 31, 129r), but, when tensions with Venice led to open war in late 1498, the 
frontier was closed. In the register of the first half of 1499 there are no payments for Baldo 
and his suppliers (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 46). According to Giovanni Portoveneri (1845, 294–95), 
in 1495 the Genoese government allowed only Pisans to buy weapons in its possessions. The 
Florentine Republic forbade the export of lances from Pistoia to Lucca and Siena in January and 
April of the same year (Dieci, Missive, 31, 173v–174r and 32, 132v–133r). 
 
Florence and military technological knowledge 
 
Florence, therefore, imported arms and armor. Was the Republic importing also knowledge? 
During the Renaissance, innovations were mainly spread by means of the migration of skilled 
labor, the so-called pratici (Schulz 2007, 89–94). Without theory and manuals, their technical 
culture derived only from the experiences in the field (Calegari 2004, 18–19). Their 
competence was exclusively empirical, learned during apprenticeships (Camerani Marri 1957, 
159–63) and travels (Degrassi 2005, 55). Lombard masters moved through various Italian 
regions constructing blast furnaces (Baraldi 2007, 211). The Duke of Ferrara hired one of these 
maestri da forno, Jacopo Tacchetto, for his ironwork in Fornovolasco, in the mountains of 
Garfagnana (Calegari 2005, 74). Genoese craftsmen built their ironworks from Liguria to 
Corsica, France, and Sicily (Baraldi 2005, 177–78). It was a continuous movement. French 
masters probably cast bronze cannons for Pisan rebels in May 1495 (Portoveneri 1845, 307). 
Iron shot was cast in Naples in November, after the arrival of Milanese gunners (Ferraiolo 
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1987, 81). And British, Dutch, Greek, French, German, Italian, and Portuguese gunners served 
Florentine during the Pisan war (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 48). As described earlier, Francesco Telli 
worked with French gunmakers in Castrocaro, before casting his cortaldo in Florence. In his 
foundry he met Lorenzo di Credi, the heir of the Verrocchio’s workshop, and Piero di Duai, a 
Picard gunner and gunmaker (Dieci, Munizioni, 5, 22r and 48r). He followed the army in 1495 
(Dieci, Missive, 32, 95r). With an order of the Dieci, he then moved to Volterra to manufacture 
new cannons (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 42, 126v). Francesco di Giuliano from Asti was a gunner in 
Livorno (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 39, 106r) and a gunmaker in Sarzana (Otto, Munizioni, 1, 15r). 
Even Giuliano di Goro was a smith and a gunner (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 39, 100r). It is not easy, 
in the records, to distinguish gunners from carpenters, smiths, engineers, or soldiers. But, if 
artillery created new crafts (Belhoste 2007, 333), a significant, reciprocal exchange of their 
knowledge, techniques, and pratiche undoubtedly occurred in Tuscany during those years. 
 
Storage and transportation 
 
Public notices about Pistoiese spears, new foundries inside city borders, and mining legislation 
are only three examples of state control of this industry. A careful examination of archival 
documentation demonstrates, in fact, that the Florentine commune actually enhanced its 
management of war production, from mining grounds to battlefields. 
This is also evident in the storage of weapons. Alongside the medieval warehouse a’ 
Lioni, in the vicinity of Palazzo dei Priori (Dieci, Munizioni, 1, XXIIIIv), new munitions dumps 
were opened in the towers of Notomia and Giustizia,  in the eastern section of the city walls on 
the north bank of the Arno (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 33, 172v). The tower of Notomia was 
expanded in 1495 and 1496 (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 34, 212r; Dieci, Deliberazioni, 36, 237v). It 
was probably that old citadel (citadella vecchia) cited by Hale (1983, 36–37) in his study on 
early modern Florentine fortifications. A foundry was built in the vicinity of Notomia in 1496 
(Dieci, Entrata, 26, 56v–57r; Dieci, Entrata, 23, 23v). The workshop of gunpowder makers, the 
fucina della polvere, was placed on the opposite bank of the river, near the city gate of San 
Niccolò (Dieci, Debitori, 27, 183v; Dieci, Entrata, 30, 64v). Four boilers for refining saltpeter 
were walled up here before 1498 (Dieci, Entrata, 30, 199v). The location was not merely 
fortuitous, as a large amount of water was necessary to refine saltpeter (Biringuccio 1558, 
150r). Another depot was sited in the palace of the Capitani di Parte Guelfa, the institution 
responsible for building and repairing state fortresses (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 34, 210r). During 
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the last decades of the century, Gaspare di Antonio Pasquini was the custodian of all materiel 
(Otto, Deliberazioni, 2, 21r). In April 1485 he was elected by the Dieci as responsible for 
munitions (ministrum ad monitiones) (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 25, 213r), and he was still in charge 
in June 1499 (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 46, 77r). In 1495 Michele di Jacopo di Baldino was chosen 
for watchman of the tower of Notomia (pro guardia pulveris qui in munitione est apud portam 
Iustitiae) (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 35, 3v). The care, purchase, and consignment of arms and armor 
were also entrusted to provveditori, officers specifically appointed by the Dieci, the Otto and 
the Capitani (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 31, 17v). Numerous officials were responsible for artillery in 
the main Tuscan towns (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 23, 78) and in encampment (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 
33, 93v). 
Whatever was the aim of these officials, transporters – vetturali and carradori – were 
indispensable in planning every military operation. The transport of heavy guns was a risky 
undertaking (Covini 2000, 228–30). In September 1482, 13 men, 26 oxen, and 4 carts were 
necessary for transporting a bombard from Arezzo to Anghiari (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 27, 222v). 
Oxen were commonly employed for transporting artillery in fifteenth-century Italy (Mallett 
2006, 166). Horses and small carts seems to have appeared only after the French invasion. In 
1498 the Dieci di Balìa hired 25 men, 25 horses and 25 “small carts” (carrette) to transport 
“small guns” (artiglierie minute) (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 47, 13r). In those years, moreover, the 
officials purchased and rented many carts “with two wheels” (a due ruote) (Dieci, Entrata e 
uscita, 30, 69r–82v). Two of the most important producers of these “new” carts were the 
Pratese Lorenzo di Giovanni Bifolchi and Domenico di Pacino (Dieci, Debitori, 32, 52v and 
Entrata, 23, 207r and 210r). The river Arno, on the contrary, was an easier means of 
transportation, and many of the cannons produced in Florence for the Pisan campaign were 
transported by boatmen (scafaioli) on their rafts (Dieci, Entrata, 30, 86v–88r; Landucci, 1969, 
197).  
Rope makers, also, provided cords for packing weapons (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 34, 214v). 
And many other Florentines were involved in this market. If several masters manufactured 
munitions, many other craftsmen were employed in supplying soldiers. Bakers, innkeepers, 
and wine merchants, for example, sold the basic foodstuffs, while porters were daily recruited 
to transport saltpeter, guns, and metals (Dieci, Deliberazioni, 46, 50v; 43, 54r; and 30, 209v). 
Carpenters – legnaioli and maestri d’ascia – were always present in camp, as were masons and 
bricklayers. Weavers, moreover, manufactured flags and pavilions for captains, and tents for 




Even a mere quantitative study, therefore, could reveal a significant growth in the commerce 
of war-related products. Hale (1987, 232–33) correctly observed that these public 
expenditures were not unprofitable. A multitude of artisans could occasionally make profits 
from the sale of countless goods: it could be an alternative source of income and an 
opportunity for gain. Merchants and bankers often made money from conflict with trade and 
loan (Caferro 2008b, 200). What Machiavelli (1521, 224) called the populous “mobile city” of 
an army, besides, would have consumed more food, clothes, and money than most “standing” 
towns, and soldiers’ wages were often recycled into the economy, intensifying market 
exchange (McNeill 1982, 74). When French soldiers entered Florence in November 1494, for 
example, the Signoria authorized the opening of several new taverns (Landucci 1969, 73). But 
the state, above all, purchased weapons. 
During the entire Quattrocento, as described in the previous pages, the Republic 
contributed to increase this market. Craftsmen were employed in producing munitions and in 
supplying soldiers and fortresses with guns, arms, and armor. Above all, the government 
fostered technological improvements in the fabrication of firearms. Iron bombards and hand 
cannons were gradually replaced by bronze artillery and harquebuses. New foundries were 
built in the city, while the introduction of iron shot stimulated the construction of new 
ironworks. Merchants traded in saltpeter and metals. Even in this field Florentine society 
confirmed the receptive and enterprising habits (Cipolla 2009, 221–225) that distinguish its 
artistic and “technical” Renaissance (Gille 1972, 8–12). Clearly, improved fiscal policies (Molho 
1994, 225–64) and increasing taxes impoverished lower classes, reduced capital, and limited 
investments (McLean 2005, 645–46). In 1497 the Pisan conflict coincided with unemployment, 
epidemics, and famine (Landucci 1969, 132–46). Armies disrupted fundamental trade routes, 
and blockades, as explained earlier, denied access to raw materials. Political crisis also 
influenced the economy of war (Cadoni 1999, 101–75). From a production-related perspective, 
however, the sources makes fairly clear that the received historiographical wisdom of a 







Figure 2. A bombard, sketched by an anonymous Sienese chancellor in 1470s 
Siena, Archivio di Stato, Concistoro, 2557 
Drawing by Angela Marino 
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Se manieri e fortezze sono stati finora ampiamente indagati dalla storiografia, militare e non, 
per la loro valenza politica, la loro funzione economica ed il loro impatto sociale, non 
altrettanto interesse hanno suscitato, negli studiosi, altri spazi della guerra medievale, come 
quelle fonderie e quelle fucine dove le armi venivano prodotte e vendute.1 D’altronde, ancor 
meno attenzione hanno ricevuto, almeno in Italia, i processi ed i progressi tecnologici dettati 
dai conflitti, la loro diffusione e la loro concreta realizzazione per mano di esperti «pratici», al 
dì la di una generica consapevolezza teorica delle loro relazioni con le evoluzioni di tattiche e 
strategie, del ruolo degli armamenti nelle scelte operative di governi e generali, del loro 
quotidiano utilizzo in miniere, botteghe ed accampamenti.2 Non sorprende, quindi, che ai 
lavori pioneristici di Angelo Angelucci e di Carlo Montù sulla storia delle artiglierie italiane 
siano seguiti soltanto pochi altri contributi, apparsi perlopiù nell’ultimo ventennio, e 
solitamente circoscritti all’area veneta ed all’indagine archeologica di alcuni relitti navali.3 
1 W. CAFERRO, Contesting the Renaissance, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 165; M. CALEGARI, Nel 
mondo dei pratici. Molte domande e qualche risposta, in Saper fare. Studi di storia delle tecniche in area 
mediterranea, Pisa, ETS, 2004, pp. 9-33; R. GOLDTHWAITE, The economy of Renaissance Florence, 
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, pp. 400-402; E. STUMPO, La finanza di guerra negli 
antichi stati italiani, in Storia economica della guerra. Quaderno 2007-2008, a cura di Catia Eliana 
Gentilucci, Roma, Società Italiana di Storia Militare, 2008, p. 196. Da segnalare è, però, la recentissima 
pubblicazione di M. MERLO, Armamenti e gestione dell’esercito a Siena nell’età dei Petrucci. Le armi, 
«Rivista di Studi Militari», V, 2016.  
2 K. DEVRIES, Medieval military technology, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2012; B. HALL, 
Weapons and warfare in Renaissance Europe, Baltimore e London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1997; J. GUILMARTIN, Gunpowder and galleys. Changing technology and Mediterrean warfare at sea in the 
sixteenth century, London, Conway Maritime Press, 2003; E. BARALDI, Una nuova età del ferro. Macchine 
e processi della siderurgia, in Il Rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, III. Produzione e tecniche, a cura di 
Philippe Braunstein e Luca Molà, Treviso, Angelo Colla Editore, 2007, pp. 214-216. 
3 A. ANGELUCCI, Documenti inediti per la storia delle armi da fuoco italiane, Torino, Tipografia Cassone, 
1869; C. MONTÙ, Storia dell’artiglieria italiana, Roma, Rivista d’Artiglieria e Genio, 1934; W. PANCIERA, Il 
governo delle artiglierie. Tecnologia bellica e istituzioni veneziane nel secondo Cinquecento, Milano, 
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Un caso a parte è forse rappresentato dagli arsenali, luoghi privilegiati di interazione e di 
scambio tra la cultura tecnica di artigiani e militari e la riflessione teorica di ingegneri e uomini 
di scienza.4 Inoltre, anche i famosi corazzai milanesi, come i Missaglia ed i Negroli, sembrano 
avere attratto l’attenzione degli storici dell’arte per le loro armi di lusso, elmi e «rotelle» di 
splendida fattura che costituivano, però, soltanto una minima parte di quel vastissimo mercato 
di spade, corazze, archibugi, anche di seconda mano, che animava le piazze di accampamenti e 
città.5 
L’obiettivo di questo saggio è, pertanto, un tentativo di ricostruzione della geografia della 
produzione bellica, dello sfruttamento delle risorse energetiche, della circolazione delle merci 
e della migrazione dei «pratici», 6 all’interno di un contesto, come quello della Firenze 
rinascimentale, economicamente molto reattivo e vivace, ma sul quale pesano, ormai da 
troppi anni, il pregiudizio machiavelliano sulle milizie mercenarie e l’«ortodossia 
dell’arretratezza» in ambito militare.7 A questo scopo, sono state vagliate fonti fiscali, come 
quelle del catasto e della decima repubblicana, e documenti prodotti dalle corporazioni dei 
fabbri, dei corazzai e degli speziali, che hanno fornito non solo informazioni sulle relazioni 
sociali e lavorative degli artigiani, ma anche, e soprattutto, sulla loro ricchezza e sugli strumenti 
Franco Angeli, 2005; C. BELTRAME, M. MORIN, I cannoni di Venezia. Artiglierie della Serenissima da fortezze 
e relitti, Firenze, All’insegna del Giglio, 2013; Ships and guns. The sea ordnance in Venice and Europe 
between the fifteenth and the seventeenth century, a cura di Carlo Beltrame e Renato Ridella, Oxford, 
Oxbow Books, 2001.  
4 P. LONG, Artisans, practitioners and the rise of the new sciences, Corvallis, Oregon State University 
Press, 2011; B. GILLE, Leonardo e gli ingegneri del Rinascimento, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1972.  
5 S. PYHRR, J. GODOY, S. LEYDI, Heroic armor of the Italian Renaissance. Filippo Negroli and his 
contemporaries, New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1998; M. SCALINI, L’armatura fiorentina del 
Quattrocento, in Guerra e guerrieri nella Toscana del Rinascimento, a cura di Franco Cardini e Marco 
Tangheroni, Firenze, EDIFIR, 1990; S. LEYDI, Le armi, in Il Rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, IV. Commercio 
e cultura mercantile, a cura di Franco Franceschi, Richard Goldthwaite e Reinhold Mueller, Treviso, 
Angelo Colla Editore, 2007; S. BIANCHESSI, Cavalli, armi e salnitro fra Milano e Napoli nel secondo 
Quattrocento, «Nuova rivista storica», LXXXII, 1998. 
6 P. BRAUNSTEIN, La geografia della produzione, in Il Rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, III. Produzione e 
tecniche, cit., pp. 3-31. 
7 Sulla presunta decadenza degli eserciti fiorentini, v. M. MALLETT, Signori e mercenari. La guerra 
nell’Italia del Quattrocento, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006, pp. 134-136; ID., L’organizzazione militare di 
Venezia nel Quattrocento, Roma, Jouvence, 1989, pp. 256-257; C. FINZI, La guerra nel pensiero politico 
del Rinascimento toscano, in Guerra e guerrieri nella Toscana del Rinascimento, cit., pp. 127-153; J. R. 
HALE, Guerra e società nell’Europa del Rinascimento, Roma – Bari, Laterza, 1987, p. 64. Basandosi su 
fonti primarie, un tentativo di ribaltamento di questa visione è stato offerto recentemente da W. 
CAFERRO, Continuity, long-term service and permanent forces. A reassesment of the Florentine army in 
the fourteenth century, «Journal of Modern History», LXXX, 2008, 2, pp. 219-251. 
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delle loro botteghe. Ampio uso è stato fatto, inoltre, dei registri delle due istituzioni militari 
fiorentine, i Dieci di Balìa e gli Otto di Pratica, avvicendatesi nel corso di tutto il Quattrocento. I 
loro libri di «munizione», di «deliberazioni» e «condotte», di «missive» e «responsive», infatti, 
hanno permesso di investigare approfonditamente il ruolo avuto dallo stato nell’introduzione 
dei cambiamenti tecnologici, nell’adozione di strumenti innovativi, nell’apertura di nuovi 
impianti e nello stimolare, complessivamente, la produzione di «piombo, polvere e saettume». 
A questa documentazione, conservata nell’Archivio di Stato di Firenze, vanno senz’altro 
aggiunti, infine, i libri di conto, le «ricordanze» ed i quaderni di appunti di due dei principali 
fonditori della Repubblica, Maso di Bartolomeo e Bonaccorso Ghiberti, conservati 
rispettivamente nella Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze e nell’archivio storico 
dell’Istituto degli Innocenti.  
 
Nella Firenze rinascimentale, il più antico arsenale risulta essere stato quello «a’ Lioni», 
posto sul retro del palazzo dei Priori, complementare ai magazzini trecenteschi della Camera 
dell’Arme, collocati, a loro volta, al pian terreno dell’edificio arnolfiano. Fin dagli anni Venti, ai 
«Lioni» venivano riposte le munizioni della Repubblica, comprese le artiglierie e la polvere da 
sparo, nonché centinaia di casse contenenti decine di migliaia di verrettoni, fabbricati durante 
la guerra coi Visconti e destinati all’esercito ed alle guarnigioni di frontiera.8 Una simile 
funzione era svolta anche dalla «chasa del chomune», dove, nel 1472, era stata collocata la 
bombarda «Victoriosa», di ritorno dall’assedio di Volterra.9 I depositi del palazzo, tuttavia, 
sembrano essere stati dismessi già prima dell’esilio di Piero de’ Medici, nel novembre del 1494, 
scacciato dalla capitale al grido di «popolo e libertà».10 L’ultima esplicita menzione dei «Lioni», 
infatti, risale al 1491, quando vi venivano collocati centotrentadue archibugi di ferro 
provenienti da Sarzana, dalla bottega di maestro Francesco d’Asti, fabbro e bombardiere.11 
Soltanto con la riforma della milizia machiavelliana, nel 1506, tornavano ad essere depositate 
sotto le volte e gli anditi del «palagio» delle armi, fra cui spiccavano, numericamente, 
seicentonovanta archibugi di bronzo fusi a Firenze, diecimiladuecento lance pistoiesi e più di 
8 ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI FIRENZE [da ora in avanti ASF], Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 1, c. XXIVv; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Munizioni, 4, cc. 40v-77r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Ricordanze, 7, c. 4r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, 20, c. 76r. 
9 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 20, cc. 73v e 92r. 
10 P. PARENTI, Storia fiorentina, I., a cura di Andrea Matucci, Firenze, Leo S. Olschki, 1994, pp. 112-129. 
11 ASF, Otto di pratica, Munizioni, 1, c. 15r. 
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seimila «petti d’acciaio» acquistati a Brescia, affidati alla custodia del massaio della Camera 
dell’Arme, e riservati alle «bande».12 
Fra il luglio del 1511 e l’agosto del 1512, anche la loggia della piazza dei Signori veniva 
adibita, «cavata et acconcia», ad arsenale delle artiglierie. Sei «finestre di filo d’ottone fatte co’ 
telai di ferro» furono montate alla «volta», a protezione di dodici cannoni, otto passavolanti, 
un cortaldo, undici mezzani, venticinque falconetti, due bombarde «all’anticha» ed un 
mortaio, coi loro carri e «fornimenti».13 I pezzi, tutti di bronzo, erano stati in parte trasferiti 
dalle «stalle del papa», altro deposito di artiglierie dei primi anni del Cinquecento, posto nei 
pressi della chiesa di Santa Maria Novella.14 Non era, in ogni caso, la prima volta che i cannoni 
facevano bella mostra di sé, sotto l’alta torre di Arnolfo. Già nel 1505, infatti, in occasione del 
quarto assedio tentato contro la ribelle Pisa, il cronista Piero Vaglienti scriveva che i cannoni 
erano sfilati tra il popolo festante.  
 
Questo dì XXVII d’agosto andonno giù l’artiglierie, che funno pezzi quaranta, 
cioè quattordici grosse di getto di libbre centocinquanta di pallottole di ferro, e 
pezzi quattordici di getto di libre cento, e pezzi dodici d’archibugi per trarre a’ 
merli. E passonno di piazza de’ Signori, a cagione che tutto ‘l popolo la vedesse, con 
gran trionfo e gran solennità.15  
 
Poste accanto al cuore della Repubblica, le artiglierie assurgevano dunque a simbolo di 
forza e di potere, vero e proprio «cliché of statecraft», necessarie alla difesa, garanzia di 
ordine,16 soprattutto in un periodo di forte crisi politica, come quello vissuto a Firenze dopo la 
battaglia di Ravenna e prima del sanguinoso saccheggio di Prato.17 La «piazza», del resto, era, e 
sarebbe ancora stata, palcoscenico del «militare». Le compagnie d’arme vi facevano spesso la 
12 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 9, cc. 165r, 181v e 189r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 10, cc. 99rv, 
158v e 172r. Dell’acquisto dei «petti per le fanterie» parla anche P. VAGLIENTI, Storia dei suo tempi, a cura 
di Giuliana Berti, Michele Luzzati ed Ezio Tongiorgi, Pisa, Pacini, 1982, p. 195. 
13 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 10, cc. 201r e 202v.  
14 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 9, c. 100v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 10, cc. 11r e 112v. La 
localizzazione esatta delle «stalle» è offerta, più che dalle fonti archivistiche, da L. LANDUCCI, Diario 
fiorentino, a cura di Iodoco del Badia, Firenze, Studio Biblos, 1969, p. 310. 
15 VAGLIENTI, Storia dei suoi tempi, cit., p. 201. 
16 HALE, Gunpowder and the Renaissance, cit., pp. 393 e 408; M. CALEGARI, La mano sul cannone. 
Alfonso I d’Este e le pratiche di fusione dell’artiglieria, in Pratiche e linguaggi. Contributi a una storia 
della cultura tecnica e scientifica, Pisa, ETS, 2005, p. 76; MALLETT, Signori e mercenari, cit., p. 168. 
17 F. RINUCCINI, Ricordi storici, Firenze, Dalla Stamperia Piatti, 1840, pp. 171-178; LANDUCCI, Diario 
fiorentino, cit., pp. 315-325; VAGLIENTI, Storia dei suoi tempi, cit., pp. 233-237. 
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mostra, rassegnate dagli ufficiali della Condotta.18 Qui, «su la ringhiera de’ Signori», veniva 
consegnato il «bastone» al capitano generale.19 E la guerra e la violenza pubblica potevano 
spesso diventare efficaci strumenti di consenso, quando espresse, o represse, dalla «bella» 
giustizia, o se incanalate nelle forme spettacolari e propagandistiche delle giostre e dei 
tornei.20 
 
E a dì venticinque di giugno 1513, feciono in su la Piazza de’ Signori uno 
castello di legniame, e fecionlo conbattere con diverse lance e arme e con 
mattoni crudi e bastoni, tutti sanza ferro. Era dentro circa cento uomini e di 
fuori furono circa trecento; e fu in modo bestiale la guerra che di quegli di 
fuori ebbono di quei mattoni in modo che ne andò assai allo Spedale, e 
anche ne morì.21 
  
Rientrati i Medici nella capitale, nel settembre del 1512, i tamburi, le armi e le corazze dei 
vecchi battaglioni di fanteria erano rientrati, a poco a poco, nei magazzini del palazzo dei 
Capitani di Parte Guelfa,22 gli ufficiali incaricati della guardia e della manutenzione delle 
fortezze del Dominio, nonché della nomina dei loro castellani, provvigionati, artiglieri e 
tecnici. 23 Le prime attestazioni della «munizione della Parte», il secondo arsenale della 
Repubblica per importanza e grandezza, risalgono al 1472.24 All’interno dell’edificio venivano 
custodite armi delle più svariate ragioni, ma anche attrezzi per i guastatori, e, soprattutto, 
ingenti quantitativi di metallo.25 Gli inventari del 1496, ad esempio, registravano quarantuno 
corazze, sessantaquattro balestre d’acciaio, dodicimila gavette di filo di Fiandra, 
cinquantanovemila punte di freccia e cinquantasettemila «passatoi», millesettecento «ferri da 
lance», cinquecento «manichi da scure e pale e marre e bechastrini», duecento «targoni», 
18 LANDUCCI, Diario fiorentino, cit., p. 255. 
19 BIBLIOTECA MEDICEA LAURENZIANA, Plut.61.41, c. 82v.  
20 LANDUCCI, Diario fiorentino, cit., pp. 176-178 P. VENTRONE, Cerimonialità e spettacolo nella festa 
cavalleresca fiorentina del Quattrocento, in La civiltà del torneo. Giostre e tornei tra Medioevo ed Età 
Moderna, atti del settimo convegno di studio, Narni, 14-16 ottobre 1988, Narni, Centro di Studi Storici, 
1990, pp. 35-53. 
21 LANDUCCI, Diario fiorentino, cit., p. 340. 
22 Sulla consegna degli armamenti ai battaglioni, v. ASF, Nove conservatori di ordinanza e milizia, 
Distribuzioni di armi, 1, c. 1v; N. MACHIAVELLI, Provisione della ordinanza, in ID., L’arte della guerra. Scritti 
politici minori, a cura di Jean-Jacques Marchand, Denis Fachand e Giorgio Masi, Roma, Salerno, 2001, pp. 
482-483; VAGLIENTI, Storia dei suoi tempi, cit., p. 214; LANDUCCI, Diario fiorentino, cit., p. 273. 
23 G. GUIDI, Lotte, pensiero e istituzioni politiche nella repubblica fiorentina dal 1494 al 1512, Firenze, 
Leo S. Olschki, 1992, pp. 823-841. 
24 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 20, c. 23r. 
25 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 11, cc. IIr-IVr. 
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trecento fra archibugi e «schopietti», sedicimila libbre di ottone, ottomila di piombo «sodo et 
d’ogni sorta», centosettantasettemila di rame «in fasci et piastre» e mille di stagno. Cassette, 
«involture» e barili erano state tutte «consegnate» ai Dieci di Balìa dal provveditore dei 
Capitani, Bernardo Ciai,26 il cui predecessore, Bernardo Bartolini, era stato nominato, alla metà 
degli anni Ottanta, «proveditore generale delle munitioni del nostro comune».27 Al loro 
«donzello» spettava, invece, il «racconciare passatoi vecchi», il «rassettare la polvere», la 
«legatura delle some mandate in campo» ed anche, occasionalmente, la fusione di pallottole 
di piombo.28  
Sempre nel 1496, si procedeva ad ottimizzare gli spazi del deposito con «rastrelli chon 
piciuoli et arpioni per apichare l’artiglieria intorno al maghazino», «uncini da apicchare 
choraze», «arpioni per apicare i targoni» e «piane per lance»,29 mentre, a poche centinaia di 
metri di distanza, in riva all’Arno, i Dieci di Balìa iniziavano l’ampliamento dell’arsenale della 
«Notomia». 
 
Completate, come il resto della seconda cerchia muraria, nel 1284, le due torri della 
«Giustizia» e della «Notomia» svettavano sul lato orientale della città, sulla banchina 
settentrionale del fiume. La prima prendeva il nome dalla porta che proteggeva, posta al 
termine della via dei «malcontenti», dei condannati a morte che di lì transitavano, diretti verso 
le forche antistanti. La seconda, la torre dell’«osservazione», era posta invece «super Arnum». 
Chiamata talvolta anche «torre di San Francesco» per la vicinanza all’omonimo convento, è 
oggi identificabile con il torrione «della zecca vecchia» che sorge in piazza Piave. L’intero 
complesso, compreso in uno spazio di cinquanta metri lineari, andava a formare, ai primi del 
Cinquecento, quella «citadella vecchia» citata da John Hale nei suoi studi sulle fortificazioni 
fiorentine della prima Età Moderna, indicata anche, in un registro del 1495, come l’«arce 
Notomiae».30 Di questo tratto di mura scriveva anche il Machiavelli in una sua «relazione di 
26 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 6, cc. 2r, 8v, 19v, 49v, 51v, 83v, 97v, 113v, 115r, 126v, 139v, 142v, 
163v e 181rv. 
27 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 25, c. 160v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 29, c. 83v; ASF, Otto di pratica, 
Missive, 6, c. 48v. 
28 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 31, c. 148rv. 
29 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, cc. 112r, 181v, 274r e 276v. 
30 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 33, c. 246r; J. HALE, The end of Florentine 
liberty. The Fortezza da Basso, in ID., Renaissance war studies, London, The Hambledon Press, 1983, pp. 
36-37. 
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una visita fatta per fortificare Firenze», sopralluogo compiuto con il noto ingegnere militare 
spagnolo Pietro Navarro nell’aprile del 1526. 
 
 Venimo dipoi alla porta alla Croce, la quale si debbe affortificare come le 
altre, e di quivi, partiti per lungo le mura, si trova una torre che è dirimpetto 
all’Agnolo Raffaello, la quale vorrebbe si ingrossasse bene, per fare più 
difese al luogo propinquo ad Arno. Venimo alla porta alla Giustizia, dove gli 
pare da abbattere il Tempio e tutti quegli imbratti che sono intorno a quella 
parte, et fare quivi un grossissimo baluardo, acciocché possa difendere 
gagliardamente quella entrata d’Arno. Vorrebbe ancora che la torre della 
munizione, che è propinqua alla porta, si abbassasse et ingrossasse, 
acciocché fosse ancora più gagliarda quella parte.31 
 
Il primo riferimento alla «porta alla Giustizia» come deposito di «pulvis et salnitru pro 
publicho munimento» risale, comunque, al 1484. In quell’anno, difatti, vi venivano 
immagazzinati diversi barili di polvere da sparo, posti probabilmente «in luochi alti, dove poco 
si pratichi, per molti rispetti, e, se non per altro, perché la stia all’asciutto».32 Nei sotterranei, 
invece, erano stivate le centinaia di migliaia di libbre di salnitro acquistate a Napoli dal banco 
Medici e rivendute al Comune. 33 Con la fine della «criptosignoria» e, soprattutto, con 
l’aumento delle minacce interne e dei pericoli esterni, i Dieci decisero di fortificare 
ulteriormente la «cittadella», affidando l’opera al capomastro del palazzo dei Priori, Simone 
del Pollaiolo, detto «il Cronaca», a Jacopo Rosselli, «maestro di murare», ed al «Riccio 
muratore».34 
La ristrutturazione della «Notomia», iniziata nel giugno del 1495, prevedeva l’allargamento 
degli spazi di deposito, lo scavo di alcune «buche per sanitro» nel seminterrato, il 
posizionamento di «chorridori» e «parapetti» lignei tra la «porta alla Giustizia» e la torre, il 
rifacimento di «schala e palchetto» ed il collocamento di una spingarda a guardia della pescaia 
dell’Arno. In particolar modo, venivano risistemate le «burbere» per «tirare suso e mandare 
giuso munizione», sostituite le chiavi e le toppe, ed acquistato il mobilio necessario 
31 N. MACHIAVELLI, Relazione di una visita fatta per fortificare Firenze, in ID., L’arte della guerra. Scritti 
politici minori, cit., p. 670. Su tali progetti e lavori, v. ASF, Procuratori delle mura, 1, cc. 1v-2r. 
32 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 8, cc. 91v e 161v; V. BIRINGUCCIO, Pirotechnia, Venezia, Per 
Comin da Trino di Monferrato, 1559, c. 154v. 
33 ASF, Otto di pratica, Munizioni, 1, cc. 3v, 12rv, 15v, 25r e 54r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, 
partiti, condotte e stanziamenti, 1, c. 33rv. 
34 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 34, c. 212r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 36, c. 237v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 14, cc. 170v-171r 
e 273v. 
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all’abitazione del guardiano, una «lettiera salvaticha», cassapanche, un «descho per 
ischirivere» ed un «chalamaio e una ampolla d’inchiostro et sanopia et penello per segnare e’ 
barili». Sul nuovo tetto, infine, veniva anche posto «el segnio de’ Dieci», una «bandera» di 
ferro a forma di colomba,35 realizzata «di suo disegnio» dal fabbro Filippo di Leonardo, detto 
«Chiavaccio».36 
L’opera di ampliamento dell’arsenale continuava ancora nel 1496, rompendo «el muro 
dell’orto della porta alla Giustizia», asportando «sassi e terra e spianare per mettere e’ charri» 
ed «impianellando el tetto fatto alla torre per choprire l’artiglierie». A giugno, la «Notomia» 
poteva essere considerata, a tutti gli effetti, il nuovo deposito delle bombarde della 
Repubblica. Oltre a ciò, nel mese precedente, si era proceduto al «muramento della stanza per 
il fornello della porta», ovverosia alla costruzione di una fonderia pubblica, destinata 
esclusivamente alla produzione di armi da fuoco. All’innalzamento del fabbricato e del 
«magazino del rame» parteciparono diverse decine di artigiani, «fornaciai», «fondatori», 
«legnaioli», fabbri, manovali, scalpellini, «carrettai» e «renaioli», tutti coinvolti a vario titolo in 
quella vivace industria edile della Firenze quattrocentesca, che, sul finire del secolo, vedeva fra 
i suoi maggiori committenti anche i Dieci di Balìa.37 Sul finire del 1498, infine, la «Notomia» 
venne dotata anche di una fucina.38 
Tutte le spese di «acchoncimo et muratura» erano minuziosamente annotate da Michele di 
Jacopo di Baldino Compagni, eletto dai magistrati, nel giugno del 1495, «pro guardia pulveris 
quis in munitione est apud portam Crucis seu Iustitiae», con condizione che risiedesse 
permanentemente nella torre. Il suo salario ammontava a quattro fiorini al mese.39 La vita del 
Compagni, tuttavia, non sembrava essere stata, fino ad allora, particolarmente legata al 
mondo delle armi. Figlio di un rigattiere, immatricolato nell’arte dei fabbri, Michele era stato 
imprigionato per debiti e costretto a prestare servizio «in sulle ghalee de’ Medici», per essere 
poi catturato «in sulle ghalee del re Ferrando da Cholombo, chorsale francioso», alla metà 
degli anni Ottanta. Dieci anni più tardi, nella sua portata della «decima», affermava di non fare 
35 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 8, c. 60v. 
36 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 13, cc. 156v-160v e 174v-176r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e 
uscita, 14, cc. 170v-171r e 273v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 15, cc. 60v e 61v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Debitori e creditori, 25, cc. 62v-63r.  
37 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 26, cc. 56v-57r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, cc. 304v e 
308v. Sull’economia legata all’edilizia, v. R. GOLDTHWAITE, La costruzione della Firenze rinascimentale, 
Bologna, Il Mulino, 1984. 
38 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, c. 64v. 
39 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 35, 3v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, 
condotte e stanziamenti, 42, cc. 115r e 169v. 
97
«arte né bottegha nessuna».40 Nonostante i suoi trascorsi burrascosi, o forse proprio in virtù 
del suo passato rocambolesco, a lui erano comunque affidate le chiavi del più importante 
arsenale fiorentino, così come la scrittura del «libro dei conti» dei Dieci, la tenuta degli 
inventari, i rapporti con gli artefici, le complesse operazioni di pesatura delle armi da fuoco e 
della polvere, la sistemazione dei «fornimenti» delle bombarde, e persino la «rasegnia» delle 
«artiglierie per le fortezze et chastella della Republica».41 A ciò si aggiungeva anche il collaudo 
dei nuovi pezzi, eseguito proprio sul «prato della Giustizia». 
 
Si portò una bonbarda alla Porta alla Giustizia, fatta di nuovo; e provandola, 
trasse e rovinò una casa alla Capannaccia.42 
 
Gaspare di Antonio Pasquini affiancava il Compagni nella gestione e nella guardia dei 
depositi, nelle spedizioni di armi, nei rapporti con gli artigiani e negli acquisti al minuto delle 
più svariate attrezzature. Scelto come «ministrum ad monitiones» nell’aprile del 1485, dopo 
avere gestito una «botegha di pizichagnolo» insieme al fratello, Gaspare era ancora in carica 
nel giugno del 1499, a quasi sessant’anni di età.43 Contrariamente al suo collega, il Pasquini 
aveva maggiore dimestichezza col mercato delle armi, avendo venduto ai Dieci, durante le 
campagne contro volterrani, senesi e napoletani, diversi barili di polvere e numerosi 
archibugi.44 A lui spettava il compito di redigere i «libri di munitione» dei Dieci di Balìa e degli 
Otto di Pratica, annotando quotidianamente le spese relative alla manutenzione dei magazzini, 
delle polveriere e delle fonderie, nonché i rifornimenti delle materie prime, i costi delle 
attrezzature ed i pagamenti a fabbri, falegnami, fonditori, fornai, carradori e muratori.45 
40 ASF, Catasto, 1021, cc. 293r-294r; ASF, Arte dei fabbri, 5, c. 52r; ASF, Decima repubblicana, 31, c. 
274v.  
41 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 13, c. 156v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, cc. 136r e 358r; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 6, cc. 181r-182r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, c. 15v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Entrata e uscita, 16, c. 1r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 34, c. 197r; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 28, c. 64v. 
42 LANDUCCI, Diario fiorentino, cit., p. 128; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, c. 112r. Nel 1510, 
«alla porta a San Francesco», venivano «provati» anche i nuovi bombardieri. In ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Munizioni, 10, c. 209v. 
43 ASF, Catasto, 994, c. 340r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 25, 213r; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, 77r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, 
condotte e stanziamenti, 2, 21r. 
44 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 20, c. 41; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 22, c. 14v. 
45 ASF, Otto di pratica, Munizioni, 1, c. 1r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, cc. 1r, 77r e 221r. 
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Sull’operato del Pasquini e del Compagni sovrintendevano, a loro volta, i due 
sottoprovveditori dei Dieci. Istituiti al tempo della guerra di Pisa, il loro incarico consisteva nel 
rivedere e «raghualgliare» i conti dell’ufficio, nel compilare le partite doppie dei debitori e 
creditori «per conto di munizione», e, a partire dal dicembre 1496, nel «tenere» il «libro 
d’entrata e uscita di artiglieria e vettovaglia e charradori e vetture».46 Ed è proprio di mano del 
sottoprovveditore Francesco di Bernardo Quaratesi l’inventario del giugno 1503 in cui si 
ritrovano «tutta la munizione et artiglieria et altra masserizia» presente nella «cittadella 
vecchia», distribuita in diversi ambienti.  
 
Nel palcho di sopra della torre della Giustizia cioè nella cima: una ruota da 
tirare suso polvere e altro chol suo chanapo vecchio in cima della torre. 
Allo scendere al sechondo palcho: undici balestre d’acciaio sfornite; 
tredici balestre di legno tra chorde e sanze chorde, quattro rotte; due 
ribalde, cioè celate. 
Allo scendere nel terzo palcho: un lettuccio vecchio; una chassetta di 
braccia tre in circha. 
Nell’ultima stanza di sotto cioè in terreno: trecentosessanta palle e dadi 
grossi di ferro da channoni; sessantasette palle di ferro e piombo da 
passavolanti; duecento dadi di ferro mezzani e piccholi; uno spinghardone 
inceppato cho’ l’arme de’ Medici; sette chode tra di ferro e bronzo da 
falconetti; una secchia di rame; una chazza da charichare; due asse d’abeto; 
tre schure cho’ manichi; uno archobuso di ferro sanza chassa; dua paletti di 
ferro; tre saccha; dua strisce di ferro lombardo; dua bande di ferro 
lombardo; quaranta manichi di pale; ottanta aste di braccia tre e mezo l’una; 
uno falchonetto inceppato chol segno della croce sanza choda; sessanta 
palle di pietra in circha da passavolante; uno fascio di legnami da trabacche; 
una bombarda grossa chol segno di cholombe in due pezzi; una bombarda in 
due pezzi chol segno della Parte Ghuelfa; uno pezzo d’artiglieria grossa a uso 
di bombarda sanza choda; uno channone di braccia cinque et mezo in circha 
inceppato in sul suo charro; cinque channoni, cioè quattro mezani e uno 
grosso, sanza ceppi e carri; uno channone grosso inceppato in sul suo 
charro; tre chortaldi grossi. 
Nella stanza tiene la Parte Ghuelfa: uno channone grosso chon sua 
schala e charro; tre passavolante chon schale e charri; uno falchonetto 
fornito sul suo charro.47 
 
La polvere ed il salnitro erano stati trasferiti, in quegli anni, sull’altra sponda del fiume, nel 
cosiddetto «antiporto» di San Niccolò, lì dove sorgeva la «fabbrica della polvere», costruita dal 
46 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 27, c. 1r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 31, c. 1r; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 35, c. 1r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 6, c. 1r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Munizioni, 7, c. 1r. 
47 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 9, cc. 3v-4v. 
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Comune attorno al 1483, ai tempi della guerra di Ferrara e della prima, infruttuosa spedizione 
contro Sarzana.48 La posizione di quest’altra «muraglia per le munizioni» era tutt’altro che 
casuale. Ingenti quantitativi d’acqua, infatti, erano necessari sia per il processo di raffinatura 
del salnitro «soro» o «rossellino», sia per garantire il movimento costante di macine verticali in 
pietra e di magli in legno, indispensabili all’incorporazione della polvere «grossa» ed alla 
produzione della polvere «granita».49 Altri mulini, posti sempre sulle rive meridionali dell’Arno, 
venivano utilizzati anche per la pressatura dello zolfo «giallo» e per la triturazione dei carboni 
di salice e di nocciolo, concentrando così la lavorazione delle materie prime nel raggio di poche 
decine di metri. Inoltre, la posizione periferica assicurava una certa protezione contro i rischi di 
incendio e di esplosione.50 Gli imprevisti e gli incidenti, tuttavia, non mancavano, e non 
sfuggivano all’attenzione degli osservatori più accorti. 
 
E a dì ventiquattro di novembre 1498, intervenne ch’a Ricorboli, essendo 
alloggiati vetturali con dieci muli carichi di polvere da bombarda e artiglierie, 
alcuni giovani volendo provare uno scoppietto, s’appicco el fuoco a quella 
polvere e arse la casa e mula; e’ vetturali ne fu guasti dal fuoco cinque in 
modo che furono portati allo spedale.51 
 
In mancanza di altre fonti, è lecito supporre che, fino agli anni Ottanta del Quattrocento, il 
prezioso propellente per le artiglierie fosse lavorato nella botteghe di quegli «speziali», 
farmacisti e venditori di spezie, cui i Dieci affidavano il compito di comporre il materiale 
esplosivo.52 In questo particolare settore merceologico, si distinguevano in particolar modo 
due famiglie. Tre generazioni di Formiconi, dalla metà del secolo in poi, avevano servito 
«Marzocco», lavorando nel quartiere di Santo Spirito, in Oltrarno.53 E già nel 1429, durante 
48 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 8, 74v. 
49 BIRINGUCCIO, Pirotechnia, cit., cc. 151r-153v; PANCIERA, Il governo delle artiglierie, cit., pp. 95-96 e 
135-136. Sulla maggiore forza esplosiva della polvere granulare e sulla sua maggiore conservabilità, v. 
HALL, Weapons and warfare in Renaissance Europe, cit., pp. 67-74; W. PANCIERA, La polvere da sparo, in Il 
Rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, III. Produzione e tecniche, cit., pp. 307-315. 
50 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 18, c. 129r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, 
cc. 94r e 103v. Sul posizionamento in città di manifatture potenzialmente pericolose, v. D. DEGRASSI, 
L’economia artigiana nell’Italia medievale, Roma, Carocci, 1998, p. 173. 
51 LANDUCCI, Diario fiorentino, cit., pp. 188-189. 
52 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 4, 90r; ASF, Arte dei medici e speziali, 4, cc. 20v-21r. Sulle attività 
della corporazione, v. anche R. CIASCA, L’arte dei medici e speziali nella storia e nel commercio fiorentino 
dal secolo XII al XV, Firenze, Leo S. Olschki, 1927. 
53 ASF, Catasto, 997, c. 297r; ASF, Decima repubblicana, 6, c. 119r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, 16, c. 46r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Munizioni, 1, c. 53v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 9, c. 8v.  
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l’assedio di Lucca, Lorenzo e Giovanni Barducci potevano fabbricare più di diecimila libbre di 
polvere, nel loro fondaco posto nella centrale via di «san Brocholo». L’opificio era poi stato 
ereditato dai loro discendenti, Stagio e Giovanni, entrambi «maestri di polvere» della 
Repubblica.54 
Ma la polvere, usata, andava letteralmente in fumo. E se questo, economicamente, era il 
suo aspetto migliore, dal punto di vista strategico il consumo eccessivo poteva rivelarsi un 
problema. Bisognava produrla incessantemente, rimpiazzarla negli accampamenti e nelle 
fortezze, e persino nelle fiaschette dei singoli archibugieri.55 Nel 1487, le sette bombarde 
«piantate» contro Sarzana consumavano quasi cinquantamila libbre di propellente alla 
settimana, ed i commissari generali richiedevano costantemente agli Otto di provvedere ad 
«instrumenti et maestri in modo che se ne possa fare ogni dì quanta ne logora il campo».56 
Fabbricare polvere in bottega, con mortai e crivelli, non poteva certo soddisfare la crescente 
domanda statale, aumentata a dismisura fin dal 1478, quando si era dovuto rifornire, da 
Firenze, più di trecento fra città, castelli e borghi.57 L’officina pubblica dell’«antiporto», 
dunque, nasceva per meccanizzare e velocizzare la preparazione del composto, evitando di 
«pestarlo» come «anticamente si soleva, con certi mulinetti et macine, come le farine», che 
«era via molto pericolosa, oltre la fadiga».58 Dai pochi libri contabili superstiti, risulta che i 
primi a lavorare nell’impianto siano stati Piero di Zanobi, soprannominato «il Zucca», ed il 
«vaiaio» Vittorio di Domenico Sini.59 Negli anni successivi, Piero avrebbe continuato a gestire 
l’arsenale insieme ad un suo altro socio, Jacopo di Corso, detto «Baia». Nel 1499, i due 
stipulavano una «conducta pulveris» con i Dieci, obbligandosi a produrre ogni mese 
quattordicimila libbre di polvere, a fronte di un salario annuale di centoventi fiorini d’oro.60 
L’anno successivo, nel «munitione di San Niccholò» si contavano quattro «chaldaie» di rame 
per la bollitura del nitrato, ventidue «tinelle d’afinar salnitro» ed un «edifizio da far polvere 
chon sei macine», nonché diversi attrezzi di metallo, madie, imbuti, bilance, botti, sacchi, 
54 ASF, Catasto, 80, c. 99r; ASF, Catasto, 1022, c. 315r; ASF, Decima repubblicana, 33, c. 405r; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 1, c. XVIIv; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 23, c. 78v; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, c. 130r.  
55 HALE, Guerra e società nell’Europa del Rinascimento, cit., p. 242. 
56 ASF, Otto di pratica, Missive, 7, c. 209rv. 
57 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 22, cc. 30r-187r. 
58 BIRINGUCCIO, Pirotechnia, cit., c. 154r. 
59 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 8, cc. 130r e 165r. 
60 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 35, c. 16r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, c. 12r.  
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scope in abbondanza, svariate cataste di legna, aceto per impastare i cosiddetti «gnocchi» di 
propellente, e calcina, olio e sapone per le mole.61  
La necessità di utilizzare considerevoli quantità di polvere, tuttavia, costringeva le 
magistrature militari fiorentine ad affidarsi anche a «pratici» che non fossero «maestri» o 
speziali. Nel 1472, Papino di Cerbino «legnaiolo» aveva ricevuto un compenso di 
centosettantatre fiorini «per la monta di libre tremiladugento di polvere da bombarda auta da 
lui».62 Altri falegnami avrebbero fatto la loro apparizione nei registri delle «munizioni» negli 
anni seguenti. Bartolomeo di Ventura Banchini, ad esempio, produceva soltanto carri, cassette 
per il trasporto di verrettoni e «inceppature d’archibusi», prima di iniziare a «raffinare salnitri e 
fare polvere nella munizione dell’antiporto della porta a San Nicholò» nel 1498.63 Filippo di 
Giovanni, conosciuto anche come «la Pippa», aveva invece servito per più di quindici anni 
come carpentiere, riparatore di balestre, artigliere ed ingegnere militare nei campi fiorentini, 
prima di collaborare con Jacopo di Corso e divenire uno dei «maestri d’afinare salnitro» di un 
nuovo impianto, costruito presso il ponte alle Grazie, nel 1499. Qui, sempre insieme al «Baia», 
operò per qualche mese anche il «Nuziato dipintore».64  
Alla fine del secolo, il reclutamento di nuova manodopera e la meccanizzazione dei processi 
di incorporazione sembravano poter garantire soddisfacenti livelli di produzione. Nei primi sei 
mesi del 1495, i maestri avevano fabbricato più di centomila libbre di polvere.65 Durante il 
maggio del 1499, l’esercito era stato rifornito con venticinquemila libbre di «grossa» e di 
«granita», e, nell’estate di quello stesso anno, ai tempi del fallito assedio di Pisa, il solo 
«Zucca» aveva prodotto sessantacinquemila libbre di propellente, lavorando «tutte le feste e 
di molte notti».66  
 
61 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 18, c. 124rv; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 9, c. 
121rv; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, c. 199v. Sulla lavorazione della polvere nera, v. HALL, 
Weapons and warfare in Renaissance Europe, cit., pp. 67-90. 
62 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 20, c. 88r. 
63 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, cc. 345v, 446v-447 e 495v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 14, 
c. 240v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 23, c. 324r.  
64 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 43, c. 72v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e 
uscita, 30, c. 79v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 13, c. 49r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, cc. 428r 
e 451r-452v; ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, c. 45v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, 24, c. 63v. 
65 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 58, cc. 45r e 86r.  
66 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, cc. 1v-65r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, cc. 147v-148r, 
188v-189r, 194v e 246r.  
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Condussevisi alsì, benché con difficultà, perché non si trovavano salnitri, 
quantità di polvere e pallottole di ferro, per le quali si mandò fino a Brescia, 
e, non se ne potendo avere la quantità necessaria, si prese per partito di 
farle di bronzo, e così si sopplì. Costava l’una circa fiorini tre. Vollene 
alquante el capitano, dorate, per trarle dentro a’ pisani, e’ quali diceano che 
a’ fiorentini mancavono danari, e che non sarebbono d’accordo a fare la 
‘mpresa.67 
 
La fusione di queste pallottole di bronzo aveva mobilitato, in quel concitato luglio del 1499, 
tutte le fonderie di Firenze. Vi era concorso, ad esempio, l’«affinatore» Jacopo Pintegli, che 
aveva imparato il mestiere dal padre Piero, impiegato nella zecca e proprietario della bottega 
di via della Gora, confinante con le mura cittadine.68 La Signoria aveva richiesto anche i servigi 
dell’orafo Giovanni Antonio Moro, di Giuliano di Andrea, di Jacopo del Mazza e di Damiano 
«campanaio alla porta a San Ghallo», fornendo loro rame, carbone, legname e mattoni per il 
forno.69  
Non era la prima che il Comune si rivolgeva ad officine private per la fusione di munizioni ed 
artiglierie. 70  Già nel 1452, Maso di Bartolomeo, chiamato comunemente «Masaccio», 71 
collaboratore di Donatello ed amico del Brunelleschi, aveva prodotto, nel suo «fornello» di via 
della Porta Rossa, diverse bombarde di bronzo, come la «Disperata», la «Lionessa», la 
67 P. PARENTI, Storia fiorentina, II., a cura di Andrea Matucci, Firenze, Leo S. Olschki, 2005, p. 280. 
68 ASF, Catasto, 998, c. 190r; ASF, Decima repubblicana, 6, c. 253rv. 
69 ASF, Entrata e uscita, 30, cc. 168v, 169v, 170v-174r, 195v-197v e 212v; ASF, Signori e collegi, 
Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, c. 86r. 
70 Sulla produzione delle artiglierie in bronzo nel tardo medioevo e nella prima età moderna, v. 
BIRINGUCCIO, Pirotechnia, cit., cc. 78v-89r e 92r-93v; GUILMARTIN, Gunpowder and galleys, cit., pp. 305-312; 
PANCIERA, Il governo delle artiglierie, cit., pp. 161-196; J. BELHOSTE, Nascita e sviluppo dell’artiglieria in 
Europa, in Il Rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, III. Produzione e tecniche, cit., pp. 325-343; R. RIDELLA, 
Produzione di artiglierie nel XVI secolo. I fonditori genovesi Battista Merello e Dorino II Gioardi, in 
Pratiche e linguaggi. Contributi a una storia della cultura tecnica e scientifica, cit., pp. 78-89. Sulla 
riflessione scientifica legata alle stesse, v. A. BERNARDONI, La fusione delle artiglierie tra Medioevo e 
Rinascimento. ‘Cronaca’ di un rinnovamento tecnologico attraverso i manoscritti di Leonardo, 
«Cromohs», XIX, 2014, pp. 106-116; ID. Le artiglierie, da manufatto tecnico alla riflessione scientifica 
degli ingegneri del Rinascimento, «Quaderni storici», CXXX, 2008, 1, pp. 3-33; GILLE, Leonardo e gli 
ingegneri del Rinascimento, cit., pp. 119-122 e 243-247; LONG, Artisans, practitioners and the rise of the 
new sciences, cit., pp. 94-110. 
71 M. GRASSO, Maso di Bartolomeo, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, LXXI, Roma, Istituto della 
Enciclopedia Italiana, 2008; M. PARDO, On the identity of ‘Masaccio’ in Leon Battista Alberti’s dedication 
of Della pittura, in Perspectives on early modern and modern intellectual history, a cura di Joseph Marino 
e Melinda Schlitt, Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 2001, pp. 230-231; C. YRIARTE, Journal d’un 
sculpteur florentin au XVe siècle. Livre de souvenirs de Maso di Bartolommeo dit Masaccio, Paris, 
Rothschild, 1894. 
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«Tribolata», la «Luchese» e la «Perla», cui sarebbero seguite la «Chaccia Pazia» e la «Né patti 
né chonchordia».72 Allievo dello stesso «Masaccio» e del Filarete,73 anche Pasquino di Matteo 
aveva modellato alcune armi da fuoco nella sua bottega di borgo alla Noce ed in diverse altre 
località del Dominio, tanto da meritarsi l’appellativo di «Pasquino delle bombarde».74 Andrea 
del Verrocchio, suo discepolo, aveva utilizzato i locali della sua «chasa», in via dell’Oriuolo, per 
la realizzazione di una bombarda da ventitremila libbre, «bella et buona», inviata a Pietrasanta 
nel 1484.75 Ed in pieno centro città, sotto «la volta del vescovato», Giuliano di Mariotto della 
Nave, «fa mistiero di champane», aveva fabbricato un passavolante nell’ottobre del 1494, 
poche settimane prima della cacciata dei Medici.76 
Sotto il nuovo regime repubblicano, due altri impianti privati assursero a ruoli di primaria 
importanza. Il primo era quello di Lorenzo di Giovanni, detto «Cavaloro», gestito insieme al 
fratello Pacino ed al socio Ludovico di Guglielmo del Buono «orafo», posto sulla via Nuova 
degli Innocenti.77 Il secondo, una «chorte chon terreno dinanzi, in mezo el muro de la città del 
sechondo cierchio, e dentro portici intorno», sorgeva nel medesimo quartiere di San Giovanni, 
a pochi metri di distanza, all’incrocio tra la via della Pergola e la via di Sant’Egidio.78 Confinante 
con l’ospedale di Santa Maria Nuova, era di proprietà di Bonaccorso di Vettorio Ghiberti, 
ingegnere militare, orafo, «maestro di getto» di campane e di cannoni, e nipote dell’assai più 
famoso Lorenzo di Cione.79  
 
Sì che per l’una chosa e per l’altre mi danno detta bottegha, la quale è stata 
già un tempo a uso di schultura overo a uso di gietto, imperò in quela si 
gittorono le porte di bronzo di San Giovanni Battista di Firenze [...]. E a me 
agiudichorono tutti i tagli di stagni, pietre fini intagliate e non intagliate, 
72 BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE CENTRALE DI FIRENZE [da ora in avanti BNCF], Baldovinetti, 70, cc. 92v, 104v e 
111v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 17, cc. 21r e 143v-144r. 
73 F. CAGLIOTI, P. PARMIGGIANi, Pasquino da Montepulciano, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, LXXXI, 
Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2014. 
74 ASF, Catasto, 1017, c. 389r; ASF, Arte dei maestri di pietra e legname, 2, c. 140v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Entrata e uscita, 8, c. 89v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 22, c. 17v. 
75 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 30, c. 249v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 
20, c. 156v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 21, cc. 122v e 146v. 
76 ASF, Decima repubblicana, 32, c. 247r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Munizioni, 1, c. 59r. 
77 ASF, Decima repubblicana, 35, c. 283r; ASF, Decima repubblicana, 25, c. 52rv. 
78 ASF, Catasto, 1022, c. 394r; ASF, Decima repubblicana, 33, c. 483v. 
79 F. ANSANI, The life of a Renaissance gunmaker. Bonaccorso Ghiberti and the development of 
Florentine artillery in the late fifteenth century, di prossima pubblicazione su «Technology and Culture»; 
G. SCAGLIA, A miscellany of bronze works and texts in the Zibaldone of Buonaccorso Ghiberti, 
«Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society», CXX, 1976, 6, pp. 485-513. 
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dovunque ve fussino, e ongni altra maserizia atta a l’arte di schultura o di 
pittore o d’orafo o di gietti, e in gienero tutte chosse non usabili alla chasa, 
cioè tutte chosse apartenenti a schrittoio o che si possa chomprendere 
essere a simili chose, perché el vero è che per testamento di Lorenzo di 
Cione Ghiberti erano mie tutte masserizie.80 
 
A partire dal 1498, in queste due fonderie, per ordine dei Dieci, erano state sperimentate le 
fusioni di nuove artiglierie di bronzo, basate su modelli francesi,81 ed assai differenti dalle 
tradizionali, «intrattabili» bombarde italiane, che richiedevano innumerevoli guastatori ed 
intere settimane di lavoro per essere trasportate e posizionate.82 Arrivati al seguito di Carlo 
VIII, i nuovi pezzi transalpini erano apparsi agli occhi dei contemporanei come terribilmente 
veloci, straordinariamente compatti ed incredibilmente manovrabili. Posti su piccole 
«carrette», trainati da cavalli, i canons, i faulcons e le couleuvrines erano inoltre caricati con 
pallottole di ferro, munizioni mai viste prima, che ne facevano «più tosto diabolici che umani 
instrumenti».83  
Su espressa richiesta del capitano generale Paolo Vitelli, in quello stesso 1498, i magistrati 
avevano anche tentato di velocizzare ed incrementare la fabbricazione di «falconetti» e 
«cortaldi»,84 facendo erigere nello «scrittoio» ghibertiano un nuovo «fornello, perché possi 
80 ARCHIVIO STORICO DELL’ISTITUTO DEGLI INNOCENTI [da ora in avanti AOI], Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di 
Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, 13230, cc. 7v-8r. 
81 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, cc. 134r, 259r, 324v e 343v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, cc. 
246r, 257r, 265r, 313v, 318r, 367v, 370v, 387v, 390r, 427v, 478v e 488r; AOI, Debitori e creditori di 
Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, 13229, cc. 24v-26r; BNCF, Banco rari, 28, c. 88r.  
82 Nel 1484, ad esempio, i commissari generali in campo avevano più volte lamentato la mancanza di 
manodopera necessaria al posizionamento delle artiglierie, che «non si piantono dal dire al fare». ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Missive, 20, cc. 157r e 225v; ASF, Dieci di balia, Missive, 21, cc. 106r e 108r; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Responsive, 32, cc. 161r, 171v, 177r, 356v, 362r e 363r.  
83 S. PEPPER, Castles and cannon in the Naples campaign of 1494-95, in The French descent into 
Renaissance Italy, a cura di David Abulafia, Aldershot, Variorum, 1995, pp. 263-265 e 286-291; G. SANTI 
MAZZINI, La macchina da guerra, Milano, Mondadori, 2006, pp. 251-252; D. POTTER, Renaissance France 
at war. Armies, culture and society, Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 2008, pp. 152-153; HALL, Weapons 
and warfare in Renaissance Europe, cit., pp. 90-95; BIRINGUCCIO, Pirotechnia, cit., c. 79rv; B. CERRETANI, 
Storia fiorentina, a cura di Giuliana Berti, Firenze, Leo S. Olschki, 1994, p. 203; P. GIOVIO, Historie del suo 
tempo, Venezia, Appresso Domenico de’ Farri, 1555, c. 59rv; F. GUICCIARDINI, Storia d’Italia, a cura di 
Silvana Seidel Menchi, Torino, Einaudi, 1971, p. 79.  
84 G. NICASI, La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 1504, «Bollettino 
della Regia Deputazione di Storia patria per l’Umbria», XVII, 1911, p. 366.  
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fare i getti migliori et più comodamente».85 Nel mentre, dopo varie tribolazioni, la Repubblica 
poteva finalmente tornare in possesso della sua fonderia della «Sapienza».  
 
Officine di proprietà statale erano attive un po’ dappertutto, in Italia. Il grande complesso 
industriale dell’arsenale di Venezia era all’avanguardia negli sviluppi della tecnologia bellica fin 
dal tardo Trecento, ed accoglieva maestri provenienti da tutta Italia.86 Una «chasa delle 
bombarde» era funzionante ad Urbino già nel 1450.87 A Napoli erano all’opera, nel Castel 
Nuovo e nel «tarcinale» navale, diversi «pratici» genovesi, francesi e siciliani, tra cui spiccava il 
«mestre maior della artelleria», Guglielmo dello Monaco.88 In delle rimesse pubbliche operava, 
probabilmente, la maggior parte dei «bombarderii» tedeschi al servizio del papa nella seconda 
metà del Quattrocento.89 Il duca di Milano ed il signore di Piombino, allo stesso modo, 
avevano fornito i loro impianti agli artigiani stranieri che avevano ingaggiato.90 E nei suoi 
possedimenti in Garfagnana, Ercole I d’Este, duca di Ferrara, aveva fatto costruire, fra gli anni 
Settanta e gli anni Novanta, il «forno di Volastro», con annessi magazzini, stalle, carbonili ed 
una «fabricha» per la riduzione della ghisa, assoldando maestri bresciani e bergamaschi.91 
A Firenze, il «fornello del comune» sembra essere stato inaugurato con un certo ritardo 
rispetto alle altre capitali italiane. Al 1485, infatti, risale la fusione delle prime artiglierie nel 
complesso della «Sapienza», e cioè quattro passavolanti, diverse spingarde e due bombarde, 
85 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, c. 145r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Munizioni, 7, c. 390r. 
86 MALLETT, L’organizzazione militare di Venezia nel Quattrocento, cit., pp. 109-114; PANCIERA, Il 
governo delle artiglierie, cit., pp. 163-166; E. CONCINA, L’arsenale della Repubblica di Venezia. Tecniche e 
istituzioni dal Medioevo all’Età Moderna, Milano, Electa, 1984.  
87 BNCF, Baldovinetti, 70, c. 7r. 
88 R. RIDELLA, Fonditori italiani di artiglierie in trasferta nell’Europa del XVI secolo, in Storie di armi, a 
cura di Nicola Labanca e Pier Paolo Poggio, Milano, UNICOPLI, 2009, pp. 19-20; FERRAIOLO, Cronaca, a 
cura di Rosario Coluccia, Firenze, Accademia della Crusca, 1987, p. 81; F. DE NEGRI, dello Monaco, 
Guglielmo, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, XXXVIII, Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1990. 
89 K. SCHULTZ, La migrazione di tecnici, artigiani e artisti, in Il Rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, III. 
Produzione e tecniche, cit., pp. 108-109. 
90 L. BELTRAMI, La Galeazesca Vittoriosa, Milano, Tipografia Allegretti, 1916, pp. 13-14; C. VISCONTI, 
L’ordine dell’esercito ducale sforzesco, «Archivio storico lombardo», III, 1876, 3, p. 475; AOI, Ricordanze 
di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, 13230, cc. 16rv e 52v-59r; AOI, Debitori e creditori di 
Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, 13229, cc. 3r-4v 
91 CALEGARI, La mano sul cannone. Alfonso I d’Este e le pratiche di fusione dell’artiglieria, cit., pp. 63-
67. 
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fabbricate dal ferrarese Alberghetto Alberghetti, uno dei più conosciuti artefici del tempo.92 Le 
fonti, purtroppo, non chiariscono dove «maestro Alberghetto» abbia realizzato le ventiquattro 
«spinghardelle» fornite ai Dieci di Balìa sei anni prima, o dove abbia lavorato su una statua di 
Traiano commissionatagli dalla famiglia Niccolini,93 ma è comunque ipotizzabile che la sua 
bottega fosse stata approntata in uno spazio pubblico, o quasi, proprio come quello della 
«Sapienza»,94 edificata su di un vasto terreno di proprietà dell’Arte di Calimala, sito tra la 
chiesa della Santissima Annunziata ed il convento di San Marco, lì dove Niccolò da Uzzano 
aveva progettato di costruire una monumentale «casa della Sapienza» per gli allievi indigenti 
dello «studio fiorentino».95 
Il cantiere del collegio, avviato nel 1429, non era mai stato portato a termine, ostacolato 
dall’ostruzionismo dei Medici, fortemente interessati al controllo dell’area, sita nel cuore 
stesso della città, ed assai vicina al loro palazzo di via Larga. Così, accanto alla chiesa servita, 
fra i «chiostri» della «casa», gli orti ed i tiratoi sorti negli anni Settanta, apriva i suoi battenti la 
«Sapienza» di Alberghetto, destinata però ad essere serrata nel giro di pochi mesi, in seguito al 
trasferimento del maestro a Venezia, ed a causa della sempre maggiore rilevanza assunta, nel 
contempo, dalle officine di Pisa.96 Soltanto nel gennaio del 1495, dopo la ribellione dell’antica 
repubblica marinara, venne giudicato necessario il ripristino dell’impianto e la costruzione di 
una nuova «muraglia per gittare artiglierie».97 D’altronde, in quegli stessi giorni, i Dieci 
sembravano essere rimasti alquanto impressionati dalle relazioni fatte loro sui nuovi pezzi 
francesi, che «sono molto buoni et fanno grandi effecti».98 Muratori e falegnami avevano 
completato la bottega nel giro di qualche settimana, scavando il «pozzo» ed edificando il 
«fornello» con migliaia di mattoni,99 mentre il «maestro di getto» del Comune, Francesco di 
Bartolomeo Telli, veniva inviato a Castrocaro «per pigliare le misure delle bombarde del re di 
92 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 23, cc. 18v e 48r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 30, c. 115r; ASF, Dieci 
di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 8, c. 129v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 30, c. 
260v, ASF, Otto di pratica, Responsive, 3, c. 422r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 24, c. 91v. 
93 ARCHIVIO NICCOLINI DI FIRENZE, Fondo antico, 106, i. 4. 
94 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 22, c. 17v. 
95 E. FERRETTI, La Sapienza di Niccolò da Uzzano. L’istituzione e le sue tracce architettoniche nella 
Firenze rinascimentale, «Annali di storia di Firenze», IV, 2009, pp. 89-112. 
96 PANCIERA, Il governo delle artiglierie, cit., p. 163.  
97 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 31 c. 149v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e 
uscita, 13, c. 45v. 
98 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 32, c. 79rv. 
99 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, cc. 15v-31v. 
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Francia» e disegnarle.100 Al suo ritorno, con ottomila libbre di rame e settecento di stagno, il 
Telli realizzava, insieme al suo socio, Simone «di Bronzi», un «cortaldo a la franzese», posto «in 
curribus more gallico», collaudato il diciassette di marzo, e subito inviato in campo.101  
I lavori nell’officina erano continuati, incessantemente, nella primavera e nell’autunno del 
1495. A maggio, gli ufficiali avevano invitato un bombardiere piccardo, Piero da Douai, a 
lavorare nell’officina, congedandolo poco dopo a causa della cattiva riuscita di un 
«chortaldo».102 In agosto, la bottega veniva ricostruita ed ampliata, permettendo al Telli di 
fondere, nei mesi successivi, più di sedicimila libbre di bronzo.103 Tuttavia, nonostante gli sforzi 
profusi dai Dieci e dai loro esperti, la fonderia era destinata a chiudere di nuovo, «per 
chagione», stavolta, «che el fornello di detta Sapienza si disse pe’ frati di San Marcho».104  
 
Ampliandosi la dottrina di frate Ieronimo, e tirando alla sua religione molti di 
cui l’ingegno vedeva pronto e bene disposto a fare negli Studi il frutto, 
volontà li venne di preparare studio o libreria oltre che là di San Marco. 
Però, parendoli vicina la Sapienza, istituita dal nobile huomo Niccolò da 
Uzzano, e raccomandato all’Arte de Mercatanti e per invidia della Casa 
Medici suto fatto lasciare per molti anni imperfetto, lui finalmente impetrò 
di potervi spendere ducati cinquemila e tirarlo alla perfezione, non mutando 
però del disegno dell’autore niente e mettendovi la sua arme, con 
condizione che quando resi fussero e’ decti denari, allora li frati di San 
Marco iurisditione alcuna non vi avessero.105 
 
Nel luglio del 1496, venivano così consegnati «in mano di Michele di Baldino, alla torre di 
San Francescho » tutti gli attrezzi provenienti dalla «Sapienza», molle, pali, rastrelli «da 
chavare rame», «vagli di ferro da buttare terra», «finestre di ferro della fornace», «ferri per le 
armadure» e «fusi di legno da fare l’anima degli stormenti», canapi, scale, casse ed argani 
100 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 12, c. 17v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 31, c. 81r. Dodici 
«falconi», cinque «cortaldi» ed altrettante «colovrine» erano state infatti lasciate da Carlo VIII a 
Castrocaro, durante la sua marcia in Romagna, come annotato in M. SANUDO, La spedizione di Carlo VIII 
in Italia raccontata da Marino Sanuto il Giovane, a cura di Rinaldo Fulin, Venezia, Tipografia del 
Commercio, 1883, p. 127. Sulla valenza e sull’utilità del disegno nella trasmissione delle tecnologie, v. D. 
DEGRASSI, La trasmissione dei saperi. Le botteghe artigiane, in La trasmissione dei saperi nel Medioevo 
(secoli XII-XV), atti del diciannovesimo convegno internazionale di studi, Pistoia, 16-19 maggio 2003, 
Pistoia, Centro Italiano di Studi di Storia e d’Arte, 2005, pp. 82-83. 
101 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, cc. 32r e 38r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 33, c. 245r. 
102 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, cc. 48r e 57v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 26, c. 82v. 
103 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, c. 358r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 13, cc. 190v-191r.  
104 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, c. 130r. 
105 PARENTI, Storia fiorentina, II., cit., p. 28. 
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destinati all’allora erigenda officina della «Notomia», insieme ad un «fornello armato di ferro 
chon due bocche».106 Soltanto nel 1498, dopo il rogo del Savonarola e la momentanea 
sconfitta dei «frateschi»,107 l’Arte aveva richiesto l’intervento della Signoria per ottenere la 
restituzione del complesso. Il ventuno luglio del 1498, il provveditore della «Sapienza» affidava 
ancora «le chiavi al provveditore dei Dieci di Balia, perché quivi si possa fare spingarde e 
artiglierie per il tempo che i presenti Dieci staranno in officio».108 Il due agosto, il «forno» era 
nuovamente in attività, dopo aver «messo tutti e’ mattoni et ferramenti di quello dalla porta 
alla Giustizia in quello alla Sapienza».109  
Nell’estate del 1503, il Telli affidava tutte le «masserizie» della bottega, compresi alcuni 
«fusi» di pezzi non terminati, a due dei nuovi «pratici» del Comune, Giovannantonio da Novara 
e Giovanni Piffero, autori, nelle settimane successive, di una «colobrina» e di un «mezzano».110 
L’anno dopo, il «maestro di getti alla Sapienza» era Bernardino di Antonio, originario di Milano, 
assoldato con una provvisione mensile di sette fiorini d’oro al mese.111 Durante la sua 
condotta, la produzione dell’impianto si era moltiplicata, come testimoniato dagli undici 
«mezzani» fusi nel 1507, dai diciannove «falconetti» fabbricati nel 1511 e, soprattutto, dai 
seicentonovanta scoppietti di bronzo consegnati al Comune nel solo 1510.112 Qualche tempo 
prima, il complesso della «Sapienza» era stato ampliato con un’altra fonderia, destinata però 
alla realizzazione di statue, come quelle del gruppo della «Predica del Battista», modellate da 
Giovan Francesco Rustici per il battistero fiorentino, e «gettate» dallo stesso Bernardino in 
cambio di centoventi fiorini.113  
Inoltre, nel 1505, i Dieci avevano investito più di cinquecento lire in una ferriera della 
«Sapienza», gestita da Jacopo di Francesco delle Opere e da Andrea di Jacopo Manzini da Colle 
106 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, c. 129v. 
107 LANDUCCI, Diario fiorentino, cit., pp. 169-178; VAGLIENTI, Storia dei suoi tempi, cit., pp. 46-51; 
PARENTI, Storia fiorentina, II., cit., pp. 162-175; CERRETANI, Storia fiorentina, cit., pp. 245-251. 
108 ASF, Carte strozziane, s. II, 51, t. II, c. 267r. 
109 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, c. 362v. 
110 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 8, cc. 127v e 161v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 9, c. 14v. Fra il 
1514 ed il 1519, un Giovanni Piffero viene indicato, nelle fonti senesi, come il fonditore delle canne 
dell’organo della cappella del palazzo comunale, e come il realizzatore di un analogo strumento per la 
chiesa della Santissima Annunziata. È piuttosto verisimile che si tratti dello stesso «pratico», padre, fra 
l’altro, di Benvenuto Cellini. V. L’organo di Giovanni Piffero del Palazzo Pubblico di Siena. Relazione di 
restauro, saggi, prelievi, rilievi, a cura di di Pier Paolo Donati, Siena, Tipolitografia Periccioli, 1983.   
111 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 9, c. 52v. 
112 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 10, cc. 9v, 31v, 172r e 225r.  
113 FERRETTI, La Sapienza di Niccolò da Uzzano. L’istituzione e le sue tracce architettoniche nella 
Firenze rinascimentale, cit. pp. 115-116. 
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Val d’Elsa. Il «fornello», in particolar modo, era destinato alla produzione di pallottole di ferro, 
cave, «da trarre fochi lavorati», 114  e di «forme di palle di ferro cholato», ma anche, 
probabilmente, di veri e propri proiettili di ghisa, realizzati grazie all’ausilio di potenti mantici, 
mossi da un particolare «ingenio».115  
 
Altre fonderie, più o meno occasionali, si ritrovavano sparse su tutto il territorio della 
Repubblica. Nella stessa Firenze, nel 1484, uno o più pezzi della gigantesca bombarda del 
Verrocchio erano stati fabbricati nelle circostanze del succitato palazzo di Parte Guelfa.116 
Nell’agosto del 1478, durante la campagna contro l’esercito napoletano sui confini senesi, a 
Colle Val d’Elsa erano state fuse «bombardelle et spingardelle», dando disposizione che 
«cotesta comunità concorra et col bronzo delle campane et con altro». 117  Un simile 
provvedimento era stato adottato, nel novembre dello stesso anno, a Montepulciano. Qui, il 
commissario Jacopo Dini scriveva «che v’è bisogno di tre bombarde grosse per defendere la 
terra», ma i Dieci, «non le potendo di quaggiù mandare comodamente» inviavano 
direttamente «costì Brancatio bombardiere, che le facci con ogni prestezza possibile».118 
In occasione degli assedi di Citerna e di Città di Castello, nel 1482, Pasquino di Matteo 
riparava il «channone» e la «tromba» di un pezzo a Sansepolcro, a poche miglia dai due centri 
umbri. Qualche mese più tardi, Pasquino avrebbe inoltre colato, nel suo «fornello» di Firenze, 
una campana per il castello di Monte Poggiolo.119 Fra il 1485 ed il 1486, anche il maestro 
tedesco Giovanni di Jacopo da Augusta «rigitava tre maschi di bombarda et uno da 
114 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 9, c. 124rv. Questi proiettili incendiari erano solitamente riempiti 
con pece «greca», olio «petroio», acqua «arza», canfora, bambagia, zolfo, vernice, salnitro, verderame, 
trementina e limatura d’acciaio, a seconda della personale ricetta dell’ingegnere. In ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 27, c. 266v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, c. 191rv. 
115 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 10, cc. 41r e 66v. 
116 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 8, cc. 129v e 161v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 30, 240v. 
117 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 5, cc. 4r, 63v, 69v, 81v, 129v-130r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, 22, c. 17v. 
118 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 6, cc. 29r e 32v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 7, cc. 46r, 83r, 122v e 179r. 
Se gli «imbasciadori» poliziani offrivano volentieri il metallo dei loro campanili ai fiorentini, ben altra 
situazione si sarebbe vissuta nell’Aquila cinquecentesca. Per punire i ribelli, infatti, il governo spagnolo 
avrebbe sequestrato le diciotto maggiori campane cittadine «per ordine dello illustrissimo signor viceré 
et consegnatole allo signor castellano per la artigliaria se fa per lo stesso castello». In S. MANTINI, L’Aquila 
spagnola, Roma, Aracne, 2008, pp. 49 e 58-60. 
119 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 8, cc. 31v, 44r, 89v e 101r.  
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pasavolante a Pietrasanta», dopo aver servito in quel di Livorno come bombardiere.120 Una 
nuova officina venne anche approntata a Firenzuola, al tempo della calata di Carlo VIII, 
affidandola al «Cavaloro», che, nella fortezza, realizzò due passavolanti, quattro spingarde e 
sei code «da bombardelle».121 A Volterra, poi, nel 1496, il capitano della città, Lorenzo Morelli, 
faceva costruire un «fornello in ciptadella per li getti del bronzo», usato da Francesco Telli per 
la manifattura dapprima di una italica bombarda di due pezzi e di cinque cortaldi «alla 
franzese».122 
Agli inizi del nuovo secolo, il provveditore di Livorno riceveva da Bernardino da Milano due 
«cholovrine over chanoni», sei mezzani, quattordici falconetti, «una bombarda per la fusta» ed 
un «passavolante pel rivellino della nuova di mare», artiglierie «che sono una chosa bella e 
buona». Il maestro lombardo si era successivamente spostato a Cascina per riparare «quattro 
chanoni de’ vostri vecchi», ma, prima di stabilirsi definitivamente nella «Sapienza», avrebbe 
lavorato anche a Castrocaro, nella fortezza di Librafratta ed a Volterra.123  
  
La presenza di diverse fonderie sul territorio è indice di una produzione decentralizzata e 
policentrica, confermata anche dalla specializzazione raggiunta da altri centri del Dominio nella 
fabbricazione di diverse tipologie di armi. Alla Trappola, nel territorio di Loro Ciuffenna, 
venivano realizzate decine di migliaia di «asticciuole» da frecce, assemblate poi in Firenze con 
le punte metalliche provenienti da Montefioralle.124 Al Borgo a Sansepolcro, Vico di Schiatta ed 
i suoi figli producevano i cosiddetti «targoni», grossi scudi di legno per la fanteria, ricoperti di 
cuoio bollito, venduti nella capitale e, spesso, alle truppe napoletane di passaggio per il centro 
120 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 9, c. 127v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 24, cc. 69r, 124v e 128v; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 28, c. 102r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 33, cc. 584r, 592r e 598r. 
121 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, c. 361r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, c. 163r; ASF Dieci di balìa, 
Debitori e creditori, 25, c. 71r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 26, c. 43v. 
122 ASF Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 28, cc. 73v-74r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 29, 
cc. 159r e 199v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, c. 244r. 
123 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 8, c. 191v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 9, c. 159v; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Munizioni, 10, cc. 23v, 60r e 243rv. 
124 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 1, cc. 138v e 196r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 2, c. 228r; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 4, cc. 2r, 5r, 22r e 40v-77r. Il ciclo produttivo dei verrettoni «da ghanba» e da 
«cianfogna» seguiva gli schemi tipici del putting-out system dell’industria tessile, caratterizzato da una 
forte divisione del lavoro. In questo sistema, le magistrature militari fiorentine rappresentavano l’anello 
di congiunzione di una catena di attività coordinate, tutte svolte a domicilio da diversi artigiani, 
controllandone e dirigendone lo svolgimento. Sul domestic system, v. P. MALANIMA, Economia 
preindustriale, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 1995, pp. 273-277. 
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Italia.125 Maestri «di carra» per le artiglierie repubblicane erano invece i fratelli Lorenzo e 
Francesco Bifolchi da Rignano, coadiuvati, almeno negli anni Ottanta, da uno dei principali 
ingegneri militari del Comune, Francesco d’Angelo, meglio conosciuto come «la Cecca».126 A 
Livorno, dopo la ribellione di Pisa, era stato costruito un «edificio» della polvere, gestito, 
durante le campagne estive, dal «Zucca» e dai suoi garzoni.127 Il carbone necessario al 
propellente veniva lavorato ad Artimino,128 mentre lo zolfo era estratto dalle cave della 
regione vulcanica di Pomarance, nei dintorni di Volterra.129 Per quanto riguarda il salnitro, la 
prima nitriera repubblicana sembra essere stata aperta a Castrocaro soltanto nel 1496, su 
iniziativa di Antonio di Jacopo da Faenza.130 Nel 1507, Antonio di Salvatore da Fermo e 
Giovanni di Domenico da Incisa aprivano un secondo impianto ad Arezzo.131 
 
Richordo chome questo dì XXX di gennaio di chomessione di messer Piero 
ghonfaloniere facciamo merchato chon Giovanni di Domenicho della Ancisa 
maestro di fare salnitro ad Arezzo, presente Francesco Davanzati, di tutta 
quella quantità di salnitro lavorassi in detto luogho, di quella qualità e bontà 
d’uno saggio appresso di Francesco Quaratesi o meglio, el quale ci ha a 
porre in doana di Firenze a ogni sua spesa, per pregio e prezzo di fiorini 
trentacinque d’oro in oro, de’ quali n’ha auto al presente da Taddeo Taddei 
depositario fiorini venti, di che ne sta mallevadore Francesco Quaratesi, el 
quale salnitro ha a mandare di quello ha lavorato, e di poi quello farà dì per 
dì.132 
 
125 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 33, c. 180r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 
20, cc. 133r e 200rv; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 27, cc. 37r e 45v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 
31, c. 17r. 
126 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 24, c. 96v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 32, cc. 
52v, 159r, 207r e 263v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, c. 43v; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, c. 127r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Missive, 5, c. 184r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Missive, 
7, cc. 26r e 38v. 
127 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 44, c. 122r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e 
uscita, 25, c. 1v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 27, c. 25v. 
128 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, cc. 67v-188r. 
129 ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte e stanziamenti, 5, c. 50r. Sulle attività 
estrattive dello zolfo sulle Colline Metallifere, v. F. FRANCESCHI, Vicende della regione boracifera 
volterrana nel Basso Medioevo, in Il calore della terra. Contributo alla storia della geotermia in Italia, a 
cura di Marco Ciardi e Raffaele Cataldi, Pisa, ETS, 2005, pp. 143-153. Il contratto di una «societate et 
compagnia sulfuris» operante «nella serra di Fontebagni o vero Allidora, corte di Libbiano, et in parte 
dele Pomarancie», è in ASF, Carte Riccardi, 816, i. 118. 
130 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 28, c. 40v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 58, c. 219v. 
131 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 9, c. 168v. 
132 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 10, c. 20v. 
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A Pistoia, invece, erano attive diverse officine di lanciai, come quella di Pace di Pippo o 
quella di Donato di Giuliano, capaci di rifornire condottieri e connestabili fiorentini con decine 
di migliaia di armi da «fanti a piè» o da «chavallo», da «sacchomanni» e da «giostra», con i 
ferri battuti secondo la tradizione italiana o la nuova moda transalpina. La compravendita di 
grossi quantitativi di lance era affidata talvolta a mercanti locali, come i Partini ed i Panciatichi, 
o alle grandi compagnie commerciali della Dominante, come gli Strozzi, che, spesso, riuscivano 
ad esportare i manufatti anche a Siena ed a Lucca.133 
Sempre a Pistoia venivano colate anche le pallottole di ferro per le nuove artiglierie «alla 
franzese», totalmente sconosciute al warfare italiano prima del 1494.134 Se i proiettili di pietra 
potevano essere scolpiti nelle cave sparse un po’ dappertutto sul territorio toscano,135 la 
fusione delle munizioni per i «cortaldi», i «falchonetti» e le «cholovrine» richiedeva invece 
impianti complessi e «pratici» capaci di adoperarli. I «fornelli», inoltre, necessitavano della 
disponibilità di acqua corrente per il movimento dei mantici, nonché di grandi quantità di 
combustibile ligneo.136 Gli impianti siderurgici sulle rive dell’Ombrone erano stati messi in 
funzione sul finire del 1498, assoldando maestri stranieri e «nostrali».137 
 
Maestro Giovanni di Piero di Piamonte, Lancilotto di Voglino da Pistoia e 
maestro Antonio di Giovanni tedesco, condocti a piacemento dell’uficio loro 
per fare pallottole di ferro colato in Pistoia a lire tredici il cento et 
schoppietti et archibusi a lire venti il cento et spingarde colle chode a lire 
diciotto il cento, tutto a pruova et a loro spese, et con conditione debino di 
133 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 19, c. 148v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 13, cc. 
171r-172v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, cc. 103v, 109r e 150v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 31, cc. 
173v-174r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 32, c. 316r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Responsive, 5, cc. 102v, 107r-
108r, 149r e 174r.  
134 GUICCIARDINI, Storia d’Italia, cit., p. 78; FERRAIOLO, Cronaca, cit., p. 81; BIRINGUCCIO, Pirotechnia, cit., 
c. 117v. 
135 Decine e decine di scalpellini, infatti, lavorarono incessantemente, per tutto il secolo, negli 
accampamenti dell’esercito, sotto le città assediate, o nelle zone vicine al fronte, come in Lunigiana, o 
sul confine senese. Sul finire del Quattrocento, la principale cava delle «pallottole di sasso» era sita nella 
gola della Golfolina, in Valdarno di Sotto, nei pressi del porto di Signa. ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 1, c. 
125v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, c. 195r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 30, c. 214r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 34, c. 209r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 31, c. 123v. 
136 BIRINGUCCIO, Pirotechnia, cit., c. 118r; E. BARALDI, La siderurgia in Italia dal XII al XVII secolo, in La 
civiltà del ferro. Dalla preistoria al terzo millennio, a cura di Walter Nicodemi, Milano, Olivares, 2004, pp. 
147-186; ID., Una nuova età del ferro. Macchine e processi della siderurgia, in Il Rinascimento italiano e 
l’Europa, III. Produzione e tecniche, cit., pp. 325-243; A. NESTI, I. TOGNARINI, Archeologia industriale, Roma, 
Carocci, 2003, pp. 70-90. 
137 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, cc. 12v-13r. 
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presente essere serviti di fiorini cinquanta larghi di oro in oro, et loro hanno 
a dare mallevadori sufficienti di francharli in fare le sopradecte artiglierie et 
inoltre di osservare il merchato.138 
 
L’«edificio del ferro» pistoiese sembra aver lavorato con «qualche difficoltà» nei suoi primi 
anni, per poi stabilizzarsi agli inizi del Cinquecento.139 A Colle Val d’Elsa, invece, i proiettili di 
ghisa venivano «gettati» fin dal 1495, sotto la supervisione di Tommaso Marinai, uno dei 
maggiori imprenditori minerari della Toscana quattrocentesca.140 Nel 1497, alle «fabriche» 
colligiane veniva inviato anche uno «maestro Giovanni», per cercare di migliorare ed 
aumentare la produzione.  
 
Noi desiderremo, quando fussi possibile, che d’ogni sorta di munitioni si 
facessino in sul nostro di quella perfectione che si fanno a Breschia o in altro 
luogho. Et essendoci venuto ad mano uno maestro Giovanni maestro di 
getti, che ha qualche oppinione di potere fare palle di ferro colato et in 
quella qualità le hanno e’ franzesi, viene con questa per provarne tale opera 
alle fabriche di costì. Et noi desiderremo che, quando non ne resultasse 
danno a’ padroni della fabriche, li fusse prestato favore, accioché potesse 
experimentare el suo disegno. Et pertanto ti diciamo che tu conforti quelli 
maestri sieno contenti, per nostro amore, a sopportare un pocho di disagio 
sanza loro danno, accioché questa cosa si experimenti141. 
 
In occasione dell’assedio del 1499, la Signoria aveva persino affittato e ristrutturato una 
ferriera di Colle, rifornendola di diciannovemila libbre di «rottami di ferro» ed affidandola al 
maestro Simone di Andrea da Romena ed ai suoi carbonai.142 L’anno successivo, l’officina 
ospitava anche un «pratico» bresciano, Giovanni di Comino dei Fusti.143 
138 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 47, c. 61r. 
139 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, 47v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, cc. 169r 
e 199r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 50, c. 196r.  
140 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, c. 37r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 14, c. 10v; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Missive, 32, c. 96r. La carriera di Tommaso è stata presa in esame da G. PAMPALONI, La miniera del 
rame di Montecatini Val di Cecina. La legislazione mineraria di Firenze e i Marinai di Prato, Prato, A cura 
della Cassa Risparmi e Depositi, 1976. 
141 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 57, c. 17r. 
142 ASF, Consulte e pratiche, 65, c. 61r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 26, cc. 320v-321r; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, c. 161v; ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, cc. 32r, 
34v e 37v. 
143 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, c. 237v; ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e 
stanziamenti, 18, c. 125r. 
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Per tutto il Quattrocento, nelle vicinanze della capitale, ed in particolar modo a Grassina, a 
Villore, a Figline ed a Ricorboli, 144  diversi fabbri aveva prodotto scoppietti, archibugi, 
spingarde, e persino bombarde. Le loro fucine integravano la produzione di manufatti ferrei 
delle più importanti botteghe cittadine, come quella della famiglia Tinacci,145 di Michele e 
Simone delle Volte,146 di Francesco di Geremia147 e di Baldassarre di Giovanni.148 Quest’ultimo, 
in particolar modo, si era arricchito, nell’ultimo ventennio del secolo, grazie alla vendita di 
migliaia di armi da fuoco portatili, come testimoniato dalle sue dichiarazioni al fisco fiorentino. 
Per la portata del catasto del 1480, infatti, «el detto Baldassarre non ha beni, salvo i ferri atti 
all’exercitio del fabro», mentre, per la «decima» del 1498, l’artefice dichiarava di possedere sei 
case, diversi terreni, e di tenere appigionate due botteghe, poste in prossimità di palazzo 
Strozzi, nella via «de’ ferravecchi», ed uno «maghazino per tenere charboni».149  
144 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 16, c. 240r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 19, cc. 
45v, 46r e 192r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 20, cc. 50v, 53v e 81v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori 
e creditori, 27, cc. 24r-25r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 2, c. 236v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, c. 
245r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 8, c. 46v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 33, c. 171r. 
145 Trasferitisi a Firenze da Castel San Niccolò, i Tinacci avevano lavorato per i Dieci di Balìa fin dagli 
anni Venti del Quattrocento, tramandandosi il mestiere per almeno tre generazioni. La loro officina era 
posta «fuori dalla porta a San Niccholò». ASF, Arte dei fabbri, 5, cc. 21r, 33v, 34v, 63r, 65v, 75v; ASF, 
Catasto, 67, c. 460r; ASF, Catasto, 1015, c. 361r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 1, c. Lv; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Munizioni, 7, cc. 5v, 19v, 28r e 39r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 16, c. 169r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Debitori e creditori, 20, c. 53v. 
146 I due delle Volte, padre e figlio, erano stati, al tempo delle guerre contro Milano, i principali 
fornitori della Repubblica, arrivando ad accumulare un discreto patrimonio immobiliare e ad investire 
più di settecento fiorini nel «monte chomune». I registri delle magistrature militari riportano diverse 
loro sperimentazioni nella fabbricazione delle artiglierie, come la realizzazione di pezzi in «ferro colato» 
o l’impiego del bronzo per il «cannone» delle bombarde. ASF, Arte dei fabbri, 5, c. 70r; ASF, Catasto, 77, 
c. 118v-121r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 1, cc. XLVIIIIr e 161r. 
147 Fin dal 1467, nella sua bottega «nel borgho fuori della porta alla Croce», Francesco era capace di 
fucinare centinaia di «scoppietti» per l’esercito fiorentino. ASF, Arte dei fabbri, 5, c. 30v; ASF, Catasto, 
1018, c. 412rv; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 17, c. 126r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 
19, 44v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 22, c. 14v.  
148 ASF, Arte dei fabbri, 5, c. 10r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, cc. 2v-65r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Munizioni, 7, cc. 20v, 46v, 53r, 56r e 60rv; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 22, cc. 14v, 17v e 21v; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 27, cc. 8v-9r e 179v-180r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 
31, cc. 20r, 22v, 120v e 147r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 35, cc. 31r e 57v.  
149 ASF, Catasto, 1005, c. 78r; ASF, Decima repubblicana, 16, cc. 204r-205r. La vendita, da parte di 
Baldassarre, di un suo «pezo di terra», è annotata anche dal cronista e calderaio Bartolomeo Masi. Il 
podere, confinante con le proprietà dello «spedale de’ Nocienti», fu pagato dal padre dello scrittore 
cinquanta fiorini d’oro. In B. MASI, Ricordanze, a cura di Giuseppe Corazzini, Firenze, Sansoni, 1906, p. 
36.  
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La fabbricazione di altri prodotti metallici, invece, si era decisamente contratta, nel corso 
del quindicesimo secolo. La fiorente manifattura di elmi e di armature, contraddistinta da 
svariate migliorie stilistiche e da nuove tipologie di protezione, aveva resistito alla concorrenza 
milanese e bresciana per tutti gli anni Venti e Trenta, riuscendo ad esportare celate e «petti» 
in Francia, in Spagna ed in Inghilterra, anche grazie all’operosità dei mercanti di armi fiorentini, 
i cosiddetti «armaiuoli».150 Delle venti botteghe di corazzai elencate nel catasto del 1427, 
tuttavia, ben poche sopravvissero all’affermazione degli acciai e delle fogge lombarde,151 in 
mancanza soprattutto di grossi ordinativi statali, essendo l’acquisto delle armature demandato 
alle singole compagnie d’arme.152 Nel 1478, Pierfilippo Pandolfini, oratore a Venezia, otteneva 
dal Senato della Serenissima la «licentia di trarre mille corazze da Brescia».153 Preparando 
l’assedio di Sarzana, nel 1487, gli Otto di Pratica avevano incaricato Filippo Redditi, uno dei 
loro cancellieri, di acquistarne a Bologna da maestri milanesi e da mercanti emiliani.154 
 
Noi haremo bisogno di cinquecento in secento corazze da fanti a piè. Però 
voliamo, sanza dimonstratione, sappi et intenda se costì n’è, et ad che 
pregio si harebbono, et quante, et avisacene subito. Et quando tu potessi 
persuadere et operare che quelli che n’hanno le portassino da loro a Pisa o a 
Pietrasancta, te ne ingegnerai, certificandogli che ne venderanno là, subito 
et presto, ogni gran somma. Ingegnerati farne opera et effecto con dextro 
modo.155 
 
Negli anni Ottanta e Novanta, a guadagnare dalle importazioni da Brescia, Mantova e 
Bologna era stato soprattutto il «vetturale» Baldo di Giovanni da Careggi, uno dei principali 
commercianti di materiale bellico del tardo Medioevo fiorentino, che in Lombardia ed in Emilia 
intratteneva diversi rapporti di affari con alcuni armaioli e mercanti, come «maestro Agnolo di 
150 SCALINI, L’armatura fiorentina del Quattrocento e la produzione d’armi in Toscana, cit., pp. 83-126. 
151 W. CAFERRO, Warfare and economy in Renaissance Italy, «The Journal of Intedisciplinary History», 
XXXIX, 2008, 2, p. 199. 
152 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, c. 101v; G. CANESTRINI, Documenti per servire alla storia della milizia 
italiana dal XIII secolo al XV, «Archivio Storico Italiano», XV, 1851, pp. 246-247. Sulla gestione economica 
delle compagnie, v. M. DEL TREPPO, Gli aspetti organizzativi, economici e sociali di una compagnia di 
ventura italiana, «Rivista Storica Italiana», LXXXV, 1973, 2, pp. 253-275; W. BERNARDONI, La compagnia 
del capitano Micheletto Attendolo nella contabilità quattrocentesca della Fraternita dei Laici di Arezzo, 
«Annali Aretini», XXII, 2014, pp. 115-144. 
153 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 4, c. 173r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 5, c. 35r. 
154 ASF, Otto di pratica, Missive, 6, c. 4r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, c. 415r. 
155 ASF, Otto di pratica, Missive, 5, c. 103r. 
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Filippo», Antonio e Gottardo «dei Battelli», e gli eredi di Guido e Ridolfo Zanchini.156 Fra le 
«munizioni» da lui vendute ai Dieci ed agli Otto, figuravano, oltre alle «coraze», anche «rami et 
ottoni», «passatoi», punte di freccia, spingarde, pallottole di ferro, archibugi, «scoppietti», 
marre, beccastrini e balestre d’acciaio, tutto solitamente «passo in doana a gabella dello 
officio».157 
 
Nell’ultimo decennio del Quattrocento, proprio per sottrarsi al monopolio mercantile di 
ferri di qualità e di acciai lavorati dei «lombardi», il «maestro di cave» Tommaso Marinai si era 
rivolto a Lorenzo de’ Medici con un progetto piuttosto ambizioso, che avrebbe potuto fruttare 
diversi utili anche alle casse dello stato. L’intento dell’imprenditore pratese, difatti, era quello 
di impiantare in Pisa l’intera filiera produttiva delle armi bianche, assoldando «pratici» 
siderurgici e facendo affidamento sugli approvvigionamenti di metallo della «magona» 
medicea di Pietrasanta, delle miniere dell’Elba e della ferriera di Suvereto, gestita dalla sua 
famiglia in compartecipazione col banco Capponi di Firenze.158 
 
Richordo questo dì XVI di novembre 1493 che, havendo più fa il nostro 
Tommaso hauto ragionamento cholla felice memoria del magnifico Lorenzo 
de’ Medici di chondurre l’arte dell’arme et altri exercizi di Milano in Pisa, et 
dicendo detto Tommaso che bisogniava prima chondurre in questa parte 
l’arte delli acciai per avere ferri acciariti et altro migliore merchato et a suo 
proposito, rimase in chomposizione che detto Tommaso ci chonducessi tale 
arte et a sua magnificenzia farebbe fare gli acciai et ferrereccie si facessino 
in questa parte, et chosì fe’. Et stimando noi, chome ci dise, che tale opera 
havessi a essere chomune, ci mettemo mano, et havendo speso parechi 
centinaia di fiorini, bisogniò havere speso del nostro, et fussi per noi 
chondotto l’arte delli acciai. Detto magnifico Lorenzo, volendo mettere 
156 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 34, c. 112r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 36, c. 236r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 48, c. 125v. 
157 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 34, c. 209v;; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Munizioni, 7, c. 269v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 27, cc. 81v-82r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, 35, c. 115r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, cc. 47v-48r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, c. 74r; 
ASF, Otto di pratica, Munizioni, 1, c. 24r;  
158 PAMPALONI, La miniera del rame di Montecatini Val di Cecina, cit., pp. 53-54; P. GINORI CONTI, Le 
magone della vena del ferro di Pisa e di Pietrasanta sotto la gestione di Piero de’ Medici e compagni, 
Firenze, Leo S. Olschki, 1939; P. MELI, S. TOGNETTI, Il principe ed il mercante nella Toscana del 
Quattrocento. Il Magnifico Signore di Piombino Jacopo III Appiani e le aziende Maschiani di Pisa, Firenze, 
Leo S. Olschki, 2006, pp. 105-168; F. FRANCESCHI, Medici economic policy, in The Medici. Citizens and 
masters, a cura di Robert Black e John Law, Firenze, The Harvard University Center for Italian 
Renaissance Studies, 2015, pp. 151-152. 
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avanti l’arte dell’armi in Pisa, promettendoci in questo ristorarci et farci 
denari assai, gli sopravenne il male del quale si morì. Et intendendo dipoi il 
magnifico Piero de’ Medici suo filgliuolo di tali ragionamenti, volle intendere 
tutto, et inteso il ragionamento seguito cholla felice memoria di Lorenzo suo 
padre, dicendo ‘io volglio vadi avanti’, et a sua richiesta li demo per nota, et 
più d’una, quello bisogniava per tale exercizio. Et doppo molte dispute, 
rimanemo in questa chomposizione, che noi facessimo di questa arte 
dell’arme et altro una chompagnia insieme, ma segreta, et facessimo questa 
arte dell’arme in Pisa et l’altre chose intorno a ciò si potessino, et che lui ci 
farebbe dare dal chomune di Firenze ducati tremila larghi d’oro in oro 
chome li chiedemo, con questo, che passati tre anni dovessimo dare tante 
arme per ammunizione o arme schoperte per huomini d’arme ciaschuno 
anno dipoi il terzo, cioè per fiorini mille larghi in oro insino allo intero 
paghamento, per quello pregio che lui farebe d’achordo cho’ signori Otto 
della Praticha che pe’ tempi fussino o con chi l’avessi a fare. Et dell’utile o 
del danno che seguissi, del quale danno ci guardi Iddio, il detto magnifico 
Piero ne havessi havere tre quarti, cioè soldi quindici per lira, et noi un 
quarto, cioè soldi cinque per lira, et di questo ci facessi una scripta, chome si 
chostuma fare nelle chompagnie, ma chon questo lo dovessimo tenere 
segreto, che tutto voleva si facessi sotto nome nostro.159 
 
Più che i tentennamenti di Piero, a far naufragare irrimediabilmente la proposta del Marinai 
sarebbero stati i rovesci politici che di lì a poco avrebbero travolto la Repubblica ed il suo ceto 
dirigente.160 Ma è comunque da notare come la scelta di Pisa non fosse assolutamente casuale, 
sia per il fondamentale ruolo svolto dalla città, «bocca della Toscana», nei traffici di tutta la 
regione,161 sia per la preesistenza di una manifattura di «munitioni» che le campagne militari in 
Lunigiana avevano contribuito a vivacizzare per tutti gli anni Ottanta. 
Fin dalla metà del Quattrocento, al tempo del conflitto contro Alfonso d’Aragona, il 
«magister bombardarum» Maso di Bartolomeo, aveva procurato, all’ombra della torre 
pendente, il «bronzo vecchio» necessario «pro novis bombardis conficiendis».162 Nelle fonderie 
della «cittadella nuova» operò, in seguito, anche il suo vecchio apprendista, Pasquino di 
Matteo, che vi fuse una bombarda «di getto di libbre quattrocento» di palla di pietra.163 Nel 
159 ASF, Carte Riccardi, 816, i. 98. 
160 PARENTI, Storia fiorentina, I., cit., pp. 63-129. 
161 G. PINTO, Cultura mercantile ed espansione economica di Firenze, in Vespucci, Firenze e le 
Americhe, atti del convegno di studi, Firenze, 22-24 novembre 2012, a cura di Giuliano Pinto, Leonardo 
Rombai e Claudio Tripodi, Firenze, Leo S. Olschki, 2014, pp. 9-10; GOLDHTWAITE, The economy of 
Renaissance Florence, cit., pp. 149-158. 
162 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, c. 113v. 
163 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 27, c. 276r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e 
uscita, 8, c. 101r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 10, c. 145v. 
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1480, anche Andrea del Verrocchio riceveva un pagamento per «resto di fattura et gittatura 
del cannone d’una bombarda di bronzo fatta in Pisa».164 Nel quindicennio successivo, il 
maestro Giovanni di Jacopo da Augusta divenne responsabile del «fornello», realizzandovi, nel 
1489, un «bavalischo» di bronzo, lungo sei metri e mezzo e pesante più di cinque tonnellate. La 
produzione dell’artigiano tedesco non si limitava comunque soltanto ai pezzi da campagna. 
Nella sua condotta con gli Otto di Pratica, siglata nel 1493, vi si trovano elencate diverse altre 
bocche da fuoco, come passavolanti, «cortali», serpentine e spingarde, categorizzate secondo 
il peso del proiettile e la lunghezza della canna.165 Ribellatasi Pisa, fu sempre Giovanni a 
realizzare, per conto dei rivoltosi, dei nuovi falconetti, «li quali si portavano sulle carette 
all’usanza di Franza», che «sono molto belle cosse, e furiosse».166  
Nella cittadella nuova, posta in riva all’Arno, erano presenti anche due «edifici da fare 
polvere», entrambi affidati al maestro Giovanni di Martino Zoppo da Modigliana, nei quali 
venivano lavorati i cospicui quantitativi di salnitro acquistati a Livorno da mercanti pisani e 
fiorentini, raffinati con le caldaie «murate» nei locali della stessa fortezza.167 Le «cotte» dei 
carboni, invece, venivano approntate, in caso di necessità, nella «vecchia», coi legni di salice 
forniti da tutti i centri del contado.168 Così come a Firenze, le «fabriche» erano state costruite 
col preciso scopo di incrementare i livelli di produzione. Fra il 1484 ed il 1485, i garzoni 
dell’officina erano capaci di fabbricare fino a cinquecento libbre al giorno di propellente, 
definito dai commissari come «vantaggiatissimo». In quel biennio, in totale, ne erano state 
realizzate quarantamila libbre. Nel solo 1487, nel campo di Sarzana, se ne erano inviate più del 
doppio.169  
Della gestione degli arsenali e delle botteghe era incaricato Francesco di Lorenzo Cambini, 
«doaniere di Pisa», che esercitava, pur senza averne esplicita nomina, la funzione di 
164 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 23, cc. 78v-79r. 
165 ASF, Otto di pratica, Munizioni, 1, c. 9v; ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 5, cc. 96v-97r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 24, c. 12v; ASF, Ufficiali delle castella, 
29, cc. 20r, 25v, 29v, 31v e 33v. Su nomenclatura e tipologia delle armi da fuoco prodotte a Firenze, v. F. 
Ansani, Craftsmen, artillery and war production in Renaissance Florence, «Vulcan. The International 
journal of the social history of military technology», IV, 2016, pp. 6-12. 
166 G. PORTOVENERI, Memoriale, «Archivio Storico Italiano», VI, 1845, 2, p. 307. 
167 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 20, c. 125r; ASF, Miscellanea repubblicana, b. 6, i. 205, c. 31v; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Missive, 20, cc. 171r e 234v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 22, c. 21r; ASF, Otto di pratica, 
Missive, 5, c. 91r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 10, c. 8v; ASF, Ufficiali delle castella, 29, c. 43r. 
168 ASF, Entrata e uscita, 10, c. 15r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 30, c. 46r. 
169 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 30, c. 46r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, c. 23v; ASF, Ufficiali 
delle castella ,29, c. 28r. 
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provveditore della città. A lui toccava tenere i conti delle «ispese» fatte per conto dei Dieci, «di 
quello si comprava et da chi, et chi pagava, et dove et a chi si mandavono tali cose», ed inoltre 
redigere i «libri grandi» della «canova» di campo, «comandare biade et bestie» e carri, 
rapportarsi con commissari, soldati ed artigiani, «fare ongni dì a chalci et a morsi» con gli ottusi 
ed astiosi rettori del contado, talvolta senza trarsi «mai calze di piè né farsetto di dosso».170  
Alla metà degli anni Ottanta, nella due cittadelle lavoravano anche dei fabbri, fra i cui 
«ferramenti lavorati et comperati» si annoveravano artiglierie di ferro, dadi per le pallottole, 
chiodi, mazze, arpioni, martelli, «bossoli da carro», «alari grossi da strugiere piombo», 
«caricatoi» e «cingnie d’archibusi», marre, beccastrini, zappe e «pestoni della polvere».171 Non 
mancavano nemmeno i «maestri di balestre».172 Tutti gli artigiani ricevevano una paga mensile 
ed erano provvisti della propria «habitatione et bottegha» all’interno dei forti, ma a loro era 
fatto assoluto divieto di vendere i propri prodotti all’esterno. In città, inoltre, si ritrovavano 
anche corazzai e lanciai, ed «una casa dove si pulisce arme».173 Alla sola costruzione delle navi 
sembra invece essere stato destinato, nell’ultimo quarto del secolo, l’arsenale dell’antica 
repubblica marinara.174 
 
Nel vecchio «arzanà», nel 1485, i commissari generali Jacopo Guicciardini e Pierfilippo 
Pandolfini avevano tentato di «accozzare insieme» l’ingegnere Giovanni di Novellino ed il 
maestro Vergaro di Navarra, da poco fuggito da Genova quando «s’achorse essere pagato di 
parole». Dal loro lavoro comune, dai loro scambi di opinioni, erano scaturiti, in breve tempo, i 
progetti di una «palandrea», una nave pesantemente armata, e di una «travata» per la difesa 
di Livorno, una sorta di piattaforma galleggiante per le artiglierie.175  
 
170 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 27, c. 230r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Responsive, 30, c. 521rv; ASF, Ufficiali delle castella, 29, c. IIIr; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 10, cc. 
1r e 15v-16r.  
171 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 8, c. 199r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 10, cc. 19r-22r; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 23, c. 90r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 25, c. 68r; ASF, Otto di pratica, 
Responsive, 3, c. 442r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 30, c. 425r. 
172 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 24, cc. 139v-140r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Missive, 7, c. 33v. 
173 ASF, Balìe, 34, c. 21v; ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte e stanziamenti, 5, c. 50r; 
ASF, Otto di pratica, Responsive, 10, c. 182r. 
174 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 30, c. 270r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 25, c. 43r. 
175 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 30, c. 261r; G. VIVOLI, Annali di Livorno, Livorno, Tipografia Sardi, 
1843, p. 243. 
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Havendo stamani accozzato insieme maestro Vergaro, che è quello di che vi 
scrivemo hiersera, con maestro Giovanni Novellino per vedere di fare una 
travata anchora noi, et havendo parlato insieme decti maestri tornò poi a 
noi maestro Giovanni solo, et ha offerto fare uno certo legno a modo di 
fusta, che vogherà con ottanta remi, et sarà forte in modo che dice vi si 
pianterà su una bombarda di gietto di libre cento in centocinquanta, et più 
dua passavolanti grossi, et disegna la bombarda piantarla a prua et i 
passavolanti a poppa, et armarlo in forma che potrà ire appresso alla ghalee 
sanza essere offeso, et, se riesce nel modo che disegna, sarà cosa di 
grandissima utilità. Il perché hoggi vi habbiamo dato principio, et 
solleciterassi con ogni prestezza. Questo maestro Vergaro tegnamo in parole 
per vedere di chavarne qualche fructo, et farassegli fare uno modello della 
travata, perché, se sarà giudicato che sia utile poi farla, si possi fare.176 
 
Colloqui simili erano avvenuti durante tutto il secolo, fra le professionalità più disparate. 
Nella bottega di Francesco di Giovanni, «vocato il Francione» lavoravano architetti, come «il 
Capitano muratore» e Giuliano da Sangallo, ed ingegneri a tutto tondo, come la Cecca, autore, 
nel corso degli anni, di «fuochi lavorati», di di «ceppi» per le artiglierie, di terrapieni, e persino 
di una fantasiosa «nugola» mobile, piena di «sacca di lana», atta a proteggere le torri dai colpi 
delle artiglierie.177 Negli accampamenti fiorentini della fine del secolo era possibile ritrovare 
muratori, legnaioli, «maestri d’ascia», scalpellini, fabbri, corazzai, o personalità dal multiforme 
ingegno, quali «la Pippa» e «Masaccio», Francesco del Caprina, «maestro Giannettino grecho», 
capo dei bombardieri del campo, o l’albanese Giovanni di Demetrio, costruttore delle difese di 
diverse città costiere.178 
Richiesti dai condottieri, offerti dai comandanti, fonditori ed artiglieri di tutta Europa 
seguivano gli eserciti in marcia, acciò che «omne bombarda habia el suo bombardiere, et sieno 
boni, et un maestro d’asse per una». Nel 1472, «el danese bombardiere del ducha di Milano» 
giungeva in campo a Volterra, insieme a «Bonagiunta da Trento con un suo figliuolo, mandati 
da Bologna da messer Giovanni Bentivogli», a «Sirro e Monchetto, ingegneri del signor conte 
d’Urbino», a «Godino francioso» ed a «Simone di Nicholò di Nantes», ed ancora «Arigo 
tedescho» e «Gerardo della Magna», «Giovanni di Bartolomeo del Bronzo maestro di 
176 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 30, c. 270v. 
177 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 24, c. 137r. La fama della «Cecca» era ben nota anche al 
temuto duca di Calabria, Alfonso d’Aragona, che nel marzo del 1486 lo richiese «con disegni et 
instrumenti et ordini da fare ponti, perché sua excellentia fa conto, se Idio gli dessi gratia di potersi unire 
con gli Orsini, d’havere a fare un ponte in sul Tevere». In ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 33, c. 462r. 
178 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 38, cc. 1r, 2r e 13r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Entrata e uscita, 22, cc. 100v-101r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 53, c. 2v. 
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bombarde» e «Vangelista da Monte Lupone maestro d’achonciare polvere da bombarda», il 
«Francione» ed il «Capitano».179  
In vista della campagna contro Pietrasanta, nel 1484, l’ambasciatore fiorentino a Milano, 
Pierfilippo Pandolfini, chiedeva ed otteneva da Ludovico Sforza «dua bombardieri». Alfonso 
d’Aragona, duca di Calabria, concedeva, da parte sua, «un ingegniero, chiamato Achactabrigha, 
il quale molto loda», un figlio di «Cyro ingegnere», che sua «excellentia dice molto praticho et 
simile al padre in simile exercitio», così come Mariotto di Lionello da Gubbio, che il condottiere 
Rinuccio da Farnese «molto commendava», ed «uno Agnolo da Castello Durante, huomo molto 
praticho ad expugnare terre et a fare cave».180 
Durante la «guerra di Roma» del 1486, Bonaccorso Ghiberti veniva inviato dai Dieci a 
Bracciano per fondere una nuova bocca da fuoco, perché «senza artiglierie ogni piccola bicocca 
fa difesa» e, «quando uno capitano ha le bombarde in ordine, spesse volte fa de’ molte cose 
con li spaventachi, che non l’avendo gli omini se ne fanno beffe».181 Il fonditore sarebbe 
rimasto nel Lazio, al servizio di Gentile Virginio Orsini, per altri due anni, come «maestro 
ingegniere», esperto di «munitiones» e «fabricationes».182 Nel 1490, era invece a Piombino, 
assoldato da Jacopo IV Appiano. Nel porto tirrenico, poi, conosceva Tommaso Marinai, 
entrando dunque in contatto con altri «pratici», con i loro strumenti, con la loro cultura 
empirica, con le loro esperienze.183 Il network di Bonaccorso, ricostruibile attraverso le sue 
«ricordanze», è d’altronde costellato di incontri con maestri «di getto» e «da forno», 
carpentieri, soldati, fabbri, artisti, conosciuti in Toscana ed altrove.184  
Come lui, altri artigiani viaggiavano ed operavano in località diverse, accrescendo il loro 
sapere tecnico, affrontando una somma sempre crescente di casi, migliorando la capacità di 
governare le variabili dei processi produttivi. Basilio della Scola, ad esempio, aveva lavorato 
per Carlo VIII, prima di trasferirsi a Venezia,185 dove da anni ormai operava Sigismondo 
Alberghetti, figlio di Alberghetto.186 Nel 1498, i Dieci assoldavano a Barga maestro Giovanni, 
179 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 20, cc. 41v, 76r e 85v. 
180 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 32, cc. 34r, 47r e 52rv. 
181 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 9, c. 171v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 33, cc. 385v e 493r; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 36, cc. 354r e 374v.  
182 C. VON FABRICZY, Adriano Fiorentino, «Jahrbuch der königlich preussischen Junstsammlungen», 
XXIV, 1903, p. 76. 
183 AOI, Debitori e creditori di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, 13229, cc. 3r-4v. 
184 AOI, Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di Vettorio Ghiberti, 13230, cc. 12r-145r. 
185 M. SANUDO, I diari, I., a cura di Federico Stefani, Venezia, 1879, p. 146; D. MALIPIERO, Annali veneti, 
«Archivio Storico Italiano», VII, 1843, p. 562. 
186 PANCIERA, Il governo delle artiglierie, cit., p. 163. 
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«huomo ingegnioso et da bene, maestro non solum di trarre, ma etiam di fare artiglieria», 
proveniente, probabilmente, dalla ferriera estense di Fornovolasco.187 Pochi mesi dopo, i 
magistrati ricevevano da Napoli una lunga, appassionata lettera da parte del loro concittadino 
Barone d’Angelo, «della maestà dell signor re Federigho ingengniero», che offriva loro 
conoscenze e competenze «da fare uno nuovo mondo». 
 
Excellentissimi signori Dieci di Ghuerra e Balìa della excellentissima città di 
Fiorenza, rachomandazione. 
Le excellentie vostre sapino che questa solo sarà per far notizia a vostre 
signorie chome, esendo istato all servizio di chasa di Raghona cinque anni fa 
in atto d’ingenyniero, ho a questa ora fatto tanto per detta chasa che s’io 
l’avesi fato per servizio di Dio saria beato. 
Per lla maestà del signor re Allfonso fu diputato all suo tempo alla 
fortifichazione di Polichastro, e lì per me si fe’ sette bastioni e perfetti in la 
provinzia del principato di Salerno a la marina. 
E di poi, per ordinazione di messer Tiballdo Vischonti, fu trafferito alla 
fortifichazione della Ischalea, e li fe’ dua bastioni. E fu trafferito all Celento e 
ad Aghruopoli, e lì fortifichai quele terre. 
E dipoi per ordinazione del signor re Allfonso fu mandato alla 
fortifichazione del Gharigliano in Terra di Lavoro.  
E si fe’ quanto per lo ingengnio e industria mia si poteva d’uno fosso di 
quarantadua pallmi fondo e quarantadua largho, e detegli pallmi quindici 
d’aqua.  
E fornito [...] fu tuto de’ franzesi in la venuta del signore re di Francia. 
Dipoi, seghuendo lo esilio loro, me ne partì da la lor divozione e lor 
servizi, e in quanto per me si fe’ per loro onore e utile posuto per me fare 
l’ho fato, di maniera tengho da loro bona e sincera ghrazia ma utile pocho 
per la imposibilità e sapientia paucha. 
Chonsiderando gli afanni delle mie illustrissime et excellentisime signorie 
et trovandomi in ordine chon quatro homini da fare uno nuovo mondo, e in 
fatto di ghuerra potreste cerchare da lo levante a lo ponente per tale 
misterio di trovare quatro piue al proposito di vostre signorie quanto sarò io 
chon quelli che a vostre signorie se chondurò, quando a quelle si piacia, e in 
prima, cioè in far bastioni in difensione d’uno istremo luogho, in piantar 
bonbarde, in chondurle, in far ponti, in far tagliate, in fare riparazione 
d’andare a dare bataglia a una terra et in difensalla, in fuochi lavorati di più 
maniere. 
Ayo el primo maestro d’Itaglia di far chanoni, falchonetti e girifalchi e 
cholonbrine, in gitalle e in armarle e sì in fabrichando, o in qualsivoglia chosa 
di ghuerra, che quando le excellentissime signorie vostre non avesino tali 
persone, e sapiendo fusino a Santa Maria Finisterre, le signorie vostre 
dovere mandare là per avelli, e di questo istate di bona voluntà che forse 
187 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 53, c. 287r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 55, c. 9r; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Missive, 57, c. 69v. 
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per aventura le signorie vostre non n’ebono cinquanta anni fa tali sufizienti 
servitori.  
Da nesuno di noi vi sarà dimandato prezo né solldo per fino a tanto non 
sono chonosciute le virtù di ciaschuno, e tuti saremo patrioti e non 
forestieri.  
E volendo le illustrissime signorie vostre vederne lo efetto si dengnino di 
mandarci quatro versi che noi posiamo venire liberi e sichuri sanza alchuna 
excezione per avere mortto uno nell 1474 a XVI d’aprile, et ayo auto la pace 
sedici anni pasati fa. Et eci uno alltro mio simile chonpangnio che ha morto 
uno alltro è du’ ani asai, e deci la pace e non c’è la rimisione, e volendo 
venire fateci lettere che vinimo sichuri tanto parliamo cholle signorie vostre. 
E troverete che per aventura sarà meglio avere quatro nostri pari che 
avere sedici isquadre di chavagli. 
Saremo chontenti per la liberazione di nostra patria metere la vita, se 
mille volte si posesi.  
El primo si è Barone d’Angniolo ingengniero del signore re. El secondo si 
è mastro Jacopo da Chortona, e terzo mastro Rosso suo fratello, e quarto 
sarà suo fratello e quinto maestro bonbardiero e gitatore di chanoni, 
falchoneti e cholonbrine e girifalchi per sufiziente e primo homo d’Itaglia, 
ma è genovese, ed è l’ochio e ‘ll quore mio, ed è disposto a morire per 
amore mio, e di questo tuto aviso. 
E ‘ll proverbio dice ch’uno bello morire tuta la vita honora, e masime 
morendo per la patria sua. 
Ch’altro disiderio per me non si tiene se non di far quallche fazione in 
onore, in utile di mia patria, si ché, parendo alle signorie vostre che siamo all 
proposito, subito per llo primo aviso di quelle saremo mossi. 
E volendo altra natura d’omini per chonto allchuno, abiamo modo e 
chredito menarne quela quantità per illustrissime signorie vostre ci fussi 
ordinato, intendosi tuti homini atti a ghuerra. 
Altro non mi ochorre di dire, se non che pregharò Idio mantengha la 
nostra excelsa città e in filicissimo istato la inalzi, e chrescha e chonservi sani 
tuti queli che amono el suo utile e ‘ll suo honore.188 
 
Una simile missiva era stata spedita, tempo prima, da Leonardo da Vinci, che si era 
proposto al duca di Milano come «maestro de compositore de instrumenti bellici» e «varie e 
infinite cose da offendere e difendere», come «bombarde comodissime e facili a portare» e 
«mortari e passavolanti di bellissime e utili forme, fora del comune uso».189 Nell’estate del 
1498, invece, era stato un anziano «capo maestro ingegnieri et architectore», Francesco di 
Giorgio Martini a proporsi al mandatario dei Dieci a Siena, offrendosi «di fare ingegni mirabili 
per la offesa di Pisa».190  
188 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 57, cc. 259r-260v. 
189 GILLE, Leonardo e gli ingegneri del Rinascimento, cit., pp. 152-154. 
190 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 58, c. 317v.  
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Negli accampamenti, nei palazzi, nelle officine, negli arsenali, i «pratici» confrontavano 
dunque le loro tradizioni, le loro esperienze, le loro metodologie, i loro prodotti, aprendo la via 
a sperimentazioni ed innovazioni. Accanto a Leonardo, Francesco di Giorgio Martini, Giovani da 
Augusta, Bernardino da Milano, Francesco d’Asti e Piero da Douai, molti altri «bombardieri» e 
«spingardieri», dall’Inghilterra al Portogallo, dall’Ungheria alla Francia, dalla Grecia alla 
Germania,191 concorrevano alla creazione di uno «spazio tecnologico unificato», promosso, 
finanziato e controllato dallo stato.192 E la guerra, come l’architettura e l’arte, come l’industria 
tessile e la stampa, mobilizzava uomini, denaro, informazioni, risorse, merci.  
 
Accanto al flusso migratorio degli artigiani, infatti, lo stato incoraggiava il commercio di 
materie prime e di prodotti finiti. Le lance di Pistoia venivano esentate dal pagamento delle 
imposte su tutto il Dominio fiorentino, che «non fu mai usanza che nostre cose di commune, 
maxime di munitione et da guerra, pagassino alcuna gabella».193 Altra mercanzia «francha» 
era, soprattutto, il salnitro, importato in grandi quantità dalla Puglia, con «licenza di tratta» 
reale, dalle Marche e dalla Liguria, attraverso i porti di Livorno e di Pesaro.194 Ad esserne 
agevolati erano mercanti come i Lomellino di Genova, i Buonvisi di Lucca, nonché i Cambi di 
Pisa e gli Strozzi, i Bardi, i Medici, i Capponi, i Berti ed i Biliotti di Firenze.195 
 
Richordo chome questo dì XX di dicembre 1497 abiamo fatto merchato chon 
Giovanni di Lorenzo Agnolo Biliotti di miglia trenta di libre di salnitro del Reame a 
fiorini quarantotto larghi d’oro il migliaio, posto in Firenze a tutte sue spese di 
191 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48 cc. 33v-35r e 107v-108v. 
192 BARALDI, Una nuova età del ferro. Macchine e processi della siderurgia, cit., pp. 214-216; SCHULZ, La 
migrazione di tecnici, artigiani e artisti, cit., pp. 89-110; PANCIERA, Il governo delle artiglierie, cit., pp. 213-
216; C. M. CIPOLLA, Tecnica, società e cultura. Alle origini della supremazia tecnologia dell’Europa, 
Bologna, Il Mulino, 1989, p. 10; G. GUERZONI, Novità, innovazione e imitazione. I sintomi della modernità, 
in Il Rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, III. Produzione e tecniche, cit., pp. 67-72; S. EPSTEIN, Labour 
mobility, journeyman organizations and markets in skilled labour in Europe, 14th-18th centuries, in Le 
techniciens dans la cité en Europe occidentale, 1250-1650, a cura di Mathieu Arnoux e Pierre Monnet, 
Roma, École Française de Rome, 2004, p. 251; L. MOLÀ, Il mercato delle innovazioni, in Le techniciens 
dans la cité en Europe occidentale, 1250-1650, in ivi, pp. 215-222;.  
193 ASF, Otto di pratica, Missive, 5, c. 149v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, cc. 355rv e 457v. 
194 ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte e stanziamenti, 1, c. 33r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 33, c. 105r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 9, c. 186r. Sui permessi 
di esportazione concessi dai sovrani napoletani e sui giacimenti di Altamura, Trani e Manfredonia, v. 
BIANCHESSI, Cavalli, armi e salnitro fra Milano e Napoli nel secondo Quattrocento, cit., pp. 573-575. 
195 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, cc. 9r, 19r, 25v e 409r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 8, c. 167r; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, c. 180v; ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, c. 
248v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 7, c. 149r. 
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vettura, posto in dogana di Firenze a gabella del chomune. El quale detto Giovanni 
s’obriga mettere in detta dogana per tutto gennaio prossimo a venire libre 
diecimila e di poi ogni mese libre diecimila sino a detta somma di libre trentamila, 
chome è detto, e noi gli dobbiamo dare e’ denari chome ce l’avrà chonsegnato e 
pesato, a detto pregio di fiorini quarantotto larghi d’oro il migliaio, el quale salnitro 
debba essere de la bontà è d’uno saggio ci è lasciato, el quale è nelle mani del 
proveditore, o migliore d’esso, e per ciò observare obrigha sé e suo rede e beni 
presenti e futuri.196 
 
Nell’estate del 1498, anche l’ambasciatore a Roma, Francesco Gualterotti, aveva stipulato 
un contratto analogo con il banco senese degli Spannochi, operante in «chorte di Roma». 
Stando alla «schritta», le venticinquemila libbre di materiale «rafinato» dovevano essere 
condotte a Firenze «sanza far loro pagare datii, passi o gabbelle di alcuna qualità».197 
Persino i modelli delle artiglierie francesi erano divenuti, a pochi mesi dal passaggio 
dell’esercito di Carlo VIII in Toscana, un prodotto ambito. Nel febbraio del 1495, un mercante 
pistoiese ne offriva ai Dieci diversi pezzi, ed prezzi, pare, piuttosto convenienti. 
 
Qui ci è uno che ha modelli bellissimi da fare artigliarie di più ragioni, che dice 
haverli havuti da certi franciosi. Sono ingegni perfectissimi da bombarde, 
passavolanti, mortai et altre artigliarie, circa quattordici o quindici capi. Harebonsi 
con picholo prezzo, che stimo stare bene. Conforto vostre signorie, parendo 
nondimeno a quelle et non altrimenti, mandare per costui che le ha, et vostre 
signorie le potranno vedere et intendere se sono il bisogno, che stimo di sì, et, 
quando così sia, usarli qualche gentilezza et torli da lui.198 
 
I traffici di merci «difficili» come le armi, tuttavia, richiedevano anche una certa 
regolamentazione.199 Per ottenere l’acquisto di «balote di fero» sul mercato bresciano, nel 
1498, gli ufficiali fiorentini avevano dovuto richiedere il beneplacito dell’ostile Senato della 
Serenissima,200 finendo poi per rivolgersi a chi le facessi «venire contro a bando».201 In quello 
stesso anno, anche i genovesi avevano posto diverse «prohibitioni in Riviera» per la vendita di 
nitrato, costringendo il commerciante a condurlo a Livorno in «segreto, et pocho per volta», ed 
196 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, c. 274v. 
197 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 23, c. 351v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, c. 127v.  
198 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 38, c. 244r. 
199 LEYDI, Le armi, cit., pp. 174-179. 
200 M. SANUDO, I diari, II., a cura di Guglielmo Berchet, Venezia, 1879, p. 896. 
201 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 57, c. 283rv. 
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obbligando il commissario a contattare altri «huomini da bene et amici nostri».202 Dal canto 
loro, i Dieci avevano dato un perentorio ordine ai magistrati pistoiesi.  
 
Preterea noi siamo advisati che lucchesi et altri a stanza de’ pisani hanno tracto 
di costì lance et altre cose da offendere et difendere, le quali sono portate a 
Luccha, et di qui a Pisa. Per rimediare a questo sanza che lucchesi o altri se ne 
possino dolere, voliamo facci mettere bando che niuno possa trarre di costì lance di 
niuna sorte né artiglierie da offendere et difendere per fuora della iurisditione 
nostra, né medesimamente possa vendere ad altri che trahessi, sotto pena di 
perdere le robe, le bestie, venti cinque ducati et quatro tracti di fune, et se ne 
truovi alcuno che contrafacessi puniscilo in quello modo occorrerà alla prudentia 
tua.203 
 
Le istituzioni degli stati territoriali, dunque, tendevano a creare la domanda ed a sostenere 
l’offerta già dal tardo Quattrocento, combattendo fra di esse, e permettendo la circolazione di 
uomini, prodotti ed idee. L’esame della «geografia della guerra» nella Toscana rinascimentale 
ha dunque cercato di mettere in luce la politica economica fiorentina nell’ambito della 
produzione bellica, il suo «governo delle manifatture» e quello «delle artiglierie», il livello di 
integrazione e complementarità raggiunto dalle officine della capitale con gli impianti 
periferici, i numerosi investimenti dello stato in attività industriali fondamentali per la sua 
stessa sopravvivenza, la concessione di numerose licenze minerarie, l’adattamento degli 
artigiani alle nuove tecnologie belliche continentali, ed anche l’iniziativa privata nelle 
importazioni di materie prime, o il sostanziale monopolio mediceo del salnitro negli anni 
culminanti del regime.204 Ed è proprio in questa loro dimensione economica, sociale, politica, 
culturale, più che in quella strettamente militare, che i conflitti del Rinascimento costituivano 
«una dimensione quasi quotidiana di vita, uno degli elementi dominanti dell’esistenza» per 
cittadini e contadini, guerrieri e «pratici», a Firenze, la città degli artisti, dove «ciò che ha esser, 
convien sia. Chi vuol esser lieto, sia, di doman non c’è certezza». 
202 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 55, cc. 45v, 101v e 126r. 
203 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 31, cc. 173v-174r.  
204 Per un approfondimento di queste tematiche, v. GOLDTHWAITE, The economy of Renaissance 
Florence, cit., pp. 400-402 e 511-545; S. TOGNETTI, Il governo delle manifatture nella Toscana del tardo 
Medioevo, in Il governo dell’economia. Italia e Penisola Iberica nel basso Medioevo, a cura di Lorenzo 
Tanzini e Sergio Tognetti, Roma, Viella, 2014, pp. 310-330; F. FRANCESCHI, L. MOLÀ, Regional states and 
economic development, in The Italian Renaissance state, a cura di Andrea Gamberini e Isabella Lazzarini, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 453-463; F. FRANCESCHI, Istituzioni ed attività 
economica a Firenze. Considerazioni sul governo del settore industriale, in Istituzioni e società in Toscana 
nell’Età Moderna, atti delle giornate di studio, Firenze, 4-5 dicembre 1992, Roma, Ufficio Centrale per i 




Figure 3. A bombard, sketched by Bonaccorso Ghiberti in 1480s 
Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Banco rari, 228 
Drawing by Angela Marino 
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Se la diffusione della tecnologia militare medievale è ormai pienamente riconosciuta come un 
fattore di cambiamento socialmente condiviso, non altrettanta fortuna storiografica pare 
abbiano avuto alcuni fra i suoi protagonisti più determinanti e significativi, come i fonditori 
dell’Italia del Rinascimento, spesso ignorati dagli studiosi interessati alle trasformazioni 
dell’arte della guerra quattrocentesca e alle sue molteplici declinazioni1. Ad esempio, poco è 
stato scritto dagli economisti sulla compravendita delle bocche da fuoco, o sull’espansione del 
mercato degli armamenti in seguito all’affermazione della polvere da sparo, già suggerita da 
alcuni mercuriali genovesi e veneziani sul finire del Trecento2. Nemmeno il decennale dibattito 
sulla cosiddetta rivoluzione militare ha distolto l’attenzione degli storici dai soggetti tradizionali 
di ricerca: i brillanti architetti e i multiformi ingegneri coinvolti, a vario titolo, nella riflessione 
sulle problematiche fortificatorie e sui relativi riflessi ossidionali3.  
Leonardo da Vinci e Francesco di Giorgio Martini, soprattutto, sono stati celebrati come 
mediatori fra una cultura teorica e un sapere empirico, raffrontando le loro opere 
Abbreviazioni 
ASF = Archivio di Stato di Firenze 
BNCF = Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze 
 
1 DeVries, Early modern military technology, p. 81; Rogers, The military revolutions, pp. 275-278; 
Stone, Technology, society, and the infantry revolution pp. 364-367. 
2 Tali listini sono riportati in Melis, Documenti per la storia economica pp. 302, 304 e 316. Riguardo ai 
successivi sviluppi del mercato degli armamenti e alle sue ramificazioni in Italia, i contributi, purtroppo, 
non abbondano. Si vedano, a titolo meramente esemplificativo, Bianchessi, Cavalli, armi e salnitro, pp. 
572-582; Merlo, Armamenti e gestione dell’esercito, pp. 71-85; Ansani, Craftsmen, artillery, and war 
production, pp. 2-22; Esch, Armi per Roma, pp. 176-178. Un contributo di recentissima pubblicazione è 
Mocarelli e Ongaro, Weapons production, pp. 3-10. 
3 Parker, The military revolution. Sulla discussione storiografica in merito, si veda The military 
devolution debate.  
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razionalizzanti e innovative con una realtà tecnica impietosamente definita come deludente4. 
Alcune recenti pubblicazioni hanno poi ribadito gli apporti dell’umanesimo ai vari settori 
artigianali, nonché la corrispettiva integrazione delle tecniche nella tradizione colta, 
concentrandosi, ancora una volta, sulle macchine leonardesche e sulle due differenti versioni 
del trattato del maestro senese5. L’insistenza su casi già noti, tuttavia, ha colpevolmente 
perpetuato la dimenticanza in cui versano, attualmente, una moltitudine di artigiani operanti 
nel settore bellico, nonostante bilanci e carteggi, ricordanze e cronache conservino numerose 
testimonianze di una loro specifica conoscenza pratica. 
La carenza di studi sui maestri dell’artiglieria6 quattrocenteschi è d’altronde imputabile 
anche ai ritardi della storiografia militare italiana, profondamente segnata, per quel che 
riguarda il tardo medioevo e la prima età moderna, dal pregiudizio machiavelliano contro le 
compagnie di venturieri, e, inevitabilmente, dal dualismo fra “corrotti” eserciti mercenari e 
“integerrime” milizie cittadine7. Solo nell’ultimo ventennio le tesi del segretario fiorentino 
sono state efficacemente ribaltate dalle analisi di Maria Nadia Covini, di Francesco Storti, di 
Enrica Guerra e di William Caferro, che hanno acutamente approfondito le indicazioni di Piero 
Pieri, di John Hale e di Michael Mallett riguardo all’organizzazione militare degli stati italiani8. 
Anche in queste fondamentali opere, però, le tematiche relative alla produzione delle armi 
sembrano avere trovato poco spazio, al di là di una generica consapevolezza teorica delle loro 
connessioni con le evoluzioni di tattiche e strategie, del loro ruolo nelle scelte operative di 
governi e generali, e del loro sempre più frequente utilizzo in assedi e battaglie.  
Non molti paiono nemmeno i lavori specificamente dedicati ai maestri di getto 
rinascimentali, se si escludono alcune recenti indagini archeologiche, i contributi dedicati ad 
alcune dinastie di fonditori cinquecenteschi, o gli studi incentrati perlopiù sulla produzione 
4 Bernardoni, La fusione, pp. 106-116; Gille, Leonardo e gli ingegneri, pp. 125-228; Fiore, Città e 
macchine del Quattrocento, pp. 40-56. 
5 Long, Artisans, practitioners, pp. 30-50. 
6 Tale definizione è attestata in Archivio di Stato di Pisa, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, Camarlingo 
della massa, 83, c. 130v. 
7 Caferro, Continuity, long-term service and permanent forces, pp. 219-220. 
8 All’ultimo ventennio risalgono infatti le pubblicazioni di Covini, L’esercito del duca; Storti, L’esercito 
napoletano; Guerra, Soggetti a ribalda fortuna. Imprescindibile, insuperata opera sulle evoluzioni 
dell’arte della guerra nell’Italia medievale è quella di Pieri, Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana. Sul 
rapporto tra stati e compagnie di ventura è incentrato il testo del Mallett, Signori e mercenari. Di più 
ampio respiro è invece la sintesi di Hale, Guerra e società, che analizza l’impatto quotidiano della guerra 
in termini di reclutamento e di reinserimento dei soldati, nonché le conseguenze economiche dei 
conflitti sulla fiscalità e sulla produzione. 
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veneta coeva9. Certo, le pionieristiche pubblicazioni di Angelo Angelucci, di Cesare Quarenghi, 
di Luigi Cibrario e di Carlo Montù, apparse a cavallo fra Ottocento e Novecento, sono ancora da 
considerarsi come validissime fonti secondarie10. Ma l’indolenza della ricerca italiana, in 
questo settore, è particolarmente evidenziata dal confronto, non solo quantitativo, con le più 
recenti pubblicazioni internazionali sull’evoluzione tecnica e sulla gestione delle artiglierie, 
saggi riguardanti piccole e grandi realtà statali europee, in un arco cronologico compreso tra la 
fine della guerra dei Cent’anni e lo scoppio dei grandi conflitti di religione11. Questo articolo, 
dunque, si propone di colmare, almeno parzialmente, tali lacune, esaminando l’apporto degli 
artigiani alla diffusione della tecnologia bellica quattrocentesca, ricostruendone sia le 
esperienze e la formazione, sia, soprattutto, il rapporto con la committenza statale, interessata 
clientela delle loro macchine d’assedio, promotrice di numerose appropriazioni e di vari 
riadattamenti tecnici12. Si tenterà quindi di delineare, complessivamente, il quadro degli 
scambi di pratici e di pratiche fra gli stati della Penisola13.  
Sullo sfondo, più che la guerra, vi sarà quindi il profondo legame fra società e tecnologia, 
tra politica ed economia, all’interno di in un contesto culturale, quale quello rinascimentale, 
che avrebbe indubbiamente incentivato e garantito la continuità del trasferimento dei saperi, 
la pacifica circolazione di uomini, anche in ambito militare14, perché «la vita, come la scienza, 
ha tutto da guadagnare dal fatto che questo incontro sia fraterno»15. 
9 Si vedano, fra gli altri, Panciera, Il governo delle artiglierie; Ridella, L’evoluzione strutturale nelle 
artiglierie di bronzo; Ridella, Produzione di artiglierie nel sedicesimo secolo; Ridella, Fonditori italiani di 
artiglierie; Beltrame, Venetian ordnance.  
10 Cibrario, Delle artiglierie; Angelucci, Documenti inediti; Quarenghi, Tecno-cronografia; Montù, 
Storia dell’artiglieria italiana. 
11 Dei famigerati cannoni di Carlo il Temerario, ad esempio, hanno trattato Garnier, L’artillerie des 
ducs de Bourgogne, DeVries e Douglas Smith, The artillery of the dukes of Burgundy, e da ultimo 
Depreter, De Gavre à Nancy. Sempre in ambito francese, si segnalano le opere di Contamine, Les 
industries de guerre, e di de Crouy-Chanel, Charroi de l’artillerie. Brioist, L’artillerie à la Renaissance, e 
Walton, The art of gunnery, si sono occupati di teoria e pratica balistica nell’Inghilterra dei Tudor e degli 
Stuart. Gli arsenali spagnoli sono stati invece analizzati da Herrero Fernández-Quesada, La artilleria de 
los reyes catolicos, e da Cossart, Le artilleurs. Per l’area tedesca, ancora valido è il volume di von 
Essenwein, Quellen zur Geschichte der Feuerwaffen. Anche l’industria ottomana è stata esaminata da 
Agoston, Guns for the sultan. Un’ampia rassegna del dibattito estero, passato e presente, è in DeVries, 
Early modern military technology, pp. 73-80. Indispensabile alla comprensione del problema tecnologico 
è infine Hall, Weapons and warfare. 
12 Staudenmaier, Rationality, agency, contingency, pp. 168-171. 
13 Hilaire-Perez e Verna, Dissemination of technical knowledge, pp. 545-546. 
14 Buchanan, Technology and history, p. 496; Edgerton, Innovation, technology, or history, pp. 686-
687 e 694. 
15 Bloch, Apologia della storia, p. 108. 
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In taluni casi, lo scarso interesse per le problematiche tecniche è stato acuito dalla 
mancanza di fonti specifiche, dovuta alla distruzione dei registri della cancelleria aragonese 
durante l’ultimo conflitto mondiale, al rogo di alcuni fondi veneziani nel Cinquecento e al 
disordine degli archivi sforzeschi. Altrettanto difficili da rintracciare sono i libri di conto e gli 
appunti degli artigiani, rari persino nell’abbondante documentazione aziendale toscana.  
Le sparse tracce della storiografia esistente verranno integrate dallo spoglio del 
carteggio e della contabilità delle magistrature militari fiorentine, da alcune cronache 
quattrocentesche, e da varie edizioni ottocentesche di documenti lombardi e campani, 
necessarie a comprendere il fondamentale ruolo delle autorità pubbliche nella gestione del 
munizionamento. Di particolare importanza saranno poi gli appunti e le ricordanze di 
Bonaccorso Ghiberti e Maso di Bartolomeo, che metteranno in luce le attività, il sapere e le 
relazioni lavorative e sociali di due fra i principali fonditori del tempo. Non mancheranno, 
infine, i riferimenti alla trattatistica quattro e cinquecentesca, relativa sia alle manifatture 
metallurgiche sia alla quotidianità guerresca.  
 
 
2. Affermazione, diffusione e sviluppo delle bombarde grosse 
 
Dopo la pace di Lodi, nel 1454, la valenza strategica delle artiglierie era ormai 
comunemente accettata da principi e condottieri. Il veterano napoletano Diomede Carafa, ad 
esempio, lodava, nei suoi Memoriali, le artiglierie, che «sono quelle fanno honore». 
 
Et quilli se dellectano in epse artelglyarie sono prudente et haviranno 
honore. Et quello fa talvolta in una bocta una zarbactana, non che una 
bombarda, non li haveria bastato milglyara de homini. Cossì dico in uno 
facto d’arme, como in una battalglya campale o combacto de terra le 
artelglyarie sono quelle che fanno le fazune de simile cose (…). Sì che se nde 
volino havere assai, et havere de quilli boni le adoprano, et anco hagiano 
habundancia de cose, perché se possano essere bene adoperate16.  
 
Negli stessi anni, il suo capitano generale, Alfonso d’Aragona, il temuto duca di Calabria, 
affermava perentoriamente che «quando uno capitano ha le bombarde in ordine, spesse volte 
fa de’ molte cose con li spaventachi, che non l’avendo gli omini se ne fanno beffe». Se il 
condottiero milanese Gian Giacomo Trivulzio concordava nel dire che «uno campo senza 
16 Carafa, Memoriali, p. 343. 
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artiglierie non vale cosa alcuna»17, i Dieci di Balìa, da Firenze, ricordavano ai loro commissari 
che «consiste, in epse bombarde, gran parte della victoria»18. 
D’altronde, rispetto a qualche anno prima, le bombarde grosse avevano ormai 
definitivamente soppiantato i trabucchi e gli arieti della tradizione medievale, iniziando a 
rivestire un ruolo sempre più importante durante gli assedi. Durante le fasi preliminari delle 
operazioni, alle bocche da fuoco era demandato non solo l’abbattimento del morale dei 
difensori per il «frachasso, periculo e grande danno» 19, ma anche la distruzione delle 
fortificazioni nemiche, in vista dello scavo delle trincee e dell’assalto frontale.  
Gli evidenti difetti delle bombarde, come le dimensioni ingombranti, la lentezza del 
puntamento, le difficoltà di trasporto e lo scarso rateo di tiro, non ne avrebbero ostacolato 
l’affermazione, né ne avrebbero diminuito la popolarità20. Già nel 1452, il governo fiorentino 
mandava in campo, contro le forze aragonesi, nove bombarde, di cui una, la Leonessa, 
«grossissima»21. Per l’assedio di Volterra, Federico da Montefeltro, «ha voluto, oltre alle tre 
bombarde mandate di qui e le due eravi da Pisa, tutte le altre v’erano rimaste, e oggi si sono 
chariche e ite via»22. I piani per il dispiegamento dell’esercito milanese, nel 1472, prevedevano 
l’impiego in campo di almeno quattro bombarde grosse e di «due Ferline e due Ruffianelle», 
nonostante ciò comportasse una spesa di diverse migliaia di lire imperiali23. Qualche anno 
dopo, le forze napoletane, papali e senesi espugnavano Colle Val d’Elsa grazie all’ausilio di 
sette bombarde, fra cui la Indiavolata, che «facieva gran fragella di case, le due e tre per 
volta»24. Durante la riconquista di Otranto, l’ambasciatore fiorentino, Pietro Nasi, testimoniava 
che «l’artiglieria che tirava alla terra era cosa stupenda, pareva che fiocchasse»25. Per gli 
attacchi contro Ficarolo, nel 1482, le truppe veneziane, comandate da Roberto da Sanseverino, 
avevano impiegato nove pezzi26. Otto grosse furono utilizzate anche Sarzana, nel 1487, tutte 
17 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 33, cc. 493r e 545r. 
18 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 20, c. 157r. 
19 Settia, Rapine, assedi, battaglie, pp. 133-138; Storti, Note e riflessioni sulle tecniche ossidionali, pp. 
243-244. 
20 Contamine, La guerra nel Medioevo, pp. 278-279; Mallett, Signori e mercenari, pp. 166-167. 
21 Dei, La cronica, p. 64. 
22 ASF, Carte strozziane, Prima serie, 113, c. 121v. 
23 Visconti, L’ordine dell’esercito ducale sforzesco, p. 469. 
24 Allegretti, Diario senese, p. 795; Fecini, Cronaca senese, p. 874. 
25 ASF, Otto di pratica, Responsive, 1, c. 276r. 
26 Mantovani, L’assedio di Ficarolo, p. 43. 
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«piantate in buono luogho, et da fare buono fructo», ché i nemici «non potranno resistere ad 
tante percosse»27.  
Stando a quanto riportato dagli ufficiali fiorentini, in Lunigiana le bombarde 
consumavano quasi cinquantamila libbre di propellente alla settimana28. L’elevato consumo di 
polvere e la necessità di un ingente quantitativo di proiettili, così come il ricorso a un crescente 
numero di armi da fuoco, non avrebbero tardato ad avere effetti concreti anche 
sull’organizzazione delle truppe, costringendo gli stati territoriali a investire somme 
considerevoli non solo sul mantenimento di eserciti permanenti, ma anche sul loro 
equipaggiamento e sulla loro logistica. Uffici addetti alla fabbricazione delle armi erano sorti 
un po’ ovunque nella Penisola, favorendo nuove opportunità di investimento a mercanti e 
oligarchi, e arricchendo maestri di polvere e falegnami, e lanciai, scalpellini e «targonai». Non 
era un caso che il duca Francesco Sforza nominasse un «officialis» e un «contrascriptor 
municionum» poco dopo il suo insediamento, che i primi «libri delle munizioni» fossero 
compilati a Firenze già al tempo del fallito assedio di Lucca, che la Camera del Comune di Siena 
avocasse a sé la funzione di acquisto dei vari armamenti, e che Alfonso il Magnanimo 
disponesse di vari capitani e maestri addetti al reperimento delle materie prime indispensabili 
alla fabbricazione e al funzionamento di spingarde e bombarde29. 
Con l’istituzione di simili cariche, gli stati italiani tentavano di imporre il proprio diritto 
esclusivo nella produzione e nell’uso delle artiglierie, sia nelle capitali sia nei centri secondari, 
riservandosi il compito di rifornire con diligenza e costanza le fortezze di frontiera, le varie 
città, gli arsenali principali e gli eserciti in marcia. Un simile monopolio era stato efficacemente 
ottenuto dalle principali realtà della Penisola, come Venezia e Firenze. A Milano, già nel 1393, 
Gian Galeazzo Visconti imponeva il divieto di far realizzare bombarde senza una sua specifica 
licenza30. Eccezioni in tal senso erano rappresentate solo dall’ambigua situazione genovese e 
dai bellicosi feudatari papali, come gli Orsini, i Colonna, i Vitelli e i Montefeltro. Per quanto 
riguarda Napoli, è probabile che le riforme di Ferrante d’Aragona tendessero a creare anche un 
“demanio” delle artiglierie, all’interno di un più ampio progetto di disarmo della feudalità 
27 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 37, cc. 261r-262r; ASF, Otto di pratica, Responsive, 3, c. 241r. 
28 ASF, Otto di pratica, Missive, 7, c. 209rv. 
29 Archivio di Stato di Milano, Registri ducali, 150, cc. 68r-69r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 1, c. 1r; 
Minieri Riccio, Alcuni fatti di Alfonso I d’Aragona, pp. 14-16; Farinelli e Merlo, La Camera del Comune, 
pp. 205-206. 
30 Bargigia e Romanoni, La diffusione delle armi, p. 153. 
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ribelle31. In ogni caso, le armi da fuoco, per la loro valenza strategica, e a causa dei loro elevati 
costi, si avviavano in quegli anni a divenire una indispensabile state-run, state-used and state-
restricted technology32, nonché un simbolo stesso dell’arte di governo33. Ma, per potersene 
avvalere, lo stato avrebbe avuto bisogno della piena disponibilità di un significativo numero di 
pratici34. 
 Accanto ai provveditori toscani, ai «superiori del carezzo e delle munition» milanesi e 
agli ufficiali napoletani, operavano infatti i maestri di bombarde veri e propri. Nella prima metà 
del Quattrocento, con la realizzazione di pezzi in ferro fucinato e cerchiato, i principali 
realizzatori di armi da fuoco erano stati i fabbri, con i loro «secreti ingeniosi» e il loro 
«essercitio da molto esaltare, perché, quando considero che li maestri di tal arte fanno li loro 
lavori senza forma, o dissegno, ma col bastargli solo veder con l’occhio, o col giudicio, e che poi 
col batter li fanno giusti, e gareggiati, mi par gran cosa»35.  
Le necessità di una guerra endemica avrebbero però portato, in breve, a diverse 
rielaborazioni tecnologiche. La polvere «granita», ad esempio, si stava rivelando non solo più 
esplosiva rispetto alla «serpentina» trecentesca, ma anche più resistente all’umidità, 
caratteristica che la rendeva maggiormente durevole e facilmente conservabile36. Allo stesso 
tempo, le maggiori capacità delle cariche determinavano modifiche delle forme delle armi, 
permettendo di ottenere diversi risultati balistici a seconda della lunghezza della canna e del 
calibro del proiettile 37 . Attorno agli anni Trenta, numerosi artigiani avevano anche 
sperimentato la possibilità di costruire delle armi con bocche multiple, degli «organi» capaci di 
sparare contemporaneamente più proiettili38. 
Le macchine tradizionali si erano però rivelate estremamente fragili, di fronte alla 
potenza del propellente granulare. Le frequenti rotture e le difficoltà nella riparazione delle 
armi favorirono così l’adozione di bombarde in bronzo, il cui sviluppo era agevolato anche dalla 
riscoperta della scultura di grandi opere artistiche di metallo, portata avanti, proprio in quegli 
anni, da Andrea Pisano, da Lorenzo Ghiberti e da Donatello39. 
31 Storti, L’esercito napoletano, pp. 119-121. 
32 Hale, Guerra e società, pp. 275-276; DeVries, Gunpowder weaponry, p. 129. 
33 Hale, Gunpowder and the Renaissance, pp. 407-410. 
34 Baraldi, Una nuova età del ferro, pp. 214 e 216. 
35 Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, cc. 136v -138r. 
36 Ansani, Craftsmen, artillery, and war production, pp. 3-6; Panciera, La polvere da sparo, p. 307. 
37 Hall, Weapons and warfare, pp. 87-95. 
38 Quarenghi, Tecno-cronografia, pp. 112 e 117. 
39 Paoletti e Radke, Art in Renaissance Italy, pp. 31-32, 204-217 e 253-270. 
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Sebbene il rame e lo stagno fossero più dispendiosi rispetto al semplice ferro, la loro 
lega garantiva indubbi vantaggi. La maggiore resistenza alle detonazioni e alla corrosione, ad 
esempio, permetteva la costruzione di armi più sicure per i serventi e più costanti nell’impiego 
durante le operazioni di assedio. Anche il sistema a retrocarica delle bronzine era stato 
nettamente migliorato rispetto a quello delle vecchie bombarde, grazie all’adozione di un 
ingegnoso raccordo a vite tra il «cannone», ovverosia la camera di scoppio, e la «tromba», cioè 
la volata. Il nuovo sistema dava la possibilità di assemblare i due, o tre, o quattro pezzi della 
bombarda attraverso un sistema a incastro semplice e solido, evitando il ricorso a funi e cunei. 
L’avvitamento, inoltre, consentiva un rapido smontaggio, facilitando il trasporto delle diverse 
parti su carri «matti», progettati appositamente per lo spostamento di pesi elevati40.  
Su di un piano meramente economico, infine, le armi composite in bronzo garantivano 
un certo risparmio, grazie alla loro estrema durevolezza. Un componente usurato o 
danneggiato poteva infatti essere agevolmente rifuso, rimodellato, e rimesso in opera. Questo 
processo di «ispezatura» e di «rifacimento» poteva essere facilmente attuato da qualunque 
esperto, anche su pezzi realizzati da altri maestri. Non a caso le grosse prodotte agli inizi degli 
anni Cinquanta erano ancora in uso dopo decenni, come la Neapolitana aragonese, la 
Vittoriosa fiorentina e le Ferline milanesi, tutte sopravvissute ai loro stessi creatori41.  
L’innovazione nasceva dunque come risoluzione di problemi strategici e pratici, e le 
pressanti richieste di ufficiali, politici e condottieri influenzavano indubbiamente le scelte e i 
metodi dei produttori di armi42. La domanda pubblica, lamentando difetti e suggerendo 
modifiche, non cessava di stimolare lo sviluppo, combinando il controllo sulle manifatture con 
il governo delle artiglierie43. Ma per la definitiva affermazione delle nuove soluzioni tecniche si 
sarebbero seguiti diversi percorsi di adattamento 44. Alcuni artefici avevano tentato, ad 
esempio, di combinare una «tromba» in lamine di ferro con dei «cannoni» in bronzo. Ferrante 
d’Aragona aveva proposto la creazione di una bombarda grossa che «serà de tanti pezi che uno 
asino ne porterà uno pezo, per potere expugnare ogni forteza et terra posta in monte». Altre 
40 Bernardoni, La fusione, p. 109; Belhoste, Nascita e sviluppo dell’artiglieria, pp. 328-335; Ridella, 
Produzione di artiglierie nel sedicesimo secolo, pp. 81-82. 
41 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 27, c. 222r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Responsive, 33, c. 598r; BNCF, Baldovinetti 70, c. 104v e 111v. Sul riciclo dei pezzi in bronzo, si veda 
Belhoste, Nascita e sviluppo dell’artiglieria, pp. 333-335. 
42 Calegari, Nel mondo dei pratici, pp. 28-29; Edgerton, Innovation, technology, or history, p. 688; 
Long, The craft, p. 698; Rosenberg, Economic development, pp. 152, 158 e 165; Staudenmaier, 
Rationality, agency, contingency, pp. 173-174. 
43 Panciera, Il governo delle artiglierie; Tognetti, Il governo delle manifatture, pp. 310-330. 
44 Long, The craft, pp. 698-699; Rosenberg, Economic development, p. 152. 
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artiglierie erano state interamente fabbricate col «ferro colato», in un unico pezzo: tentativi 
tuttavia destinati a fallire, data l’estrema pesantezza e l’intrinseca debolezza della ghisa45. 
Immutato restava però il gigantismo dei proiettili in pietra, che, a causa del loro basso peso 
specifico, rendevano indispensabile l’uso di massi di grosso diametro per ottenere sufficienti 
effetti distruttivi46.  
 Sperimentazioni col bronzo erano comunque state fatte in tutta la Penisola fin 
dall’ultimo quarto del Trecento, con delle «bombardae aeneae» già presenti a Roma, a Ivrea, e 
a Mantova. Del rame era stato acquistato e immagazzinato anche a Como e a Pavia, e qualche 
fonditore era stato attivo a Perugia e a Genova nei decenni successivi47. Nel Mezzogiorno, 
Alfonso d’Aragona e i suoi maestri catalani potevano disporre fin dagli anni Trenta di 
«tormenta aenea, quae multa, ac varia mirae magnitudinis habebat»48.  
Intorno alla metà del secolo, in ogni caso, la forgiatura sarebbe stata utilizzata 
esclusivamente per la manifattura di calibri minori, come passavolanti, spingarde e cerbottane. 
I fabbri, da parte loro, avrebbero continuato ad accumulare discrete fortune grazie alla vendita 
di armi da fuoco portatili, come scoppietti e archibugi49. Ma le bombarde grosse dei principali 
stati italiani non sarebbero comunque più state «de ferro, alla antiqua»50. Il rame e lo stagno le 
avrebbero rese migliori, secondo l’umanista ligure Bartolomeo Facio, consigliere del 
Magnanimo e storiografo ufficiale della corte partenopea.  
 
Di queste artiglierie, alcune se ne fanno di bronzo, alcun’altre di ferro, ma le 
prime sono migliori, e più nobili. Fannosi con due bocche, o due canne (…), 
l’una delle quali, cioè quella di fuori, è più larga, e sono quasi uguali in 
longhezza. Gettansi le più volte insieme, e talhor separatamente. Ma quelle 
che separatamente si gettano, si commettono poi insieme, e le sottili si 
pongono nelle grosse, e si congiungono insieme strettissimamente, perché 
non rifiatino in alcun luogo. Si acconciano dipoi sopra un tronco di quercia 
cavato, che chiamano il ceppo, acciocché la palla ne vada più alta, e più 
lontana. E questa è la forma, e l’uso di questa machina. La forza poi, con la 
quale è mandata la palla di pietra con tanto impeto fuori, nasce dalla polve, 
che si fa di salnitro, di zolfo, e di carbone di salcio (…). Questa polve si mette 
45 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 1, cc. XVIIIr, XLVIIIIr e Lv; Belhoste, Nascita e sviluppo dell’artiglieria, 
pp. 333-334; Ermini, Campane e cannoni, p. 394; Hall, Weapons and warfare, p. 93; Ridella, L’evoluzione 
strutturale nelle artiglierie di bronzo, pp. 15-16; Storti, Note e riflessioni sulle tecniche ossidionali, p. 252. 
46 Ridella, Produzione di artiglierie nel sedicesimo secolo, p. 82. 
47 Quarenghi, Tecno-cronografia, pp. 90, 107-108, 115, 121 e 127. 
48 Minieri Riccio, Alcuni fatti di Alfonso I d’Aragona, pp. 12-14. 
49 Ansani, Geografie della guerra, pp. 102-103. 
50 Ermini, Campane e cannoni, p. 393. 
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nella più stretta canna, e calcasi dentro con uno cogno di ferro fatto a 
questo fine. E poi vi s’aggiunge una palla di pietra, ridotta con ugual misura 
della canna più grande. Finalmente si dà fuoco per un picciolo pertugio, ch’è 
nella canna men grande, lavorato sottilmente. Et a questa guisa, 
combattendo egli con molto impeto dentro, procacciando d’uscire, getta la 
palla da lontano, a guisa di fulmine. Né fin qui s’è trovato machina che tiri 
con maggior violenza, né più discosto, i sassi, di quello che fa l’artiglieria. E 
con questa si fendono le forti muraglie, le gagliardissime torri si gettano a 
terra, e ne vanno le palle più di due miglia discosto. Ma l’artiglieria del re 
Alfonso, chiamata la Generale, le mena più lontano di qualunque altra51. 
 
Il procedimento tecnico della fusione delle bombarde di bronzo era però tutt’altro che 
codificato 52 . Ogni maestro seguiva il proprio modo di fare, influenzato da precedenti 
esperienze ed esperimenti, nonché dal confronto con altri maestri, come significativamente 
riportato negli appunti del fonditore fiorentino Bonaccorso Ghiberti. 
 
La tromba de le bombarde vole essere lungha sanza el chanone sette 
palottole e mezza. Altri dichono otto, et è meglio. E la grosseza del bronzo 
vole essere il sesto del mezo diametro de la palottola. El vano del chanone 
vole essere uno pocho più che la metà del vano de la tromba. La grosseza 
del bronzo del chanone vole essere la metà del voto. Vole avere grosso el 
fondo un terzo53. 
 
Procedimenti e proporzioni potevano così variare in ogni singola località, anche a poche miglia 
di distanza. Le norme suggerite da Francesco di Giorgio Martini, ad esempio, differiscono, in 
tutto o in parte, dai canoni del suo corregionale. 
 
Sia la gola della ovvero coda della bombarda lunga due diametri della pietra, 
e la vita che congiunge la gola con la tromba sia la metà del diametro, e la 
tromba sia cinque in sette diametri. E, posposta la comodità del trattare e 
maneggiare la bombarda, per la quale si fa di due o di più parti, quanto la 
tromba più lunga, e l’instrumento di manco parti fusse, di tanto maggiore 
efficacità saria54. 
 
Ulteriori regole, teoriche e pratiche, venivano poi stabilite dall’ingegnere senese per la 
progettazione delle artiglierie in funzione del calibro. 
51 Facio, Fatti d’Alfonso d’Aragona, pp. 222-223. 
52 Bernardoni, La fusione, pp. 112-113; Guilmartin, Gunpowder and galleys, pp. 305-312; La Salvia, 
Organizzazione della produzione, p. 116. 
53 BNCF, Banco rari 228, 82v. 
54 Martini, Trattato di architettura, p. 246. 
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 È da sapere che a tutte si ricerca tre condizioni, senza le quali non può 
essere perfetto l’instrumento. La prima, che la tromba sia per tutto di eguale 
vacuità, sicché i circoli del vacuo suo per tutto siano eguali, e le linee tratte 
dal primo all’ultimo fine siano dirette parallele, ovvero equidistanti, 
toccando per tutto i circoli intermedi, perocché, quando fussero i circoli 
della estremità maggiori degli altri, la palla, quando da una parte, quando 
dall’altra, declinerai. La seconda condizione è che il foro d’onde entra il 
fuoco sia piccolo e sopra l’ultima estremità del vacuo della gola, acciò in 
dietro non rimanga alcuna vacuità. La terza e ultima, che il vacuo della gola 
ovvero coda sia sempre più angusto uniformemente verso il foro del fuoco e 
parte posteriore dell’instrumento, il modo che il diametro dell’ultimo circolo 
del vacuo della gola sia la quinta parte minore del primo55. 
 
La differenziazione della lunghezza e del diametro, l’utilizzo di due diversi metalli, le 
dimensioni variabili delle pallottole, si riflettevano non solo nella diversità dei pezzi, ma anche 
nella varietà dei loro utilizzi. I più piccoli servivano, ad esempio per la difesa di terre murate, 
per la protezione degli accampamenti, o per il supporto delle grosse durante le manovre di 
puntamento. Gli attaccanti dispiegavano, inoltre, anche bombarde e mortai, ché «in piccolo 
tempo ogni fortezza di muro, ogni grossa torre si ruina e getta per terra». Fra gli anni Settanta 
e Ottanta, sempre il Martini, nel suo Trattato, elencava tutte le tipologie di armi da fuoco, e i 
«modi di procedere a varie offese».  
 
In prima la bombarda di lunghezza comunemente di piedi quindici in venti. 
La pietra sua di pondo di libbre trecento in circa. La seconda è chiamala 
mortaro, diritto o campanuto, lungo piedi cinque in sei, il quale non debba 
essere di più parti. La pietra sua di pondo di libbre ducento in trecento. La 
terza è nominata comune ovvero mezzana, lunga piedi dieci. La pietra di 
libbre cinquanta in circa. La quarta è appellata cortana, lunga la tromba sua 
piedi otto e la coda piedi quattro. La pietra sua di libbre settanta in cento. La 
quinta è detta passavolante, lunga piedi diciotto in circa. La pietra sua si è 
plumbea, con un quadro di ferro in mezzo, di libbre sedici in circa. La sesta è 
chiamata basalisco, lunga piedi ventidue in venticinque. La pietra sua, di 
qualunque metallo, di libbre venti in circa. La settima è chiamata 
cerbottana, lunga piedi otto in dieci. La pietra, di piombo, libbre due in tre. 
L’ottava è nominata spingarda, lunga piedi otto. La palla, di pietra, di libbre 
dieci in quindici56. 
 
55 Ibidem, p. 247. 
56 Martini, Trattato di architettura, pp. 245-246. 
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Simili classificazioni tendevano verso una razionalizzazione dei pezzi e, presumibilmente, 
riflettevano anche le richieste della committenza in tal senso57. Proprio in quegli anni, il 
condottiero Orso Orsini, nei suoi scritti sul Governo et exercitio della militia, aveva proposto 
una normalizzazione delle artiglierie di piccolo calibro, come le cerbottane, per migliorare e 
ottimizzare le prestazioni degli addetti ai pezzi. 
 
Siano tucte d’una mesura, d’uno peso, et che vogliano tucte la ballocta ad 
un modo, et ogniuna tanta polvere, acciò che l’uno zarbactaneri possa 
subvenire l’altro et che omne uno le sappia operare tucte58. 
 
Anche a Venezia, nel 1487, i «patroni all’arsenal» Luca Pisani, Francesco Foscarini, Piero 
Soranzo, Girolamo Duodo e Pietro Lion avevano cercato di regolamentare le misure delle 
bombarde e il peso della palla, perlomeno nelle fucine del bresciano. 
 
Con volontà dela illustrissima Signoria, hano concluso et fato margado con 
maistro Venturin, maistro Piero, Tonin et Mignol de Valtropia maistri de far 
bombarde, con sit che loro se proferiscano a far dite bombarde con i modi 
subscripti. 
Che tute le bombarde che loro farà segondo le sue forse siano de uno pezo 
de piera e portada de polvere, et peso, et longeza de tromba egualmente, et 
siano de bono et optimo fero, ben boiide et salde, segondo l’uso de boni 
maistri (…). Che tutti i canoni, segondo sue sorte, siano fatti non mazori né 
minori uno de l’altro, ma tuti se servano et possino adaptar in ogni tromba, 
juxta la sorta. Che tute bombarde siano bolade de tre punte de ponzon nela 
cana dentro, sì davante come da driedo (…), et questo sia el segno dela 
illustrissima Signoria. Et cussì etiam ogni maestro che farà dite bombarde 
dieba metter el suo segno super li contraforti, sì suso le trombe come suso i 
canoni, et questo azoché se cognosa quello maistro haverà fatto la 
bombarda, per potter laudar over biazemar. Che tute bombarde che loro 
farà debino darle conducte a Breza, et lì siano per sua chiareza pesade, et se 
loro vorano farle provar quali siano in sua libertà. Ma, dapoi conducte de qui 
all’arsenal, siano repesade un’altra volta, et cussì provate, al qual peso et 
prova loro debino star suzeti. Dechiarando che ’l peso se intenda al peso de 
Bressa, el qual, dapoi veduto dal peso venitian a quelo de Breza, per quello 
siano pagati a soldi ventotto il peso. E il suo pagamento li sia fato de tempo 
in tempo, come li anderà consegnando, dandoli de presente (…) ducati 
cento, il qual se dié partir fra loro maistri, zoé ducati venticinque per uno de 
sovenzion, la quale se dié scontar come parerà a essi magnifici priori et 
patroni nele sue manifature59.  
57 Bernardoni, La fusione, p. 115. 
58 Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Départment des manuscrits, Italien 958, c. 18r. 
59 Quarenghi, Tecno-cronografia, pp. 171-172. 
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 Tuttavia standardizzazioni definitive delle armi erano ancora di là da venire. Nello stesso 
documento, alle sole spingarde vengono assegnati tre calibri, da cinque, tre e una libbra, e tre 
lunghezze della canna, fra i sei e i quattro piedi, nonché tre diversi pesi, cioè seicento, 
quattrocentocinquanta e centosettanta libbre. Anche a Firenze le bombarde potevano avere i 
calibri più disparati, dalle trecento libbre in su, e i basilischi non erano esattamente pezzi 
minuti, come quelli martiniani, potendo pesare più di sedicimila libbre, distribuite su ben 
undici braccia60. 
 
Tra monopolio e openess. Le politiques techniques degli stati italiani in ambito militare 
 
Più che la trattatistica, a propagare la diffusione delle nuove artiglierie erano stati proprio i 
fonditori, attraverso il loro lavoro, la loro flessibilità nell’apprendimento, il loro bagaglio 
culturale, le loro diverse esperienze e specifiche competenze61. Come in altri settori produttivi, 
la migrazione di manodopera specializzata era infatti essenziale alla disseminazione delle 
innovazioni, allo scambio dei prodotti e alla trasmissione del sapere tecnico, nonché alla 
mediazione fra le più recenti tecnologie e i più disparati interessi politici, economici e militari 
dei capitani e dei signori italiani62. 
I metodi legati alla fabbricazione delle grosse di bronzo iniziavano rapidamente a 
circolare nelle corti e negli arsenali di tutta la Penisola, veicolati dai loro stessi creatori, maestri 
del «ridurre» i metalli «alle lor ultime perfettioni», dotati di «molto buono ingegno e gran 
iudicio». Il fonditore Vannoccio Biringuccio, autore del celebre trattato sulla Pirotechnia, 
descriveva la sua arte come faticosa «sì d’animo che di corpo», soggetta «più alla fortuna che 
all’ingegno», ma, «per contenere in sé certa espettatione di novità, produtta da grandezza 
d’arte, aspettata con desiderio, le fa supportare con piacere», tanto più «quando l’artefice 
vede che per fino a gli huomini ignoranti è arte grata et dilettevole». Il fonditore senese non 
mancava di sottolineare quanto, per i fonditori, fosse «importantissima cosa d’essere buon 
disegnatore, et che quanto più può habbi l’arte della scoltura», e «bisognali poi sapere ben 
lavorar di legname et di ferro, et non esser ignorante di saper lavorare al torno». Inoltre, 
60 Ansani, Craftsmen, artillery, and war production, p. 9. 
61 Ridella, Fonditori italiani di artiglierie, p. 19; Rosenberg, Economic development, pp. 154-157.  
62 Calegari, Nel mondo dei pratici, pp. 22-25; Degrassi, La trasmissione dei saperi, pp. 65-69; Hilaire-
Perez e Verna, Dissemination of technical knowledge, pp. 537-541; Long, The craft, p. 708; Molà, States 
and crafts, p. 133. 
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«ricercasegli ancora il sapere murare per far forni et cannali al suo proposito». Ancora più 
importanti, veri e propri rudimenti del mestiere, erano «tre attioni principali, che è l’una il far 
ben le forme et ben disporle, l’altra il ben fondere et liquefar le materie de’ metalli, la terza è 
in far le composition delle compagnie loro, secondo gli effetti che volete fare, alle quali cose è 
di bisogno usare ogni possibile advertentia, perché l’una senza l’altra non perfettamente fatta 
sarebbe, che tutte le vostre fadighe si convertirebbeno in nulla». All’invito alla perfezione 
seguiva però un ammonimento, perché, se «con tanti colpi et tante avertentie è bisogno di 
schermire con lei, per defendere l’utile et l’honore tuo», allora «a me pare un’arte da fuggire 
più che si può»63.  
Al di là del modellare le forme di argilla e del padroneggiare il processo di fusione a cera 
persa, altri «gran secreti» riguardavano direttamente la produzione delle artiglierie, come la 
correlazione tra lo spessore della camera di scoppio e la carica di propellente, il collegamento 
tra la lunghezza della volata e la gittata del pezzo, il rapporto tra le dimensioni della canna e 
quelle del proiettile, l’alesatura dell’anima, i sistemi d’incastro tra la «tromba» e il «cannone», 
e le decorazioni della culatta64. Ovviamente, «son li modi molti, tanto per causa dell’opere, 
come anco per l’ingegno et pratica o parere de’ maestri, de’ quali a un piace un cammino et a 
un altro un altro»65. Intorno agli anni Cinquanta, a parecchi fonditori veniva poi richiesto di 
mettere in opera le loro grosse durante gli assedi, occupandosi del posizionamento e del tiro 
delle stesse. Anche in qualità di ingegneri e di bombardieri, gli artefici meritavano le lodi di 
cronisti, oratori e sovrani, tanto per la precisione nel tiro, quanto per la cura dei pezzi66. 
Eppure, quasi nessuno di loro aveva iniziato la propria carriera come fabbricante di armi, 
o come soldato. Nel periodo dell’apprendistato, le procedure di base delle varie arti del fuoco 
potevano essere assimilate in numerose botteghe, copiando fedelmente i manufatti dei 
maestri, collaborando attivamente all’esecuzione delle loro opere, o realizzando 
autonomamente alcuni modelli. Molti artigiani erano stati garzoni di scultori, di campanai, di 
orafi, e persino di padellai e di calderai, prima di diventare dei maestri di bombarde a tutti gli 
effetti67. Nel corso degli anni, una formazione così diversificata avrebbe aiutato gli apprendisti 
63 Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, cc. 74v-76v e 100v. Un riassunto delle osservazioni del maestro toscano è 
in Garzoni, La piazza universale, cc. 248r-249r.  
64 Bernardoni, La fusione, pp. 112-114. 
65 Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, c. 83r. 
66 Simonetta, Historie, c. 329r; Storti, Note e riflessioni sulle tecniche ossidionali, pp. 253-254. 
67 Belhoste, Nascita e sviluppo dell’artiglieria, p. 331; Ermini, Campane e cannoni, pp. 388 e 390; La 
Salvia, Organizzazione della produzione, 112-121; Wackernagel, Il mondo degli artisti, pp. 369-370 e 380-
386. 
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a dominare le difficoltà delle tecniche di fusione, rendendoli pronti ad un «magisterio di gran 
fatica, pericolo et travaglio, sì del corpo etiandio della mente», simili «a uno spazza camino 
tento di carboni et dispiacevoli et fuligginosi fumi, con veste polverose et dal fuoco mezze 
brucciate, et anco di molle fangosa terra le mani et il viso tutto imbrattato». 
Così, maturati nei grandi e nei piccoli centri di tutto il continente, attratti dalla curiosità 
e dal desiderio di prestigio, i fonditori quattrocenteschi sarebbero stati costantemente in cerca 
di esperienze professionali68. Alcuni artigiani sceglievano di presentarsi ai loro futuri datori di 
lavoro vantando le più disparate competenze. Nel 1482, Leonardo da Vinci offriva a Ludovico il 
Moro i suoi «modi de bombarde comodissime e facili a portare», e, «occurrendo di bisogno, 
farò bombarde, mortari e passavolanti di bellissime e utili forme, fora del comune uso»69. Sul 
finire del secolo, Bernardo da Novara prometteva agli ufficiali fiorentini di «essere maestro di 
getti molto sufficiente et etiam di essere bombardiere perfecto». Allo stesso modo, 
«Cristofano di Arrigo dal Faxo della Magna Alta et Giovanni di Lupo da Binrine dello Reno 
bombardieri», definiti come «due homini singulari nel loro exercitio», affermavano di «sapere 
et di getto et di trarre et di fare fuochi lavorati quanto se ne possa sapere per alchun altro, et 
che sono contenti sperimentarsi et stare uno mese gratis per mostrare le virtù loro»70.  
Anche l’ingegnere Barone d’Angelo, nella sua esuberante lettera di presentazione ai 
Dieci di Balìa di Firenze, lodava, fra i membri della sua squadra, «el primo maestro d’Itaglia di 
far chanoni, falchonetti e girifalchi e cholonbrine, in gitalle e in armarle», che «è l’ochio e ’l 
quore mio», e che è identificabile, probabilmente, con il genovese Antonio Gioardi, al tempo 
attivo presso le fonderie partenopee71. 
Non ci sarebbe stato comunque troppo bisogno di presentazioni o di favoritismi. Gli stati 
italiani, al contrario, incoraggiavano i trasferimenti dei maestri di getto, contattando i vari 
artefici attraverso ambasciatori, mercanti e ufficiali, e ampliando e stabilizzando i circuiti dei 
pratici. In generale, simili politiques techniques per attrarre artigiani forestieri e regolamentare 
l’apertura di nuove manifatture erano state attivate fin dai primi decenni del Quattrocento, 
68 Calegari, Nel mondo dei ‘pratici’, pp. 18-19; Epstein, Labour mobility, p. 251; Schulz, La migrazione 
di tecnici, artigiani e artisti, pp. 89-94. 
69 Gille, Leonardo e gli ingegneri, pp. 152-154. 
70 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, cc. 9r e 122v.  
71 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 57, cc. 259r-260v. La missiva è pubblicata integralmente in Ansani, 
Geografie della guerra, pp. 111-113. Per gli incarichi del Gioardi durante il regno di Federico d’Aragona, 
si veda Volpicella, Le artiglierie di Castel Nuovo, p. 347.  
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talvolta affidate ad istituzioni specificatamente votate alla ricerca di tecnologie innovative e di 
migliori opportunità commerciali72.  
Leggi «pro arte introducenda», soprattutto nel settore tessile, erano state varate un po’ 
dappertutto, e con ottimi risultati, grazie alla lungimiranza delle autorità, le uniche capaci di 
garantire e di gestire in maniera adeguata i privilegi e le concessioni riservate ai maestri 
stranieri, così come le corti, che allo stesso tempo, promuovano processi di invenzione, 
specializzazione e perfezionamento73. La capacità di impiantare nuovi opifici e la possibilità di 
disporre di un sufficiente numero di fonditori, tuttavia, non costituivano soltanto un problema 
economico, o un’occasione produttiva. Il possesso delle artiglierie rappresentava anche una 
questione di prestigio e di magnificenza, di autosufficienza e di reputazione nelle operazioni 
militari, di difesa dai nemici esterni e interni. L’acquisizione di nuove tecnologie belliche era 
indubbiamente una priorità dell’azione di governo, tanto quanto l’organizzazione degli 
eserciti74.  
Per allettare i pratici forestieri, principi e repubbliche assicuravano loro la fornitura 
gratuita di materie prime, sia di prima che di seconda mano. Considerata la bassa produttività 
dei giacimenti della Penisola, pur di garantirsi sufficienti quantità di minerale, i governi erano 
spesso costretti a rivolgersi ai mercati e agli esperti dell’Europa settentrionale75. Alcuni stati 
avevano anche tentato di sottrarsi all’egemonia dei maestri tedeschi introducendo apposite 
legislazioni minerarie, agevolando l’apertura di cave private nei loro territori, e tutelando la 
crescita dei distretti già presenti 76 . Tuttavia, almeno nel corso del Quattrocento la 
fabbricazione delle bombarde avrebbe inciso relativamente poco sulla richiesta di rame e di 
stagno, dal momento che il bronzo poteva essere recuperato attraverso la rifusione degli 
«strumenti rotti». Inoltre, la produzione di armi di grosso calibro era piuttosto discontinua, tale 
da rendere necessario l’accumulo di una discreta riserva di materie prime, ma non un loro 
incessante acquisto77. 
72 Franceschi, Istituzioni e attività economica, pp. 114-116; Hilaire-Perez e Verna, Dissemination of 
technical knowledge, pp. 548-550; Molà, States and crafts, pp. 134-137. 
73 Guerzoni, Novità, innovazione e imitazione, pp. 67-72. 
74 Molà, States and crafts, p. 146. 
75 Vergani, L’attività mineraria e metallurgica, pp. 221-223. 
76 Pampaloni, La miniera del rame, pp. 3-33; Braunstein, Le entreprises minières, pp. 560-569; 
Calegari, La mano sul cannone, pp. 63-67. 
77 Ansani, Craftsmen, artillery, and war production, p. 14. 
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Alfonso il Magnanimo consegnava puntualmente quintali di bronzo ai suoi maestri di 
getto78. Nel 1459, a Siena, Agostino da Piacenza era creditore, nei confronti del Comune, di più 
di tredicimila libbre di metallo, utilizzato per la fusione della Balzana79. Qualche decennio 
dopo, i camerlenghi fiorentini annotavano l’acquisto di «bronzi, ottoni et stangnio», comprati 
da calderai, mercanti, banchieri, merciai e ferravecchi, tutti consegnati ad Andrea del 
Verrocchio «per fare la bombarda grossa»80. Sul finire del secolo, sempre a Firenze, i Dieci di 
Balìa rendicontavano il «rame e stagno hanno auto da noi e quanti vasi hanno gitato» il 
maestro Francesco Telli ed i suoi aiutanti. Un altro consuntivo riguardava, invece, Lorenzo di 
Giovanni, detto Cavaloro. 
 
Monta in tutto quanto ebbe da noi balle centosettantotto di rame, netto 
libre trentamila e cinquecentoundici (…). 
Monta lo stagno auto chome di sopra libre tremilacinquecento e 
settantatre.  
A dì ventidue di luglio 1495 (…) abiamo auto dal sopraschritto una 
pasavolante, pesò netta libre cinquemila e centoventi. 
A dì sette d’ottobre (…) una pasavolante, pesò netta libre cinquemila e 
ottocento. 
A dì trentuno detto (…) un chortale, pesò netto libre semila e quattrocento. 
In tutto, montano e’ sopraschitti getti, chome si vede, libre diciassettemila e 
trecento venti.  
Che monta in tutto, a fiorini dieci di larghi di grossi el migliaio, fiorini 
centosettantatre e soldi otto larghi di grossi81. 
 
Alle consegne di materiale veniva solitamente aggiunto lo sconto del calo di lavorazione 
del bronzo, ovverosia l’abbuono della fisiologica perdita di parte del metallo durante e dopo la 
fusione. A carico del maestro erano invece la cera e il combustibile della fornace, carboni e 
«legna, stagionate e secche, perché in queste consiste il vigor del fuoco et la forza del tutto»82. 
Nell’ambito delle trattative tra artefici e ufficiali, ancora più importante era la 
concessione gratuita di un’officina pubblica, spesso emblematicamente collocata accanto ai 
centri del potere. Il castello estense, ad esempio, ospitava la fonderia dei duchi ferraresi. 
Alcuni spazi sottostanti la torre del Mangia erano adibiti alla lavorazione delle bombarde 
78 Minieri Riccio, Alcuni fatti di Alfonso I d’Aragona, pp. 253, 424 e 429.  
79 Ermini, Campane e cannoni, p. 396. 
80 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 8, cc. 130r e 161v. 
81 Ibidem, 13, cc. 190v-191r e 197rv. 
82 Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, c. 93r. Sul finire del secolo, il valore di una catasta di «legne d’ontano per 
fondere», a Firenze, si aggirava intorno alle cinquanta lire: Archivio Storico dell’Istituto degli Innocenti di 
Firenze, 13230, c. 16v.  
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senesi. In laguna, la Serenissima offriva ai suoi maestri non solo gli spazi del suo arsenale, ma 
anche un’abitazione per le loro famiglie. In quel di Napoli, invece, le botteghe erano poste 
nelle sale del Castel Nuovo, sulle banchine del porto, e persino in alcune abitazioni fuori dalle 
mura, «ubi fiebant bombardae curiae». Nell’inventario compilato nel 1501 da Luise Setaro, 
governatore della regia artiglieria napoletana, venivano descritti diversi strumenti delle 
officine dei fonditori del castello, come una «verga de ferro soctile da annectare la terra da 
dintro la artegliaria», «cerchie» e «bande de ferro per forme» di diverse misure, dei mantici, 
parecchie tavole di olmo per gli affusti, e numerosi altri strumenti per la fornace83. Pochi anni 
prima, nei depositi della fortezza aragonese, erano immagazzinate anche cinquantanove 
tonnellate di rame84. 
Impianti di proprietà dei singoli maestri erano invece presenti a Firenze, dove «il fornello 
del comune» era stato inaugurato solamente agli inizi degli anni Ottanta, nel pieno centro della 
città, durante le fasi più intense della guerra in Lunigiana85. Fra gli strumenti forniti al maestro 
di getto per l’opificio della Sapienza, un nota del 1496 elencava un «fornello armato di ferro 
chon due bocche», due «finestre di ferro della fornace», una «forchetta di ferro da chavare le 
finestre», due «rastrelli di ferro da nettare la fornace», due «mandriani di ferro da chavare 
rame», due «vagli di ferro da buttare terra», tre «treppiedi di ferro da fucina», nove «fusi di 
legno da fare l’anima degli stormenti», venti «cerchi grossi e sottili di ferro per le forme», un 
«chanapo chon due taglie e charuchola di bronzo da trar fuori», un «ferro da nettare drento» 
le canne, e tenaglie, scale, beccastrini, verghe, paranchi e argani86. 
Dato il monopolio statale nella fabbricazione dei pezzi, agli artefici non veniva conferita 
alcuna privativa contro la concorrenza di altri fonditori. I magistrati, anzi, avrebbero sempre 
arruolato un maggior numero di maestri, stranieri e non, assicurandosi un rifornimento 
continuo di artiglierie, sia in tempo di pace, sia in caso di impellente necessità87. Tra i benefici 
per i maestri di getto poteva però rientrare la concessione della cittadinanza, come avvenuto 
talvolta a Napoli, e non solo. A Vercelli, Giovanni della Mola da Casale e Antonino di Cozola 
sarebbero diventati parte integrante della comunità se avessero consegnato al comune tre 
83 Volpicella, Le artiglierie di Castel Nuovo, pp. 333-337. 
84 Quarenghi, Tecno-cronografia, p. 178. 
85 Ansani, Geografie della guerra, pp. 92-94. Per la storia del complesso della Sapienza, si veda 
Ferretti, La Sapienza di Niccolò da Uzzano. 
86 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, cc. 129v-130r. 
87 Sulla concessione di monopoli, si veda Molà, Inventors, patents, and the market for innovations, 
pp. 7-10; Belfanti, Guilds, patents, p. 571. 
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cerbottane entro due mesi88. In Sicilia, i maestri della famiglia Arena, nel 1488, venivano 
riconosciuti come cittadini di Palermo, dopo il loro trasferimento da Catania89. 
Non mancavano, infine, un salario mensile o una paga a cottimo, quest’ultima 
genericamente calcolata sulla quantità di metallo fusa. A Venezia il compenso era annuale, e 
ammontava a diverse decine di ducati, quando non centinaia90. I maestri senesi potevano 
anche essere rimunerati con beni immobiliari incamerati dalla Repubblica91. Il Magnanimo era 
in grado di promettere addirittura venticinque ducati per ogni mille libbre di materia 
lavorata92. Per tutta la seconda metà del secolo, i Dieci di Balìa offrivano una paga compresa 
fra le sessanta e le settantacinque lire per lo stesso peso, ad indicare probabilmente una certa, 
consolidata prassi italiana in merito93.  
Una condotta del 1493, conclusa sempre a Firenze tra il Comune e «magister Johannes 
de Uspurch teuthonicus», stabiliva il prezzo e la tipologia delle artiglierie, la percentuale del 
calo dei getti, le spese a carico dell’artigiano e gli obblighi della Signoria, «come si costuma di 
fare in simili cose». 
 
In prima che il decto maestro Giovanni debba fare et gittare tucte le 
infrascripte artiglierie qui ad apresso notate et scripte per prezo et pregio di 
lire settanta piccioli et di quattrini neri il migliaio, a sua spese delle cose che 
vi si haranno adoperare chome si costuma di fare in simili cose et getti, 
havendo però la materia del getto dagli Octo decti. Et con pacto che il chalo 
di decti getti non possa passare libbre sette per cento, et per infino a tanta 
somma di calo gli sia admessa et facta buona. Passando più l’habbi ad fare il 
decto maestro Giovanni buono di suo a decti Octo. 
I decti getti che egli è obligato fare ad ogni requisitione di decti Octo agli 
infrascripti pregi sono questi, cioè: bombarde grosse intere di uno pezo o di 
dua o di tre chome a decti Octo paressi, di getto di libbre quatrocento di 
pietra o più; meze bombarde di getto da libbre ducento in su, di uno o più 
pezi; quarte bombarde da libbre cento in su di getto, di uno o più pezi; 
octave bombarde da libbre quaranta in su di getto, di uno o più pezi; 
bombarde da ripari da quindici in venticinque libbre di getto, di uno pezo o 
più; passavolanti, cortaldi o basilischi di uno pezo o di dua o più chome 
vorranno i decti Octo, di getto da libbre cento di piombo o di ferro in su; 
mezi passavolanti, cortaldi et basilischi di getto di piombo o ferro da libbre 
cinquanta a cento; quarti passavolanti di getto chome di sopra da libbre 
88 Quarenghi, Tecno-cronografia, pp. 131-132. 
89 Palazzolo, Cannoni e fonditori in Sicilia, p. 68. 
90 Panciera, Il governo delle artiglierie, pp. 163-164.  
91 Ermini, Campane e cannoni, p. 394. 
92 Minieri Riccio, Alcuni fatti di Alfonso I d’Aragona, p. 444. 
93 BNCF, Baldovinetti 70, 92v e 111v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, cc. 244r, 246r e 265r. 
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venticinque in cinquanta; item serpentine sino da cinque a venticinque 
libbre di getto in circa; item spingharde da libbre cinque in sei di getto. Le 
quali tucte cose il decto maestro Giovanni si obligha et promette a decti 
Octo di fare bene et lealmente a uso di buono et leale maestro94. 
 
Allo stesso modo, nel 1472, i Nove della Custodia della Repubblica di Siena commissionavano 
al loro maestro Giovanni da Zagabria la realizzazione di una bombarda di bronzo, da modellarsi 
su una forma preesistente, concedendogli la fornitura dei metalli e l’usufrutto della fonderia 
comunale. 
 
Supradicti officiales decreverunt quod magister Johannes de Sclavonia, 
magister bombardarum, colet trombam super forma facta olim per 
magistrum Augustinum (…), et similiter cannonem. Et si aliqua ex dictis 
formis non esset bona, illam reficiat suis sumptibus, et dictam bombardam 
cum cannone suis sumptibus det ad perfectionem, et factam consegnet (…). 
Habeat a Comuni Senarum ramen et stagnum opportunum, et locum subtus 
voltas planas sale consiliorum ubi fuerunt facte alie. Et pro suo labore et 
mercede, seu salario, libre novem pro singulo centonario (…). Item pro calo 
in conflatura deficiendo, admittatur decem pro centonario95. 
 
Sempre connessa alla produzione di artiglierie era la licenza concessa dagli Anziani di Lucca a 
Paolo Nicolini per l’apertura di un «edificio da trapanare spingarde, a aqua, in quel comune di 
San Quirico a Petroio, piviere di Sergromignio, in sul terreno suo», nel 147096. 
Negli stessi anni, contratti simili venivano siglati anche con altri fabbricanti di munizioni, 
quali maestri di polvere e lavoratori del ferro, cui venivano ugualmente concessi laboratori 
pubblici, retribuzioni mensili, minerali e metalli, e, talvolta, anticipi e aiuti finanziari per avviare 
le attività97. Significativo sarebbe stato, in tal senso, il tentativo dell’azienda Marinai e del 
banco Medici di «chondurre l’arte dell’arme et altri exercizi di Milano» in quel in Pisa98. Ma, 
negli stessi anni, simili sforzi per attirare i rinomati corazzai lombardi erano stati compiuti 
anche a Napoli e a Ferrara99. Nel 1464, i patti conclusi fra il maestro Ottolino e gli emissari di 
Borso d’Este prevedevano un premio di cento fiorini d’oro per «conducere se cum familia sua 
94 ASF, Otto di Pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte e stanziamenti, 5, cc. 96v-97r.  
95 Angelucci, Documenti inediti, pp. 556-557. Patti fra municipalità e artefici pare fossero in uso 
anche Oltralpe, come riportato da Contamine, La guerra nel Medioevo, p. 205. 
96 Quarenghi, Tecno-cronografia, pp. 146-147.  
97 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, cc. 12v-13r e 52v; 47, cc. 60r e 61r. 
98 ASF, Carte Riccardi, 816, i. 98. 
99 Bianchessi, Cavalli, armi e salnitro, pp. 560-572; Motta, Armaiuoli milanesi, pp. 201 e 219; Venturi, 
Relazioni artistiche, pp. 230-237. 
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usque ad duos menses proximos futuros ad habitandum in civitate Ferrarie», e qui, con tre 
aiutanti, lavorare «continue et toto ejus vite tempore de arte et magisterio armorum»100. 
Signori, condottieri e capitani non mancavano inoltre di richiedere o di offrire dei 
fonditori ai propri alleati, così come avveniva normalmente per gli ingegneri civili e per gli 
architetti militari. Già nel 1417, il governo senese pregava il signore di Lucca, Paolo Guinigi, di 
inviare un «magister bombardarum» ai suoi confederati101. Nel 1454, il marchese di Ferrara 
metteva a disposizione di Ludovico Gonzaga il maestro Giovanni da Lodi, affinché portasse a 
termine la fusione di una bombarda102. L’anno dopo, il senato di Ragusa si informava presso la 
Signoria di Firenze sulla disponibilità di due suoi tecnici, offrendo loro il metallo, un’officina e 
delle sostanziose ricompense in denaro103. Da parte sua, Lorenzo de’ Medici promuoveva 
Leonardo da Vinci alla corte di Ludovico Sforza, e assumeva, per l’officina comunale di 
«Marzocco», l’artigiano ferrarese Alberghetto Alberghetti, concessogli probabilmente da 
Ercole d’Este, allora capitano generale della lega che aveva sostenuto il Magnifico durante la 
guerra dei Pazzi104. Lo stesso Alberghetti sarebbe stato richiesto anche dal signore di Faenza, 
Galeotto Manfredi, «per octo zorni, tanto che io facia vedere queste mie artigliarie»105. Sul 
finire del secolo, gli emissari fiorentini in Francia domandavano a Carlo VIII un maestro delle 
artiglierie, mentre i commissari generali repubblicani inviavano ai Dieci di Balìa un «Antonio 
Chiariti da Lucca, maestro di getti, quale altra volta vostre signorie ci hanno chiesto», ben 
ragguagliati della sua opera e delle sue qualità106.  
Non mancavano nemmeno i prestiti delle armi stesse. Nel 1459, Giovanni d’Angiò 
stipulava un «mutuo» semestrale, in Genova, per due grosse 107. Nel 1464, i fiorentini 
spedivano al duca di Milano, via mare, una bombarda, destinata all’assedio dello stesso 
capoluogo ligure108. Qualche tempo prima, Filippo di Savoia aveva sollecitato al signore di 
Gruyères l’invio di due pezzi a canna molto corta, detti vugleri 109. Nel 1482, i senesi 
100 Cittadella, Notizie relative a Ferrara, p. 490. 
101 Angelucci, Documenti inediti, pp. 580-581. 
102 Cittadella, Notizie relative a Ferrara, p. 494. 
103 Fabriczy, Fonditori fiorentini, p. 316. 
104 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 8, c. 129v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 30, c. 260v. 
105 Angelucci, Documenti inediti, pp. 277-278. 
106 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 40, c. 356r; Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la 
Toscane, p. 659. 
107 Storti, Note e riflessioni sulle tecniche ossidionali, p. 252. 
108 Beltrami, Le bombarde milanesi, p. 803. 
109 Quarenghi, Tecno-cronografia, p. 145. 
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dichiaravano al papa «parati facere de dictis nostris bombardis que placita sint sue 
sanctitati»110. Per la campagna dell’agro romano, nel 1486, Alfonso d’Aragona aveva richiesto, 
ai suoi alleati toscani, l’invio di due pezzi da Montepulciano, perché «non si può fare senza una 
bombarda grossa et qualche mezana artiglieria», e, senza, «ogni piccola bicocca fa difesa»111. 
Da Napoli e da Roma provenivano rispettivamente la «bombarda del re di tre pezzi» e la 
«bombarda grossa del papa di due pezzi» utilizzate contro le fortificazioni di Colle Val d’Elsa 
nel 1479112.  
Prestiti e offerte smentirebbero, quindi, qualsiasi parvenza di “segreto militare” attorno 
alla produzione delle grosse, almeno per il Quattrocento113. Pur trattandosi di un sapere 
fondamentale per la sicurezza, il getto delle artiglierie non era coperto da nessuna 
riservatezza, configurandosi piuttosto come una open technique, disponibile e replicabile da 
qualsiasi stato, purché inserito nel tessuto delle leghe, generali o particolari che fossero114. 
Contrariamente a quanto avveniva per altre manifatture, le autorità italiane non ponevano 
controlli o restrizioni sui trasferimenti dei loro fonditori, non dovendo proteggere alcun 
primato economico o alcuna supremazia manifatturiera delle città capitali115. Allo stesso 
modo, neanche le corporazioni potevano porre vincoli alla circolazione della manodopera, non 
afferendo i pratici ad alcuna specifica arte. Nel caso fiorentino, nonostante qualche maestro 
fosse immatricolato nell’«arte dei maestri di pietra e legname», i pratici non erano costretti da 
nessuno statuto a mantenere il riserbo sulle tecniche impiegate, o a rimanere nella comunità 
di origine116.  
Del resto, rispetto ad altre armi, come corazze, scoppietti e lance, le artiglierie pesanti 
erano un merce assai meno “difficile”117. In quanto di proprietà governativa, le grosse non 
erano assolutamente immettibili sul mercato. Solo i piccoli calibri potevano essere 
commerciati al dettaglio da maestri forestieri, senza però mai costituire una serie concorrenza 
per i prodotti locali. I fiorentini acquistavano un paio di spingarde l’anno sul mercato 
110 Angelucci, Documenti inediti, p. 563. 
111 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 33, cc. 354r, 385v e 519r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 36, c. 
362r. 
112 Allegretti, Diario senese, pp. 793-794. 
113 Bernardoni, La fusione delle artiglierie, p. 107. 
114 Hilaire-Perez e Verna, Dissemination of technical knowledge, p. 540. 
115 Molà, Inventors, patents, and the market for innovations, pp. 137-138. 
116 Belfanti, Guilds, patents, pp. 574-576. Sul ruolo delle arti nella diffusione del sapere tecnico, si 
veda anche Epstein, Craft guilds, pp. 693-705. 
117 Ansani, Geografie della guerra, pp. 115-116; Ashtor, Aspetti dell’espansione italiana, pp. 24-25; 
Bianchessi, Cavalli, armi e salnitro, pp. 573-575; Leydi, Le armi, pp. 171-175. 
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bresciano, un nonnulla, rispetto alla manifattura dei fabbri del Dominio, capaci di produrre 
centinaia in un solo semestre118. Nel 1492, Ferrante d’Aragona comprava a Milano, oltre a 
diecimila lame di spada e tremila partigiane, ben mille spingarde. Durante la conquista del 
regno, anche suo padre, Alfonso, aveva acquistato delle artiglierie in Catalogna, ma, in 
entrambe i casi, le forniture straordinarie erano state dettate unicamente dall’impellenza dei 
combattimenti e dalle minacce avversarie119. 
 
Storie di pratici 
 
Durante l’intero Quattrocento, interazioni e scambi fra le più disparate culture tecniche, 
artistiche e politiche sembravano avvenire quotidianamente, in tutta la Penisola. La 
reputazione e le sperimentazioni delle maestranze veneziane, ad esempio, attiravano 
indubbiamente l’attenzione di molti pratici, che spesso richiedevano al Senato l’autorizzazione 
a recarsi in laguna per studiare le tecnologie marciane, finendo talvolta per stabilirsi 
definitivamente in città. Fra i magazzini dell’arsenale si potevano quindi incontrare fabbricanti 
francesi, croati e germanici, o esperti provenienti dalla Terraferma, dalla Lombardia, dalle 
Marche, dal Piemonte, dalla Puglia. Originario di Cremona era invece maestro Bartolomeo, 
affermatosi come un personaggio chiave nella gestione, nel munizionamento e nella 
organizzazione dell’artiglieria120. Nel 1487, come suo successore, sarebbe stato designato il 
figlio di Alberghetto Alberghetti, Sigismondo, «peritissimus et excellentissimus artifex 
conficiendorum tormentorum, passavolantium et aliorum huiusmodi instrumentorum 
bellicorum», promettendogli la concessione di un’abitazione, uno stipendio annuo di duecento 
ducati, e il pagamento di tutti i pezzi portati a termine121. 
A Napoli, nel solo Castel Nuovo, intorno agli anni Cinquanta operavano maestri 
provenienti da Genova e dalla Sicilia, dalla Savoia e dall’Umbria, dalla Germania e dalla 
Catalogna, tutti agli ordini del «mestre maior de la artilleria», il parigino Guglielmo dello 
Monaco, incaricato dal Magnanimo della produzione di bombarde e dell’approvvigionamento 
118 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 33, c. 171r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori 
e creditori, 22, cc. 14v e 22r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 30, c. 109v. 
119 Barone, Le cedole di tesoreria, pp. 235-236; Minieri Riccio, Alcuni fatti di Alfonso I d’Aragona, p. 7; 
Quarenghi, Tecno-cronografia, p. 177. 
120 Mallett, L’organizzazione militare di Venezia, pp. 109-116; Ashtor, Aspetti dell’espansione italiana, 
pp. 21-26. 
121 Angelucci, Documenti inediti, pp. 282-283. 
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di polvere e di salnitro122. Attivo a Milano già nel 1443, il fonditore francese si era trasferito 
presso la corte di Alfonso in qualità di realizzatore di «multiplices machinae», «egregie 
instructus arte horologiorum et quarundam pulchrarum rerum». Per incoraggiarlo a dedicarsi 
al suo lavoro «bene, alacri, libero et toto animo», il sovrano aragonese gli aveva garantito la 
cittadinanza regnicola e un salario annuo di quattrocento ducati d’oro, incrementati dal suo 
successore con la concessione della gabella della piazza Maggiore di Napoli.  
A partire dal 1453, il dello Monaco aveva progettato e fuso campane e fontane. Ma il 
suo capolavoro tecnico, a detta di molti, era rappresentato dall’imponente Neapolitana, una 
grossa di quattro pezzi, realizzata con nove tonnellate di bronzo, finemente incisa, e decorata 
con «lo stemma reale di Aragona e del reame di Napoli, tenendo da una parte il castello e 
dall’altra la divisa delle spighe del miglio»123. Nella reggia partenopea, l’artefice avrebbe poi 
fuso numerose altre bombarde e spingarde, alternando il suo lavoro in officina con quello sul 
campo di battaglia. 
 
Parmi dovere fare intendere la forza de la bombarda che ha tracto, la quale 
se chiama la Neapolitana, et porta quatrocento libre de petra, et così la virtù 
del bombardero, che è magistro Gulielmo. Dicta bombarda non se poté, per 
l’aspreza del monte, piantare più presso alla torre (…), et bisognava trare a 
l’insuso. El muro de la torre, dove era più debile, era grosso quatordici 
palmi, che quando el conte de Sarno et l’altri de la terra videro mectere 
dicta bombarda in quello loco (…) se ne ridevano, parendoli cosa impossibile 
che dicta bombarda ce dovesse fare alcuna offesa. La virtù del bombardero 
è stata questa, che mai ha gitato una sola petra in fallo, che ad tutti è parso 
cosa assai meravigliosa124. 
 
Le capacità e l’ingegno avrebbero permesso a Guglielmo di godere di un immenso prestigio, a 
corte, e di accumulare, nei decenni successivi, una discreta fortuna personale. Negli anni 
Sessanta, gli sarebbe infatti stato accordato l’acquisto della baliva di Cosenza, così come il 
possesso dei feudi di Monasterace, Perricello e Campolongo, nella provincia di Calabria Ultra, e 
l’usufrutto di tutte le miniere di allume del Regno, a eccezione di quelle regie di Ischia e 
Lipari125.  
Sempre in quel di Napoli operava un altro francese, Patris de la Motte, che aveva 
precedentemente prestato servizio presso Riccardo III ed Enrico VII d’Inghilterra. Dall’Impero 
122 Barone, Le cedole di tesoreria, p. 13. 
123 Minieri Riccio, Alcuni fatti di Alfonso I d’Aragona, p. 444. 
124 Storti, Note e riflessioni sulle tecniche ossidionali, p. 254. 
125 Barreto, Artisan ou artiste, pp. 301-307. 
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proveniva poi un maestro Giovanni, che aveva realizzato a Gaeta una bombarda. Prima 
dell’arrivo di Guglielmo dello Monaco, Alfonso aveva commissionato altre bronzine a 
Bartolomeo da Milano. Ma altri fonditori, in genere, erano attivi anche nell’arsenale navale 
partenopeo126.  
La disponibilità di numerosi specialisti garantì ai sovrani aragonesi una produzione 
incessante di armi da fuoco, stimolata anche dalle guerre, dalle rivolte e dalle congiure che 
travagliarono il regno per tutto il secondo Quattrocento. Nel 1474, i pezzi della «regia 
munitione» assommavano a ben centotrentasette unità, fra bombarde e cerbottane di 
metallo 127 . Alla fine del secolo, nel Castel Nuovo erano presenti una «casa grande 
dell’artiglieria», un deposito di polvere e una raffineria di salnitro, e almeno due distinte 
fonderie, gestite da Giovanni da Catania, Federico da Bergamo, Antonio Gioardi da Genova e 
Pietro «de Coria, spagniolo», insieme a cinque loro garzoni128. In quegli anni, l’armeria della 
reggia, stando al cronista veneziano Marino Sanudo, rappresentava una vera e propria delizia 
per i contemporanei129. 
 Seguendo le strade aperte da mercenari, fabbri, meccanici e stampatori loro 
connazionali, Guglielmo di Norimberga, Corrado di Stoccarda e altri artigiani tedeschi erano 
giunti a Roma negli anni Sessanta, su invito della Camera Apostolica. A loro spettavano gli 
incarichi di bombardieri e di maestri dell’artiglieria, mentre al pontefice in persona era spesso 
demandata la benedizione delle bocche da fuoco. D’altronde, come notava uno sconsolato 
notaio della curia, «dove che per altro tempo li santi apostoli intendevano a conquistare li 
popoli alla fede et devotione christiana colli miracoli, orationi et segno della santa croce, 
adesso si acquistano colli colpi delle bombarde»130. Nel 1462, tre bombarde erano state 
addirittura ribattezzate coi nomi più cari a Pio II.  
 
Quarum primam, ex nomine patris Pii pontificis, Silviam appellavit. Alteram, 
ex nomine matris, Victoriam (…). Tertiam (…), Aeneam, quod id fuerit ante 
praesulatum pontificis nomen. Et haec reliquis maior, quae trecentorum 
126 Minieri Riccio, Alcuni fatti di Alfonso I d’Aragona, pp. 253, 255 e 257; Ridella, Fonditori italiani di 
artiglierie, pp. 19-20. 
127 Barone, Le cedole di tesoreria, p. 400. 
128 Volpicella, Le artiglierie di Castel Nuovo, pp. 336-337. 
129 Sanudo, La spedizione di Carlo VIII, p. 238. 
130 Infessura, Diario della città di Roma, p. 134. 
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pondo emisit, ille ducentorum, in qui tant vis reperta est, ut nulla murorum 
moles resistere valeret131. 
 
La Silvia, la Vittoria e l’Enea erano state realizzate dal maestro Agostino de’ Rossi da Piacenza, 
arrivato nella Città Eterna l’anno precedente, per espressa volontà di sua santità. Gli accordi 
con il «frabricator bombardarum» prevedevano l’affitto di una casa, la consueta fornitura del 
bronzo, la concessione degli strumenti e una paga di venti fiorini per ogni mille libbre di peso 
delle artiglierie132.  
Dal punto di vista della committenza, la decennale carriera di Agostino appare senz’altro 
come una delle più notevoli. L’artefice era stato infatti attivo non solo a Roma, ma anche a 
Milano, a Mantova e ad Urbino. A Siena, soprattutto, aveva realizzato due bombarde, «magnas 
et ornatas», numerose serpentine e svariati «cannoni» per dei pezzi preesistenti. Inoltre, aveva 
preso parte, in qualità di bombardiere, alle operazioni contro Aldobrandino Orsini e Niccolò 
Piccinino133. Le sue capacità avevano finito per attirare le attenzioni di numerosi governanti, e, 
nel 1457, anche Federico da Montefeltro ne aveva domandato insistentemente i servigi.  
 
El me ocurre al presente el bisogno de uno maestro da gittare bombarde, et, 
perché sono informato che lì in Siena è uno bono et sufficiente maestro, 
quale me satisferia assai, che ’l conobbi fin d’alora quando stetti lì amalato, 
prego istantemente le signorie vostre che, ad mia singulare complacentia, li 
dia licentia, anzi, li commetta che vegna via subito, che cusì rechede el 
bisogno mio (…). Et io li farò fare el debito del suo pagamento, per modo che 
se chiamarà ben contento. Io debbio sperare che le signorie vostre me 
compiacciano del dicto maestro, perché in omne cosa che tendesse al bene 
et stato de la vostra Republica io seria affectionatissimo quanto niun altro 
possesse havere al mondo, et maxime attento che queste bombarde io le 
voglio per operarle contro el signor Sigismundo, inimico de la vostra 
signoria, a la quale me raccomando134.  
 
La Repubblica, solitamente, non tardava a concedere, al proprio artigiano, la licenza di lavorare 
presso gli alleati. La crescente stima dei contemporanei, e i suoi viaggi, permisero ad Agostino 
di entrare personalmente in contatto con Cicco Simonetta e con papa Piccolomini, arrivando a 
131 Schulz, La migrazione, pp. 108-109; Esch, Economia, cultura materiale ed arte, pp. 140-142. Si 
vedano anche le testimonianze coeve di Piccolomini, Commentarii rerum memorabilium, p. 135. 
132 Ermini, Campane e cannoni, p. 397. 
133 Ibidem, pp. 388-401. 
134 Angelucci, Documenti inediti, pp. 544-545. 
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ottenere, da quest’ultimo, il titolo di «palacii apostolici architectus ac exercitus Sanctae 
Romane Ecclesiae bombarderius»135.  
Come il maestro piacentino, anche l’«ottimo ingegnere» Ferlino da Chieri operò sui 
campi di battaglia e in bottega, servendo la Serenissima, e riuscendo persino ad aprire una 
propria officina sull’isola della Giudecca136. Il fonditore piemontese era giunto a Venezia dopo 
aver fabbricato numerose bombarde in Savoia e in Lombardia. Qui, in particolar modo, aveva 
realizzato due omonime Ferline, di due pezzi ciascuna, entrambe caricabili con duecento libbre 
di palla di pietra137. 
Negli stessi anni, il genovese Francesco Bianco fondeva a Milano la Corona, di 
quattrocento libbre di calibro, e la Bissona, di trecento. Delle medesime pallottole di 
quest’ultima era munita la Liona, eccezionalmente realizzata in ghisa dallo specialista ligure138. 
Maffeo da Como e Dainese Maineri, invece, sovrintesero alla fusione di una bombarda di otto 
tonnellate, la Galeazesca Victoriosa, la cui «tromba» poteva ospitare un gigantesco proiettile 
di cinquecentosettanta libbre, e la cui «coda» doveva contenere l’esplosione di ben cento 
libbre di polvere139. Ma tra i «ducali ingeniari et bombarderi» sforzeschi figuravano anche altri 
esperti locali, oltre a pratici stranieri, fra cui Cristoforo da Gandino, Francesco da Pavia, 
Francesco da Mantova, Giovanni da Lodi e «magistro Nardivo de Franza»140. 
Il tema della difesa, ovviamente, riguardava anche gli stati minori. Nel 1458, il marchese 
Borso d’Este aveva a sua disposizione due maestri francesi, Simone e Nicolò da Nancy141. Nel 
1471, per finanziare i lavori di Giovanni di Zagabria, il governo senese era arrivato persino a 
imporre una specifica tassa sulle concessioni di grazia, «considerato che non sia molto honore 
che le vostre signorie, essendo di stima asai, habi solamente due bombarde, che quando ce ne 
fusseno dieci non sarebero troppe, et darebero a la vostra Republica grande reputatione»142. 
Per il conflitto contro Firenze, nel 1479, una grossa di due pezzi, pesante più di otto tonnellate, 
era stata fusa da Pietro di Niccolò Campana, e «passava mura, ripari, e ogni cosa, e non era 
niente che la tenesse». Durante quello stesso anno, la cattura di diverse artiglierie nemiche 
135 Ermini, Campane e cannoni, pp. 396-398. 
136 Panciera, Il governo delle artiglierie, p. 163. 
137 Simonetta, Historie, c. 329r; Visconti, L’ordine dell’esercito ducale sforzesco, p. 471. 
138 Beltrami, Le bombarde milanesi, pp. 798-799; Quarenghi, Tecno-cronografia, pp. 142-143. 
139 Visconti, L’ordine dell’esercito ducale sforzesco, p. 471.  
140 Motta, Architetti ed ingegneri militari sforzeschi, pp. 139-140. 
141 Cittadella, Notizie relative a Ferrara, p. 495. 
142 Archivio di Stato di Siena, Concistoro, 2557, c. 1r. 
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rese possibile la vista di una luccicante «montagna di bronzo» davanti al Palazzo Pubblico, con 
ventidue bombarde trionfalmente esibite in Piazza del Campo143.  
Firenze, del resto, pareva essere all’avanguardia, nel campo della produzione di armi da 
fuoco. Fin dalla metà del secolo, infatti, il Comune si era affidato esclusivamente a dei maestri 
di getto per la realizzazione delle sue armi d’assedio, forte anche della tradizione di suoi 
scultori e dei suoi orafi, come Donatello e Michelozzo. Collaboratore di entrambe era stato 
Maso di Bartolomeo, che, a partire dal 1449, si era occupato della produzione di armi nella 
«chasa delle bombarde» di Urbino, pagato «a ragione di fiorini venticinque del migliaio» di 
libbre di bronzo. Per Federico da Montefeltro, Maso avrebbe realizzato una «cierbottana di 
quattro pezi a vite», una grossa di tre pezzi, «di portata di libre trecento, che pesò la bombarda 
libre dodicimila e cinquecento», e una «bombarda di portata di libre ducento e quattro», fusa 
con undicimila libbre di metallo144. 
Tornato a Firenze nel 1451, nella sua bottega di via Porta Rossa, Maso provvide, nel giro 
di pochi mesi, ad immatricolarsi all’«arte de’ maestri di pietra e legname»145. Nell’inverno del 
1453, i Dieci di Balìa lo incaricavano di reperire, nelle fortificazioni di Pisa, del bronzo usato, 
affinché lo conducesse a Firenze, «pro novis bombardis conficiendis»146. La contabilità dei 
magistrati ne enumerava quattro, e cioè la Disperata, la Lionessa, la Tribolata, e la Lucchese, 
pagate più di millecinquecento lire, «in somma di più bronzo avuto».  
 
Quattro bombarde, le quale abiamo fatto fare di bronzo vecchio che 
avevamo, ch’era libre ottomila e centosessanta, il quel venne da Pisa da 
Chonsoli del Mare (…) in più pezi, e libre quindicimila e quatrocentoventuno 
chomperamo da più persone (…).  
E’ nomi di dette bombarde sono qui da piè. Pesono in tutto libre ventimila e 
trecentocinquanta, che il resto di detto bronzo chalò per farlo due volte 
fondere, che chalò libre quattordici per cento. Una bombarda che si chiama 
la Disperata, che ha il chanone a vite, pesò libre novemila e secentotrenta, e 
una bombarda che si chiama la Leonessa che pesò libre semila e 
novecentoquindici, e una bombarda che si chiama la Tribolata che le 
faciemo la tromba e il chanone venne da Pisa, fu detta tromba libre dumila e 
ottocentonovanta e il chanone fu dumila e cinquanta, e una che si chiama la 
Lucchese, che avavamo la tromba e faciemo fare il chanone, che pesò libre 
143 Allegretti, Diario senese, p. 794; Angelucci, Documenti inediti, pp. 561-562. 
144 BNCF, Baldovinetti 70, cc. 7r e 22r. 
145 Ibidem, c. 37r. 
146 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 20, c. 113v. 
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cinquecento e ottanta, sì che in tutto pesò detto bronzo, chome di sopra, 
libre ventimila e trecentocinquanta147. 
 
Nel suo «conto di dare e d’avere e di opere», Maso riportava i calibri e le cariche delle 
bombarde, specificando che la «tromba di detta Disperata porta libre trecento di pietra, el 
channone porta libre ottanta di polvere», che la «tromba de la Leonessa porta libre 
ducentocinquanta di pietra e il channone porta libre cinquanta di polvere», e che «la tromba 
detta la Tribolata è di portata di libre centocinquanta di pietra»148. Nei mesi seguenti, il 
maestro fiorentino avrebbe provveduto a riparare e rifondere più volte il «cannone» di alcune 
grosse, rottosi durante le operazioni contro gli invasori aragonesi sul litorale toscano. Sempre 
per la stessa campagna, Masaccio avrebbe curato la «fattura d’una bombarda di portata di 
libre quattrocento di pietra, la quale bombarda pesò libre tredicimila circha», e di altre tre 
macchine, la Caccia pazzia, la Né patti né concordia e la Vittoriosa.  
 
E deono dare a dì due d’aprile, per manifattura d’una bombarda detta 
Chaccia Pazia, di portata di libre ducento e cinquanta di pietra, pesa detta 
bombarda libre ottomila e cinquecento, per prezo di lire settantacinque el 
migliaio, lire secentotrentasette e soldi dieci. 
E deono dare a dì tre di luglio, per manifattura del channone della Vittoriosa, 
pesò libre cinquemila e novecento, per lire settantacinque el migliaio, lire 
trecentosettantacinque. 
E deono dare a dì tre di luglio, per manifattura del channone che io rifeci alla 
tromba di Né patti né chonchordia, che l’ho rendere detto dì, che pesò libre 
cinquemila e ducentosettanta, per lire settantacinque el migliaio, monta lire 
trecentosettanta e soldi cinque149. 
 
Grazie ai suoi incarichi negli accampamenti di Rencine, Vada e Rosignano, Maso conosceva 
anche Astorre II Manfredi, allora condottiero dell’esercito gigliato. Per il signore di Faenza 
avrebbe fuso diverse cerbottane, «cholla divisa dell’agnello», nonché «un paio di forme di 
bronzo che gittavano due pallottole di piombo, l’una di libre due e l’altra di libre una oncie 
sei»150. 
Fra gli assistenti di Masaccio, oltre al fratello Giovanni, figurava anche un suo discepolo 
montepulcianese, che, fra gli anni Settanta e Ottanta, si sarebbe guadagnato la stima del 
147 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 17, cc. 143v-144r. 
148 BNCF, Baldovinetti 70, c. 92v. 
149 Ibidem, cc. 101v e 111v. 
150 Ibidem, cc. 88v, 150v e 153v.  
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Magnifico e il soprannome di Pasquino delle Bombarde151. Dopo aver lavorato in Romagna e in 
Toscana sotto la guida del maestro, Pasquino aveva modellato autonomamente svariate 
bocche da fuoco nella sua officina fiorentina e nella cittadella nuova di Pisa, partecipando 
anche a qualche assedio, come quelli di Citerna e di Città di Castello nel 1482152. Durante la sua 
carriera, era riuscito a entrare nella cerchia dello scultore Desiderio da Settignano, finendo per 
trasmettere le sue conoscenze e le sue competenze a un allievo di quest’ultimo, Andrea del 
Verrocchio. Nel 1484, su commissione dei Dieci di Balìa, anche il famoso artista avrebbe 
realizzato, con ventitremila libbre di bronzo, una grossa di tre pezzi, «bella et buona», 
destinata all’assedio di Pietrasanta, ricevendo in cambio ben millequattrocento lire153. 
Nel giro di trent’anni, dunque, attraverso un’accorta politica di mecenatismo, la 
Repubblica sembrava aver favorito la creazione e la maturazione di una vera e propria scuola 
di maestri di getto locali, di scultori votati anche alla fusione di armi, arrivando a possedere 
almeno venti pezzi di artiglieria campale, tra cui una bombarda capace di lanciare più di 
settecento libbre di palla di pietra, il maggior calibro dell’intera Penisola154. Soltanto le 
sollecitazioni dell’estenuante conflitto contro i genovesi richiesero l’apporto di pratici 
forestieri, come l’Alberghetti, e come, soprattutto, Giovanni da Augusta, arrivato a Livorno, col 
fratello Matteo, in qualità di semplice bombardiere.  
 
Quel maestro bombardiere si vuole intendere cum esso noi. Se noi il 
vogliamo adoperare per bombardiere, el pregio suo è facto, cioè ducati dieci 
a tempo di guerra et il famiglio, et ducati sei a tempo di pacie. Ma se lo 
vogliamo adoperare a gittare, vuole essere pagato di getti, et è contento 
che, nel tempo si pagha di getti, il soldo non gli corra, et fare le cose gli 
commetteranno le signorie vostre per due o tre ducati meno che non fa 
maestro Alberghetto. Et però non l’ho mandato ancora a Pietrasancta, 
perché se l’uomo non si compone cum esso lui e’ serve malvolentieri, et 
pena mille anni et hassene cattivo servigio, benché lavori bene a ogni modo. 
El pacto mi pare si facci per noi, perché, oltra il piacere ci fa salvandoci il 
bombardiere, ci levamo da dosso la spexa del bombardiere (…). A Livorno ha 
facto quattro archibusi che sono vantaggiatissimi, ma sono un pocho troppo 
gravi, che pesano dalle trentasei alle quarantatre libre l’uno. Ho lasciato 
sieno inceppati et messi nella roccha nuova. Avanza a Livorno di cose 
151 ASF, Arte dei maestri di pietra e legname, 2, c. 140v; BNCF, Baldovinetti 70, c. 62v. 
152 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 27, cc. 257v e 276r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Entrata e uscita, 8, cc. 44r e 89v. 
153 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 30, c. 209v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e 
uscita, c. 129v. 
154 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 22, c. 14r. Per le politiche fiorentine, si veda Ansani, Geografie della 
guerra, pp. 88-98, 106-107 e 116-117. 
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vecchie et triste dugentocinquanta libre di bronzo, che se non havessimo a 
mandare costui in Lunigiana l’arei messo in cittadella et fattogli fare dieci o 
dodici archibusi di venti libre l’uno, che sono buona monitione per queste 
cittadelle et costeranno piccola cosa più che di ferro155. 
 
A partire dal 1485, l’artigiano tedesco divenne il responsabile della fornace di Pietrasanta. 
Grazie al suo incessante impegno, sarebbe ben presto arrivato a coordinare i lavori della 
fonderia pubblica pisana, introducendo i propri metodi nella fusione tanto di «bavalischi» 
quanto di passavolanti, «cortali», serpentine e spingarde156. Nel 1488, Giovanni realizzava 
anche delle campane, destinate al duomo di Pisa ed alla rocca di Sarzana157. Il doganiere di 
Pisa, Francesco Cambini, non poteva che lodarne l’opera, perché «e’ dura assai faticha et serve 
bene»158.  
Il Comune di Firenze, comunque, non tardò ad incentivare l’arrivo di nuovi pratici 
stranieri. Tra la fine del Quattro e l’inizio del Cinquecento, furono infatti invitati a lavorare 
nella Sapienza un maestro piccardo, Piero da Douai, e Giovannantonio da Novara 159 , 
quest’ultimo aiutato dal fiorentino Giovanni Piffero, il padre di Benvenuto Cellini160. Dal 1504 
al 1511, l’officina pubblica fu gestita in esclusiva da Bernardino da Milano, che avrebbe 
contribuito ad armare la milizia machiavelliana con decine di pezzi di artiglieria pesante e con 
centinaia di armi da fuoco portatili161. 
 
Il network dei maestri di getto 
 
Parallelamente alla scuola di Maso e di Pasquino, la tradizione fusoria dei Ghiberti si era 
andata tramandando ed evolvendo nel corso di almeno tre generazioni. Ben prima di aderire 
formalmente all’«arte dei maestri di pietra e legname», il giovane Bonaccorso era cresciuto 
lavorando a fianco del padre Vettorio, ammirando da vicino le monumentali «porte del 
Paradiso» realizzate da suo nonno Lorenzo per il battistero fiorentino. Erede degli strumenti, 
155 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 30, c. 519r. 
156 ASF, Otto di pratica, Munizioni, 1, c. 9v; ASF, Ufficiali delle castella, 29, cc. 20r, 25v, 29v, 31v e 33v; 
ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 14, c. 197r; 16, c. 157r. 
157 Böninger, Gli artigiani stranieri, p. 111. 
158 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 37, c. 267v. 
159 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, cc. 48r e 57v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 8, cc. 127v e 161v. 
160 Gaye, Carteggio inedito, p. 455; Cellini, Vita, pp. 3-7. 
161 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 10, cc. 9v, 31v, 172r e 225r. 
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dei libri e della bottega di famiglia, anche lui aveva scelto l’avito mestiere, rivendicandolo 
sempre con orgoglio nei suoi scritti. 
 
La prima metà di detta bottegha overo istanza mi si dà per testamento di 
Lorenzo benché io l’avessi avere tutta per il detto testamento, e l’altra metà 
per li danari ho ispeso in chasa, sì che per l’una chosa e per l’altre mi danno 
detta bottegha, la quale è stata già un tempo a uso di schultura overo a uso 
di gietto, imperò in quela si gittorono le porte di bronzo di San Giovanni 
Battista di Firenze (...). E a me agiudichorono tutti i tagli di stagni, pietre fini 
intagliate e non intagliate, dovunque ve fussino, e ongni altre maserizie atte 
a l’arte di schultura o di pittore o d’orafo o di gietti e in gienero tutte chosse 
non usabili alla chasa, cioè tutte chosse apartenenti a schrittoio o che si 
possa chomprendere essere a simili chose162. 
 
Proprio grazie alle sue ricordanze, al suo «libro di debitori e creditori» e al suo «zibaldone» di 
appunti, è possibile ricostruire, più che per molti altri suoi contemporanei, la sua attività di 
pratico163, una carriera iniziata nel 1479, quando realizzava, per il Comune, le sue prime armi 
da fuoco. Non è improbabile che avesse conosciuto, in quell’occasione, Pasquino di Matteo e 
Alberghetto Alberghetti, entrambe impegnati a fondere delle spingarde da impiegare contro le 
truppe napoletane, romane e senesi, allora schierate intorno al Poggio Imperiale164. 
Agli anni precedenti risalivano, probabilmente, le letture di Vitruvio, gli studi sui 
macchinari di Mariano Taccola, gli approcci all’architettura militare e la ricopiatura del trattato 
del nonno, così come le note sull’oreficeria contenute nello «zibaldone», riguardanti i materiali 
necessari «per fare bronzo nero» o per «arientare senza fuocho», o la composizione dell’«aqua 
da dorare fero». Nel 1484, nello «scrittoio» all’incrocio fra la via di San Gilio e via della Pergola, 
Bonaccorso era alle prese con la realizzazione di alcune campane per l’ospedale di Santa Maria 
Nuova, come testimoniato anche dalle sue numerose annotazioni su scale e proporzioni di 
questi manufatti, e sui «modi di fare champane grose nela fosa»165. 
Su commissione dei Dieci di Balìa, richiesto a più riprese dagli alleati romani, il maestro si 
recava a Bracciano nel 1486, fondendovi una grossa, e rimanendovi in qualità di ingegnere del 
condottiero Gentile Virginio Orsini, responsabile di «munitiones et fabricationes». Nel 1490, il 
162 Archivio Storico dell’Istituto degli Innocenti di Firenze, 13230, cc. 7v-8r.  
163 Si tratta, rispettivamente, dei manoscritti 13230 e 13229, conservati presso l’archivio storico 
dell’Istituto degli Innocenti, e del quaderno, segnato 228, appartenente al fondo Banco rari della 
Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze. 
164 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 22, c. 17v. 
165 Immagini e testi del libro di appunti ghibertiano sono analizzati in Scaglia, A miscellany of bronze 
works and texts; Scaglia, A translation of Vitruvius. 
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Ghiberti si trasferiva ancora una volta, mettendosi al servizio del signore di Piombino, Jacopo 
IV Appiano, con un salario di otto fiorini d’oro al mese. Nel porto tirrenico, avrebbe collaborato 
con due dei più importanti imprenditori minerari toscani, i fratelli pratesi Zanobi e Tommaso 
Marinai, attivi nell’estrazione e nella vendita di rame e di ferro166. Nel 1493, Franceschetto 
Cybo, il figlio di Innocenzo VIII, lo incaricava di «pore pregio delle munizioni e artiglierie e 
armadure e molte chose ne le chastela che lui dette overo vendé al singniore Vergilio 
Orsino»167. 
Tornato finalmente a Firenze, nel 1491, il Ghiberti sarebbe rientrato in contatto con 
molti dei suoi vecchi conoscenti, come il campanaio Giuliano di Mariotto e il muratore Antonio 
dal Pino, insieme al quale avrebbe costruito una fornace di riverbero, forse simile, nelle 
proporzioni, a quella rappresentata nello «zibaldone»168. Altro «bono compare» era il pittore 
Pietro Vannucci, il famoso Perugino, al quale già il padre aveva affittato parte della bottega 
ghibertiana, riservandosi però «l’uso de l’entrare e de l’avere del porticho dove sono e’ 
fornegli». Negli anni successivi, avrebbe incontrato esperti nella lavorazione della ghisa e 
maestri di getto di diverse nazionalità, condottieri e ufficiali, quei «molti» e quegli «altri» di cui 
avrebbe scrupolosamente annotato i consigli. Durante la sua trentennale carriera, avrebbe 
viaggiato e visto «asai istorie», sviluppando il suo «buono ingegnio», coltivando una discreta 
pluralità di interessi, e arricchendo il suo sapere di pratico169. 
L’intraprendenza e la ricettività dei maestri di getto erano d’altronde testimoniate da 
molteplici opere d’arte e da altrettanti lavori d’artigianato, impieghi alternativi durante il 
«tempo di pace»170. Guglielmo dello Monaco, ad esempio, aveva realizzato le maestose porte 
del Castel Nuovo, che immortalavano nel bronzo la vittoria di Ferrante d’Aragona contro 
Giovanni d’Angiò. Perito di meccanica, il maestro francese era stato capace di realizzare un 
orologio monumentale per la reggia napoletana. La campana della Torre del Mangia, a Siena, 
recava in rilievo la firma, il «Iovanes de Saghabria me fecit». Maso di Bartolomeo dirigeva i 
lavori in diversi cantieri urbinati. A Firenze, egli avrebbe realizzato un «cimiero d’ariento del 
segno di Volterra, cioè un grifone adosso a un dragho», una stemma di marmo per la famiglia 
Vettori, alcune statue per Cosimo de’ Medici, e un «uscio d’ottone con stipiti di bronzo» per 
166 Pampaloni, La miniera del rame, pp. 34-56. 
167 La carriera e le opere di Bonaccorso sono ampiamente discusse in Ansani, The life of a 
Renaissance gunmaker, cui si rimanda per più dettagliate indicazioni archivistiche. 
168 BNCF, Banco rari 228, c. 82v. 
169 Gille, Leonardo e gli ingegneri, pp. 8-12. 
170 Caferro, Warfare and economy, p. 200. 
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l’erigendo Tempio Malatestiano di Rimini. Lui, Masaccio, avrebbe anche coordinato il restauro 
del palazzo della Parte Guelfa, e fuso la «champana dell’oriuolo di palagio, che fu migliaia 
undici vel circha»171. Le fonti toscane menzionano il fonditore genovese Francesco Bianco 
come «maestro di fare polvere da bombarda», abile a piazzare i suoi prodotti in patria e 
all’estero. Giovanni Piffero, da parte sua, avrebbe alternato la manifattura di artiglierie a quella 
di canne d’organo e di altri strumenti musicali. Bernardino da Milano, invece, avrebbe 
realizzato alcune statue, come quelle del gruppo della Predica del Battista, create da Giovan 
Francesco Rustici per il battistero fiorentino. Pasquino da Montepulciano aveva collaborato 
con Filarete, Michelozzo, e Luca della Robbia, rivelandosi versato non solo nella produzione di 
artiglierie, ma anche nella scultura in pietra e in marmo. Era persino divenuto un cantore, e 
maestro dei chierici della cattedrale di Santa Maria del Fiore. 
Come gli altri fonditori, Dainese Maineri aveva conosciuto e frequentato architetti, 
militi, bombardieri, meccanici e salnitrai, dentro e fuori il castello Sforzesco. Nelle corti 
signorili, nelle rimesse pubbliche, negli accampamenti e nelle piazze, gli artigiani intessevano 
importanti reti sociali, suggerendosi differenti opinioni, perfezionando le proprie metodologie, 
e ascoltando i frequenti suggerimenti della committenza172. Gli arsenali sarebbero diventati 
così delle vere e proprie trading zones, siti di sperimentazione e di innovazione, in cui persone 
con competenze diverse potevano comunicare in maniera proficua 173. Persino le tristi 
necessità della guerra avrebbero creato interazioni fondamentali al progresso tecnico.  
 
Successful technological change seems to involve a kind of interaction that 
can best be provided by direct, personal contact. Successful instances of 
technological change in the past have involved a subtle and complex 
network of contacts and communication between people, a sharing of 
interests in similar problems, and a direct confrontation between the user of 
a machine, who appreciates problems in connection with its use, and the 
producer of machinery, who is thoroughly versed in problems of machinery 
production174. 
 
Le darsene veneziane, la fonderia del Castel Nuovo, la scuola fiorentina, l’«ufficio dei lavoreri 
ducali» milanese potevano dunque essere considerati come dei veri e propri collettivi di 
171 BNCF, Baldovinetti 70, cc. 26r, 27v, 28r, 47v-48r, 57v e 71v. Si veda anche Yriarte, Le livre de 
souvenirs. 
172 Hilaire-Perez e Verna, Dissemination of technical knowledge, p. 560. 
173 Long, Artisans, practitioners, pp. 94-107. 
174 Rosenberg, Economic development, p. 168. 
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pratici, in cui le più disparate capacità venivano coinvolte e sollecitate, coordinando la 
«scientia, sufficientia, experientia, industria, diligentia et solicitudine» degli artefici175. Non a 
caso il duca di Ferrara riuniva, nelle sue ferriere in Garfagnana, una folta schiera di fabbri, 
minatori, cavatori, carbonai, muratori, maestri «da forno» e «da fabriche», appositamente 
scelti nelle valli alpine, per avviare la produzione di materiale bellico176. Un’iniziativa, quella 
estense, che, negli stessi anni, sarebbe stata imitata anche da Ludovico il Moro, nelle sue 
fonderie in Val d’Ossola177.  
Gli stati mettevano così in contatto diverse capacità, rendendo l’apprendimento di 
tecniche maggiormente rapido, e il trasferimento dello know-how più sistematico 178. Il 
supporto e l’interesse delle autorità, insomma, si rivelavano indispensabili ad un fruttuoso 
scambio tecnico, sociale ed economico179. Le politiche di incentivo alla produzione, di sviluppo 
della manifattura, determinavano infatti la creazione di un contesto reattivo e dinamico. E le 
scelte e i progetti dei governanti favorivano il prosperare di una ambientazione materiale ed 
immateriale ideale al processo di rinnovamento tecnologico, mettendo a disposizione un 
insieme di risorse, e creando una stabile connessione tra numerosi saperi180. 
 
Conclusioni. Le artiglierie francesi, tra rivoluzione militare ed evoluzione tecnica 
 
Negli anni successivi al fatidico 1494, nel vivace ambiente culturale del Rinascimento italiano, 
gli incontri tra artigiani, politici e militari si sarebbero rivelati necessari all’acquisizione di una 
tecnologia bellica che, di lì a poco, avrebbe radicalmente cambiato il modo di concepire e di 
combattere la guerra. Dopo aver attirato l’attenzione di diversi commentatori e cronisti, 
infatti, la «diabolica» artiglieria francese era stata immediatamente adottata dalle principali 
potenze della Penisola181. I condottieri assoldati da Carlo VIII, come i Vitelli, i Colonna, gli 
Orsini, consigliarono l’uso di canons, couleuvrines e faucons ai loro signori, raccomandando 
175 Repishti, Architetti e ingegneri, pp. 44-58. 
176 Baraldi e Calegari, Pratica e diffusione della siderurgia, pp. 93-119; Calegari, La mano sul cannone, 
pp. 63-76. 
177 Motta, Armaiuoli milanesi, p. 223. 
178 Epstein, Labour mobility, p. 251. 
179 Franceschi e Molà, Regional states, pp. 458-466; Heilbroner, Do machines make history?, p. 343. 
180  Cipolla, Storia economica dell’Europa pre-industriale, pp. 223-224; Hilaire-Perez e Verna, 
Dissemination of technical knowledge, p. 544; Rosenberg, Economic development, p. 167. 
181 Sulla rapida affermazione dei pezzi transalpini nella Penisola, si veda Ansani, «This French artillery 
is very good and very effective». Hypotheses on the diffusion of a new military technology in Renaissance 
Italy, di prossima pubblicazione in «Journal of Military History».  
163
tanto l’assunzione di nuovi esperti quanto la costruzione di ulteriori fonderie. Dal canto loro, i 
maestri di getto si era adattati piuttosto facilmente alle nuove forme, diffondendo la novità 
attraverso i loro spostamenti, come nel caso di Basilio della Scola e Sigismondo Alberghetti, 
stabilitisi a Venezia e a Ferrara, dopo aver servito a Lione e a Milano.  
A Firenze, avendo apprezzato i «grandi effecti» di cannoni e colubrine, i Dieci di Balìa 
incaricarono due dei loro artigiani di «pigliare le misure e disegnare pezzo per pezzo» tutte le 
artiglierie del «cristianissimo re» allora depositate a Castrocaro, in modo da poterle «fare per i 
bisogni del nostro Comune, perché le faccino più a proposito et commode al servirsene»182. 
Per favorirne la produzione, gli ufficiali avevano anche provveduto all’erezione di una nuova 
«muraglia» pubblica «per gittare artiglierie», nonché alla costruzione, a spese del Comune, di 
«fornelli», nelle botteghe private, «perché si possino fare i getti migliori et più 
comodamente»183. Nel marzo del 1495, un primo «cortaldo alla franzese» veniva inviato nel 
campo gigliato184. Il disegno e l’imitazione dei manufatti erano stati indubbiamente validi 
mezzi di trasmissione della conoscenza185, ma la riuscita dell’arma aveva dimostrato che la 
Repubblica disponeva di fonditori, pratiche e strumenti per acquisirla in maniera efficace e 
consapevole186.  
I bozzetti di Francesco Telli e di Lorenzo Cavaloro servirono anche a Bonaccorso 
Ghiberti, che di lì a poco li avrebbe ricopiati nel suo «zibaldone», aggiungendovi però la 
descrizione dei metodi di fusione adottati dai pratici transalpini, incentrati sul rapporto tra il 
volume del proiettile e lo spessore della camera di scoppio, appresi probabilmente dai 
fondeurs e dai canonniers dell’artillerie royale.  
 
E’ franzesi usano fare grosse le loro passavolanti dirieto el netto, cioè el 
sodo, sanza le chornici, tre palottole, cioè una al voto e due al bronzo, cioè 
tanto grosso el bronzo da ongni lato quanto el vano. E questo fano a quello 
che giettano insino in dieci libre di piombo. E quele che giettano da trenta a 
quaranta o a cinquanta libre di piombo fano grosse dirieto tuto el netto di 
fuori due palottole e mezo o pocho più.  
 
182 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 31, c. 81r. 
183ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, c. 145. 
184 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, c. 38r. 
185 Calegari, Nel mondo dei pratici, p. 29; Degrassi, La trasmissione dei saperi, pp. 82-83; Hilaire-Perez 
e Verna, Dissemination of technical knowledge, pp. 538, 544 e 547; Staudenmaier, Rationality, agency, 
contingency, p. 175.  
186 Ansani, Craftsmen, artillery, and war production, p. 11; Ansani, The life of a Renaissance 




Uno chortaldo overo passavolante che el vano sia tra uno terzo et uno 
quarto, et lungha braccia sei e uno terzo, peserà circa di libre cinquemila 
tutta, quando sarà netta, faciendola grossa dirieto dua palottole el di fuori o 
pocho più. Un altro cortaldo o vero passavolante che sia lungho braccia sei e 
che gietta ottanta libre di piombo peserà circha a libre semila187. 
 
A partire dal 1497, Bonaccorso stesso realizzò diversi «cortaldi alla francese», fusi in un unico 
pezzo di bronzo, dotati di orecchioni, e dalle dimensioni e dal peso assai più contenuti rispetto 
alle tradizionali grosse utilizzate fino ad allora188. 
La velocità di trasmissione delle tecniche ebbe, all’apparenza, un che di sorprendente. 
Non si trattava di imitare solamente l’arma, ma di replicare tutto un complesso di congegni, di 
azioni, di strategie atte a farla funzionare a dovere. Le nuove artiglierie, infatti, erano montate 
su complicati affusti mobili, muniti di pesanti ruote ferrate e di sospensioni più che resistenti. 
Inoltre, dovevano essere caricate non con i macigni tradizionali, ma con pallottole di ferro, 
difficilmente realizzabili senza l’ausilio di fornaci adeguate, ma assolutamente necessarie alla 
buona riuscita dei bombardamenti di saturazione adottati dai maîtres francesi189.  
Tuttavia, non si sarebbe potuta acquisire così rapidamente una simile, complessa senza 
una conoscenza pregressa, da parte dei vari maestri, delle pratiche di fusione dei pezzi, dei 
metodi di lavorazione della ghisa, e dei sistemi di costruzione dei carri «matti» delle 
bombarde190. E difficilmente, soprattutto, l’artillerie royale avrebbe trovato spazio nella tattica 
guerresca italiana, se la committenza statale non avesse sviluppato delle forti esigenze in fatto 
di mobilità e di alleggerimento dei pezzi. Ben prima degli anni Novanta, ad esempio, gli eserciti 
di Firenze e di Venezia avevano utilizzato delle spingarde montate su carri a due ruote, molti 
simili ai falconetti191. La necessità di pezzi più manovrabili, d’altronde, era stata ben espressa, 
nella seconda metà degli anni Settanta, da Orso Orsini. 
 
Quale bombarde vorriano essere facte tucte due ciascuno d’un peczo, et la 
una pesasse trenta cantara in un peczo, et l’altra vinti, et porrianose fare 
sufficiente ad abactere omne muro come quelle de tre peczi, che pesano 
187 BNCF, Banco rari 228, cc. 87v-88r.  
188 Ansani, The life of a Renaissance gunmaker, pp. 766-771. 
189 Contamine, L’artillerie royale française, pp. 246-249. 
190 Heilbroner, Do machines make history?, pp. 338-340. 
191 Mallett, L’organizzazione militare di Venezia, p. 113.  
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sexanta cantara. El modo da farse dicte bombarde vorria essere de farle 
buctare de cola de brunzo in uno peczo, che la tromba fosse grossa due 
degeta, el cannone dove sta la polvere quattro (…), et poi fortificarle, et farle 
coperire tucte due de cerchie de ferro ben saldate et ben facte (…). Et le 
bombarde antescripte fanno para fazone, et portanose meglio, piantanose 
più presto, et possonosse subito levare a li bisogni. Dicte bombarde se 
vogliono portare quando li campi sono equali a lo nemico, et anche alquanto 
inferiore. Quando li campi sono avantagiusi o superiori al nemico, se 
possono portare bombarde de omne sorte, et in quello caso le bombarde de 
tre peczi so’ bone ad usarele, et ogni altra grossa et impacciosa bombarda. 
Ma in omne muodo, per li campi, quanto de manco peczi so’ le bombarde, 
meglio so’, perché so’ de manco impaccio ad invitare et svitare, legare et 
piantare, et cossì ad levarle192. 
 
In questo senso, l’adozione delle artiglierie di Carlo VIII, delle tecnologie «oltramontane», era 
stata una soluzione contingente a problemi peculiari della comunità politica, militare e tecnica 
italiana, configurandosi come una evoluzione delle precedenti, ingombranti armi da fuoco193. 
Un adattamento, questo, evidenziato anche dalla fabbricazione di “ibridi” tra la tradizione 
straniera e quella italiana, come colubrine dotate di camere di scoppio separate, imitazioni 
creative da cui sarebbe derivato un flusso continuo di aggiustamenti e di piccole modifiche da 
parte della manodopera specializzata194. 
L’importazione della tecnologia non comportò, quindi, un processo di mera replica. 
L’invasione francese, anzi, diede il via ad un percorso di cambiamento e di sviluppo intrapreso 
attivamente dai fonditori e dai loro signori, con una gradualità dettata da numerosi fattori, 
geografici e politici, culturali ed economici 195 . Certo, non erano mancati fallimenti e 
rallentamenti, errori e ripensamenti. Le vecchie grosse continuarono ad essere prodotte e 
utilizzate. Gli stessi cannoni, sebbene rapidamente assimilati nella prassi guerresca, non 
incisero eccessivamente sugli esiti di assedi e battaglie, di fatto costituendo più una rivoluzione 
in termini di munizionamento e finanziamento, che non tattica o strategica196.  
Nondimeno, agli inizi del Cinquecento, la tradition of innovation rinascimentale197 
avrebbe portato «li moderni, più ingeniosamente et con miglior ragioni procedendo, perché le 
sperienze così gli hanno demostrato», a sostituire le «sconcie et intrattabili bombarde» con 
192 Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Départment des manuscrits, Italien 958, cc. 15v-17r. 
193 Bijker e Law, Shaping technology, p. 11. 
194 Hilaire-Perez e Verna, Dissemination of technical knowledge, p. 537 
195 Rosenberg, Economic development, pp. 152 e 166; Long, The craft, pp. 703-704.  
196 DeVries, Catapults are not atomic bombs, pp. 464-470; Raudzens, War-winning weapons, pp. 407-
410. 
197 Molà, States and crafts, p. 146. 
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armi di «assai maggior effetto»198. E anche se, «nel farle, è gran differenza da maestro a 
maestro, perché ogniuno vuol dimostrare d’havervi sopra gran pareri e gran segreti», la 
«regola» e la «moderatione» degli artefici sarebbero state fondamentali per i successivi 
sviluppi della scienza militare, dettati dai «maladetti, abominosi ordigni» e dalla polvere da 
sparo.  
In un’Europa in fermento, in cui guerra moderna e produzione manifatturiera sarebbero 
andate di pari passo, anche i maestri di getto italiani sarebbero stati capaci di «fare uno mondo 
nuovo», disseminando il loro sapere in tutto il continente, e fabbricando macchine sempre più 
potenti, sempre più resistenti, e sempre più numerose199. D’altronde, «in fatto di ghuerra 
potreste cerchare da lo levante a lo ponente per tale misterio di trovare homini al proposito di 
vostre signorie», e «troverete che per aventura sarà meglio avere quatro nostri pari che avere 
sedici isquadre di chavagli»200. 
 
198 Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, c. 79rv. 
199 Baraldi, Una nuova età del ferro, p. 216; Cipolla, Tecnica, società e cultura, p. 10; Hale, Guerra e 
società, pp. 41-74; Hall, Weapons and warfare, pp. 201-235; Ridella, Fonditori italiani di artiglierie, pp. 
20-42. 




Figure 4. A bombard, sketched by Antonio Pisanello in Naples, during 1450s 
Paris, Musée du Louvre, Département des Arts graphiques, INV 2294 
Drawing by Angela Marino 
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This article explores the technological development of artillery production in “backward” 
Florence during the last two decades of the fifteenth century. It demonstrates, contrary to 
extant historiography, the existence of a lively and reactive war-related industry in 
Renaissance Italy, aware of new ideas and new techniques, and examines the assimilation of 
the most efficient French ordnance into Italian warfare and into the practices of artisans. 
Through the life of a single Renaissance gunmaker, Bonaccorso Ghiberti (1451–1516), the 
grandson of the illustrious Lorenzo Ghiberti (1378–1455), this article studies the culture, the 
knowledge, the variety of methods and the movements of the community of Renaissance 
Tuscan craftsmen. 
A major problem in the historiography of warfare and military technology in fifteenth-
century Florence is entrenched assumptions. From Niccolò Machiavelli in the early sixteenth 
century to the present, the historiography has only restated old assertions of a division 
between corrupt mercenaries and reliable citizen armies, ignoring the traditions and 
innovations, changes and adaptations, and culture and methods of both soldiers and artisans. 
The Renaissance is furthermore portrayed as a time of Florentine military decadence. Tuscan 
statesmen have been repeatedly blamed for their disinterest in warfare, and even for their 
“incomprehension” of the irrational, violent phenomenon of war. According to William 
Caferro, the schema of Florentine backwardness has by now achieved the status of 
orthodoxy.1 
1 This portrait of the Florentine army has been based more on humanist literature than on archival 
research: Charles Calvert Bayley, War and Society in Renaissance Florence; Claudio Finzi, “La guerra nel 
pensiero politico del Rinascimento toscano,” 141; William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, 74; Michael 
Mallett, L’organizzazione militare di Venezia, 256–57. Other statements on the alleged Florentine 
backwardness have been made in: Daniela De Rosa, “Il controllo politico di un esercito”; Mallett, Signori 
e mercenari, 134–36; John Hale, Guerra e società nell’Europa del Rinascimento, 64; Stephan Epstein, 
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The military institutions of other Italian Renaissance states have been reevaluated in 
recent decades by a few important studies. Scholars have underlined the political role of these 
offices, their impact on the fiscal system, their attempts to construct an efficient chain of 
command, and the tactical innovations proposed by captains.2 Even in the most well-known 
cases, however, the productive activities tied to war have generated a little attention from 
historians. The manufacture of firearms during Italian Quattrocento, for example, has been 
rarely analyzed. The literature on the early developments of artillery in the Peninsula is 
surprisingly scarce. The pioneering works of Angelo Angelucci and Carlo Montù were published 
in 1869 and 1934, respectively. Manlio Calegari and Francesco Storti in 2000 called attention to 
the lack of work in Italian historiography on technological and specifically military themes. 
Articles on Renaissance Italian military technology have only started to appear in Italy in the 
last decades.3 
Walter Panciera, for example, has focused on Venetian institutions and their influence 
on the manufacture of guns and gunpowder in the second half of the sixteenth century. 
Renato Ridella, Marco Morin, and Carlo Beltrame have studied archeological finds, especially 
shipwrecked sea ordnance, for the same period. Calegari has investigated the fifteenth-
century foundries and ironworks of Ercole I and Alfonso I d’Este in the Apennines. Jean-
François Belhoste has made a comprehensive survey of these works in his own essay on late 
medieval European ordnance.4 
“Storia economica e storia istituzionale dello stato,” 108–109. William Caferro, “Continuity, Long-Term 
Service and Permanent Forces,” offers, along with a relevant archival analysis, an extensive bibliography 
of works on the Florentine military historiography. 
2 For Venice, Milan and Naples, see, respectively: Mallett, L’organizzazione militare di Venezia; Maria 
Nadia Covini, L’esercito del duca; Francesco Storti, L’esercito napoletano. A survey of recent Italian 
studies has been proposed by Luciano Pezzolo, “La ‘rivoluzione militare’,” 32–59, and Claudio Donati, 
“Strutture militari,” 45–62. 
3 For international literature, see, for example: Kelly DeVries, Medieval Military Technology; Bert 
Hall, Weapons and Warfare; John Francis Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys. Geoffrey Parker, The 
Military Revolution, linked innovations in military technology with several, radical changes in warfare 
and government, opening an intense 
4 Early works on Italian ordnance are: Angelo Angelucci, Documenti inediti; Carlo Montù, Storia 
dell’artiglieria italiana. The complaints of Manlio Calegari are expressed in Calegari, “Nel mondo dei 
‘pratici’,” 9–14. For the opinions of Storti on the uncertain identity of Italian military historiography, see 
Storti, “Istituzioni militari in Italia tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna.” Recent works on the topic of 
production and management of artillery are: Walter Panciera, Il governo delle artiglierie; Panciera, “La 
polvere da sparo”; Renato Ridella, “Produzione di artiglierie”; Ridella and Francesco Laratta, “Un 
cannone veneziano”; Carlo Beltrame and Marco Morin, I cannoni di Venezia; Beltrame and Ridella, Ships 
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Scholars have explored weapons and their connection with the evolution of tactics, their 
role in the operational choices of governments, and their daily use. Nevertheless, the 
importance of smiths, gunmakers, and other masters, along with their practices and products, 
have been often ignored by economic and military historians.5 Only the renowned Milanese 
armorers, along with other Italian corazzai, with their luxurious and fascinating goods, seem to 
have attracted the attention of art historians.6 Gilded helmets and precious bucklers, however, 
were only a small part of the vast market of swords, armor, gauntlets, and shields. Little is 
known about the production of other Italian states, or about the commerce of weapons in the 
Late Middle Ages, or about the important second-hand market in equipment.7 The same 
applies to raw materials. Enzo Baraldi has studied the technical innovations in Alpine 
ironworking, such as new types of furnaces and more effective bellows. A Tuscan mining 
enterprise was examined by Guido Pampaloni. Moreover, early modern treatises explained 
casting methods and illustrated the tools of craftsmen, but the buyers of materials frequently 
remained unknown.8 Last but not least, also the manufacture and the trade of saltpeter in 
Renaissance Italy are scarcely considered by historians, in spite of the significant suggestions 
on its artificial production made by Bert Hall in 1997.9 
This article, obviously, cannot fill in all the blanks in this historiography, yet by drawing 
attention to the Florentine master Bonaccorso Ghiberti this article offers a new perspective on 
Renaissance gunmaking in Tuscany. Ghiberti is a valuable and, with respect particularly to 
and Guns; Calegari, “La mano sul cannone”; Jean Françoise Belhoste, “Nascita e sviluppo dell’artiglieria 
in Europa.” 
5 The economic aspects of the problem have been analyzed by: Caferro, “Warfare and Economy in 
Renaissance Italy;” Richard Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, 400–401; Enrico 
Stumpo, “La finanza di guerra,” 196. 
6 For an exhaustive examination of the Milanese trends during the sixteenth century, see: Stuart 
Pyhrr, José Godoy, and Silvio Leydi, Heroic Armor of the Italian Renaissance. The Tuscan production has 
been examined in Mario Scalini, “L’armatura fiorentina del Quattrocento.”  
7 Silvio Leydi, “Le armi”; Silvia Bianchessi, “Cavalli, armi e salnitro,” 560–72; Luciana Frangioni, “Armi 
e mercerie fiorentine per Avignone”; Frangioni, “Aspetti della produzione”; Brian Sandberg, “The 
Magazine of All Their Pillaging.” 
8 The books of Vannoccio Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, and Georg Agricola, De re metallica, appeared in 
the mid-sixteenth century. A significant contribution to the studies on medieval iron working is: Enzo 
Baraldi, “La siderurgia In Italia dal XII al XVII secolo.” 
9 Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 67–91; Bianchessi, “Cavalli, armi e salnitro,” 572–82; Brenda 
Buchanan, ed., Gunpowder. Florentine archival documentation abounds with notes on exchanges of the 
precious propellant, purchased in Naples, Genoa, Milan, and Rome. See, for example: Otto di Pratica, 
Munizioni, in ASF, 1, 15v; Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 33, 105r; Dieci di 
Balìa, Debitori e creditori, in ASF, 28, 40v; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 9, 186r; Dieci di Balìa, 
Munizioni, in ASF, 8, 167r; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 23, 351v. 
171
actual production, a somewhat understudied figure. Other aspects of his life have received 
more attention. Art historians have studied his writings, examining the theoretical and 
practical connections with the heritage of his family, and underlining the relationships 
between Bonaccorso and other Renaissance artists. Gustina Scaglia, for example, has discussed 
the studies of Bonaccorso on Vitruvius, and his interest in the architectural machines designed 
by Filippo Brunelleschi for the construction of the dome of the Florentine cathedral. Scaglia 
has also published part of Bonaccorso’s notebook, the zibaldone. A decade before, Trude 
Krautheimer-Hess wrote on the estates that Bonaccorso inherited from his father Vettorio 
(1418–1496) and his grandfather Lorenzo Ghiberti. Lastly, the recent research of Victor Coonin 
briefly analyzes a rental agreement between the Florentine master and the painter Pietro di 
Cristofaro Vannucci, better known as Perugino.10 
Generally, these scholars have not dealt with Bonaccorso’s actual bronze works. Scaglia 
has commented on his drawings of firearms and his notes on furnaces, but she did not cite the 
numerous cannons that Bonaccorso produced in the last two decades of the fifteenth century. 
Nevertheless, contemporary sources mentioned him as a maestro di getto, a master in bronze 
founding, specializing in the casting of bells and, above all, artillery pieces. Various archival 
documents often remind us of the craft of Bonaccorso: his account books repeatedly hint at 
the gunmaking career of their writer. But his libro di ricordanze and his libro di debitori e 
creditori have never been analyzed from a military, technological, or economic perspective. 
Today, these sources are kept in the historical archive of the Istituto degli Innocenti in 
Florence, along with hundreds of other memoirs, written by merchants, artisans, and bankers. 
The zibaldone, instead, is part of the banco rari collection of the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale 
of Florence. But further data are found in the Florentine State Archive. The fiscal records of the 
catasto and the decima repubblicana provided information on the wealth of the craftsman and 
his bottega, the so-called scrittoio. The documentation of the guild of stonemasons and 
carpenters (maestri di pietra e legname) was useful for understanding the working 
relationships of Bonaccorso and his membership in the arte. The registers of the military 
institutions, moreover, were fundamental for this research. The books of ammunitions 
(munizioni) of the two Florentine military institutions, the Dieci di Balìa (the council of ten 
officials elected in time of war during the whole century) and the Otto di Pratica (a permanent 
10 For further readings on the life of Bonaccorso Ghiberti, see: Gustina Scaglia, “Drawings of 
Machines”; Scaglia, “A Miscellany of Bronze Works”; Scaglia, “A Translation of Vitruvius”; Trude 
Krautheimer-Hess, “More Ghibertiana”; Victor Coonin, “New Documents.” 
172
office responsible for warfare and diplomacy created in 1480), their resolutions (deliberazioni), 
as well as their bookkeeping (entrata e uscita, debitori e creditori), offer the opportunity to 
highlight the leading role of public demand in the production of weapons and in the 
introduction of technical innovations. The correspondence of the Signoria, after the political 
upheavals of 1499, completed this documentation.11 The analysis of such varied sources was 
necessary to understand the roles, uses, and developments of technology in its actual context 
– in this case, in the lively economic, social, cultural, military, and political life of Renaissance 
Florence.12 
 
The formation of a gunmaker 
 
Little is known about the early career of Bonaccorso. He probably completed his 
apprenticeship in the workshop of his family. Here, he could have studied the notes of his 
grandfather on Vitruvius and Brunelleschi, learning at the same time the rudiments of 
architecture and the practices of metal casting. His first notes in the Zibaldone concerned the 
art of the goldsmith.13 During his adolescence, Bonaccorso helped his father Vettorio to 
complete the monumental bronze doors of the Florentine Baptistry of Saint John. Vettorio was 
in fact a goldsmith, a founder, and an architect. Bonaccorso was the fourth member of the 
Ghiberti family to work on the “Gates of Paradise” from 1425, after his grandfather Lorenzo, 
his uncle Tommaso, and his father.14 At the age of twenty-three, in December 1474, 
Bonaccorso finally enrolled in the guild of stonemasons and carpenters with one of his 
brothers, Lorenzo. Other gunmakers and bronze workers, like the magister bombardarum 
Pasquino di Matteo from Montepulciano, had joined this same corporazione during the 
previous years.15 The onerous tasks and the virtues of these maestri di getto were described by 
Vannoccio Biringuccio in the sixth book of his Pirotechnia in 1540. According to the Sienese 
master, these craftsmen were used to withstanding the heat of furnaces, and strong enough to 
11 The Dieci di Balìa, in fact, were not elected until October 1500. For the conflict over the electoral 
legislation and the complex reform of this office, see: Giorgio Cadoni, Lotte politiche e riforme 
istituzionali, 101–175. For the coexistence and the alternation of the Dieci and the Otto, see: Nicolai 
Rubinstein, Il governo di Firenze, 238–45. 
12 Pamela Long, The Craft, 702–707. 
13 Giuseppe Marchini, Vittorio Ghiberti architetto; Maria Grazia Ciardi Dupré dal Poggetto, “Proposte 
per Vittore Ghiberti.” For Bonaccorso’s interest in the works of Brunelleschi and Vitruvius, see: Scaglia, 
“Drawing of Machines,” 96–97. His notes on jewelry are in Banco rari 228, in BNF, 1r-2r. 
14 Scaglia, “A Translation of Vitruvius,” 3; Giovanni Gaye, Carteggio inedito, 109. 
15 Arte dei maestri di pietra e legname, in ASF, 2, 143r and 140v. 
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handle the weight of timber, bricks, stones, and metals. Above all, craftsmen had to be 
diligent, careful, and experienced in drawing, carving wood, and walling up.16 
Bonaccorso would have resembled a chimney sweep, stained with smoke and coal, with 
a dusty, singed dress, when he crafted his first small, bronze guns – nine spingarde – for the 
Florentine commune in 1479.17 In those years, along with his father Vettorio, he also produced 
and repaired bells for the church and the hospital of Santa Maria Nuova.18 Reported in 1484, it 
could have been the first commission for the Ghiberti’s workshop since 1480, when the 
foundry “was empty because no work is being done.”19 Bonaccorso wrote down several notes 
about these castings in the Zibaldone. He illustrated bell scales, molds, furnaces, and various 
practical methods of achieving different proportions in height, thickness, and width for the 
production of “beautiful” buone campane. Another drawing even showed the technique for 
welding a cracked bell.20 
According to Scaglia, Bonaccorso was also commissioned to produce new firearms for 
the Florentine army during the campaign in the border region of Lunigiana in 1487. The 
account books of the Otto di Pratica, however, do not testify his presence in the siege of 
Sarzana, or his works in the zone behind the front.21 Nevertheless, it is likely that Bonaccorso 
was in the encampment, as at that time he was, in fact, serving the condottiere Gentile 
Virginio Orsini, who actually fought the Genoese troops that spring. Bonaccorso was the 
maestro ingegnere, the military engineer of this mercenary captain. From 1486 to 1488, he 
was employed in munitiones and fabricationes, building new fortifications and casting new 
bombards.22 Nothing is known of his fortresses, but probably, as well as other contemporary 
16 Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, 74v–76v. 
17 Dieci di Balìa, Debitori e creditori, in ASF, 22, 17v. 
18 Santa Maria Nuova, in ASF, 40, 154v and 179r. 
19 Catasto, in ASF, 1022, 394r–395r. 
20 Banco rari 228, in BNF, 51v, 57rv, 74v, and 75v. 
21 Scaglia, “A Miscellany of Bronze Works,” 485; Dieci di Balìa, Debitori e creditori, in ASF, 24; Ufficiali 
delle Castella, in ASF, 29. Even though this last register is now part of the archive of the Ufficiali delle 
Castella, it was originally written for the Otto di Pratica, as clearly stated in its heading. 
22 Cornelius Von Fabriczy, Adriano Fiorentino, 76. Gentile Virginio Orsini was hired by the Florentine 
Republic and the Duchy of Milan in 1485 along with three other members of his family, Giulio, Vicinio, 
and Giampaolo. Their condotta is reported in: Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in 
ASF, 30, 114r–118r. For their involvement in the conquest of Sarzana, see: Dieci di Balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, in ASF, 24, 101v–102r. For the Florentine campaign in Lunigiana and the conquest of 
Pietrasanta and Sarzana, see, instead: Francesco Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, 76–78; Niccolò 
Machiavelli, Historie fiorentine, 218v–221v. 
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engineers, he was entrusted to construct only temporary defenses, such as terrepleins and 
bastioni, along with carpenters, smiths, and maestri d’ascia.  
The interest of Bonaccorso in military architecture is also testified by a detailed drawing 
of the Torre del Marzocco in Livorno, probably copied from the original project of the tower. In 
this sketch, Ghiberti wrote down the thickness of the wall and the position of ammunition 
dumps, cisterns, and ovens for the garrison. In those years, Bonaccorso may have met three of 
the most brilliant Tuscan military architects of the late Quattrocento: Francesco di Giovanni, 
called Francione, Giuliano da Sangallo, and Francesco d’Agniolo, also known as la Cecca.23 This 
variety of works and activities was typical of contemporary engineers. For example, Filippo di 
Giovanni, called la Pippa, was a gunner, a carpenter, and a gunpowder maker. He served the 
Florentine Republic for more than fifteen years, building bastions, repairing crossbows, 
manufacturing wooden parts of firearms, following the army in several campaigns, firing guns, 
and even estimating the saltpeter bought by the Signoria from foreign merchants.2424 
Also the migration of gunmakers is testified by several contemporary sources. German 
masters, for example, were hired in Rome during the second half of the century. In 1492, 
French, Genoese, and Sicilian skilled labor worked together in the Neapolitan foundry of Castel 
Nuovo.25 And two years before, in Tuscany, even Bonaccorso moved to Piombino. He was 
hired by the local lord, Jacopo IV Appiano, with a salary of eight golden florins per month. In 
his libro di debitori, Bonaccorso did not specify his duties, but twice noted a trade of copper, 
the indispensable component of bronze alloy.26 His metal works allowed Bonaccorso to meet 
the Pratese brothers Zanobi and Tommaso Marinai, two of the most important prospectors of 
the time. Along with some members of prominent Florentine oligarchic families, Tommaso 
Marinai was also the owner of the Montecatini copper mine and the iron mine of Volterra.27 
Bonaccorso seems to have concluded deals with these brothers during his stay in Piombino: in 
fact, he lent to Zanobi ten golden florins for two unspecified trades in Corsica and Sardinia. 
23 Banco rari 228, in BNF, 96v; Scaglia, “La «Torre del Marzocco» a Livorno.” The contemporary 
presence of the three architects under the walls of Sarzana is testified in: Dieci di Balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, in ASF, 24, 186v; Ufficiali delle Castella, in ASF, 29, 15v. 
24 Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 43, 72v; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e 
uscita, in ASF, 30, 79v; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 13, 49r; Signori e collegi, Condotte e 
stanziamenti, in ASF, 17, 45v; Dieci di Balìa, Debitori e creditori, in ASF, 24, 63v. 
25 Ridella, “Fonditori italiani,” 19–20; Knut Schulz, “La migrazione di tecnici,” 108–109; Montù, Storia 
dell’artiglieria italiana, 347. 
26 Debitori e creditori di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13229, 3r–4v 
27 For the business of Marinai, see: Guido Pampaloni, “La miniera del rame di Montecatini”; 
Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, 529. 
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Although Bonaccorso left the coastal town in August 1491, the contract with Jacopo IV 
enhanced his reputation as a reliable, expert gunmaker.28 In January 1493, Francesco Cybo, 
count of Anguillara and Cerveteri, sent Bonaccorso in his castles for inventorying and 
estimating artillery, ammunitions, and armor. On this occasion, Bonaccorso encountered his 
former master, Gentile Virginio Orsini, who was in the process of acquiring the counties of 
Franceschetto.29 
 
Demand and supply of artillery 
 
But, what type of artillery could Bonaccorso have produced, or inventoried, for his masters? In 
those years, in Pisa, Giovanni da Auspurch or da Uspurghi, a probable native of the city of 
Augsburg in Germany, cast one basilisco in two pieces, eleven braccia long and weighing more 
than 16,000 libbre (a Florentine libbra was approximately equal to 340 grams, while a 
Florentine braccio measured 58 centimeters). He also crafted two single-piece, bronze cortali, 
in the foundry of one of the city fortresses, the so-called cittadella nuova. In his contract, 
signed in January 1493, the Otto di Pratica specified each type of his artillery production: 
bombarde (with a shot weight of 400 libbre or more), half bombards (200 libbre or more), 
quarter bombards (100 libbre or more), eighth bombards (40 libbre or more), bombards da 
ripari for castles and city walls (from 15 to 25 libbre), passavolanti, cortali, basilischi (100 
libbre), half passavolanti, cortali, basilischi (from 50 to 100 libbre), quarter passavolanti (from 
25 to 50 libbre), serpentine (from 5 to 25 libbre), and spingarde (from 5 to 6 libbre).30 
Giovanni used exclusively bronze in his workshop, characteristic of ordnance 
manufacture in the late fifteenth century. Pasquino di Matteo, Damiano di Giovanni, and 
Brancazio di Guido also realized their guns exclusively with copper and tin in 1478, during the 
war against Naples, Siena, and Rome. Alberghetto Alberghetti from Ferrara was one of the 
most important Italian gunmakers, when he made several bronze spingarde for Lorenzo de’ 
Medici in 1478 and 1485. Similar firearms were fabricated by Maso di Piero d’Antonio during 
28 Debitori e creditori di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13229, 3v and 4v. In 
1490, a Florentine golden florin equaled one hundred and thirty soldi, while a Florentine lira was worth 
twenty soldi. Nine soldi corresponded approximately to the daily rate for unskilled workers during the 
century. See: Goldthwaite, La costruzione, 598; Goldthwaite, The Economy of Reinassance Florence, 364. 
29 Debitori e creditori di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13229, 13v. 
30 Otto di Pratica, Munizioni, in ASF, 1, 9v; Otto di Pratica, Deliberazioni, partiti, condotte e 
stanziamenti, in ASF, 96v–97r; Dieci di Balìa, Debitori e creditori, in ASF, 24, 12v; Ufficiali delle Castella, 
in ASF, 29, 20r, 25v, 29v, 31v, and 33v. 
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the siege of Pietrasanta in 1484. Another maestro di getto was Giuliano di Mariotto della Nave, 
who realized a bronze passavolante. Even Andrea del Verrocchio was quoted in the sources as 
a “master” in casting cannons, manufacturing a bombarda grossa for Lorenzo de’ Medici in 
1484. It was a giant bronze gun of three pieces, weighing more than twenty thousand libbre, 
and was still in service in 1488. (See appendix 1.) In the last decades of the century, other 
Florentine masters were also active in the Dalmatian republic of Ragusa.31 
The fabrication of Florentine artillery was also entrusted to smiths. By the 1430s, Tuscan 
craftsmen produced dozens of forged iron bombards for the Dieci, and even in this early 
technological stage the production was diversified. Small firearms of fifteen pounds were put 
beside guns of hundreds or thousands of libbre. Michele di Jacopo tested cast iron (ferro 
colato) for the making of three single-piece bombards in 1429, while Piero di Tinaccio 
manufactured a four-barrel bombard, a so-called “organ cannon,” with a thousand libbre of 
iron.32 During the second half of the century, improvements in gunpowder production 
permitted several kinds of differentiation of shapes and uses to obtain better results. The 
pieces listed by Francesco di Giorgio Martini in his treatise of 1478 were actually produced in 
Florence in the 1480s and 1490s. From the longer to the shorter, they were basilischi, 
bombarde, passavolanti, cortane, mezzane, cerbottane, spingarde, and mortari.33 A particular 
variety of these guns were the spingarde and the passavolanti a cartoccio, loaded with both 
the powder and the shot contained in a sheet of paper, a foglio reale.34 Nevertheless, 
compared with the ordnance of maestri di getto, smiths’ bombards were undoubtedly less 
strong and less safe. A single-piece cast bronze gun could better contain the explosions 
generated by larger powder charges, increasing the range of shot and diminishing the risks for 
gunners.35 
31 Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 23, 79r; Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, 
condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 24, 102v, and 175v; Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, in ASF, 30, 240v and 260v; Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 8, cc. 129v e 161v; Dieci 
di Balìa, Debitori e creditori, in ASF, 22, 17v; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 5, 26r. For the travels of 
Florentine gunmakers, see: Ridella, “Fonditori italiani,” 19. 
32 Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 1, XLr, XLVIIIIrv, and 161r. 
33 Francesco di Giorgio Martini, Trattato di architettura, 245–46; Ridella, “Produzione di artiglierie,” 
77–92. 
34 Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 24, 98v. Biringuccio later described 
this cartridge in: Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, 156r. For a further explanation, see: Angelucci, Documenti 
inediti, 90–91. 
35 Panciera, Il governo delle artiglierie, 120; Calegari, “La mano sul cannone,” 71–72; Ridella, “La 
produzione di artiglierie,” 80–85; Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, 79r. 
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The ordnance produced by Florentine masters, therefore, might seem obsolete, 
considering the contemporary European tendency towards safer, more agile, bronze ordnance. 
But the Florentine style of artillery was typical of other ordnance in the Italian context. A 
Sienese bombard in 1478 weighed more than eight tons. Other massive iron and bronze 
bombards were fabricated in Milan during those decades. One of them, the Galeozesca 
Vittoriosa, weighed eight tons, three more than Verrocchio’s bombarda grossa of 1484. The 
three other Milanese grosse – the Corona, the Bissona, and the cast iron Liona – required 
nearly 80 carts and 200 pair of oxen for their transportation. According to Mallett, even 
Venetian gunmakers cast giant pieces during the second half of the century. The Aragonese 
army was still using a bombarda grossa during the recapture of Naples in 1495.36 
 
The assimilation of the French ordnance 
 
Before the French army crossed the Alps in autumn 1494, bronze use was already increasing in 
Tuscany. By 1452, Maso di Bartolomeo had crafted four heavy bombards with more than 
23,000 libbre of copper.37 In 1472, Volterra was besieged with eight bronze pieces.38 And 
twenty years later, between 1492 and 1493, more than 540,000 libbre of copper were stored 
in Florentine and Pisan arsenals.39 According to Ciasca, tin and copper were imported from 
northern Europe, in particular from England and Poland. In the 1480s, the Republic 
promulgated several laws for increasing the local production and promoting the opening of 
new mines. Sources throughout the century testify to a reutilization of second-hand metals. 
Nevertheless, bronze remained one of the most expensive materials. It cost twenty-four lire 
for every hundred libbre, while iron cost only seven lire for the same quantity. Tin cost forty 
lire every cento, and the Otto bought copper for about twenty-nine lire and five soldi for every 
hundred libbre.40 
36 See: Angelucci, Documenti inediti, 85; Belhoste, “Nascita e sviluppo dell’artiglieria in Europa,” 331; 
Mallett, L’organizzazione militare di Venezia, 110–114; Ferraiolo, Cronaca, 78. The Milanese ordnance is 
listed in Carlo Visconti, “Ordine dell’esercito ducale,” 470–86. 
37 Dieci di Balìa, Debitori e creditori, in ASF, 17, 143v. 
38 Balìe, in ASF, 34, 28r. 
39 Otto di Pratica, Munizioni, in ASF, 1, 21r–40r. 
40 Importations were suggested by Raffaele Ciasca, L’arte dei medici e speziaIi, 438–440. For the 
regulation of new mining enterprises, see: Provvisioni, Carte di corredo, in ASF, 26, 113r. The market for 
second-hand copper is testified in: Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 27, 
231v; Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 30, 252v. The prices of these metals 
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In 1494, however, with the appearance of the infamous artillery of Charles VIII, these 
materials became indispensable for reaching new standards of excellence in gunnery. The 
introduction of trunnions and the small size of canons, couleuvrines, and faulcons enabled 
French gunners to fire rapidly. The mobility and the maneuverability of these pieces, along 
with the use of iron cannonballs, offered many improvements over the heavy, traditional 
bombards and their stone ammunition.41 Even if the king did not make his way to Naples 
thanks to his bronze ordnance, his guns undoubtedly caused fear and astonishment among 
Italian chroniclers, ambassadors, soldiers, and statesmen.42 The great number of pieces, the 
speed of horses and carriages, and the menacing spectacle of several small, heavy cannons 
probably impressed witnesses accustomed to the difficult shift of a single, “intractable” 
bombard. According to Francesco Guicciardini, these firearms were more “diabolic” than 
“human” devices.43 For these reasons, Charles’s cannons provoked interest and attention: 
“this French artillery is very good and very effective,” wrote the Dieci di Balìa laconically in 
March 1495.44 For these reasons above all, the military officers of the Republic decided to 
produce those weapons directly in Florence. 
In January 1495, in the center of the city, the Dieci started the construction of a new 
foundry in the semi-abandoned area of the Sapienza, the college projected seventy years 
earlier by Niccolò da Uzzano for the Florentine university.45 Before mid-February, bricklayers 
and carpenters completed the workshop, digging the casting pit and “walling up” the furnace. 
The masters of the Sapienza received 8,000 libbre of copper and 700 libbre of tin few days 
later. In March, the first ever French style cannon produced in Florence was sent to the Pisan 
encampment.46 
are repeatedly noted in the bookkeeping of the military offices. See, for example, Dieci di Balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 30, 240r; Otto di Pratica, Munizioni, in ASF, 1, 21r. 
41 Giovanni Santi Mazzini, La macchina da guerra, 251–52; David Potter, Renaissance France at War, 
152–53; Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 90–95. 
42 Simon Pepper, “Castles and Cannon.” 
43 Paolo Giovio, Historie, 59rv; Bartolomeo Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, 203; Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, 
79rv; Guicciardini, Storia d’Italia, 79. 
44 Dieci di Balìa, Missive, in ASF, 32, 79rv: “Queste artiglierie franzesi sono molte buone et fanno 
grandi effecti.” 
45 Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 5, 17r; Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in 
ASF, 31, 149v. For the history of the college and the events that followed its construction, see: Emanuela 
Ferretti, “La Sapienza di Niccolò da Uzzano.” 
46 Dieci di Balìa, Missive, in ASF, 32, 79r; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 5, 15v, 25r, 32r, and 38r; 
Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 33, 245r. It is difficult to establish the 
actual ratio of tin and copper used in those castings. The maestri often fabricated their guns with metals 
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The designers of this bronze cortaldo a la franzese were maestro Francesco di 
Bartolomeo Telli and his assistant, maestro Simone di Bronzi. In January, before the opening of 
the foundry, the Dieci ordered Francesco to reach Castrocaro and join the French gunners and 
gunmakers that garrisoned the town for observing, measuring, and drawing their cannons. 
Here, he examined twelve falconi, five cortaldi, and five colovrine. The same task was 
entrusted to another artisan, Lorenzo di Giovanni, called Cavaloro, in April.47 The alliance with 
Charles VIII permitted and encouraged this circulation of ideas and men.48 The apprenticeship 
of Francesco and Lorenzo was extremely successful. Their drawings could have been a sort of 
guidebook for subsequent casting processes and for the reproduction of French guns.49 Basing 
their efforts on a solid and reliable tradition of bronze working, the assimilation of new 
techniques and new patterns in Florentine production was about to start. The bronze cortaldo 
demonstrated that the Republic in the 1490s had the makers, the knowledge, and the tools for 
acquiring innovations and reaching excellent qualitative levels in gun production. 
The market for the new French cannons thrived immediately. In February 1495 a 
Pistoiese merchant offered several models of these guns to the Dieci.50 
 
Here is a man who has beautiful models for making various kind of guns. He 
has acquired them from some Frenchmen. These models are perfect for 
crafting bombards, passavolanti, mortars and other pieces. They are 
fourteen or fifteen pieces. We could buy them for a reasonable price. I 
exhort your lordships to search for this man, and your lordships could see 
these models and grasp if they are just what you need. I think so. 
 
that they already had in the workshop, and these libbre were not computed by officials. Moreover, and 
very often, they did not cast all the material that they received from the Commune. 
47 Dieci di Balìa, Missive, in ASF, 31, 81r; Dieci di Balìa, Responsive, in ASF, 38, 45r; Dieci di Balìa, 
Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 12, 17v, and 103v. For the number of the French cannons, see: Marino Sanuto, 
La spedizione, 127. 
48 A treaty between the Florentine Republic and the king of France was signed in November 1494: 
Piero Parenti, Storia fiorentina, 141–44; Luca Landucci, Diario fiorentino, 86; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, 
219. 
49 For the importance of drawings in the transmission of knowledge, see: Donata Degrassi, “La 
trasmissione dei saperi,” 82–83; Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, 76r; Wolfgang Lefèvre, Picturing Machines. 
50 Dieci di Balìa, Responsive, in ASF, 38, 244r: “qui ci è uno che ha modelli bellissimi da fare artigliarie 
di più ragioni, che dice haverli havuti da certi franciosi. Sono ingegni perfectissimi da bombarde, 
passavolanti, mortai et altre artigliarie, circa quattordici o quindici capi. Harebonsi con picholo prezzo, 
che stimo stare bene. Conforto vostre signorie, parendo nondimeno a quelle et non altrimenti, mandare 
per costui che le ha, et vostre signorie le potranno vedere et intendere se sono il bisogno, che stimo di sì, 
et quando così sia usarli qualche gentilezza et torli da lui.” 
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In May, even the Pisan rebels could manufacture five passavolanti all’usanza di Franza, 
“beautiful and furious things.”51 French technology spread rapidly across the whole of Italy. In 
November 1495, iron cannonballs were made in the Neapolitan arsenal “for the first time 
ever,” probably by Milanese masters. In Venice, an engineer who served with Charles VIII, 
Basilio della Scola, started the production of new ordnance in May 1496. The duke of Ferrara, 
Ercole d’Este, built ironworks, furnaces, and warehouses in Fornovolasco between 1496 and 
1497, hiring Lombard artisans for fabricating shot and artillery.52 In Florence, the casting work 
in the Sapienza continued incessantly during the spring and the autumn of 1495. In May, a 
Picard gunner, Pierre from Douai, was invited to work in the foundry, but he failed in casting a 
cortaldo. Francesco Telli, instead, supplied the army with several spingarde and passavolanti 
ala franzese, that is, falcons and culverins. In August, his first furnace was rebuilt, and, a few 
weeks later, a second foundry was fully operational in the same area. In the following months, 
the Dieci decided also to open new workshops in two of their most important border 
fortresses, both entrusted to their Florentine masters. Cavaloro was sent in Firenzuola to 
complete several unfinished passavolanti, while Francesco Telli reached the citadel of Volterra, 
where a new fornello was made for li getti del bronzo.53 
Initially, however, the manufacture of the new single-piece bronze cannons coexisted 
with the production of the traditional ordnance. In July 1496, Baldassarre di Giovanni, a smith, 
still fabricated an iron bombarda, two iron passavolanti, and several iron spingarde. He was 
undoubtedly the most important partner of the Dieci di Balìa for supplying iron, ammunitions, 
and portable guns such as scoppietti and archibugi.54 But, alongside Baldassarre, the maestri di 
getto also continued to craft artillery with old methods and old shapes. In May 1496 Lorenzo di 
Giovanni and his workmate, Ludovico di Guglielmo, created a giant bombard of three pieces 
with nearly 17,000 libbre of cast bronze. Francesco Telli was still casting many breech sections 
51 Giovanni Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” 307. 
52 Ferraiolo, Cronaca, 81; Sanudo, I diarii, vol. 1, 146; Domenico Malipiero, “Annali veneti,” 562. For 
the development of the Ferrarese ordnance, see Calegari, “La mano sul cannone.” 
53 For the works and the movements of Francesco Telli, see: Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 5, 48r, 
57v, 295r, and 307r; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 14, 134v, 168v, and 304v; Dieci di Balìa, 
Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 15, 288v; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 17, 238r; Dieci di Balìa, Debitori 
e creditori, in ASF, 26, 82v; Dieci di Balìa, Debitori e creditori, in ASF, 34, 19v. 
54 Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 42, 129r–132r; Dieci di Balìa, 
Munizioni, in ASF, 5, 3r–65r; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 6, 107v and 141v; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e 
uscita, in ASF, 15, 262v; Dieci di Balìa, Debitori e creditori, in ASF, 28, 76v–77r. These collaborations 
would have been fruitful for Baldassarre: according to his statement of income, he owned six houses 
and three pieces of land by the end of the century. Decima repubblicana, in ASF, 16, 204r–205r. 
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for his passavolanti, along with new single-piece cortaldi. In March 1496 he produced a 
bombarda di dua pezi decorated with the coat of arms of the Commune. A similar gun was cast 
one year later in Volterra.55 
Only in the first half of 1498 did the Florentine masters seem to fully abandon the 
artillerie italiane for the French style. The change was probably due to the wartime increase in 
demand. In this year, the Republic took the offensive against Pisan rebels, with the help of the 
Duke of Milan. Ludovico Sforza supplied his Florentine allies with 10,000 golden florins and 
about 30,000 libbre of raw saltpeter.56 Moreover, the new captain, Paolo Vitelli, had 
experience with the French ordnance at the time of his service with the French army in the 
kingdom of Naples between 1495 and 1496. During his command, he frequently requested 
new bronze cannons, tons of powder, and iron cannonballs, and he personally owned twelve 
bronze falconetti in his stronghold of Città di Castello, which he would have used for seizing 
Buti and Vico Pisano.57  
Meanwhile in Florence, the Dieci began to repair several furnaces under the supervision 
of one of the captain’s secretaries. The fornello of the Sapienza was rebuilt. A new foundry for 
maestro Telli was also previously constructed near the arsenal of the tower of Notomia, in the 
eastern section of city walls, on the north side of the Arno. The officers also hired new 
gunpowder makers and widened their workshop, sited on the opposite bank of the river, in the 
vicinity of the city gate of San Niccolò. Between July and September Francesco Telli cast 12,000 
libbre of bronze, manufacturing ten falconetti and three cannoni of different forms. The same 
number of cannons was crafted by Lorenzo di Giovanni and his workmate.58 (See appendix 2.) 
When the Venetian army invaded the Tuscan region of Casentino in the autumn of 1498, 
the Florentine artillery was very different compared to the past. New portable firearms, the 
archibugi, were replacing the old scoppietti, and the encampment was supplied only with the 
55 The bombarda di tre pezzi is reported in Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in 
ASF, 34, 212r; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 5, 173r. For the cannons of maestro Telli, see: Dieci di 
Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 17, 221v; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 5, 136v, and 178r. 
56 Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 30, 1r; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 7, 511v. 
57 Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 33, 117r; Dieci di Balìa, Missive, in 
ASF, 59, 90v; Dieci di Balìa, Missive, in ASF, 60, 101r. For the career of Paolo Vitelli, see: Claudio Rendina, 
I capitani, 450; Giuliano Passero, Giornali, 104; Giuseppe Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli,” 366. 
58 Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 7, 390r; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 23, 23v, and 241v. 
The accounts of both masters were kept in Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 7, 367v, 387v, 427v, and 
508v. For the tower of Notomia and its foundry, see: Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 13, 156v–
160v; Dieci di Balìa, Debitori e creditori, in ASF, 32, 173v–207v; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 7, 352r, 
and 362v. 
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new ordnance: four cannoni grossi alla franzese and their carri grossi nuovi a dua ruote fornite, 
two cortaldi and two passavolanti, one falconetto grosso a facce di bronzo d’un pezzo, another 
falconetto tondo di bronzo a camera, and the other eight falconetti.59 Even the terminology 
changed: according to the French custom, the word “cannone” no longer indicated only the 
breech chamber of the gun, but the whole artillery piece.60 
According to the Pisan chronicler Giovanni Portoveneri, in 1499 the Florentine army 
besieged his city with eighty guns.61 
 
The Florentine army numbered about fifteen thousand men between 
infantry and cavalry. They carried also eighty guns. There were fifty pieces 
between passavolanti and cortaldi, mounted on carts, and seven heavy 
bombards. Florentine gunners fired about two hundred shot per hour on the 
wall and in the city. The entire world seemed to be getting destroyed. 
 
This source, as well as many others, shows that the demands of actual combat compelled 
soldiers and rulers to use both “old” and “new” models. Even if the Florentine masters had 
produced only French cannons, in fact, all manner of weapons were pressed into service, 
irrespective of their quality, metal, or mobility. Technical innovations were also combined with 
traditional machines. Several falcons were equipped with a separate breech like old spingarde. 
And in the same way, in those months Louis XII seized Lombard castles with three bombards of 
his Piedmontese allies, along with thirty-six pieces of the royal artillery.62 
For the campaign of 1498 the Dieci also rented and purchased many new carts, carrette 
alla franzese. These were equipped with a box for powder and cannonballs, and were 
extraordinary useful for moving light pieces, the artiglierie minute, such as falconetti. Their two 
wheels, above all, were moved by fast horses, instead of the slow oxen traditionally used in 
the transportation of heavy guns. The reduction in weight and size in bronze artillery, in any 
case, permitted additional improvements. A cannone could reach the impervious mountain of 
Casentino from Florence in ten days only, accompanied by only eight carters (carradori) and 
59 Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 5, 3r–65r; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 6, 1v–4r, 142v, and 
224r. 
60 Santi Mazzini, La macchina da guerra, 252. 
61 Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” 341–42: “erano circa persone quindicimila tra piè e a cavallo, e avevano 
recato per anco ottanta boche d’artiglierie, che ve n’era tra passavolanti e cortali boche cinquanta in 
carete, e bombarde grosse sulle culatte, boche sette, in modo che tiravano circa colpi dugento per ora 
tra nelle mura e per la tera, che parea che el mondo si disfacesse.” 
62 Sanuto, I diarii, vol. 2, 1104. 
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eight pairs of oxen. In the preceding decades thirteen men, twenty-six oxen, and four carts 
were necessary to the ground transit of a giant, iron bombard from Arezzo to Anghiari.63 
 
The “beautiful cannons” of Bonaccorso Ghiberti 
 
In the first decade of the sixteenth century, besides, the Dieci decided to foster the production 
by hiring masters from the Alpine regions of Piedmont and Lombardy. Giovanni Antonio from 
Novara, for example, arrived in Florence in 1502. Bernardino from Milan, instead, worked in 
Castrocaro before moving to the foundry of the Sapienza, to Volterra, to Librafratta, and to 
Livorno. In the workshop of this port in 1506, the Milanese master crafted six mezzani, two 
colovrine, fourteen falconetti, a passavolante for the ravelin of the fortezza nuova di mare, and 
a bombarda for a small galley. Moreover, he cast 692 scoppietti for the Florentine, 
Machiavellian militia in 1510.64 
Alongside Bernardino, Giovanni Antonio, and the other maestri di getto, Bonaccorso 
Ghiberti also contributed to the development of Florentine artillery. When he began to write 
his libro di ricordanze in 1496, he had already returned in Florence. After the death of his 
father Vettorio in November of the same year, Bonaccorso inherited a third of a farm in 
Settimo and, in the capital, a third of the family house in the street of borgo Allegri, and an 
apothecary workshop in the canto alle paglie. Above all, Bonaccorso took full ownership of the 
foundry of his father and his grandfather, which included the tools for casting and engineering, 
blacksmith’s instruments, and also the drawings and the books of Lorenzo Ghiberti. 
Bonaccorso notes proudly (and repeatedly) that it was the bottega “in which the bronze 
gates of San Giovanni of Florence were made.”65 In March 1497 he began to live in his 
workshop, in the rooms near the facilities for bronze casting. The foundry – “the portico where 
the furnace is” – was next to the church of Santa Maria Nuova, in the old street of San Gilio. 
In January 1497 Bonaccorso walled up a new reverberatory furnace with the help of 
three bricklayers. The bricks, baked or mud, cost fourteen lire. According to Biringuccio, this 
63 Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 30, 69r–90r; Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, in ASF, 27, 222rv; Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 47, 13r; 
Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 7, 356r, 364v, and 366r; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 30, 72r. 
64 Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 8, 127v, 161v–162r; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 9, 180rv; 
Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 10, 172r, and 174r. 
65 Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13230, 6v–14v. For the 
inheritance of Lorenzo and Vettorio Ghiberti, and for the property disputes between Bonaccorso and his 
half-brothers Francesco and Cione, see: Krautheimer-Hess, “More Ghibertiana,” 307–311. 
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fornello di riverberazione was “powerful” and necessary for the principal castings, the gran 
getti of statues, bells, and artillery pieces.66 In the Zibaldone, Bonaccorso illustrated several 
different fornelli. For example, he depicted a furnace with a water wheel used for smelting soft 
ores in the vicinity of mines or for assaying the metals. Another one was used by glassmakers. 
Above all, Bonaccorso showed two fornelli used in casting and in remelting bronze: the first 
had an oval hearth and the second was round, with two fire boxes.67 It is likely that similar 
types of furnaces were placed in the scrittoio. 
A new furnace was necessary, as in the preceding months the Dieci di Balìa 
commissioned Bonaccorso to cast new cannons for the Republic. In April he made two small, 
bronze passavolanti ala franzese of nearly 3,000 libbre. But, like Telli and Cavaloro, he also 
crafted an old-style bombarda grossa in two pieces, weighing more than 12,000 libbre, 
following his casting method. The muzzle of a bombard had to be seven and a half shots in 
length, and a sixth of the diameter of its projectile in thickness. The side of the breech, instead, 
had to measure a quarter of the bore; its bottom, a third. The empty space of the chamber, a 
little bit more than a half. The expense for the fuel and the alder wood for casting amounted 
to 50 lire. The four wheels of the carro della bombarda, besides, cost almost 200 lire, and 76 
lire were spent on the laying and aiming systems and the shaft of the carriage. The Dieci owed 
Bonaccorso 182 florins di grossi for these three firearms: the price was fixed, as usual, at 10 
florins di grossi every hundred libbre of cast bronze. The cost of pieces weighing less than 
1,000 libbre, such as falconetti and spingarde, was set at 80 lire for the same quantity of metal. 
These were the typical salaries of a Florentine maestro di getto, the earnings from his work, his 
magistero.68 
One year later the sottoprovveditore, Manno degli Albizi, was still providing Bonaccorso 
with 8,000 libbre of copper and 800 libbre of tin. The contribution of military officers, in fact, 
was not merely monetary. They periodically provided maestri with these metals and other raw 
66 Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, 101v–104r. 
67 Banco rari 228, in BNF, 75r, 82r, and 83r. These and other furnaces are described in Biringuccio, 
Pirotechnia, 101v–106v. 
68 Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13230, 16v; Debitori e creditori di 
Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13229, 24v; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 15, 
301v; Dieci di Balìa, Debitori e creditori, in ASF, 28, 20r; Dieci di Balìa, Debitori e creditori, in ASF, 32, 
52v. The payments for the masters’ manifattura are reported in Dieci di Balia, Munizioni, in ASF, 5, 
181rv; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 7, 318r, and 508v; Banco rari 228, in BNF, 91v: “La tromba de le 
bombarde vole essere lungha sanza el chanone sette palottole e mezza […]. El vano del chanone vole 
essere uno pocho più che la metà del vano de la tromba. La grosseza del bronzo del chanone vole essere 
la metà del voto. Vole avere grosso el fondo un terzo.” 
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materials, subtracting their cost from the price of the end product. And, with these stagno and 
rame, Bonaccorso produced two single-piece passavolanti in July 1497.69 In August he left his 
hometown and moved again to Piombino. He remained here until December, along with 
Raffaello di Monna Venere, a carpenter who helped him “with the bombards.”70 
As for the other masters, 1498 was the most “revolutionary” year in the gunmaking 
career of Bonaccorso. His ordnance, too, seems to have adapted to the French design. In April 
he received a new commission by the military officers “to cast artillery and complete some 
molds.” Three months later the Dieci delivered to their maestro 8,000 libbre of copper and 
1,000 libbre of tin. With this raw material, Bonaccorso produced three French-style bronze 
guns: a cortaldo overo bombardella, a cannone overo passavolante with a shot weight of fifty 
libbre of iron, and a small cannone a uso di candeliere. This undefined terminology revealed 
the coexistence of new (cortaldo, cannone) and traditional (bombardella, passavolante) names 
during the process of adaptation and innovation. In any case, significantly, Bonaccorso’s notes 
in the Zibaldone included a reference to French methods of casting artillery, related to the 
diameter of the shot.71 
 
A chortaldo or passavolante will weigh about five thousand libbre, if it has a 
bore diameter of a third or a quarter of braccio, a length of six and a third 
braccia […], and a rear part thick as two shot. Another chortaldo or 
passavolante will weigh about six thousand libbre, if it has a length of six 
braccia, and if it fires eighty libbre of lead […]. French gunmakers are 
accustomed to cast the breech of their passavolanti three shot thick, that is, 
one for empty space and two for bronze, that is, every side of the chamber 
as much thick as the gap. This is their own way to craft guns with a shot 
weight of ten libbre of lead, or less. And for the pieces with a shot weight of 
thirty, or forty, or fifty libbre of lead, they made these sides two and half 
shot thick. 
69 Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13230, 15r; Dieci di Balìa, 
Debitori e creditori, in ASF, 32, 207v. 
70 Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13230, 16rv.  
71 Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13230, 19r. The reference is in 
Banco rari 228, in BNF, 87v–88r: “Uno chortaldo overo passavolante che el vano sia tra un terzo e un 
quarto, e lungho braccia sei e un terzo, pesserà circha di libre cinquemila tutta […], faciendola grossa 
dirieto dua pallottole […]. Un altro cortaldo overo passavolante che sia lungho braccia sei e che gietti 
ottanta libre di piombo pesserà circha a semila libbre […]. E’ franzesi usano fare grosse le loro 
passavolanti drieto el netto, cioè ‘l sodo sanza la chornice tre palottole, cioè una al vuoto e dua al 
bronzo, cioè tanto grosso el bronzo da ongni lato quanto el vano. E quelo fano a quele che gettano insino 
in dieci libbre di piombo. E quelle che gettano da trenta a quaranta o a cinquanta libbre di piombo fanno 
grosse drieto tutto el netto di fuori dua palottole e mezo o pocho più.” 
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 Several sketches of his notebook almost certainly depict the guns that Bonaccorso 
produced in that summer: single-piece, bronze, light cannoni, mounted on carts equipped with 
two spoke wheels, tailpieces, and different gun laying systems. Various notes were about the 
proportions and the measurements of cannons, or the calculation of the weight of a piece 
according to length, or the earth used on the molds of ordnance. Bonaccorso wrote down even 
some tricks to break a cannon with molten metal, or to disengage the nut and screw of an 
overheated bombard. A couple of figures were also dedicated to handguns and mortars. But 
these drawings, above all, illustrate Bonaccorso’s curiosity about the innovation. They showed 
the development of his artillery, from the giant bombards to the bronze cortaldi, from the 
copy of Valturio’s obsolete firearms to the assimilation of French technology.72 
Between August and September the Dieci gave another thousand libbre of metal to 
Bonaccorso. Moreover, they ordered him to build a new furnace in his workshop for “an easier 
and better melting,” perché possi fare i getti migliori et più comodamente. This fornace in via 
della Pergola cost thirty-two lire and eight soldi. It was a useful improvement for Bonaccorso, 
who rapidly manufactured a falconetto and another beautiful cannon, decorated with heads of 
lions and “old-fashioned” ornaments: “on September 22, 1498, I have tried and I have handed 
to the Dieci a French-fashioned, bronze cannon with lion heads on the trunnions and classical 
ornaments on the muzzle.” A third gun, six and half braccia long and with a shot weight of fifty 
libbre of iron, was produced in November. At this time, the credit of Bonaccorso with the Dieci 
amounted to 293 florins di grossi. With 30,000 libbre of bronze, he had made one cortaldo, 





72 Banco rari 228, in BNF, 55v, and 82r–94v; Scaglia, “A Miscellany of Bronze Works,” 492–93 and 
498–513; Bertrand Gille, Leonardo e gli ingegneri del Rinascimento, 116. Even Leonardo da Vinci, in two 
plates of his Codex Atlanticus, illustrated this development, sketching cannoni vecchi next to cannoni 
franzesi and colovrine. Ridella, “L’evoluzione strutturale,” 20–22. 
73 Debitori e creditori di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13229, 25v; Ricordanze di 
Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13230, 23r–26r; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 7, 
390r, 427v, 478r, and 488r; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 23, 242r. Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di 
Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13230, 25r: “ricordo come a dì 22 di settembre 1498 io detti e 
provai a’ X un chanone di bronzo a la franzese chon teste di lioni ne’ piloni overo ne’ manichi chon fregi a 
l’anticha. E a dì 23 lo pesorono e dissono ch’è pessato netto libre seimila ducento.” 
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Casting guns, casting shot 
 
However, cannons and harquebuses were useless without shot. Stone was still in use for the 
iron bombards. The major quarry was sited near the gorge of Golfolina. Here, in 1499, Simone 
di Tommaso del Pollaiolo, also known as il Cronaca, crafted 1,005 stone shot for supplying the 
army during the siege of Pisa. Lead was adopted in large quantities for the making of little 
bullets, mainly for the small calibers of scoppietti, archibugi, spingarde, and passavolanti. The 
metal was “cut,” melted, and cast into pallottole. In 1495 more than 15,000 pallottole di 
piombo da passavolanti were stored in the arsenal of Parte Guelfa. During the spring of 1498 
the provveditore of the Florentine encampment counted about 500 lead shot for archibugi and 
spingarde, and more than 1,000 for passavolanti, falconetti, and cortaldi. In 1499 cast lead was 
even used for “covering” two stone shot.74 The practice was unusual in Florentine warfare, but 
at that time metal shot was becoming the new standard. The innovation of the French cast 
bronze ordnance was in fact accompanied by the introduction of cast iron shot. They were 
cheap and easily reproducible, with better performances than the traditional stone 
ammunition.75 
According to contemporary chroniclers, those cannonballs were totally unknown to 
Italian warfare. However, as with the guns, Florentine masters assimilated the new technology 
immediately. Tommaso Marinai was commissioned to cast bronze molds for the shot in March 
1495. Other molds were made by Giuliano d’Andrea, a stonecutter. The production, managed 
by Tommaso himself, started in the ironwork of Colle Val d’Elsa in the first months of 1495. In 
May more than one hundred pallottole di ferro colate were sent to the Florentine 
encampment at a cost of 135 lire. Three years later, Florentine gunners had approximately 
available the same quantity of projectiles. However, the necessities of the campaigns in Pisan 
contado and in Casentino, and the increasing number of bronze cannons, compelled the Dieci 
74 Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 27, 226r; Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, 
condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 31, 148v; Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 
34, 209r; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 6, 229r–233r; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 30, 135v, 
and 192r; Dieci di Balìa, Missive, in ASF, 31, 123v. 
75 This innovation has been analyzed by: Calegari, “La mano sul cannone,” 64–65; Hall, Weapons and 
Warfare, 93–94; Ridella, “Produzione di artiglierie,” 85. For contemporary descriptions and impressions, 
see: Guicciardini, Storia d’Italia, 78; Ferraiolo, Cronaca, 81; Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, 117v. 
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to accelerate the production. In July 1498 the Dieci signed a contract with a Lombard master 
and a Florentine merchant for a furniture of a thousand projectiles.76 
  
I remember that today, on July 21, 1498, we have made a bargain with 
Agniolo di Filippo from Brescia and Baldo di Giovanni from Careggi for cast 
iron shot, weighing up to fifty libbre each, according to the model. We will 
pay 13 lire for every hundred libbre of metal, and Agniolo and Baldo have to 
hand two hundred cannonballs by the fifth of August and three hundred by 
the tenth of the same month. They have to bring the shot in Signa at their 
expense, except the custom duties of our territory. 
 
Agniolo and Baldo delivered about 400 shot between August and October, earning more than 
2,000 lire. At the same time, the military officers received hundreds of iron cannonballs from 
Castrocaro. They also hired three masters, Giovanni di Piero from Piedmont, Antonio di 
Giovanni from Germany, and Lancillotto di Voglino for casting iron shot in Pistoia. The price 
was fixed at thirteen lire for every hundred libbre of shot. Their condotta made provision also 
for the manufacture of scoppietti, archibusi, and spingarde. In February Giovanni, Antonio, and 
Lancillotto received 244 lire for forty-five palle grosse da cannoni and four palle piccole da 
passavolante.77 But despite these efforts, and despite the growth of the market in cannonballs, 
the army still had insufficient ammunition.  
In the summer of 1499 the Signoria tried its best to solve the problem of the “necessary 
and indispensable” shot. New pallottole were made with stone and lead, but after the taking 
of Cascina, captain Paolo Vitelli expressly requested iron cannonballs for knocking down the 
walls of Pisa. In July the ambassador in Venice requested balote from the Most Serene 
Republic. The officials sent also an intermediary in Brescia, Mantova, and Bologna for acquiring 
300 projectiles. The marquis of Ferrara, Ercole d’Este, was asked to lend 200 shot. The 
Florentine agent in Lucca, Francesco Spina, bought 465 cast palle di ferro and many forged 
76 Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 5, 37r; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 6, 231v–233r; Dieci, 
Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 14, 10v; Dieci di Balìa, Missive, in ASF, 32, 96r. Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 7, 
355rv, and 457v: “richordo oggi questo dì XXI di luglio 1498 chome abbiamo fatto merchato chon 
Angniolo di messer Filippo da Brescia e chon Baldo di Giovanni da Chareggi di palle di ferro cholato di 
libre 50 in circha l’una, sechondo il modello, e di nostro a L. 13 per il cento di libre, portate al porto a 
Signa a ongni loro spesa salvo le gabelle del nostro territorio, i quali ci debbono dare in detto porto palle 
200 per tutto dì V d’agosto prossimo a venire e palle 300 per tutto dì X detto, e volendone noi di poi 
insino alla somma di 1000 sia a nostro piacimento.” 
77 Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 23, 542r; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 30, 110r; 
Dieci di Balìa , Munizioni, in ASF, 7, 353r–386v. 
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palle fatte a maglio, for about 400 golden florins.78 Moreover, the captains of Arezzo and 
Cortona were ordered to send ferramenti vecchi and other scrap iron towards the capital. 
Nineteen thousand libbre of those rottami di ferro were collected and dispatched to an 
ironwork in Colle Val d’Elsa. The conversion and the rent of this foundry – an edificio del ferro – 
cost 127 lire, and the price of the fifty wooden palle for the molds was 8 lire. The production 
was entrusted to two charcoal-burners and to maestro Simone d’Andrea from Romena, a 
mountain village sited in the vicinity of several ironworks in Casentino. From July to 
September, Simone cast 394 shot of various sorts, weighing a total of 14,000 libbre.79 
At the same time, Lancillotto di Voglino and his workmates were given more than 
21,000 libbre of scrap iron, but they could manufacture only 163 palle. By the end of July, in 
fact, their furnace did not work perfectly but with, they reported, qualche difficultà.80 The 
Signori sent maestro Francesco Telli to repair the malfunctioning fornello, and a few days later 
Bonaccorso Ghiberti also moved to Pistoia.81 
 
On July 20, 1499, the Signoria of Florence sent me to Pistoia to craft iron 
cannonballs for the siege of Pisa. On July, 24, the Signoria sent to my 
workshop Giovanni d’Aspurgo, and commissioned him to cast bronze shot 
for the cannons, because they could not have the iron ones. 
 
This confirms the report of Piero Parenti, who wrote that the army was provided with 
“expensive” cast bronze cannonballs for lack of iron ones. Their hurried production mobilized 
every gunmaker and every bellfounder of Florence. The masters were Giovanni of Augsburg, 
Francesco Telli, Lorenzo Cavaloro, Ludovico orafo, and Bonaccorso Ghiberti, along with three 
campanai, Jacopo Pintegli, Giovanni Antonio orafo, and Damiano. Some of these craftsmen 
78 Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, in ASF, 21, 29v, 41r, 52r, and 55v; Signori e collegi, Condotte e 
stanziamenti, in ASF, 17, 21v; Dieci di Balìa, Missive, in ASF, 60, 74r; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in 
ASF, 26, 320r; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 30, 146v, 164r, 175r, and 192r. The Venetian 
negotiation is reported also in Sanuto, I diarii, vol. 2, 896. 
79 Consulte e pratiche, in ASF, 65, 61r; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 26, 320v–321r; Dieci di 
Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 30, 161v; Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 17, 32r, 34v, 
and 37v. For the ferriere of Casentino, see: Andrea Barlucchi, “La lavorazione del ferro,” 175–78. 
80 Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 30, 169r and 199r; Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, in 
ASF, 21, 47v; Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 18, 4v. 
81 Debitori e creditori di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13229, 26r: “a dì venti di 
luglio 1499 la Singnioria di Firenze mi mandò a Pistoia per fare fare palottole di ferro per tirare chon 
chanoni in Pisa, e a dì ventiquatro mi mandorono in bottegha mia da Santa Maria Nuova uno maestro 
Giovanni d’Aspurgho maestro di gietti perché lui gittassi loro palottole di bronzo per chanoni perché non 
vedevano modo di potterle avere di fero.” 
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were ordered to build new furnaces. Officials paid in advance for bricks, charcoal, and timber. 
As usual, the maestri were provided with copper collected from the two Florentine arsenals of 
Giustizia and Parte Guelfa, and with 5,000 libbre of old, used copper arrived from the castle of 
Firenzuola. The Signori also acquired 15,000 libbre of copper, 3,000 libbre of tin and 11,000 
libbre of brass from Matteo Strozzi. Bonaccorso, moreover, received several “rotten” 
cannons.82 
Bonaccorso, in his account books, complained about the whole situation. According to 
his notes, the military officers “expropriated” his foundry during his stay in Pistoia and ordered 
Giovanni of Augsburg to use the furnace for casting bronze shot. However, the German master 
left the scrittoio for the encampment after only two days. By the end of July, Bonaccorso was 
recalled in Florence and was required to finish the work. Considering the poor quality of the 
metals and the large quantity of materia triste and burnt bronze, Bonaccorso initially refused, 
but his attitude was soon mitigated by the promise of a large payment. In the first twelve days 
of August, Bonaccorso manufactured 364 palottole di bronzo weighing 19,000 libbre. His credit 
account amounted to 191 florins di grossi. Four of these projectiles were handed to two 
goldsmiths, Andrea di Pasquino and Paolo Soglianni, that the Signori had commissioned to 
engrave an inscription, per tirarle in Pisa dorate e con uno motto, for the purpose of deriding 
the besieged Pisans.83 
Within two weeks, Florentine maestri crafted 689 bronze shot, earning more than 300 
florins di grossi. Nevertheless, despite the expensive efforts of officials and artisans, the siege 
of Pisa ended with a resounding, disastrous failure. The Florentine artillery knocked down 
about fifty braccia – nearly thirty meters – of the Pisan walls, but the captain Paolo Vitelli 
refused to assault the breach. In October the condottiere was captured, charged with treason 
and rebellion, and then beheaded on the roof of the Palazzo dei Priori.84 In any case, in 
autumn 1499 only 100 palle di bronzo da cannone remained in Florentine warehouses, but 
82 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, 280; Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, in ASF, 21, 52v; Dieci di Balìa, 
Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 30, 168v, 169v, 170v–174r, 195v–197v, and 212v; Signori e collegi, Condotte e 
stanziamenti, in ASF, 17, 86r. 
83 Debitori e creditori di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13229, 50v and 51r; 
Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13230, 33v–35r; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata 
e uscita, in ASF, 30, 170v–173r, and 179v; see also Anonymous, “La guerra del Millecinquecento,” 367. 
84 The Pisan campaign of 1499 has been descibed by: Landucci, Diario fiorentino, 198–203; 
Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” 341–49; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, 281–306; Bartolomeo Masi, Ricordanze, 
43–45. 
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these cannonballs were not used for a second time. In 1503, they were handed to maestro 
Giovannantonio da Novara as “raw material” for manufacturing a new cannon.85 
In the following years, the Signori hired new experts in casting iron shot. In May 1500 
Giovanni di Comino dei Fusti, native of Brescia, was at work in his ferriera in the territory of 
Sienese Republic. Through the podestà of Barga, they also contacted a master of the Estense 
ironwork of Fornovolasco. In Florence, Francesco Telli continued to craft lead shot for bronze 
firearms.86 By 1507 the Republic no longer suffered a cannonball shortage. According to a 
contemporary register of munizioni, thousands and thousands of iron shot were fabricated in 
Florentine Tuscany at that time.87 
The Dieci di Balìa also encouraged the production of hollow iron spheres, necessary for 
the production of incendiary missiles, the so-called fuochi lavorati. In 1505 the officials 
invested more than 500 lire in a new foundry in the area of the Sapienza, managed by Jacopo 
di Francesco dell’Opera and Andrea di Jacopo from Colle Val d’Elsa. The shells of fuochi lavorati 
were usually filled with “black” and “Greek” pitch, oil, sulfur, paint, turpentine, saltpeter, 
verdigris, cotton wool, tow, twine, and wax, and they were usually made by engineers and 
gunpowder makers. In 1499 the Florentine maestri di polvere Jacopo di Corso and Piero di 
Zanobi fabricated about 400 palle di fuochi lavorati for the Pisan siege with paint, pitch, 
turpentine, and camphor. In the Zibaldone, Bonaccorso Ghiberti wrote down his personal 
recipe for making rockets, fire arrows, and fire balls to be dropped in water.88 
 
Fire balls to be dropped in water. Tow covered with powder, tied with string 
and soaked in vinegar. Then, another covert of tow wrapped in powder and 
bound with rope and dipped in vinegar. Then, make a hole and put a 
wooden peg in it. Melt sulfur, Greek pitch and sheep fat, and dip the ball in 
this mixture for protecting it from water. Then, set fire to the peg, and drop 
the shot in water. 
85 Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 18, 82v; Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 8, 188v. 
86 Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 17, 237v, and 249r; Signori, Missive seconda 
cancelleria, in ASF, 22, 71r; Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 18, 134r. 
87 Munizioni, in ASF, 10, 67v, 76v–77r, 87v, 93r, 166r, 174v, and 187rv. The source does not clarify if 
these projectiles were produced in Florence or in Colle Val d’Elsa. 
88 Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, in ASF, 9, 124rv; Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, in ASF, 30, 191rv; Dieci di 
Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, in ASF, 27, 266v. Banco rari 228, in BNF, 88v–92r: “fuochi 
lavorati per aqua. Istopa involta in polvere e leghata chon ispago e poi tuffata in acieto. E dipoi un altra 
choverta di stoppa rivolta in polvere e leghatta chon ispagho e tuffatta in acietto. Chossi fa tantte volte 
quanto la voi fare grossa. E dipoi farvi uno foro e mettervi uno piolo di lengnio. E poi abi zolfo, pecie 
grecha e un po’ di sevo di pechora e ongni chosa fonduto. E tuffavi quela palla e favi intor-no una 
grosseza per difendere dal aqua. E apichavi fuocho e giettala in aqua.” 
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 The manufacture of these fuochi lavorati was common among Italian contemporary engineers. 
Basilio della Scola crafted fuogi artifiziadi and “poisoned spears” for the Venetian army in 
1498. And forty years before, even Maso di Bartolomeo listed the ingredients for the “Greek 
fire” in his account book.89 
 
A man of his time 
 
The casting of bronze cannonballs was the last commission of Signoria for Ghiberti. In fact, he 
did not produce any artillery for the second siege of Pisa in June 1500. During this year, the 
scrittoio functioned only in March. For a few weeks, Bonaccorso helped Giovanni of Augburg 
cast three bells for the church of San Miniato al Monte. In November, he was newly hired by 
Jacopo IV Appiano as a gunmaker. He returned to Piombino in February 1501, along with 
several assistants. Here, he crafted his last bronze cannon. When Bonaccorso returned to 
Florence, he ceased casting. Neither the libro di ricordanze nor the libro di debitori cite new 
metal works after March 1501. In July he sold part of his copper to the commune of 
Castelfranco.90 He was fifty years old, and it is likely that he was actually too elderly to 
withstand the toil of the foundry. According to Biringuccio, in fact, the arte del getto was 
suitable only for strong, young, and vigorous craftsmen.91 
In 1502 Bonaccorso was elected as bookkeeper (provveditore) of his guild, as evidenced 
by a quadernuccio kept in the archive of the Istituto degli Innocenti.92 He also continued to 
keep up to date the account of his estates, including the rentals of the Perugino’s bottega and 
of the apothecary workshop in the canto alle paglie. Meanwhile, he slowly emptied his 
foundry of unused metal. In 1503 he handed 1,000 libbre of copper and bronze to maestro 
Giovannantonio from Novara. In 1505 he gave to Baccio from Montelupo, a sculptor, several 
libbre of tin. In November 1508 and April 1509, Bonaccorso was ordered to deliver about 6,000 
libbre of bronze to the principal Florentine gunmaker, Bernardino from Milano. The Dieci di 
Balìa requested this metal because Bonaccorso was in debt of more than 18,000 libbre of 
89 Sanuto, I diarii, vol. 2, 362–63; Baldovinetti 70, in BNF, 1r. 
90 Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13230, 52v–59r, and 69v; 
Debitori e creditori di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13229, 4v–5r and 56r. 
91 Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, 75r. 
92 Debitori e creditori dell’arte dei maestri di pietra e legname, in ASII, 13231. 
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copper, tin, and brass. Bonaccorso, in fact, seems to have received, from 1496, a large quantity 
of materia that he did not cast.93 
In July 1509 Bonaccorso moved to the border town of Firenzuola, to work in the local 
customs as doganiere. He was given another public office in April 1511, becoming the new 
podestà of Monte Spertoli, in the vicinity of Florence. When he came back to Florence, 
Bonaccorso stopped writing his ricordanze. At present, there are no known sources for 
reconstructing the last five years of his life. Probably he again visited his estates in Suvereto, in 
the Maremma region.94  
Journeys were an important part of his life. Like many other pratici he travelled 
frequently, meeting gunners and soldiers, learning new techniques, listening to different 
opinions and various advices. Reading his grandfather’s notes, he knew the thinking of 
Vitruvius and the devices of Mariano Taccola. He was familiar with the works of Francesco di 
Giorgio Martini and Giuliano da Sangallo. He collaborated with famous condottieri, and was a 
good friend of Pietro Vannucci, one of the most important painters of the late Italian 
Quattrocento.95 His network included also bellfounders, soldiers, politicians, prospectors, 
gunmakers. He improved his method by meetings and experience, and the rich heritage of his 
family undoubtedly helped him to develop his practical knowledge. He was always proud of 
the achievements of the Ghiberti’s foundry. During his life, moreover, Bonaccorso showed 
interest in several fields, such as architecture and engineering. Above all, he actually practiced 
the bronze casting of statues, bells, and cannons. Bonaccorso, with his receptive and 






93 Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13230, 101r, 119r, 144r, and 
147r; Debitori e creditori di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13229, 50v. 
94 Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13230, 149v, 158r–163v, and 
165. 
95 Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, in ASII, 13230, 147r. See also: Coonin, 
“New Documents,” 100–101. Pietro rented a part of the scrittoio for twelve florins per year: his 
agreement with Vettorio Ghiberti dated back to 1487, and ended only in 1511. 
96 Methods and knowledge of Renaissance engineers and craftsmen are analyzed in Gille, Leonardo e 
gli ingegneri del Rinascimento, 8–12; Schulz, “La migrazione di tecnici,” 89–94; Calegari, “Nel mondo dei 




According to Stephan Epstein, during the fifteenth century the transfer of technical knowledge 
became faster and more systematical in Europe. As described on the previous pages, public 
demand played a leading role in the creation of this “unified technological space” and in the 
introduction of technical improvement and innovative tools. States promoted inventions, 
specialization, changes, promoted new opportunity for inventiveness and production, and 
needed a vast number of artisans for achieving its aims. The Florentine Republic, like Venice 
and France, reacted to security threats investing also in technology. And war, like architecture, 
art, printing, mechanics, and weaving, mobilized men, money, and scientific and technical 
resources. A variety of people from diverse backgrounds offered opinions, suggested 
alternatives, and produced writings, drawings, and, above all, objects. It was not only a 
relationship between patrons and clients. Like Bonaccorso, many other pratici met among 
themselves, or with military experts, statesmen, or engineers, confronting their traditions, 
their skills, and their own methodologies. This web of contacts was created in encampments, 
palaces, squares, and factories. Arsenals, for example, became sites for experimentations and 
innovations. But the Florentine example suggests that technical improvements could mature 
also inside a single workshop, an apothecary’s store, a forge, or a renowned bottega such as 
Verrocchio’s.97 
Here, information and ideas circulated freely. Craftsmen carried on their empirical 
process, repeating and gradually improving established procedures. Their practical culture was 
the result of different experiences, developed during travel, work, and apprenticeship. They 
learned from other masters, copying items, imitating advances, improving and adapting their 
own technique, and developing a unique, concrete, logical knowledge. Often, developments 
took place without any articulated theory. Neither Ghiberti nor Telli were aware of the 
numerous, complex, critical variables involved in the casting of their guns. Sometimes, failures 
followed successes. The production of a French cannon, like the casting of a statue or the 
fabrication of any machinery, required multiple attempts, observation, intuition, and 
reflection. And when rationality entered the various, vast world of empiricism, practical 
knowledge met the interest of learned culture. Francesco di Giorgio Martini tried to classify 
97 Epstein, “Labour Mobility,” 251; Baraldi, “Una nuova età del ferro,” 214–16; Guido Guerzoni, 
“Novità, innovazione e imitazione,” 67–72; Schulz, “La migrazione di tecnici,” 89–110; Luca Molà, “Il 
mercato delle innovazioni,” 215–22; Carlo Maria Cipolla, Tecnica, società e cultura, 10; Filippo De Vivo, 
“La farmacia,” 141–42; Jean-Louis Fournel, “I luoghi,” 637–39. 
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guns according to their length and to the weight of their shot, exalting, moreover, in their 
superiority over ancient weapons. Leonardo da Vinci studied the casting methods, the recoil of 
cannons, the motion of projectiles, the nature of gunpowder. Niccolò Tartaglia combined 
mathematics and ballistics, working on theoretical and actual problems. In the meantime, 
corned powder and the blast furnaces permitted changes in the production of guns and new 
departures in their design. In turn, the fabrication of artillery stimulated other researches. 
Machiavelli, for example, reflected on the tactical use of firearms, and the Most Serene 
Republic finalized its “government” of ordnance. In the first decades of the sixteenth century, 
moreover, Vannoccio Biringuccio and Georgius Agricola wrote their treatise on mines, ores, 
metals, and castings.98 
Social demand inspired and encouraged several technical transformations, and 
information and culture continued to spread, through handbooks, craft mobility, migrations, 
and encounters during the early modern technological efflorescence.99 In this lively, 
stimulating context, the Dieci di Balìa encouraged their masters to introduce French 
technology in foundries and encampments. Enhancing their artillery, the Florentine officials 
were to promote a new, modern art of war. Bronze cannons, in fact, would have played an 
important part in the sixteenth-century “military revolution,” with serious consequences on 
tactics and fortifications.100 Nevertheless, at the end of the Italian Quattrocento, these changes 
were not completely carried out. As described in the previous pages, technological progresses 
were neither constant nor linear. Sometimes, they were not effective at all. Iron firearms and 
stone shot were still used on battlefields. Craftsmen produced giant bombards and separate 
breeches. Casting new projectiles was often problematic, due to the scarcity of adequate 
furnaces. The construction of bastion forts, moreover, was far from being widespread. 
Traditional warfare, therefore, would have coexisted with the assimilation of new weapons for 
decades. 
 
98 Calegari, “Nel mondo dei ‘pratici’,” 18–19; Gille, Leonardo e gli ingegneri del Rinascimento, 254–
81; Degrassi, “La trasmissione dei saperi,” 53–87; Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys, 305–312; 
Belhoste, “Nascita e sviluppo dell’artiglieria in Europa,” 327–28; Andrea Bernardoni, “Le artiglierie,” 8–
25; Bernardoni, “La fusione,” 108–114; Long, Artisans/Practitioners, 94–110; Hall, Weapons and 
Warfare, 67–133; Allan Gilbert, “Machiavelli on Fire Weapons,” 275–82; Panciera, Il governo delle 
artiglierie, 213–16; Baraldi, “Una nuova età del ferro,” 208–213. 
99 Guerzoni, “Novità, innovazione e imitazione,” 63–87. 
100 Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution; Parker, The Military Revolution; Jeremy Black, A Military 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. A bombard, sketched by Antonio Pisanello in Naples, during 1450s 
Paris, Musée du Louvre, Département des Arts graphiques, INV 2293 
Drawing by Angela Marino 
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ARTICLE VI 
“THIS FRENCH ARTILLERY IS VERY GOOD AND VERY EFFECTIVE.” 
HYPOTHESES ON THE DIFFUSION OF A NEW MILITARY TECHNOLOGY IN RENAISSANCE ITALY 
The Journal of Military History 
 
Submitted: November 2016 




The performances of the French cannons during the Neapolitan campaign of 1494 has been 
discussed several times, and with divergent, contrasting outcomes.1 Geoffrey Parker, for 
example, affirmed that the entire invasion marked an important, durable change in European 
warfare.2 In his analysis of the impact of royal artillery on Italian fortifications, instead, Simon 
Pepper claimed the necessity to retain a “healthy skepticism” for its presumed 
accomplishments, effectively demonstrating that Charles VIII did not make his way through the 
Peninsula thanks to his ordnance.3 Kelly deVries and Robert Douglas Smith have agreed with 
this opinion, highlighting, moreover, that king’s guns were very, very far from being 
“revolutionary.”4 
Beyond the considerations about the effects of French weapons on the developments of 
bastioned fortifications, however, a study on the assimilation of the new technology in Italy is 
1 Bert Hall, Weapons and warfare in Renaissance Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997), 158; Jean-François Belhoste, “Nascita e sviluppo dell’artiglieria in Europa,” in Il 
rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, III. Produzione e tecniche, ed. Philippe Braunstein and Luca Molà 
(Treviso: Angelo Colla Editore, 2007), 326-327; Raffaele Puddu, Eserciti e monarchie nazionali nei secoli 
quindicesimo e sedicesimo (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1975), 47-49; Manlio Calegari, “La mano sul 
cannone,” in Pratiche e linguaggi. Contributi a una storia della cultura tecnica e scientifica, ed. Luciana 
Gatti (Pisa: ETS, 2005), 61-62; Bertrand Gille, Leonardo e gli ingegneri del Rinascimento, trans. from the 
1964 French edition by Adriano Carugo (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1972), 40-41 and 243-244; John Hale, Guerra e 
società nell’Europa del Rinascimento, trans. from the 1984 English edition by Franco Salvatorelli (Rome 
and Bari: Laterza, 1987), 43. 
2 Geoffrey Parker, La rivoluzione militare. Le innovazioni militari e il sorgere dell’Occidente, trans. 
from the 1996 English edition by Gianfranco Ceccarelli and Natalia Seri (Bologna: il Mulino, 2005), 27-28. 
3 Simon Pepper, “Castles and cannon in the Naples campaign of 1494–95,” in The French descent into 
Renaissance Italy, 1494-1495. Antecedents and effects, ed. David Abulafia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995), 
265. 
4 Kelly deVries and Robert Douglas Smith, The artillery of the dukes of Burgundy (Woodbridge: The 
Boydell Press, 2005), 42-44. 
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still missing, as well as a comparison between the French royal artillery and the actual, 
traditional, Italian bombards of the late fifteenth century. Besides, a comprehensive survey of 
Italian Renaissance artillery has not been undertaken since the beginnings of the last century.5 
The early works of Angelo Angelucci and Cesare Quarenghi date back even to the second half 
of the nineteenth century.6 Only in the last decades historians and archaeologists have focused 
on the production and the management of firearms. Walter Panciera, for example, has studied 
the influence of Venetian institutions on the manufacture of ordnance and gunpowder during 
the sixteenth century. Carlo Beltrame, Renato Ridella, and Marco Morin have analyzed 
shipwrecked sea ordnance for the same century. Manlio Calegari examined how the Ferrarese 
dukes tried to foster the fabrication of ammunitions in their ironworks over the Apennines.7 
In any case, a general disinterest has affected the investigation of Italian war production in 
the Late Middle Ages. The workshops of smiths, the practices of gunmakers, have been 
frequently ignored by economic and military historians.8 Almost nothing is known about the 
trades of metals.9 Also the commerce of saltpeter have been scarcely considered by scholars, 
along with a noteworthy second-hand market in materiel.10 Only the luxurious and fascinating 
masterpieces of the renowned Lombard armorers seem to have attracted the attention of art 
historians. The various articulations and regulations of this manufacture were partially 
explored by Silvio Leydi, analyzing the exports of Milanese arms during the sixteenth century. 
5 Carlo Montù, Storia dell’artiglieria italiana (Rome: Rivista d’Artiglieria e Genio, 1934). 
6 Angelo Angelucci, Documenti inediti per la storia delle armi da fuoco italiane (Turin: Tipografia 
Cassone, 1869); Cesare Quarenghi, “Tecno-cronografia delle armi da fuoco italiane”, Atti del regio 
istituto d’incoraggiamento alle scienze naturali, economiche e tecnologiche di Napoli 17 (1880): 53-295. 
7 Walter Panciera, Il governo delle artiglierie. Tecnologia bellica e istituzioni veneziane nel secondo 
Cinquecento (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2005); Renato Ridella, Fonditori italiani di artiglierie in trasferta 
nell’Europa del XVI secolo. In Storie di armi, ed. Nicola Labanca and Pier Paolo Poggio (Milan: Unicopli, 
2009); Renato Ridella, “Produzione di artiglierie nel sedicesimo secolo. I fonditori genovesi Battista 
Merello e Dorino II Gioardi,” in Pratiche e linguaggi. Contributi a una storia della cultura tecnica e 
scientifica (Pisa: ETS, 2005); Carlo Beltrame and Renato Ridella, Ships and guns. The sea ordnance in 
Venice and Europe between the 15th and 17th century(Oxford and Oakville: Oxbow books, 2011); Carlo 
Beltrame and Marco Morin, I cannoni di Venezia. Artiglierie della Serenissima da fortezze e relitti 
(Florence: All’Insegna del Giglio, 2013). 
8 William Caferro, “Warfare and economy in Renaissance Italy,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 39, no. 2 (2008); Richard Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, 400-401; Enrico 
Stumpo, “La finanza di guerra negli antichi stati italiani,” in Storia economica della guerra,ed. Catia 
Eliana Gentilucci (Rome: Società Italiana di Storia Militare, 2008), 196. 
9 Enzo Baraldi, “La siderurgia In Italia dal XII al XVII secolo,” in La civiltà del ferro. Dalla preistoria al 
terzo millennio, ed. Walter Nicodemi (Milan: Olivares, 2004). 
10 Silvia Bianchessi, “Cavalli, armi e salnitro fra Milano e Napoli nel secondo Quattrocento,” Nuova 
Rivista Storica 52, n. 3 (1998). 
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Mario Scalini, moreover, has dedicated several essays to Tuscan artifacts, as sword, cuirasses, 
and helmets.11 
Military technology, instead, has been seen as “the key driving force behind the nature 
of Medieval warfare.” Innovation has been considered a cause, or a consequence, of political 
and social transformations. Deterministic and interdependent changes in technique have 
become the engines of several, so-called “revolutions.”12 The purpose of this article, however, 
it is not an investigation of similar, undefined, questionable repercussions in the long term. It 
aims to examine the premises of a rapid technological assimilation, the immediate 
introduction of French pattern into Italian warfare, the coexistence of older and latest heavy 
weapons, as well as the actuality of a lively and reactive war-related industry in Renaissance 
Italy, aware of new ideas and new practices. Above all, this paper wants to suggest new 
archival researches, indispensable for comprehending the structure and the dimensions of this 
business, and for knowing its political connections, its commercial links, and its protagonists. 
 
The primary and secondary sources used for this research are numerous. The analysis of 
such different, variegated documents was necessary to understand roles, uses and 
developments of technology in its actual context. The various, contemporary description of 
French cannons, the first impressions of Italian writers and statesmen, and the following 
diffusion of cannons in the whole Peninsula, for example, have been analyzed through more 
than thirty Roman, Genoese, Sienese, Venetian, and Neapolitan chronicles. These diaries were 
mostly published in the anthologies of the Rerum Italicarum Scriptores between the 
eighteenth and the twentieth century. Several critical editions of documents, in addition, have 
been useful for the study of the circulation of ideas, products, and craftsmen, and the 
production of firearms in the Italian fifteenth century. 
Florentine case has been examined in depth, thanks to the abundant handwritten 
material kept in the local state archive, in the National Central Library and in the Innocenti 
11 Stuart Pyhrr, José Godoy, and Silvio Leydi, Heroic armor of the Italian Renaissance. Filippo Negroli 
and his contemporaries (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1998); Luciana Frangioni, “Aspetti 
della produzione delle armi milanesi nel XV secolo,” in Milano nell’età di Ludovico il Moro (Milan: Il 
comune, 1983); Mario Scalini, “L’armatura fiorentina del Quattrocento e la produzione d’armi in 
Toscana,” in Guerra e guerrieri nella Toscana del Rinascimento, ed. Franco Cardini and Marco 
Tangheroni (Florence: EDIFIR, 1990). 
12 Kelly DeVries, Medieval military technology (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1992), 95-122; Hall, 
Weapons and warfare in Renaissance Europe, 201-235; Parker, La rivoluzione militare, 11-16; John 
Stone, “Technology, society, and the infantry revolution of the fourteenth century,” The Journal of 
Military History 68, no. 2 (2004): 361-367. 
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Institute. Despite the “orthodoxy” of a warlike decadence,13 the registers of the Florentine 
military institutions, the Dieci di Balìa and the Otto di Pratica, have offered the opportunity to 
highlight the leading role of the public demand in the production of weapons and in the 
introduction of technical innovations. The bookkeeping of the most important Florentine 
gunmakers, moreover, permitted to deal with their actual bronze works and to analyze the 
developments of Tuscan artillery in the second half of the fifteenth century.  
 
The production of Italian bombards 
 
By the mid of the fifteenth century, Italian regional states seemed to have enhanced their 
management of artillery, often pursuing a policy of general reform of their military 
institutions.14 While dukes, kings, and popes entrusted their fates to permanent forces, guns, 
in fact, were becoming more prominent in warfare, and especially in sieges.15 Traditional, 
medieval machinery, as catapults and trebuchets, was slowly disappearing from battlefields, 
even thought they were still assembled and positioned under the walls of Lucca, Manfredonia, 
Genoa, and Volterra.16 Gunpowder, instead, was influencing tactics and logistics, radically 
13 Claudio Finzi, “La guerra nel pensiero politico del Rinascimento toscano,” in Guerra e guerrieri 
nella Toscana del Rinascimento, ed. Franco Cardini and Marco Tangheroni (Florence: EDIFIR, 1990), 141; 
Michael Mallett, Signori e mercenari. La guerra nell’Italia del Rinascimento, trans. from the 1974 English 
edition by Alghisi Princivalle (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006), 134-136; Stephen Epstein, “Storia economica e 
storia istituzionale dello stato,”in Origini dello stato. Processi di formazione statale in Italia fra medioevo 
ed età moderna, ed. Giorgio Chittolini, Anthony Molho, and Pierangelo Schiera (Bologna: il Mulino, 
1994), 108-109; William Caferro, “Continuity, long-term service and permanent forces: a reassessment 
of the Florentine army in the fourteenth century,” The Journal of Modern History 80, no. 2 (June 2008): 
219-251. 
14 Francesco Storti, L’esercito napoletano nella seconda metà del Quattrocento (Salerno: Laveglia, 
2007); Maria Nadia Covini, L’esercito del duca: organizzazione militare e istituzioni al tempo degli Sforza, 
1450-1480 (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medioevo, 1998); Michael Mallett, L’organizzazione 
militare di Venezia nel Quattrocento, trans. from the 1984 English edition by Enrico Basaglia (Rome: 
Jouvence, 1989). A survey of Italian recent studies has been proposed by Claudio Donati,“Strutture 
militari degli Stati Italiani nella prima età moderna: una rassegna degli studi recenti,” in Società Italiana 
di Storia Militare. Quaderno 2000, ed. Piero Del Negro (Rome: Edizione Scientifiche Italiane, 2003), 45-
62, and Luciano Pezzolo, “La ‘rivoluzione militare’. Una prospettiva italiana,” in Militari in Età Moderna. 
La centralità di un tema di confine, ed. Alessandra Dattero and Stefano Levati (Milan: Cesalpino, 2006), 
32-59. 
15 Mallett, Signori e mercenari, 94-120 and 164-168; Luciano Pezzolo, “La ‘rivoluzione militare’,” 24. 
16 Aldo Settia, Rapine, assedi, battaglie. La guerra nel Medioevo (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 2009), 130. 
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changing the conduct and the character of campaigns.17 Above all, in the medium term and in 
the long run, firearms were affecting the costs of warfare, increasing the expenditures on 
soldiers, personnel, training, equipment, ammunitions, and fortifications.18 
Military institutions invested considerable sums in the defense of their borders and in 
the supplying of their troops.19 The constant purchases of ordnance, hand cannons, powder, 
metals, arms and armor, crossbows and arrows, as well as the construction of arsenals and 
furnaces, stimulated a lively and reactive war related industry, connecting the “control over 
manufacture” with the “government of artillery”.20 In this market, the public demand played 
an important, leading role. States fostered technological improvements, promoted the 
introduction and the diffusion of innovative tools, and created opportunities for commerce 
and production. At the same time, war mobilized money, scientific and technical resources, 
engineers and artisans. Officials and condottieri needed a vast number of craftsmen for 
achieving their aims, a “small army” of practitioners, as blacksmiths, experts in bronze casting, 
gunpowder makers, producers of saltpeter, carpenters, stone-cutters, transporters, and many 
others.21 
17 John Hale, “Gunpowder and the Renaissance,” in ID., Renaissance War Studies (London: The 
Hambledon Press, 1983), 390-391.  
18 Caferro, “Warfare and economy in Renaissance Italy:” 177; Hale, Guerra e società nell’Europa del 
Rinascimento, 41-47.  
19 Silvio Leydi, “Le armi,” in Il rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, IV. Commercio e cultura mercantile, 
ed. Franco Franceschi, Richard Goldthwaite, and Reinhold Mueller (Treviso: Angelo Colla Editore, 2007); 
Fabrizio Ansani “Craftsmen, artillery, and war production in Renaissance Florence,” Vulcan. The 
international journal for the social history of military technology 4 (2016); Bianchessi, “Cavalli, armi e 
salnitro fra Milano e Napoli nel secondo Quattrocento;” Marco Merlo, “Armamenti e gestione 
dell’esercito a Siena nell’età dei Petrucci. Le armi,” Rivista di Studi Militari 5 (2016); Pamela Long, 
Artisans, practitioners and the rise of the new sciences (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2011), 
96-100. 
20 Panciera, Il governo delle artiglierie. Tecnologia bellica e istituzioni veneziane nel secondo 
Cinquecento; Sergio Tognetti, “Il governo delle manifatture nella Toscana del tardo Medioevo,” in Il 
governo dell’economia. Italia e penisola iberica nel basso Medioevo, ed. Lorenzo Tanzini and Sergio 
Tognetti (Rome: Viella, 2014), 310-330; Fabrizio Ansani, “Geografie della guerra nella Toscana del 
Rinascimento. Produzione di armi e circolazione dei pratici,” Archivio Storico Italiano 651 (2017): 116-
117. 
21 Enzo Baraldi, “Una nuova età del ferro,” in Il rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, III. Produzione e 
tecniche, 214-216; Luca Molà, “Il mercato delle innovazioni,” in Le techniciens dans la cité en Europe 
occidentale, 1250-1650, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Pierre Monnet (Rome: École française de Rome, 2004), 
215-222; Cipolla, Tecnica, società e cultura. Alle origini della supremazia tecnologia dell’Europa 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 1989), 10. 
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The diffusion and the affirmation of artillery, moreover, triggered off a continuous 
experimentation in their production. Established procedures and accustomed methods 
underwent several modifications since the second quarter of the century. 22 Gunmakers 
improved their pieces by a long series of empirical attempts that required observations, 
intuitions, and trials, and errors.23 Several military engineers reflected upon the correlation 
between the length and the thickness of guns and the weight of their ammunitions and of their 
charge.24 
Gradual, interdependent innovations concerned several features of the pieces. Their 
propellant, for example, the black powder, was made granular, “corned”, and it was more 
powerful and more durable than the traditional, “mealed” one.25 Stone shot, also, was 
substituted by lead projectiles in the usage of small firearms and hand cannons. At the same 
time, craftsmen tried new designs and new materials for their guns. Barrels became longer, in 
order to increase the range of shot. Cast iron was tested for fabricating heavy ordnance. The 
outcomes, however, were scarce.26 In the course of a decade, gunmakers preferred bronze to 
the cast iron. This was due to a number of reasons. First of all, the casting of bronze could rely 
on the solid, secular tradition of bell makers and artists. Moreover, bronze allowed the 
production of single piece guns, or the introduction of a nut and screw system for connecting 
the two, or three, or four barrels of heavy artillery. Thanks to these innovations, ordnance 
could better contain the explosion of larger powder charges, diminishing the risks for gunners, 
servants, and sappers. Finally, a bronze broken gun could be remelted, and the metal reused 
for the substitution of damage sections, or even the manufacture of new firearms.27 
 
22 Belhoste, “Nascita e sviluppo dell’artiglieria in Europa,” 325-342. 
23 Gille, Leonardo e gli ingegneri del Rinascimento, 243-246. 
24 Andrea Bernardoni, “Le artiglierie nella riflessione scientifica degli ingegneri del Rinascimento,” 
Quaderni Storici 130, no. 1 (2008): 9-10. 
25 Hall, Weapons and warfare in Renaissance Europe, 67-95; Walter Panciera, “La polvere da sparo,” 
in Il rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, III. Produzione e tecniche, 307-315. 
26 An unique cast iron bombard was tested in Florence in 1430s. Milanese gunmakers tried to realize 
a similar gun in 1470s. See: Ansani “Craftsmen, artillery, and war production in Renaissance Florence,” 7; 
Luca Beltrami, “Le bombarde milanesi a Genova nel 1464,” Archivio Storico Lombardo 4, no. 4 (1887): 
798-799; Ridella, “Produzione di artiglierie nel sedicesimo secolo,” 81-82. 
27 John Guilmartin, Gunpowder and galleys. Changing technology and Mediterranean warfare at sea 
in the 16th century. (London: Conway Maritime Press, 2003), 305-313; Belhoste, “Nascita e sviluppo 
dell’artiglieria in Europa,” 330-333; Renato Ridella, “L’evoluzione strutturale nelle artiglierie di bronzo in 
Italia fra XV e XVII secolo,” in I cannoni di Venezia, 15-16. 
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In the second half of fifteenth century, these technical progresses had already 
emerged in Italy. Forging gradually came to be used only for light pieces. Giant bronze 
bombards were rapidly replacing older, smithy ones, while thousand tons of copper and tin 
were now stored in arsenals and warehouses.28 In the South, already in 1430s, during the war 
with Angevines, Alfonso the Magnanimous tried to improve the fabrication, the administration 
and the use of ordnance. According to the records of the Aragonese chancery, the king 
acquired bombards from Spanish merchants, hired Catalan gunners and Italian gunmakers, and 
started the production of the new corned powder in his territories of Campania and Puglia.29 
Before and after the conquest of Naples, in 1442, Alfonso appointed Pietro dell’Ortigna, 
Dalmao Delentorn and Alessandro Moragnes as captains of artillery, giving them the 
responsibility to buy saltpeter, sulfur, coal, lead, copper, tin, and other raw materials.30 Along 
with these officials, several foreign gunmakers worked in Neapolitan foundries, as Giovanni 
from Germany, Bartolomeo from Milan, Pietro from Perugia, Giordano from Savoy, and other 
Genoese and Sicilian artisans.31 In the arsenal of the Castel Nuovo and in the shipyard, this 
labor realized dozens of bronze guns. According to the contemporary chronicler Bartolomeo 
Facio, Alfonso had at his disposal “lots of admirable bronze firearms of various size.”32 The 
army and the fleet were also supplied with iron pieces.33 
In 1465, king Ferrante ordered the construction of a new arsenal in the capital.34 Nine 
years later, he commissioned Giosuè Cantelmo, a painter, to depict the ordnances stored in 
the royal armory. The result was a book containing the drawings of one hundred and thirty-
seven pieces, among bombards and cerbottane.35 The importance of artillery for the warlike 
28 Fabrizio Ansani, “The life of a Renaissance gunmaker. Bonaccorso Ghiberti and the development of 
Florentine artillery in the late fifteenth century,” Technology and Culture 58, no. 3 (2017): 756-759. 
29 Anonymous, “Diario napoletano,” in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, XXI., ed. Ludovico Antonio 
Muratori (Milan: Tipografia della Società Palatina, 1732), 1113. 
30 Camillo Minieri Riccio, “Alcuni fatti di Alfonso I d’Aragona dal quindici aprile 1437 al trentuno di 
maggio 1458,” Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane 6, no. 2 (1881): 242 and 245. 
31 Renato Ridella, “Fonditori italiani di artiglierie in trasferta nell’Europa del XVI secolo,” in Storie di 
armi, ed. Nicola Labanca and Pier Paolo Poggio (Milan: UNICOPLI, 2009), 19-20. 
32 Bartolomeo Facio, De rebus gestis ab Alphonso primo Neapolitanorum rege commentariorum libri 
decem (Lyon: Apud haeredes Sebastianii Gryphii, 1560), 296. 
33 Minieri Riccio, “Alcuni fatti di Alfonso I d’Aragona,” 424. 
34 Nicola Barone, “Le cedole di tesoreria dell’Archivio di Stato di Napoli dall’anno 1460 al 1504,” 
Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane 9, no. 1 (1884): 32 
35 Nicola Barone, “Le cedole di tesoreria dell’Archivio di Stato di Napoli dall’anno 1460 al 1504,” 
Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane 9, no. 3 (1884): 400. The current English translation for 
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ruler of the Neapolitan kingdom was underlined also by Diomede Carafa in his Memoriale, a 
memoir written for Alfonso, duke of Calabria and captain of the Neapolitan army.36 
 
As it can be seen, guns bring honor, and those who delight in artillery are 
wise and distinguished. Sometimes, a cerbottana, or a bombard, complete 
tasks that a thousand men cannot undertake. In a battle, or during a siege, 
ordnance accomplishes very much. Just four cerbottane can put a squadron 
to flight, or kill sheltered defenders, or destroy battlements. Therefore, it 
would be good to have numerous pieces and skilled gunners. 
 
Another courtier, Orso Orsini, in his treatise on the command and the drill of the militia, 
advised his prince to supply the troops with, at least, two hundred cerbottane and two 
bombards.37 Years later, even the Venetian chronicler Marino Sanudo was impressed by the 
Neapolitan arsenal.38 
 
The royal arsenal was divided in three warehouses. Beautiful armor for 
mounted knights were stored in the first depot. Another one contained 
cuirasses and crossbows. In the third armory there were eight heavy bronze 
bombards and two large cerbottane, and a lot of breastplates for 
infantrymen, and numerous iron bombards for fortresses and galleys. Those 
weapons were kept inside the Castel Nuovo. 
 
It is likely that, among those bombards, laid also the Neapolitana. It was a masterpiece of 
engineering, a giant bombard of four pieces, realized with nine thousand and two hundred 
kilograms of bronze, loaded with a stone shot of one hundred and thirty kilograms,39 finely 
inlaid with heraldic symbols.40 His creator was the French master Guglielmo dello Monaco, the 
foreman of the Neapolitan arsenals and the most important bronze worker of the Aragonese 
cerbottana is “blowgun.” During Renaissance, the term indicated a gun with a long barrel and a small 
caliber. 
36 Diomede Carafa, Memoriali , ed. Franca Petrucci Nardelli (Rome: Bonacci, 1988), 343. 
37 BNF, Départment des manuscrits, Italien 958, 4v and 15v. 
38 Marin Sanudo, La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia, ed. Rinaldo Fulin (Venice: Tipografia del 
Commercio, 1883), 238. 
39 All the medieval measures of mass and length, as the Neapolitan libbra, the Florentine braccio, the 
Milanese rubbo, the Ferrarese piede, and so on, have been converted into standard units of the 
international metric system.  
40 Francesco Storti, “Note e riflessioni sulle tecniche ossidionali del secolo quindicesimo,” in Diano e 
l’assedio del 1497, ed. Carmine Carlone (Battipaglia: Laveglia, 2010), 253; Alan Ryder,The Kingdom of 
Naples under Alfonso the Magnanimous. The making of a modern state (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 
280.  
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period. From 1452 to 1470, he was entrusted by sovereigns with casting firearms, clocks, bells, 
medals, and even with the planning and the realization of the beautiful, imposing gates of 
Castel Nuovo.41 
Also in Milan engineers collaborated with the dukes on the management of artillery. 
Bartolomeo Gadio, for example, was the “overseer of the ammunitions,” the responsible for 
the purchase and the transport of weapons. In 1472, he supervised, along with two other 
gunmakers, Dainese Maineri and Maffeo from Como, the casting of the Galeozesca Vittoriosa. 
This enormous bronze bombard weighed more than eight tons, and could fire more than two 
hundred kilograms of stone.42 It was not the only heavy gun stored in the state warehouses of 
Pavia and Milan. For the campaign in Liguria, in 1464, Francesco Sforza sent two other bronze 
bombards, the Corona and the Bissona, and the cast iron Liona. These firearms were fabricated 
by Francesco Bianco, a Genoese master, and had a shot weight from ninety to one hundred 
and thirty kilograms.43 In 1470s, the ducal ordnance was composed, moreover, of two small 
bombards, called rofianelle, and two medium sized ferline, the latter named after their 
manufacturer, the “excellent engineer” Ferlino from Chieri.44 
Ferlino acquired this reputation at the courts of Savoy and Milan. In 1452, he was also in 
Venice. Here, he cast a couple of firearms in the renowned city Arsenal, before opening his 
personal workshop in the district of Castello. Around 1460, also Antonio di Conti started to 
work in Calle della Tana.45 Among shipyards and armories, Italian and German masters 
experimented new techniques and innovated instruments and products. Under the supervision 
of the “heads of gunners,” Venetian artisans experimented new shots, different carts, and 
original shapes for small pieces. The workshop of the Most Serene Republic, therefore, 
became attractive as to apprentices as to skilled and famous engineers, like Bartolomeo from 
Cremona and Sigismondo Alberghetti.46 
41 Felicita de Negri, “Dello Monaco, Guglielmo,” in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, XXXVIII. (Rome: 
Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1990); Joana Barreto, “Artisan ou artiste entre France et Italie? Le cas 
de Guglielmo Monaco à la cour de Naples au XVe siècle,” Laboratoire italien. Politique et société 11 
(2011). 
42 Belhoste, “Nascita e sviluppo dell’artiglieria in Europa,” 331. 
43  Beltrami, “Le bombarde milanesi a Genova nel 1464,” 798-799; Carlo Visconti, “L’ordine 
dell’esercito ducale sforzesco,” Archivio Storico Lombardo 3, no. 3 (1876): 469-472. 
44 Giovanni Simonetta, Historie delle memorabili et magnanime imprese fatto dallo invittissimo 
Francesco Sforza (Venice: Al segno dil Pozzo, 1544), 329r. 
45 Panciera, Il governo delle artiglierie, 163.  
46 Mallett, L’organizzazione militare di Venezia nel Quattrocento, 110-114 
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Other minor states provided to secure their future with the fusion of copper and tin. In 
1450, in Urbino, Federico from Montefeltro engaged Maso di Bartolomeo and other Florentine 
gunmakers for his “house of bombards.” The famous condottiere spent more than five 
hundred florins on two heavy pieces, weighed respectively three hundred and thirty kilograms 
and four tons.47 Ludovico II Gonzaga, marquis of Mantua, contacted various Italian chancery in 
order to find labor for the casting of new heavy bombards.48 Ercole d’Este, instead, raised a 
metallic wall for protecting Ferrarese borders against Venetian troops.49 During the Salt War, 
in 1482, the duke confiscated even one hundred and fifty bells for the making of passavolanti, 
harquebuses, and other small bronze firearms.50 
In Tuscany, the Sienese commune hired master Agostino from Piacenza in 1453. In the 
workshop of the town hall, the Lombard artisan fabricated several heavy bronze bombards, 
immediately used against the count Aldobrandino Orsini. In that campaign, however, Sienese 
officers complained about the delay of the supplies and the excessive number of “old” and 
“useless” iron bombards.51 During the following decades, the Tuscan republic attempted to 
increase the production of pieces. In 1468, the city council put a tax for financing the purchase 
of metals and the cast of two new guns, entrusted to the master Giovanni from Zagreb.52 
 
It would be dishonorable, for your lordships, to own only two bombards, 
considering that even ten would not be too many, and that the Republic 
could gain a reputation for them […]. It would be useful, then, if citizens 
could pay at least one ducat for every public pardon, entrusting the 
collection to the treasurer of the Concistoro […], and earmarking this sum to 
fabricate bombards […]. These firearms would be exclusively commissioned 
by the Nove della Guardia […], and it would be forbidden to spend this 
income for everything else. 
 
47 BNCF, Baldovinetti, 70, 7r and 22r. 
48 Giampaolo Ermini, “Campane e cannoni. Agostino da Piacenza e Giovanni da Zagabria: un 
fonditore padano e uno schiavone nella Siena del Quattrocento,” in L’industria artistica del bronzo del 
Rinascimento a Venezia e nell’Italia settentrionale, ed. Matteo Ceriana and Victoria Avery (Verona: 
Scripta, 2008), 397. 
49 Calegari, “La mano sul cannone,” 63. 
50 Marin Sanudo, Commentarii della guerra di Ferrara tra li Viniziani e il duca Ercole d’Este, ed. 
Leonardo Manin (Venice: Co’ tipi di Giuseppe Picotti, 1829), 46. The word passavolante derived from the 
combination of the past participles of the two Italian verbs passare and volare, that is, “to pass” and “to 
fly.” In the fifteenth century, the term indicated a gun with a long barrel and a small bore.  
51 Ermini, “Campane e cannoni,” 391-401. 
52 ASSI, Concistoro, 2556; ASSI, Concistoro, 2557, 1r. 
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In spite of this efforts, the Sienese army was still using an iron bombard for the sieges of the 
Florentine border towns of Castellina, Radda, Brolio, Cacchiano, and Monte San Savino, in 
1478. The next year, however, after the unexpected and decisive victory of Poggio Imperiale, 
many bronze firearms were plundered from enemy encampment.53 Moreover, Pietro di 
Niccolò Campana cast a giant weapon of two pieces, three and a half meters long, weighed 
eight and a half tons, loaded with one hundred kilograms of stone.54 At the end of the Pazzi’s 
war, Piazza del Campo seemed a “bronze mountain, with twenty-two bombards displayed in 
front of the palace.”55 
In 1479, even a “papal bombard” arrived in this main square, dismantled in two pieces, 
and followed by several stones of one hundred and fifteen kilograms.56 In those years, pontiffs 
were extremely attentive to the development of their ordnance, and the increase of their 
number. In 1462, Agostino from Piacenza, “distinguished artisan,” cast three heavy guns for 
Pius II, the Silvia, the Vittoria and the Enea,57 in which “there is such strength that no wall, 
whatever its thickness, can resist.”58 Paul II invited many German gunmakers in the Roman 
foundries. From 1464 to 1471, Conrad from Stuttgart and William from Nuremberg were 
employed by the Apostolic Camera as gunners and keepers of arsenals and fortresses.59 Also 
Sixtus IV ordered the production of several guns, decorated with the oak of his family, the 
Della Rovere. In 1482, the bronze Sistina Papale was named after the pope.60 Two years later, 
his holiness himself blessed the new ordnance, praying, wherever it went, for the rout of 
enemies.61 
 
53 Cristoforo Cantoni, “Cronaca senese,” ed. Alessadro Lisini and Fabio Iacometti, in Rerum Italicarum 
Scriptores, XV., 6., ed. Pietro Fedele (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1939), 880 
54 Allegretto Allegretti, “Diario senese,” in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, XXIII., ed. Ludovico Antonio 
Muratori (Milan: Tipografia della Società Palatina, 1733), 794. 
55 Angelucci, Documenti inediti per la storia delle armi da fuoco italiane, 561-562. 
56 Allegretti, “Diario,” 794. 
57 Ermini, “Campane e cannoni,” 397-398. 
58 Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Commentarii rerum memorabilium, quae temporibus suis contigerunt 
(Frankfurt: Officina Aubriana, 1614), 135 
59 Knut Schulz, “La migrazione di tecnici, artigiani e artisti,” in Il rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, III. 
Produzione e tecniche, 108-109. 
60 Gaspare Pontani, “Diario romano,” ed. Diomede Toni, in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, III., 2., ed. 
Giosuè Carducci and Vittorio Fiorini (Città di Castello: Lapi, 1908), 9 and 16. 
61 Stefano Infessura, Diario della città di Roma, ed. Oreste Tommasini (Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 
1890), 134.  
213
Once upon a time, saint apostles converted towns to faith and devotion with 
miracles, speeches, and the sign of the holy cross. Nowadays, cities were 
conquered with the shot of bombards and cerbottane, and with other 
machinery fitted for the battle. 
 
According to Antonio da Vasco, among these firearms were two “really heavy” bronze guns, 
two passavolanti, two cerbottane, and several iron “small bombards.”62 In his Diario, the 
chronicler mentioned also the private artillery of two of the most important Roman families, 
the Orsini and the Colonna.63 
In 1486, during the conflict with Sixtus, Nicola and Virginio Orsini requested a gunmaker 
from their Florentine allies. The Dieci di Balìa granted one of their principal gunmaker, 
Bonaccorso di Vettorio Ghiberti, the nephew of the illustrious Lorenzo di Cione.64 At that time, 
the Republic of Florence was undoubtedly in the vanguard of bronze castings. A decade of 
wars against Siena, Naples, Rome, and Genoa, in fact, was compelling military officers to 
accelerate the production of ordnance.65 The Medici bank multiplied the purchases of metal 
and saltpeter.66 The foundry of the Sapienza was opened in the capital, while other workshops 
were built in Pisa and in the border towns of Colle Val d’Elsa, Montepulciano, Sansepolcro, 
Pietrasanta, and Firenzuola.67 
Several craftsmen contributed to these developments. Already in 1452, Maso di 
Bartolomeo, better known as Masaccio, stored in Florentine arsenals five bronze heavy pieces. 
They were the Disperata, the Lionessa, the Tribolata, the small Perla, and the little Lucchese. 
Some months later, the “master of bombards” made also the Caccia Pazzia, the Vittoriosa and 
the Né patti né concordia. These firearms weighed from three kilograms to four tons, while 
their stone shot ranged in size from eight to one hundred kilograms.68 One of Masaccio’s 
apprentices, Pasquino di Matteo from Montepulciano, realized fifty-one spingards and several 
bombards in 1478, along with Alberghetto Alberghetti from Ferrara, Bonaccorso Ghiberti, 
Damiano di Giovanni and Brancazio di Guido. In the same year, after the Pazzi’s conspiracy, 
Lorenzo the Magnificent dispatched two of his personal bronze “small bombards” in Volterra. 
62 Antonio da Vasco, “Diario della città di Roma,” ed. Giuseppe Chiesa, in Rerum Italicarum 
Scriptores, XXIII., 3., ed. Giosuè Carducci and Vittorio Fiorini (Città di Castello: Lapi, 1908), 511. 
63 Ibid., 525 and 534. See also: Pontani, “Diario,” 30-31. 
64 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 9, 171v. 
65 Ansani, “Craftsmen, artillery, and war production,” 9-10. 
66 ASF, Otto di pratica, Munizioni, 1, 1v-59v. 
67 Ansani, “Geografie della guerra,” 88-98. 
68 BNCF, Baldovinetti, 70, 77v-112r. 
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Smiths, moreover, fabricated hundreds of hand cannons.69 The necessity of the war compelled 
Florentine masters to experiment also on mobile firearms, as several, innovative spingards 
“mounted on carts.”70 
In 1484, Pasquino crafted a bombard with a caliber of one hundred and thirty-five 
kilograms of stone.71 His former disciple, Andrea del Verrocchio, contemporaneously realized 
an enormous, beautiful gun of three pieces with seven thousand and eight hundred kilograms 
of bronze.72 Both firearms were used in the victorious siege of Pietrasanta. Alongside them, 
the army carried in Lunigiana two other heavy guns, the Fregosina and the Colombina, and an 
impressive bombard of four pieces, capable of firing two hundred and thirty kilograms of 
projectile.73 Another giant gun was cast in 1489 by Giovanni di Jacopo from Augsburg, the 
controller of the Pisan armory. His basilisk weighed more than five tons of bronze.74 
 
This incessant production, these continuous experimentations, and these frequent 
variations of shapes and dimensions, led also to theoretical elaborations and attempt of 
classifications. Leonardo da Vinci studied the casting methods, the recoil of cannons, the 
motion of projectiles, and the nature of gunpowder. Niccolò Tartaglia worked on hypothetical 
and actual problems, combining ballistics and mathematics.75 Francesco di Giorgio Martini 
tried to classify guns according to their length and to the weight of their shot, exalting, 
moreover, their superiority over ancient weapons. The ordnance listed in his treatise was 
actually produced across the whole Peninsula in the 1480s and 1490s. From the heavy 
bombards to the long basilisks, the Sienese engineer wrote down the characteristics, the 
length of barrels, the proportions of powder charges, and the calibers of all the “principal 
variety” of guns.76 
 
69 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 22, 14v, 17v and 32r. 
70 ASF, Otto di pratica, Missive, 5, 109v. 
71 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 27, 276r. 
72 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 30, 249v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 20, 
156v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 21, 122v e 146v. 
73 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 21, 148r and 162r. 
74 ASF, Otto di pratica, Munizioni, 1, 9v. 
75 Andrea Bernardoni, “La fusione delle artiglierie tra Medioevo e Rinascimento. ‘Cronaca’ di un 
rinnovamento tecnologico attraverso i manoscritti di Leonardo,” Cromohs 19 (2014): 106-116. 
76 Francesco di Giorgio Martini, Trattato di architettura civile e militare, ed. Cesare Saluzzo (Turin: 
Tipografia Chirio e Mina, 1841), 245-247. 
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The first is the bombarda, with a common length from four and a half to six 
meters. Its stone weighs roughly one hundred and two kilograms […]. The 
less the pieces of the gun, more will be its effectiveness […].  
The second is called mortaro, from one and a half to two meters long. It 
must be realized with a sole piece. Its stone weighs from seventy to one 
hundred kilograms […].  
The third is known as commune or mezzana, three meters long, and its 
stone weighs about seventeen kilograms.  
The fourth is named cortana. Its anterior barrel is two and a half meters 
long, and one meter is the measure for the posterior one. Its stone weighs 
from twenty to thirty-five kilograms.  
The fifth is the passavolante, and it is five and a half meters long. Its lead 
shot weighs five and a half kilograms.  
The sixth is called basilisco, with a length from six and a half to seven and 
half meters. Its shot weighs about seven kilograms, and it can be produced 
with any metal.  
The seventh is the cerbottana. It is long from two and a half to three meters. 
The lead shot weighs about one kilogram.  
The eighth is named spingarda. It is two and a half meters long, and it has a 
stone shot weighed from three and a half to five kilograms.  
 
In any case, this endeavor to classify and to rationalize firearms was merely theoretic. In 
everyday practice, these names could be attributed to other guns. A basilisk could be bigger 
even than a bombard, and a cerbottana and a passavolante could be the same thing.77 A 
Florentine contract, signed in January 1493 with the German master Giovanni from Augsburg, 
highlights these differences.78 
 
Master Giovanni should make and cast all the undermentioned guns, priced 
at seventy lire every three hundred and forty kilograms of molten metal. He 
would purchase tools at his expenses, and the Otto di Pratica would supply 
the raw material, according to custom. The weight loss of these castings 
should not exceed the seven percent.  
Every time he was requisitioned, master Giovanni should manufacture full 
bombarde grosse in one, or two, or three pieces, with a shot weight of one 
hundred and thirty-five kilograms or more. 
Then, half bombards, with a shot weight of sixty-seven kilograms or more, in 
one piece or more. 
Quarter bombards, thirty-three kilograms or more, in one piece or more. 
Eighth bombards, thirteen kilograms or more, in one piece or more. 
77 For an English nomenclature of late fifteenth-century Italian artillery, see: Pepper, “Castles and 
cannon in the Naples campaign of 1494–95,” 292-293. 
78 ASF, Otto di pratica, Deliberazioni, 5, 96v-97r. A Florentine lira was worth twenty soldi. Nine soldi 
corresponded approximately to the daily rate for unskilled workers during all the century. 
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Bombards for castles and city walls, from five to eight kilograms, in one 
piece or more. 
Passavolanti, cortaldi, basilischi, in one piece or more, with a lead or iron 
projectile weighed thirty-three kilograms or more. 
Half passavolanti, cortaldi and basilischi, from sixteen to thirty-three 
kilograms. 
Quarter passavolanti, from eight to sixteen kilograms. 
Serpentine, from one and a half to eight kilograms. 
Spingarde, from one and a half to two kilograms. 
Giovanni promise to the Otto to realized all these firearms honestly and 
loyally, like a skillful and capable craftsman. 
 
Narrations of the French ordnance 
 
In this lively context, during the late summer of 1494, appeared the French artillery of Charles 
VIII. Italian statesmen were aware of the force and the capabilities of this single piece, heavy 
bronze ordnance. Already in June 1492, the ambassador Zaccaria Contarini reported on royal 
firearms to the Venetian senate.79 
 
The king’s bombards fire about thirty kilograms of iron shot. They are 
mounted on small carts, and, thanks to an admirable system, they can shoot 
easily, without any other support. It is said that Charles had countless 
spingards on carts. French use these guns in two cases. When the 
encampment is positioned, the soldiers form these carts into an 
impregnable fortification. When the army besieges a city, or a castle, these 
pieces demolish walls much more smoothly and in less time than our heavy 
bombards. People said that more than thirty thousand horses were 
necessary for the transportation of the ordnance of Louis XI. Now, the 
monarch carries twelve thousand horses with him. 
 
This accurate judgment was successively reaffirmed and summarized by the Florentine agent 
in Lyon, Francesco della Casa, in June 1494.80 
 
French captains are speeding up the supplies for the fleet. Above all, they 
are moving a numerous and beautiful artillery. It is affirmed that this 
ordnance can raze fortresses and walls in a matter of hours, or in a few days, 
because of their unbroken bombardment. 
79 Le relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al senato, I., 4., ed. Eugenio Alberi (Florence: Società Editrice 
Fiorentina, 1860), 23. 
80 Négociations diplomatique de la France avec la Toscane, I., ed. Abel Desjardins and Giuseppe 
Canestrini (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1859), 311. 
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 On the next day, the worried diplomats Guidantonio Vespucci and Piero Capponi express to 
Piero de’ Medici their opinion on Gallic menace.81 
 
French are conveying to Italy, by sea and by land, a large number of guns, all 
mounted on carts. These firearms are not large in size, but they can fire an 
iron projectile ranged from thirty to one hundred kilograms. It is said that 
gunmakers thicken their breech and gradually narrow the barrel up to the 
muzzle, in order to make them stronger. The pieces have, in the middle of 
their barrel, two trunnions, with which they can be laid and fixed to their 
carts. Every gun has its cart, its gunners, its ammunitions, and its proper 
cartridges. When the army stay at camps, the carts are arranged to form a 
bulwark. When captains want to start a battle, instead, they approach the 
enemy and open fire on his troops, forcing him into fighting. During siege, 
gunners unyoke horses from the carts, turn cannons to the fortress, and 
move artillery little by little, up to the walls. Here, they crumble all the 
defenses, aiming thirty or forty guns against towers, embrasures, and so on. 
It is said that these guns can pierce four meters of stone. Although the 
breach is small, the multitude of shots smashes the walls. Gunners do not 
cease fire day nor night. They do not take rest from shelling. So, French do 
not doubt that they can conquest Leghorn in a single day, and Pisa in two. 
They also make fun of the fortifications of Ostia. A gunner, back from 
Naples, bets his head on seizing Castel Nuovo in just two days. Though 
French love to boast, Francesco della Casa and other Florentines narrate 
frightening stories about these firearms.  
 
The assertions of the Tuscan envoys were motivated not only by the military importance and 
the technical efficacy of French ordnance. The excellent organization of the royal artillery, in 
fact, the number of its officials and employees, the structure of its chain of command, had no 
parallel in contemporary Italian institutions. In Venice, for example, an “artillery supervisor” 
was established only ten years later.82 Beyond the Alps, on the contrary, Louis XI had started a 
serious reformation of his artillery corps already in 1470s.83 In 1494, on the eve of the invasion, 
the office was composed by two “grand masters” of artillery, Jean de La Grange and Guyot de 
Louviers, a lieutenant, a captain of trains, and several commissioner for the custody of 
gunpowder, metals, and tools. A treasurer, moreover, along with five commissioners and an 
inspector, was entrusted with the payments of raw materials and salaries.  
81 Ibid., 401-402. 
82 Panciera, Il governo delle artiglierie, 62-64. 
83 David Potter, Renaissance France at war. Armies, culture and society (Woodbridge: Boydell and 
Brewer, 2008), 152-157. 
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Soldiers and ordnance, instead, were subdivided into five permanent corps, the so-
called bandes, respectively posted in Lower and Eastern Brittany, Brabant, Western Flanders, 
and Normandy. Every regiment ordinary included dozens of carters, carpenters, smiths, 
sappers, and hundreds of horses. Gunmakers and gunners did general and regular 
maintenance, and cast new weapons. During wartimes, their captains could recruit 
supplementary, “extraordinary” servants, as pioneers, masons, adjutants, matrosses, and 
gunners. In all, the king could rely on more than one hundred and fifty heavy guns, not 
counting the pieces stored in the arsenals of French cities.84 
 
Towards Naples. The performances of the royal artillery 
 
Pepper demonstrated that, in the autumn of 1494, in Tuscany, the French army numbered 
about forty or fifty artillery pieces. French bulletins and Italian chronicles listed eight or nine 
cannons, four culverins, and at least thirty falcons.85 All these weapons were cast with a single 
piece of bronze. The cannons weighed from two to four tons, had a length from two and a half 
to three meters, and fired twenty-two kilograms of iron projectile. The culverins, instead, were 
one meter longer, slimmer, and loaded with thirteen kilograms of iron shot. Last, but not least, 
the small falcons shot four kilograms of lead, and, generally, weighed less than five hundred 
kilograms.86 
 The sight of this artillery impressed the most of Italians. Sebastiano Tedallini, a Roman 
priest, portrayed it as “the most beautiful ordnance of nowadays.”87 According to Marino 
Sanudo, the havoc caused by French “spingards” could be compared to the damages inflicted 
by an average, traditional bombard.88 Also the Sienese diarist Allegretto Allegretti call them 
84 Philippe Contamine, “L’artillerie royale française à la veille des guerres d’Italie,” Annales de 
Bretagne 71, no. 2 (1964): 221-261. 
85 Pepper, “Castles and cannons in Naples campaign,” 286-288. 
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(Venice: Per Comin da Trino di Monferrato, 1558), 79v-80r; Sanudo, La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia, 
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87 Sebastiano Tedallini,“Diario romano,” ed. Paolo Piccolomini, in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, XXIII., 
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“small bombards.”89 The difference between Italian and Ultramontane guns, however, was 
soon noticed by a Perugine humanist, Francesco Matarazzo.90 
 
The French firearms had unusual shapes, compared to our weapons. First of 
all, they were made with a single piece of bronze, and extremely long. Their 
shot could pass three meters of stone wall from one side to another. 
Moreover, these French pieces fired only iron balls, and they were called 
with original names. Transporters mounted them over two solid wheels, 
large or small, according to the weight of the gun. Carts were draft by 
horses. 
 
Around 1520, Paolo Giovio, reconstructing the scene of the passage of French army through 
Rome, narrate the fear and the astonishment provoked by the royal firearms.91 
 
More than thirty-six guns, mounted on carts, induced astonishment and 
fright among everyone. They were drawn by horses, at incredible velocity, 
over flat grounds and on slopes. The biggest of these, two and a half meters 
in length and two thousand kilograms of bronze in weight, were named 
cannons, and fired an iron ball as large as a man’s head. After them followed 
the culverins, half as long again, but with a narrower barrel and a smaller 
shot. Falcons of different dimensions ended the parade. The smallest of 
them threw a ball similar in size to an orange. All these pieces were buckled 
on two thick trunnions, with which gunners could aim at the target. Lighter 
ordnance was transported on two wheels. The carriages of heavier weapons 
had four. In this case, the two rear wheels could be removed or put for 
speeding up or slowing down the march. The pace of cavalry could even be 
equaled by carthorses, across plains, due to the tremendous skill of carters 
and masters. 
 
Another relevant description of these guns was made by Andrea Bernardi, a Forlivese barber, 
eyewitness to the French march in Romagna, during October and November 1494.92 
 
On Sunday, the French left Forli and pitched their tents in the village of San 
Martino and in its vicinity. Soldiers moved also all of their firearms […], that 
is, nineteen carts, except six heavy guns. The largest was a cast bronze 
89 Allegretti, “Diario,” 835. 
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91 Paolo Giovio, Le historie del suo tempo (Venice: Appresso Domenico de’ Farri, 1555), 59rv. 
92 Andrea Bernardi, “Cronache forlivesi dal 1476 al 1517,” I., 2., ed. Giuseppe Mazzatinti, in 
Monumenti istorici pertinenti alle provincie di Romagna (Bologna: Presso la Regia Deputazione di Storia 
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weapon. It was three meters long, and its bore was sixty centimeters wide. 
Two bombards had a medium size. The others were three massive 
passavolanti, all manufactured with a single piece of metal. The smallest of 
them fired an iron ball big as a round loaf. These firearms were mounted on 
carts. These vehicles had a robust axle that connected two well carved 
wheels, in order to shoot incessantly and without shelters. The wheels had 
solid bent spokes, and were strengthened with thick iron plates and nails. 
Their diameter measured ninety centimeters, and their width half a meter. 
The hub, where the spokes met, was metallic, and well proportioned, and 
twenty-five centimeters high and wide. A large number of horses drafted 
these carts. The first heavy bombard was shift by twenty-two beasts, tied 
two by two with ropes and halters, the latter covered with black leather […]. 
Al least sixteen animals drew the other carts […]. Gunners carried with them 
also powder and iron shots.  
 
At the end of the campaign, in August 1495, the Vicentine engineer Basilio della Scola reported 
to Venetian officers on the quality and the quantity of enemy artillery stored at that time in 
Vercelli. In the preceding year, he was one of the commander of French trains. His account of 
the various pieces is probably one of the most reliable, contemporary description of the royal 
artillery.93 
 
Five serpentine cannons, two and a half meters long, fire sixteen kilograms 
of iron ball. Four culverins, or passavolanti, from three and a half to four 
meters long, shoot a projectile of ten and a half kilograms. Fourteen falcons, 
similar to spingards, are long two meters, and are loaded with lead shots, 
weighed from four to five kilograms. 
 
On his way to Naples, however, Charles VIII rarely aimed his guns at Italian fortresses. 
Frequent reversal of alliances, tactical errors, popular rebellions, Milanese loans, ruthless 
violence, scarce resistance, and even a mystic aura facilitated his march toward the South. 
Only in five occasions the king had to lay siege to resistant castles, and his army was forced 
into battle just twice. The very first shots were fired by the French vessels during the 
encounter of Rapallo, in September 1494. 94  Philippe de Commines, in his Mémoires, 
remembered the massacre of Aragonese mercenaries carried out by the heavy artillery, 
“weapons never seen before” in the Peninsula.95 The pieces were then landed in the harbor of 
93 Sanudo, La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia, 559. 
94 Francesco Guicciardini, The history of Italy, I., trans. from the Italian edition by Austin Parke 
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La Spezia, in time to meet the terrestrial army at Florentine borders, in Lunigiana, while the 
enemy fleet withdrew from Liguria.96 
In Romagna, the Milanese captain Gaspare Sanseverino and the lieutenant Bérault 
Stuart, lord of Aubigny, had at their disposal at least twenty-two guns. These weapons were 
supervised by the “grand master” Jean de La Grange himself.97 According to Giovio, the 
veteran condottieri of the Neapolitan army feared “enormously” the new firearms.98 Their 
hesitations, however, allowed French to overawe the rulers of the region, including one of the 
most important allies of king Alfonso, Caterina Sforza.99 The duke of Calabria was powerless to 
intervene when his foes besieged Mordano, in mid October.100 
 
On Monday, the French soldiers left their encampment, and reached 
Mordano. They attacked the castle from morning until night, unceasingly. 
Their artillery wore down all the defenses that surrounded the walls. 
 
The town was sacked and burned.101 Nine days after, the village of Solarolo surrendered after a 
single, miss shot of a culverin.102 Consequently, the lady of Imola sided immediately with her 
former adversaries, granting them passage and provisions.103 
 
Then, the peoples of Italy, eager of novelties, began to embolden, noticing 
an extraordinary something never seen before. And that is, the easiness in 
transporting and handling a large amount of ordnance. At that time, French 
excelled in this exercise. 
 
In northern Tuscany, the march of the army halted in front of the fortifications of Sarzana and 
Sarzanello. Pepper affirmed that these two newly built citadels were “formidable 
strongholds.”104 Architecturally, the round corner bastions, the ravelins, the gun platforms, 
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99 Cecil Clough, “The Romagna campaign of 1494. A significant military encounter,” in The French 
descent into Renaissance Italy, 1494-1495. Antecedents and effects, 204-205. 
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and the wide ditches certainly made these fortresses more “modern” than hundreds of Italian 
castles. However, in that autumn, Florentine officers complained frequently about the lack of 
ammunition, food, soldiers, gunners, artillery, and other defenses. By the end of October, the 
commissioner Piero Tornabuoni lamented the scarcity of money, “and this shortage is 
dismaying everyone.” Several of his desperate letters reported the complete “disorder” of the 
garrison, and regretted, moreover, the disinterest of his superiors, in Florence.105 
Following the surrender of Piero de’ Medici and Alexander VI,106 Charles VIII proceeded 
rapidly towards Naples. According to Sanudo, “French do not draw their sword for fighting, but 
only for scaring.” Between Lazio and Campania, towns opened their gates to the invaders, 
lowering Aragonese flags and offering their devotion to the new monarch, “saint, fair, and 
conscientious man.” L’Aquila rebelled at the beginning of 1495. Angevin faction reemerged 
impetuously, while the whole kingdom was “burning.”107 
Only two castles opposed the relentless journey of the king. The “impregnable” 
fortifications of Montefortino was captured at the first assault.108 Sanudo made a mistake in 
denying the shelling of the stronghold,109 which towers collapsed, instead, under enemy fire.110 
 
The army moved the artillery near Montefortino. This fortress was fortified 
by nature and by human intelligence. Nonetheless, neither weapons nor 
walls could stop the Gallic onslaught and the force of their ordnance. These 
cannons were longer than Italian guns, and shot thirty kilograms of iron ball. 
All these pieces fired at the same time. In a few moments, a larger part of 
the walls was crumbled. Through the breach, French and Swiss entered the 
town, and massacred inhabitants and guards. 
 
Another bloodbath awaited Monte San Giovanni in the next days, on February. The mutilation 
of a French herald unleashed the Ultramontane anger upon the unfortunate village. Charles in 
105 ASF, Otto di pratica, Responsive, 10, 169r, 172r, 229r, 328r, 375r, 378r, 381rv, 417v 
106 Bartolomeo Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, ed. Giuliana Berti (Florence: Leo S. Olschi, 1994), 196-197 
and 224-225; Piero Parenti, Storia fiorentina, I., ed. Andrea Matucci (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1994), 113-
114 and 169-170; Sanudo, La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia, 106-107 and 183-186. 
107 Matarazzo, “Cronaca della città di Perugia,” 23; Sanudo, La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia, 154 
and 187;  
108 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 38, 121r; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, I., 177; de Commines, 
Croniques du roy Charles huptieme,16v.  
109 Sanudo, La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia, 207. 
110 Sigismondo de’ Conti, Storie dei suoi tempi dal 1475 al 1510, II., ed. Giacomo Racioppi (Florence: 
Tipografia Barbera, 1883), 102-103. 
223
person ordered its destruction. After eight hours of night shelling, and despite the rugged 
position of the fort, the infantry attacked the breach.111 No one escaped.112 
 
The garrison of Monte San Giovanni numbered three hundred men. Having 
confidence in the thickness of walls, and disbelieving the force of French 
artillery, they dared to harm the king’s emissary […]. This act inflamed the 
Gallic pride. Without any delay, soldiers assaulted the castle, driven by rage. 
In short, they charged in. Defenders were cut in pieces […]. The castle was 
sacked and burned. This bitterness terrified the surrounding villages. 
Considering the cruel fate of Mordano and Montefortino, everybody 
believed that neither barrier nor warriors could stand up to the French army 
and the fury of its artillery without severe damage. 
 
The massacres weakened the already crumbling Aragonese resistance. After the conquest of 
San Germano, the betrayal of Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, and the uprising of Capua, the march to 
Naples, in the mid February 1495, became a triumphal parade.113 
 
In the capital, the last Aragonese loyalists barricaded themselves in the Castel Nuovo, in 
the Castel dell’Ovo and in the Torre di San Vincenzo. Within twenty days, the three strongholds 
surrendered to the new sovereign. According to Pepper their sieges did not represent “the 
classic victory of new guns over old fortifications.”114 The Castel Nuovo, for example, did not 
suffer serious damage from French bombardment, even though the shortage of iron 
cannonballs and gunpowder prevented gunners from firing continuously and repeatedly.115 It 
is evident, however, that the attackers, thanks to their mobile ordnance, could threaten and 
conquest three fortified positions rapidly and successively. And it is a matter of fact, above all, 
that these cannons were already being assimilated into Italian warfare.  
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A comparison between “traditional” and “modern” heavy firearms 
 
In the day of Fornovo, in July 1495, the French artillery malfunctioned, most probably due to 
heavy rain.116 Cicognano from Castrocaro, an infantryman of the Italian league, witness of the 
battle, told his Forlivese friends that, if it were not for the bad weather, the Venetian army 
would be overwhelmed by the enemy shots.117 Several officers of the Most Serene Republic 
gave contrasting version of the initial phase of the encounter, now relating that firearms 
spared French a resounding defeat, now writing that adversaries lacked powder.118 Francesco 
Matarazzo, instead, reported that the all the pieces fired simultaneously, causing heavy 
casualties among men-at-arms and stunning many knights with a deafening noise.119 Philippe 
de Commines commented briefly that the king’s ordnance was undoubtedly superior to Italian 
guns, though neither the former nor the latter killed more than ten persons.120 
At that time, in any case, the royal artillery had already achieved the height of its fame. 
Italian rulers and mercenary captains were overly impressed by the Ultramontane siege 
strategy. The rapidity and the efficiency with which French gunners could move, aim, and fire 
their guns represented an absolute, frightening novelty. The practice of positioning numerous 
guns near the walls, the simultaneity of the explosions, the saturation bombardments, the use 
of iron cannonballs, and the immediate assaults were unprecedented in Italian Renaissance 
warfare.121 According to de Commines, Venetian senators were incredulous about the French 
way of seizing towns, which was simply “new, in Italy.”122 
In march 1486, the duke of Calabria and the Milanese condottiere Gian Giacomo 
Trivulzio required their Florentine allies to send several firearms towards their encampment, in 
Maremma. According to the two generals, the weapons were useful for acquiring reputation 
and scaring the surrounding villages. Moreover, they continually underlined that, without 
guns, every “insignificant hovel” could oppose resistance, slackening the operations.123 In 
reality, every well garrisoned town could suffer weeks of shelling. In 1479, despite its isolation, 
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Colle Val d’Elsa fiercely repelled Neapolitan and Sienese assaults, in spite of the menace of 
seven bombards.124 The fortress of Ficarolo drove back attackers for two months, during the 
Ferrarese war, before surrendering to Roberto Sanseverino.125 Genoese troops defended 
Pietrasanta, in 1484, for the an entire autumn.126 A bunch of Orsini loyalists controlled a 
fortified bridge for twenty days, mocking the papal soldier with the shots of their hand 
cannons.127 Eight heavy Florentine bombards did not subdue Sarzana, in 1487.128 
Time did not favor prolonged sieges. Armies abounded in deserters, especially when the 
wages arrived too late.129 The rigors of winter hindered marches, supplying, and plundering.130 
But the transportation of heavy, traditional bombards was certainly another major problems 
for commanders. Uneven roads were not suitable for the passage of giant, cumbersome 
machines. In May 1464, Milanese engineers had to organize the entire logistic of shifting of the 
Corona, the Bissona, and the Liona. The three weapons arrived in Genoa one month later, after 
a troubled journey, and with an exasperating pace of two kilometers a day.131 In 1468, king 
Ferrante had to hire dozens of smiths, carpenters, mule drivers, woodcutters and boatman for 
moving his artillery on the mountains of Abruzzo.132 On the way to Pisa, in June 1487, the 
wheels of two Florentine carriages sank into mud, driving the carters “in despair.”133 Several 
months before, the duke of Calabria waited for ten long days the allied bombards, the time 
required to cover the distance from Montepulciano to Montorio, a “difficult and wicked” 
travel.134 
The loans of ordnance highlights another aspect of the question. When the transport 
was impossible, or too much slower, republics and princes preferred to borrow firearms, and 
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engineers, and gunners from the other members of their leagues.135 Besides, only principal 
states could line up full trains of artillery.136 Bronze bombard were expensive, and raw 
materials were equally costly. 137 In 1484, the Florentine commune purchased, for one 
thousand and seven hundred lire, two hundred kilograms of second hand metal, collecting 
them from merchants, apothecaries, sculptors, ropemakers, iron scrap dealers. Besides, more 
than one hundred and a half kilograms of copper were bought from the company of Benedetto 
and Francesco di Tanai de’ Nerli, priced fifty-five florins each three hundred kilograms. Tin cost 
seventy-five florins every three hundred kilograms.138 Sienese officials paid similar sums for 
several consignments of Venetian bronze in 1470s.139 
Significant expenditures concerned also transports. In Tuscany, oxen, mules, donkey, 
horses, and carts were rented, and they drivers indemnified. During campaigns, the Dieci di 
Balìa could spend more than one thousand golden florins for these expenses.140 A large 
number of carriages was necessary for the shifting of every single dismantled piece of 
bombards and for the transportation of the indispensable accessories, as trestles, beds, 
ladders, and other wooden supports, frames, and mantlets.141 A Neapolitan treatise listed 
forty-eight carts exclusively for the shifting of all this equipment.142 For the reconquest of 
Otranto, in 1480, king Ferrante allocated two thousand ducats for the monthly pay of two 
hundred carts.143 A Milanese account for 1472 reported that the cost for the moving of eight 
heavy bombards and eight spingards amounted to one hundred and eighty-eight carts and 
four hundred and thirty-four pair of oxen.144 Nevertheless, not all the ordinary carts were 
suitable for bearing heavy loads. Florentine officers could not find any useful carriage in the 
Pisan countryside for carrying artillery in Lunigiana, in 1487. Engineers and “masters of carts” 
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were then commissioned to manufacture new carriages, made especially for bombards.145 
Three years before, in Arezzo, the same search was equally problematic.146 
The recurrent scarcity of pioneers complicated matters further. They were indispensable 
for repairing roads, for building shelters, for leveling the ground, for positioning the 
encampment. Moreover, they were employed in moving, planting, aiming, firing, and 
repositioning the giant firearms. The victory itself “consists in pioneers.”147 Without them, 
gunners could only twiddle their thumbs. The absence of this forced labor, or its lateness, 
could slow down an entire siege. Officials often lamented the daily desertions, the 
insubordinations, often caused by the brutal treatments of soldiers.148 
Consequently, bombards shot infrequently, not to mention the breakdowns, the 
shortage of ammunition and powder, the scarce quality of saltpeter, the errors of the gunners, 
and the enemy sorties. The Neapolitan heavy guns fired at an average rate of seven projectiles 
every twenty-four hours, during the siege of Otranto, in 1480.149 Florentine charges exploded 
ten times per day, or even less, under the walls of Pietrasanta, in 1487.150 But all those 
difficulties and complications compelled Italian captains to devise new solutions long before 
the French invasion. The necessity for more maneuverable pieces was expressed already in 
1477 by Orso Orsini.151 
 
During campaigns, I would supply the army with two bombards. The first 
should fire three hundred libbre of stone, and the second two hundred. Both 
these firearms should be made with one piece of bronze, and they should 
weight two and a half and one and a half tons, respectively. These weapons 
would be as effective as the guns of three pieces, which are heavier and 
cumbersome. Their breech should be eight centimeters thick, their muzzle 
four, and the bore should be strengthen with another metallic rim. The 
whole barrel should be reinforced and welded with forged iron hoops […]. 
Similar bombards were undoubtedly efficient, and could be planted and 
moved quickly.  
These guns should be used when the army is numerically disadvantaged. 
When the enemy is weaker, a captain could line up every sort of bombard, 
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including the awkward ones. In any case, less are the pieces of arms, more 
rapid is their positioning and their shifting, not requiring screwing and 
unscrewing, tying, and so on […]. 
The vehicles for their transport should be two very high carts, equipped with 
two robust, iron axles. The bombards should be positioned under these iron 
bars, so that they could be loaded easily. Indeed, they could not fall from 
the carriage[…]. Thirteen pairs of oxen should be sufficient for dragging 
these carts. 
 
The Neapolitan commander suggested also the use of standardized light firearms, identical in 
size, caliber, and charge, “so that every single gunner could manage each of them.”152 In 1467, 
the famous condottiere Bartolomeo Colleoni introduced spingards mounted on carts into 
Italian battlefields, an experimentation replied in Florence and Venice during the following 
decades.153 
 
French innovations, in 1494, fitted perfectly all of these Italian issues. The drastic 
diminution of weight, for example, affected production and transportation. 154  The 
manufacture of heavy guns did not require anymore thousands and thousands kilograms of 
expensive bronze. With the same quantity of metal, a gunmaker could manufacture at least 
two cannons, or several culverins, all cast in single, safer, handy pieces. These transformation 
would have led to an increase of the number of firearms. Between April 1497 and November 
1498, Florentine craftsmen realized fifty-seven weapons, while the carpenters fabricated as 
many carriages, assembled on French models.  
The new carts were reliable and resistant. Wheels were strengthened with nails and iron 
plates.155 Stouter spokes and axles, moreover, permitted to withstand difficult journeys and 
impassable roads.156 
 
Never believe that things which differ from the ordinary are made at home, 
but if you would believe that I should make them such as to be more 
beautiful, you would err. For where strength is necessary, no account is 
taken of beauty, but they all arise from being safer and stronger than ours. 
The reason is this. When the carriage is loaded, it either goes on a level, or 
152 Ibid., 18rv. 
153 Claudio Rendina, I capitani di ventura (Rome: Newton & Compton, 1999), 196. 
154 Belhoste, “Nascita e sviluppo dell’artiglieria in Europa,” 335-336.  
155 Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, 115v-116v. 
156 Niccolò Machiavelli, Libro dell’arte della guerra (Venice: Appresso Gabriel Giolito de’ Ferrari, 
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inclines to the right or left side. When it goes level, the wheels equally 
sustain the weight, which, being divided equally between them, does not 
burden them much. When it inclines, it comes to have all the weight of the 
load upon that wheel on which it inclines. If its spokes are straight, they can 
easily collapse, since the wheel being inclined, the spokes also come to 
incline, and do not sustain the weight in a straight line. And, thus, when the 
carriage rides level and when they carry less weight, they come to be 
stronger. When the carriage rides inclined and when they carry more 
weight, they are weaker. The contrary happens to the bent spokes of the 
French carriages. For when the carriage inclines to one side, it points on 
them, since being ordinarily bent, they then come to be straight, and can 
sustain all the weight strongly. When the carriage goes level and the spikes 
are bent, they sustain half the weight. 
 
Change concerned also the tractive force of these vehicles. The reduction of weight and the 
adoption of the carrette allowed the substitution of slow teams of oxen with faster draft 
horses. This rapidity of movement was also accompanied by a significant improvement in the 
procedures for aiming. In fact, the introduction of trunnions facilitated enormously the tasks of 
gunners, fixing the pieces to cart, and permitting an easier pivoting of guns.157 Therefore, 
sieges could start even with a small number of pioneers.  
Another technical development was the extension of barrels. As noticed by many 
chroniclers, French firearms were longer than Italian weapons. Larger powder charges and 
lengthened weapons increased the velocity and the range of shot. 158  Moreover, the 
cumbersome stone projectiles were replaced by iron cannonballs. According to Vannoccio 
Biringuccio, these shots were totally unknown to Italian warfare before the French descent.159 
Cast iron missiles had several economical and strategic advantages. They combined the 
production efficiency and the cheapness of the raw material with the possibility of making 
smaller bores and firing heavy, damaging shot.160  
 
Thus, the French ordnance charmed all the Italian captains who served Charles VIII and 
Louis XII. Historians and chroniclers noticed its fearful fame and its technical innovations. And, 
157 Giovanni Santi Mazzini, La macchina da guerra, II. (Milan: Mondadori, 2006), 254. 
158 Sanudo, La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia, 265. 
159 Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, 117v. 
160 Hall, Weapons and warfare in Renaissance Europe, 94; Ridella, “Produzione di artiglierie nel 
sedicesimo secolo,” 85. 
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in 1530s, Francesco Guicciardini would have summarized the past and the present of Italian 
artillery in a notorious excerpt from the Storia d’Italia.161 
 
The largest pieces of the artillery we are speaking of, were called bombards, 
and from that time were spread through Italy, and made use of in sieges. 
Some of them were made of iron, and some of bronze, but they were of so 
large a size, that, on account of the little experience of the gunners, and 
clumsiness of their carriages, they were moved from place to place very 
slowly, and with great difficulty, and for the fame reason were very unhandy 
when placed against the walls of a town. The intervals between the firings 
were so long, that a great deal of time was lost, and little progress was made 
in comparison to what we see in our days. This gave time to the besieged to 
cast up ramparts and fortifications behind the breaches at their leisure. But, 
notwithstanding all these impediments, the violence of the saltpeter, of 
which gunpowder is made, was such that, when these instruments were set 
on fire, the balls flew with so horrible a noise, and stupendous force, even 
before they were brought to their present perfection, that they rendered 
ridiculous all the instruments, so much renowned, invented by Archimedes 
and others, and used by the Ancients in sieges of towns. But now the French 
brought a much handier engine, made of bronze, called cannon, which they 
charged with heavy iron balls, smaller without comparison than those of 
stone made use of heretofore, and drove them on carriages with horses, not 
with oxen, as was the custom in Italy. And they were attended with such 
clever men, and on such instruments appointed for that purpose, that they 
almost ever kept pace with the army. They were planted against the walls of 
a town with such speed, the space between the shots was so little, and the 
balls flew so quick, and were impelled with such force, that as much 
execution was done in a few hours, as formerly, in Italy, in the like number 
of days. These, rather diabolical than human instruments, were used not 
only in sieges, but also in the field, and were mixed with others of a smaller 
size. Such artillery rendered Charles's army very formidable to all Italy. 
 
In his Pirotechnia, Biringuccio wrote a similar exaltation of the new artillery.162 
 
Today the moderns proceed more intelligently and with greater reason, 
because experiments have enlightened them. They have moderated the 
superfluous and strengthened the weaknesses, abandoning the unwieldy 
and awkward bombards that threw heavy stone shot with a huge 
consumption of powder, guns that needed both a high expenditure on 
pioneers and a large number of working animals. Today craftsmen 
manufacture cannons easier to handle and to shift, due to their lightness. 
These weapons shoot iron cannonballs, smaller than the stone projectiles of 
161 Guicciardini, The history of Italy, I., 147-149. 
162 Biringuccio, Pirotechnia, 79rv. 
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bombards, but with a greater effects on targets, since they are made of an 
harder material and they are fired more frequently. Cannons can also be 
planted without supports and shelters. 
 
Diffusion and assimilation of the new technology 
 
In 1494, the French artillery seems to have been manufactured in Italy even before the king 
passed the Alps. According to the Venetian chronicler Marino Sanudo, in fact, transalpine and 
local gunmakers were already casting one hundred small firearms in Milan, in August. Shortly 
afterwards, these pieces were dispatched towards royal encampments, in the vicinity of 
Parma.163 
Another ally of Charles VIII, the “good French” Ercole I d’Este,164 got very interested in 
these firearms. Since 1480s, the duke of Ferrara was trying to enhance the metallurgic 
production in his dominions for commercial and military purposes.165 He was investing in 
ironworks and mines, gathering craftsmen and information. During his visit in France, in 1493, 
he probably saw the infamous royal artillery. 166 With the same attention to technical 
innovations he lead in Lombardy, in November 1494.167 
 
In his stay in Milan, the duke of Ferrara commissioned master Giovanni, the 
son of master Alberghetto, to made three models of passavolanti, one with 
French likeness, and two with different shapes. Ercole obtained from 
Ludovico il Moro fifty kilograms of copper. This metal was previously bought 
for the casting of the equestrian statue of Francesco Sforza. It was 
transported in Pavia, and then in Ferrara. Master Giovanni also went here. 
 
It was not the first exchange of artisans and technology between these two courts. Already in 
1480s, at the request of Ercole, several Milanese armorers, followed by their apprentices, 
reached Emilia.168 In any case, the anonymous author of the diario ferrarese reported that 
Giovanni Alberghetti, along with other Ferrarese masters, crafted these French guns daily, in 
163 Sanudo, La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia, 70-71.  
164 Bernardino Zambotti, “Diario ferrarese,” ed. Giuseppe Pardi, in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, XXIV., 
7., ed. Pietro Fedele (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1937), 232. 
165 Manlio Calegari, “Nel mondo dei ‘pratici’. Molte domande e qualche risposta,” in Saper fare. Studi 
di storia delle tecniche in area mediterranea, ed. Manlio Calegari (Pisa: ETS, 2004), 15-18.  
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167 Sanudo, La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia, 118-119. 
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haste. From January to November 1495, dozens of these passavolanti came out from the 
foundry of the Castello Estense. These culverins were long six and a half meters and mounted 
on carts.169 
In 1496, Ercole and his heir, Alfonso, embarked on an ambitious political, economic, and 
military project. They decided to construct a new furnace in Fornovolasco, in their possessions 
on the Apuan Alps, in order to foster the production of bronze artillery and iron shot. Ducal 
officers contacted and hired expert practitioners in alpine regions. In 1497, thanks to the 
contributions of miners, “masters of furnaces,” smiths, carpenters, charcoal burners, and many 
others, the mill was opened.170 One year later, also Ludovico il Moro planned a similar factory 
of armor and ordnance. The workshops had to be erected in Vogogna, a small village on the 
Toce river, in the Val d’Ossola.171 In 1499, at least sixty French pieces were stored in the 
Castello Sforzesco, along with their carts and their ammunitions.172 
Contrary to its belligerent neighbors, the Republic of Venice was a latecomer to the new 
technology. The previous experiments with spingards mounted on carts, strangely, did not lead 
to an immediate adoption of original, innovative weapons.173 Only in May 1496 the production 
of transalpine armaments started in the district of Cannaregio, under the supervision of Basilio 
della Scola, an engineer who served with Charles VIII during the Neapolitan campaign.174 
 
On this day, they began to fabricate several guns for shelling, like heavy 
bombards, mounted on carts, according to the French custom. These pieces 
are long like passavolanti, but thicker. They fire shots from three to six 
kilograms.  
 
One hundred pieces were tested in Lido in November, cast probably by Paolo da Canal.175 
Some cannons, culverins, and falcons were used in Casentino, against Florentine fortifications, 
169 Anonymous, “Diario ferrarese dall’anno 1409 al 1502,” ed. Giuseppe Pardi, in Rerum Italicarum 
Scriptores, XXIV., 7., ed. Pietro Fedele (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1933), 137, 140, 164, 173 and 194; 
Sanudo, La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia, 485; Malipiero, “Annali veneti:” 562. 
170 Calegari, “La mano sul cannone,” 63-70. 
171 Motta, “Armaiuoli milanesi”: 223. 
172 Marin Sanudo, I diari, II., ed. Guglielmo Berchet (Venice: A spese degli editori, 1879), 1087. 
173 Sanudo, La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia, 465; Mallett, L’organizzazione militare di Venezia nel 
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174 Marin Sanudo, I diari, I., ed. Federico Stefani (Venice: A spese degli editori, 1879), 146. 
175 Ibid., 375. 
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by the end of 1498.176 However, their transport was problematic, due to impassable mountain 
road, frequent breakings of carts, and scarcity of draught animals.177 
A strong impulse to the manufacture of new firearms was given by the war against 
Milan, in 1499. The allied French ambassador expressly requested cannons for the campaign, 
blaming old bombards. In July and in August, the officers of the Arsenal distributed hundreds 
of thousands kilograms of copper among their four gunmakers, Alberghetto Alberghetti, 
Sperandio de’ Savelli, Paulo da Canal and Francesco from Venice.178 The captain of infantry, 
Giovan Battista Caracciolo, solicit also some culverins for defending his encampment.179 The 
high-powered ironworks of Brescia and Salò assured a constant provision of cannonballs.180 
In Siena, the first cannon was made, in July 1495, by Giacomo di Bartolomeo Cozzarelli. 
Other local gunmakers, as Carlo d’Andrea Galletti and Vannoccio di Paolo Biringuccio, worked 
in the capital and in Montepulciano, realizing bronze falcons. At the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, the Camera del Comune hired also Antonio di Giacomo Ormanni, Alessandro 
d’Antonio Giusi, and Vannino d’Antonio Vannini for defending its insecure borders with the fire 
of cannons.181 During their war against Florence, also the Pisan rebels experimented some 
firearms “according to the French custom.” In May 1496, with the assistance of the French 
soldiers that garrisoned the town, they could manufacture five passavolanti of various sizes. 
These culverins, “beautiful and furious things,” were soon pointed at the towers of Ripafratta. 
The castle surrendered in two days.182 A couple of years later, the Pisan army rushed the 
bastion of Stagno with one cannon and four culverins.183 
A long series of naval defeats against the French fleet, instead, compelled the Republic 
of Genoa to adopt cannons in the first months of 1497. The officers of San Giorgio, in fact, 
reasoned that the deciding factor in battles was the number and the size of enemy firearms. 
For preventing further losses of ships and freights, they ordered that every Genoese ship had 
to transport three and a half tons of bronze artillery, that is, two cannons and four falcons.184 
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The information on Neapolitan artillery after 1494 is quite scarce. Sanudo narrated that 
Ferrandino lacked bombards and gunners. 185  However, in November 1495, during the 
reconquest of the capital, several iron projectiles were realized in the naval arsenal “for the 
first time ever.”186 Subsequently, the situation had improved. Rebel castles were struck by 
French-style guns since 1496.187 An inventory dated 1499 listed ninety pieces among cannons, 
falcons, and culverins, a few captured from the routing enemy, and the most manufactured by 
Italian, Spanish, and French gunmakers in the foundries of the Castel Nuovo.188  
Federico d’Aragona, moreover, could even lend several weapons to his Roman allies, the 
Colonna. 189 According to Sigismondo de’ Conti, the Neapolitan armaments allowed the 
Colonna to maintain a significant predominance in the Lazio region. The strongholds of their 
opponents, the Orsini and the Conti, fell one after the other, in the winter of 1497.190 
 
The Colonna’s soldiers moved towards Torre Mattia. This castle seemed 
capable to resist to a prolonged assault, considering the thickness of its 
walls, the strength of the garrison, and the numerous shelters. Nonetheless, 
it was captured, because, along with other machinery, the besiegers carried 
two long French cannons with them. Those firearms could even have 
destroyed diamond walls. 
 
A few weeks later, Colonna’s falcons decimated Orsini’s infantry in the battle of Montecelio. 
The victors chased the fugitives as far as the castle of Pratica.191 
 
The town of Pratica perched on a rugged place. It seemed to brave every 
attack. Only a narrow trail led to its gate, surrounded by rocks and crags. 
Those circumstances, however, did not dismay Colonna’s troops, because 
winners do not know obstacles. They pitched their encampment nearby the 
walls, and, against all odds, the army carried its heavy cannons on the 
mountain […]. Francesco Conti, the archbishop of Consa, escaped from the 
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town with two of his brothers. He then found shelter in the castle, sited on a 
steep cliff, and isolated from the village. Initially, the clergyman refused to 
surrender, but when, despite his opinion, he saw the cannons, he was 
forced to yield. 
 
The astonishing, sudden conquests of their archrivals suggested to the Orsini to reopen their 
foundry in Bracciano immediately.192 
Obviously, also pope Alexander VI decided to provide his troops with the novel firearms. 
Around 1500, his son, Cesare Borgia could line up several cannons and hundreds carthorses.193 
Roman craftsmen supplied the gonfalonier of the Church with numerous new guns for his 
campaign in Romagna.194 
 
In Fano, the duke waited for his ordnance, leaded by Vitellozzo Vitelli across 
the Adriatic coast […]. They were fifteen pieces, that is, two new culverins, 
which bore was thirty-five centimeters high, engraved with the pontifical 
coat of arms. Moreover, there was a third culverin, a little bit smaller than 
the other, marked with a square surmounted by a cross. The rest were five 
cannons and eight falcons, all crafted recently. The bore measured twenty-
five centimeters for cannons, and twelve and a half centimeters for falcons. 
 
In 1502, moreover, the pontiff bought from Luigi XII the Neapolitan artillery stored in the 
fortifications of Ischia, spending thirty-three thousand ducats for twelve cannons, sixteen 
culverins, and many other small firearms.195 A few months later, the rebellion of Cere was 
suppressed by the firepower of countless “French pieces.” Witnesses reported that six 
thousand shots had hit the walls and the roofs of the town.196 
In the meanwhile, other important families of the Papal States were adopting the new 
technology. Astorre III Manfredi, lord of Faenza, purchased several new guns in Brescia. 
Guidubaldo from Montefeltro affirmed that French gunners were masters of artillery and 
war.197 Moreover, the two condottiere brothers Paolo and Vitellozzo Vitelli owned twelve 
falcons, crafted by Florentine and Spanish artisans in their stronghold of Città di Castello.198 
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Like Fabrizio and Prospero Colonna, like Virginio, Carlo, and Giordano Orsini, they personally 
had experience with the French ordnance during their service with the French army in 1495 
and 1496.199 
 
The story of Vitelli’s firearms was closely intertwined with the developments of 
Florentine artillery. In fact, since Paolo became the general captain of the Republican army, in 
May 1498, he frequently requested new French guns, tons of powder, and iron cannonballs 
from his employers, forcing them to increase the quality and the quantity of ordnance 
production.200 
Nevertheless, the Gallic technology was not unknown to the military officers of the 
Republic. The royal cannons attracted attention and interest among its statesmen even before 
the slaughter of Montefortino and the conquest of Naples. In the first weeks of 1495, the Dieci 
di Balìa ordered one of their gunmakers, Francesco Telli, to reach Castrocaro for examining 
and drawing the falcons, the cannons, and the culverins left there by the king. 
Contemporaneously, the officials were constructing a new foundry in the center of Florence, 
nearby the old, abandoned college of the Sapienza.201 Before the end of February, maestro 
Telli and Simone di Bronzi received eight two tons of copper and two hundred and a half 
kilograms of tin.202 A few weeks later, the first ever French style firearm produced in Florence 
was sent to the Pisan encampment. It was a bronze cannon, put on a cart, “according to 
French custom.”203 The Dieci commented to their officers that “this French artillery is very 
good and very effective.”204 
The business flourished immediately. In February 1495, a Pistoiese merchant offered 
several models of these guns to the Dieci.205 
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Here is a man who has beautiful models for making various kind of guns. He 
has acquired them from some Frenchmen. These models are perfect for 
crafting bombards, passavolanti, mortars and other pieces. They are 
fourteen or fifteen pieces. We could buy them for a reasonable price. I 
exhort your lordships to search for this man, and your lordships could see 
these models and grasp if they are just what you need. I think so.  
 
In April, another Florentine gunmaker, Lorenzo di Giovanni, called Cavaloro, was sent in 
Castrocaro.206 Soon after, a Picard gunner, Pierre from Douai, was invited to work in the 
foundry of the Sapienza.207 The ambassadors in France even requested a “master of artillery” 
from the king.208 The Dieci decided also to build new furnaces in the border fortresses of 
Volterra and Firenzuola. In the capital, the castings continued incessantly until autumn 1495.209 
Only in the first half of 1498, however, the Florentine craftsmen fully abandoned the 
Italian artillery for the French ones. The increase of war demand compelled this innovation. In 
this year, in fact, after the execution of Girolamo Savonarola and the defeat at San Regolo, the 
Republic took the offensive against Pisan rebels, leaded by its new captain. Several furnaces 
were repaired under the supervision of one of the Vitelli’s chancellors, while the officers hired 
carpenters and gunpowder makers.210 Between July and September, Francesco Telli cast four 
tons of bronze, realizing ten falcons and three cannons of different forms. The same number of 
cannons was crafted by Lorenzo di Giovanni and his workmate, Ludovico del Buono.211 
Another gunmaker, Bonaccorso Ghiberti, was adapting his creations to the French 
design. In that summer, the grandson of the famous Lorenzo produced three bronze cannons. 
In August, the Dieci ordered Bonaccorso to build a new furnace in his workshop for “an easier 
and better melting.”212 It was a useful improvement. The craftsman rapidly manufactured a 
falcon and another beautiful cannon, decorated with lion heads and “classic” ornaments. A 
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third gun, three meters in length and with a shot weight of sixteen kilograms of iron, was 
realized in November.213 
Significantly, Bonaccorso reported in his personal notebook, the so-called Zibaldone, 
two references to French methods of casting artillery, related to the diameter of the shot.214 
 
A culverin or passavolante will weigh about one hundred and seven hundred 
kilograms, if it has a bore diameter of twenty or fourteen centimeters, a 
length of three and a half meters […], and a rear part thick as two shot. 
Another culverin or passavolante will weigh about two tons, if it has a length 
of three and a half meters, and if it fires twenty-seven kilograms of lead […]. 
French gunmakers are accustomed to cast the breech of their passavolanti 
three shot thick, that is, one for empty space and two for bronze, that is, 
every side of the chamber as much thick as the gap. This is their own way to 
craft guns with a shot weight of three kilograms of lead, or less. And for the 
pieces with a shot weight of ten, or thirteen, or seventeen kilograms of lead, 
they made these sides two and a half shot thick.  
 
Other notes concerned the proportions and the measurements of cannons, the calculation of 
the weight of a piece according to his length, and the earth used on the molds of ordnance. 
Several drawings, instead, represented single-piece, bronze cannons mounted on carts, 
equipped with two spoke wheels, tailpieces, and different aiming systems.215 
At the same time, the use of a large number of cannons made iron cannonballs 
indispensable. As with the guns, Florentine masters assimilated the new technology 
immediately. The production, managed by one of the most important Florentine prospectors, 
Tommaso Marinai, started in the ironwork of Colle Val d’Elsa in the first months of 1495.216 
However, three years later, Florentine gunners had approximately available the same quantity 
of projectiles.217 The necessities of the campaign against Pisa compelled the Dieci to accelerate 
the production. In July 1498, the Dieci signed a contract with a Angelo from Brescia and Baldo 
di Giovanni, a Lombard master and a Florentine merchant, for a furniture of a thousand 
projectiles.218 In December, military officers also hired three masters, Giovanni di Piero from 
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Piedmont, Antonio di Giovanni from Germany, and Lancillotto di Voglino for casting iron shot 
in Pistoia, along with handguns, harquebuses, and spingards.219 
In the autumn of 1498, the Florentine artillery was very different compared to the past. The 
Dieci stopped definitively the purchases of old, iron spingards. 220  Their army received 
exclusively new pieces for the campaign in Casentino. More than twenty thousand and three 
hundred kilograms of bronze were cast in thirty-seven guns, between February and 
September.221 According to Marino Sanudo, Florentine army, at that time, had two hundred 
pieces mounted on carts, including twenty-five pieces among culverins and cannons.222 One 
year later, in 1499, the Florentine troops besieged Pisa with at least eighty guns.223 
 
The Florentine army numbered about fifteen thousand men between 
infantry and cavalry. They carried also eighty guns. There were fifty pieces 
between culverins and cannons, mounted on carts, and seven heavy 
bombards. Florentine gunners fired about two hundred shot per hour on the 
wall and in the city. The entire world seemed to be getting destroyed.  
 
A “revolutionary” deployment? 
 
This last source, as well as many others, shows that the demands of actual combat compelled 
soldiers and rulers to use both “ancient” and “new” guns. All kinds of weapons were pressed 
into service, irrespective of their quality, or metal, or mobility. Until the first years of the 
sixteenth century, French cannons coexisted with Italian bombards. In 1496, Florentine 
masters crafted three bronze heavy arms and a small, iron one.224 In Venice, Alberghetto 
Alberghetti realized two giant firearms in 1498. In the following months, Ludovico Sforza 
supplied Genoa with two bombards and four culverins, while the Most Serene Republic 
defended the castle of Pizzighettone with a gun manufactured sixty years before. Even Louis 
XII seized Lombard castles with three aged weapons of his Piedmontese allies, along with 
219 ASF, Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, 23, 542r; ASF, Dieci di Balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, 110r. 
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thirty-six pieces of the royal artillery.225 This utilization is revealed also by the permanence of  
the customary Italian terminology. Culverins were generally called passavolanti, and the 
cannons were often confused with cortane.226 
Technical innovations, besides, were frequently combined with traditional machines. 
The creation of these hybrids would have revealed different paths in the adaptation and the 
development of the firearms.227 In Florence, for example, several falcons were equipped with a 
separate breech, like old spingards. The French fashioned ones, instead, were cast in a single 
piece.228 Lead shot often substituted iron cannonballs, also because armies were still not 
provided with enough new ammunitions. In 1499, the Florentine Signoria had to requested 
projectiles everywhere, in Mantua, in Ferrara, in Lucca, in Brescia, purchasing even contraband 
wares.229 At the same time, the factories of Ercole d’Este were about to shut up, due to the 
scarce quality of minerals and an insufficient overall productivity of missiles.230 In central Italy, 
average ironworks could not cast metal for this purpose, especially on an early stage of 
diffusion of the “alpine” blast furnaces.231 This shortage of cast iron balls would have proved to 
be a serious problem and an annoying slackening for assailants, depriving them of the 
opportunity to hammer the walls and the morale of the defenders.232 
Rulers ran into difficulties not only with the manufacture of shot, but also with the 
fabrication of the new carriages. Spokes, axles, and wheels were not so easy to reproduce. The 
vehicles seemed to break continuously, along the impassable mountain roads. Above all, the 
common oxen were still preferred to the unobtainable horses, with evident repercussions for 
225 Sanudo, I diari, I., 1016; Sanudo, I diari, II., 759, 1104, and 1272. 
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the rapidity of the operations. The Venetian expedition in Tuscany, during the winter of 1498, 
would have highlighted these limitations.233  
In order to avoid dangerous deficiencies, authorities were forced to make timely, 
systematic preparations for equipping their army with pieces, missiles, and gunpowder. They 
had also to stockpile copper and tin, iron, timber, sulfur and saltpeter, reorganizing the whole 
commodity chain. Officers tried to combine the “government of artillery” with the 
“governance of the production.”234 The Florentine procurement for the 1498 campaign in the 
Pisan countryside could be considered as a significant achievement. Founders realized thirty 
guns in just three months. Ambassadors signed contract for the supply of nitrate in Genoa, in 
Rome, and in Milan, while the gunpowder makers of the capital worked even overnight. A local 
merchant, along with a Lombard master, provided hundreds iron cannonballs. The Dieci di 
Balìa rented also “twenty-five horses and twenty-five carts” for the shift of light falcons. Their 
captain, however, was not very pleased. He would have requested “shot and powder, powder 
and shot,” again and again.235  
In spite of their determined efforts, hence, states could not always maintain the new 
armaments. And, “without an effective logistical system, new technologies might be of little 
consequence in campaigns.”236 In general, anyway, the new ordnance was satisfying the needs 
of commanders in terms of mobility, surprise, and fright. Small town and minor posts, the 
“insignificant hovel” detested by the duke of Calabria, could not oppose resistance to their 
attacks. Paolo Vitelli would have conquered five fortified position in the course of a month and 
a half, in 1498. But, despite its indisputable qualities, the French-style artillery was not a “war-
winning weapon.”237 In 1494, the Aragonese sovereigns were more betrayed than defeated, 
when their allies surrendered, and their people rebelled. The possibility to counter-attack the 
invaders with cannons and culverins did not save the Neapolitan kingdom from a second fall, in 
233 Sanudo, I diari, II., 161 and 178. 
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1502.238 Pisa resisted two consecutive saturation bombardments, in 1499 and in 1500, carried 
out by Florentine and Gallic troops. In the first case, the assault failed also because of a lack of 
munitions.239  
Victories and defeats, then, would have been determined by other political, diplomatic, 
and economic issues. In the Peninsula, besides, the rapid diffusion of cannons was preventing 
every opponent to establish a technological superiority. And the most recent fortresses were 
not giving any advantage too. The French artillery, in fact, would not have impacted on the 
construction of fortifications, at least not immediately. Military engineers would have resorted 
to the traditional “anti-gunpowder defenses” experimented through the whole fifteenth 
century, that is, the reduction of the height and the thickening of walls, the increase in the 
number of gunports, and the building of ravelins. 240 In the Tuscan documentation, the term 
“bastion” would have still indicated a terreplein fortified with wooden structures and 
numerous firearms, located on the outside of the town perimeters.241 The customary round 
towers would have proliferate until the third decade of the sixteenth century, while the 
bastioned front was still evolving from traditional forms.242 
In addition, the cannons did not alter the figures of contemporary armies. For the 
challenging surrounding of Pisa, the Florentine Commune hired about eight thousand 
infantrymen, the same number marshaled for the operations against Pietrasanta in the 
preceding decade.243 A certain rise in the number of soldiers was probably provoked by 
prolonged operations and ambitious aims, rather than extensive uses of the new ordnance. In 
1499, the Most Serene Republic recruited fifteen thousand men for invading the eastern part 
of the duchy of Milan, and not for seizing just one city or two.244 Moreover, this growth in 
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military manpower would have been determined also by famine, poverty, and unemployment, 
the severe consequences of five years of uninterrupted war.245     
Therefore, the complexities of contemporary societies diminish the importance of the 
“watershed” caused by the appearance of the French guns. 246 The supposed “departure in 
warfare” proposed by Geoffrey Parker seems to be denied not only by the evidences of 
chronicles and registers, but also by the ordinary use of the armaments, which testified to  
irregular patterns of deployment and assimilation into the actual warfare.247 Certainly, the 
assimilation of the French artillery could resemble the “punctuated equilibrium” discussed by 
Clifford Rogers, with “evolutionary change” which “occurs during short periods of rapid 
development.”248 However, these accelerations were the results of interrelated elements. The 
technical transformation was possible thanks to the steady improvements matured in the 
broader, receptive milieu of the Italian Renaissance. And the technological “bursts,” above all, 
would have been only a part of the premises of future political implications. The roots of the 
“early modern state,” of a centralizing government, are complex and numerous.249 
French ordnance, then, was not so “revolutionary.” The adoption of the new pattern 
was immediate, but its affirmation required attempts, failures, and, above all, time. External 
pressures speeded up or slowed down its diffusion. Alliances permitted and favored the 
exchange of projects, drawings, goods, and artisans. Wars urged the mobilization of every 
resource, the production of newer arms, and the use of old bombards. The context, however, 
was encouraging. French fashion, in general, fascinated several courts, and attracted princes 
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and soldiers.250 Renaissance engineers were still thirsty for novelty and experimentations.251 
Military market was thriving. States had men, knowledge, and tools for acquiring innovations, 
and the public demand was playing an important, leading role in the introduction of 
technological improvements. Indeed society was inspiring innovations, while information and 
culture spread through handbooks, craft mobility, migrations, encounters.252 
The French royal artillery clearly contributed to part of these innovations, with its impact 
on Italian warfare. In the following decades, the intensive diffusion of mobile cannons would 
have had serious consequences on fortifications, logistics, and tactics in the whole Peninsula. 
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, however, these transformation were not completely 
carried out. It was not a sudden technical, or political, or military “revolution.” The process 
depended on innumerable, different, interdependent factors. 253  But the new guns, 
undoubtedly, constituted a significant, potential instrument of change. And, from the point of 
view of productivity, they would have represented an interesting challenge.  
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Figure 6. An ideal bombard, sketched by Francesco di Giorgio Martini in 1490s 
Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Magliabechiano II.I.141 
Drawing by Angela Marino 
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In spite of a generic awareness of their impact on operational choices, the ammunition 
supplies have sparked scarce interest among scholars of Renaissance Italy.1 Little is known on 
the manufacture and the commerce of weapons in the fifteenth-century Peninsula, or on the 
technological innovations, or on the construction of new arsenals.2 Historians have focused 
more on the theoretical studies of eminent engineers, on the formation of their humanistic 
culture, than on the actual practices of smiths and gunmakers.3 Parade, gilded armor have 
often stolen the glance of art experts, but the state orders of thousands cuirasses were 
completely neglected by economists. 4 The extensive, lively market of the indispensable 
1 Enrico Stumpo, “La finanza di guerra negli antichi stati italiani,” in Storia economica della guerra, 
ed. Catia Eliana Gentilucci (Rome, 2008), p. 196; William Caferro, “Warfare and economy in Renaissance 
Italy,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 39, no. 2 (2008), pp. 198-200; Richard Goldthwaite, The 
economy of Renaissance Florence (Baltimore, 2009), pp. 400-01. 
2 Manlio Calegari, “Nel mondo dei ‘pratici’. Molte domande e qualche risposta,” in Saper fare. Studi 
di storia delle tecniche in area mediterranea, ed. Manlio Calegari (Pisa, 2004), pp. 9-33. 
3 Andrea Bernardoni, “Le artiglierie, da manufatto tecnico alla riflessione scientifica degli ingegneri 
del Rinascimento,” Quaderni storici 130, no. 1 (2008); Bernardoni, “La fusione delle artiglierie tra 
Medioevo e Rinascimento. ‘Cronaca’ di un rinnovamento tecnologico attraverso i manoscritti di 
Leonardo,” Cromohs 19 (2014); Gustina Scaglia, “A miscellany of bronze works and texts in the Zibaldone 
of Buonaccorso Ghiberti,”Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 120, no. 6 (1976); Scaglia, 
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Adriano Carugo (Milan, 1972); Pamela Long, Artisans, practitioners and the rise of the new sciences 
(Corvallis, 2011), pp. 94-126. 
4 Silvio Leydi, “Le armi,” in Il rinascimento italiano e l’Europa. Commercio e cultura mercantile, eds. 
Franco Franceschi, Richard Goldthwaite and Reinhold Mueller (Treviso, 2007), pp. 171-90; Stuart Pyhrr, 
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propellants of artillery, the saltpeter, was regarded with the same indifference, as the 
introduction of new shapes and new materials in the fabrication of ordnance.5 Sporadic 
publications on the management and production of firearms cannot fill all the blanks in the 
field, 6 and cannot be compared to the complete analyses offered by the international 
literature.7 Mines and furnaces, at least, have been studied by archaeologists and specialists in 
Medieval craftsmanship.8  
Besides, only recently the military historiography of the fifteenth-century Peninsula has 
evolved from its aged paradigms.9 Proposed by Niccolò Machiavelli in his most famous 
works,10 the juxtaposition of unreliable mercenary companies and regretted citizen armies has 
been finally overcome by a gradual reevaluation of the military establishments of kingdoms, 
5 Silvia Bianchessi. “Cavalli, armi e salnitro fra Milano e Napoli nel secondo Quattrocento,” Nuova 
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eds. Carlo Beltrame and Marco Morin (Florence, 2013), pp. 13-28; Ridella, “Produzione di artiglierie nel 
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duchies, and republics. Several contributes have highlighted the importance of these 
permanent offices in the formation of regional states, in the organization of armies, and in the 
repercussions of war on tax systems.11 
The purpose of this paper, then, will be the examination of one of the indispensable 
functions of those institutions, that is, the supplying of arms and money to soldiers during a 
campaign. The context will be the northern Tuscany of the late fifteenth century, at the time of 
the war between the Florentine Republic and its Pisan rebels. This conflict, in fact, represents 
an indicative case of the appearance of new technologies on battlefield, their assimilation, and 
their considerable, direct effects on production. Moreover, the account-books of the Dieci di 
Balìa, the ten officials responsible for Florentine warfare, offer the opportunity to study the 
output levels of armament industry, the costs of ammunitions, and the quality of weaponry. 12 
The correspondence of this office, along with the dispatches of the Signoria and the letters of 
condottieri and commissioners, permits to document also the solutions to awkward 
transportations, the difficulties with the scarcity of equipments, the role of the public demand 
in the introduction of innovations, and the problematic adaptation to new patterns and 
strategies. Lastly, diaries and chronicles highlight the results of sieges and battles, and the 
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Internal turmoil, external rebellions. The origins of the campaign  
 
The events of 1498 and 1499 cannot be understood without a brief, indispensable summary of 
the internal power struggles that exacerbated the Florentine public life after the exile of Piero 
de’ Medici and the fall of his regime.13 During the first years of the republican restoration, in 
fact, three were the major rival parties that competed for preponderance in public councils. 
The powerful “sect” of the “holy prophet” Girolamo Savonarola ruled “everything,” in the 
capital. It was composed by the so-called frateschi, or piagnoni, or pinzocheri, upholders of a 
popular, “broader” government. Their foes were the oligarch arrabbiati, and the radical, 
violent youth of the compagnacci. Last but not least, the nostalgic palleschi, or bigi, aspired the 
Medici’s return and the revival of the “old state.” In several occasions they were pleaded guilty 
of plots, but their support was anyhow indispensable for governing the town.14 
Furthermore, other interests grouped and divided the Florentine citizens. The 
opposition between the common people and the aristocratic magnates often developed into 
fierce conflicts over the extension of political rights, the electoral systems, and the fiscal 
legislation.15 The ambitious, “perverted” elite was repeatedly accused of concentrating the 
power in its hands, assigning public officers to “friends” and “unworthy men,” and increasing 
taxation in order to oppress the common people.16 The auspicated “union of the city,” invoked 
continuously during parliamentary sittings, was simply a chimera.17                 
 
Our city was in complete disorder. The hope was lacking. The expenditures 
were multiplying. Artisans could not work, poor men could not feed their 
families. We could not stand this suspense. Our citizens, moreover, were 
13 Leonardo Morelli, “Cronaca,” in Delizie degli eruditi toscani, XIX., ed. Ildefonso di San Luigi 
(Florence, 1785), p. 199; Piero Parenti, Storia fiorentina, I., ed. Andrea Matucci (Florence, 1994), pp. 
149-51; Filippo, Alamanno, and Neri Rinuccini, Ricordi storici, ed. Giuseppe Aiazzi (Florence, 1840), pp. 
152-157; Luca Landucci, Diario fiorentino (Florence, 1969), ed. Iodoco del Badia, pp. 73-76 and 89-90. 
14 Bartolomeo Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, ed. Giuliana Berti (Florence, 1994), pp. 222-23 and 233-34; 
Filippo de’ Nerli, Commentari dei fatti civili occorsi dentro la città di Firenze, ed. Colombo Coen (Trieste, 
1859), pp. 112-20; Francesco Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, eds. Piero and Luigi Guicciardini (Florence, 
1859), pp. 139-41; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, I., pp. 167-69 and 190-91; Piero Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi 
tempi, eds. Giuliana Berti, Michele Luzzati, and Ezio Tongiorgi (Pisa, 1982), pp. 31-41. 
15 Giorgio Cadoni, Lotte politiche e riforme istituzionali a Firenze tra il 1494 e il 1502 (Rome, 1999), 
pp. 19-84; de’ Nerli, Commentari, pp. 134-35; Jacopo Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, ed. Lelio Arbib 
(Florence, 1842), pp. 119-20. 
16 Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 230; Piero Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., ed. Andrea Matucci 
(Florence, 2005), pp. 53-54 and 191. 
17 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, I., p. 272. 
250
split. Some craved to steal the government from the people, establishing an 
oligarchy. Others wanted to oppose this peril, even at cost to seize arms. 
The supporters of the past regime hoped to recall Piero de’ Medici. 
Selfishness and ambition incited everyone. Even the Signoria was divided. 
Florentines were proving to be enemies of each other.       
 
Another cause of bitter controversy was the foreign policy. The “pacific friar” exhorted 
his followers to trust the promises of the king of France, the victorious “divine minister” guided 
by the “holy sapience.” This confidence in Charles VIII was encouraged also by merchants and 
bankers, worried about the loss of privileges and prestige in Transalpine fairs, and menaced by 
royal banishments.18 Faith and fear, as well as money and markets, consolidated an unstable 
alliance, despite all the deceits perpetrated by “wicked,” “perfidious,” and “thieving” French.19 
Florentines, moreover, were suspicious of Italian diplomacy. According to Francesco 
Guicciardini, the duke of Milan, Ludovico Sforza, often spoke in public against the republican 
regulations. To people’s eyes, the “Moro,” as he was called, was secretly planning to establish 
an oligarchic government in collusion with the arrabbiati, the bigi, and other “principal 
citizens.” The gentry was more and more considered subversive, antagonist of the “good, 
popular way of living.”20 
This already critical situation was undoubtedly worsened by the war with Pisa. The city 
of the leaning tower had rebelled against the Florentine “unbearable tyranny” on November 
9th 1494, during the stay of Charles VIII. Shouting for “people and freedom,” Pisans occupied 
the “old citadel,” confiscated the weapons from traders, expelled their rulers, and pledged 
loyalty to the king. In the vicinity, the inhabitants of Lari, Vico, Ponsacco, and Cascina joined 
the revolt immediately.21 Lucca and Genoa backed the turmoil.22 In a few days, Florence lost its 
most important regional market,23 one of its principal arsenals,24 and a “large quantity” of its 
18 Landucci, Diario fiorentino, pp. 108-109; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, I., pp. 207, 251, and 282-83; 
Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, p. 96.  
19 Rinuccini, Ricordi storici, pp. 138-39; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, p. 112. 
20 Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, p. 145; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, I., pp. 210-11 and 315-16; Nardi, 
Istorie della città di Firenze, p. 99. 
21 Giovanni Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” in Archivio Storico Italiano 6, no. 2 (1845), pp. 287-88; 
Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, pp. 14-20; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, pp. 210-11; Parenti, Storia 
fiorentina, p. 129.  
22 Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” pp. 294-95; Paolo Giovio, Historie del suo tempo, I. (Venice, 1555), f. 
81v. 
23  Goldthwaite, The economy of Renaissance Florence, pp. 149-58; Giuliano Pinto, “Cultura 
mercantile ed espansione economica di Firenze,” in Vespucci, Firenze e le Americhe, eds. Giuliano Pinto, 
Leonardo Rombai, and Claudio Tripodi (Florence, 2014), pp. 9-10. 
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soldiers. Pisan men-at-arms, in fact, abandoned the Florentine encampment, “and all of them 
are now against us.”25   
Since then, a wearing military campaign would have raged across the entire Tuscany. 
Nor the king nor his envoys could obtain the surrender of the “obstinate” Pisans, 
notwithstanding the pacts between his majesty and the Republic.26 Florence reacted by force 
of arms in December 1494, sending its troops toward San Miniato.27 Conscript infantrymen 
were mobilized in the Pistoiese region, while the “brave” Florentine youth reached the 
encampment. According to Luca Landucci, the chance of plucking attracted also numerous 
peasants.28 By the end of the winter, a large part of the Pisan countryside was reconquered, 
but, on March, the upset of Montepulciano led to a mounting tension on the southern, Sienese 
border.29 The fighting on two fronts had imaginable consequences. Undisturbed, the Pisans 
made several incursion into Valdinievole and into Maremma. With the help of the French 
garrisons of the “new citadel” and Gascon mercenaries, they also assaulted Montecarlo and 
Librafratta. 30 In May 1495, the fall of the latter, and the “betrayal” of the Gallic troops, raised 
a storm of protest. Citizens blamed the Dieci di Balìa on a “deliberate” rout, “planned for 
subjugating our people.” Charles VIII became a “unworthy, disloyal, perfidious, barbarous 
assassin.” The enraged Florentines would have cursed him again in the following months. On 
September 14th, during a first siege of Pisa, the same French garrison, the same “traitors,” 
opened fire on Florentine soldiers, forcing them to withdraw.  
 
Florentines hired many soldiers, entrusting them to the Guidubaldo from 
Montefeltro, duke of Urbino, a young man, more talented for literature than 
war. The Dieci, moreover, appointed Francesco Valori and Paolantonio 
Soderini as general commissioners. Our army fiercely entered the suburb of 
Saint Mark, nearby the walls of Pisa, and several men-at-arms got over the 
city gates. Rebels were dismayed. However, despite our bribes and their 
promises, the French troops began to aim its guns at our encampment, from 
24 Fabrizio Ansani, “Geografie della guerra nella Toscana del Rinascimento. Produzione di armi e 
circolazione dei pratici,” Archivio Storico Italiano 651 (2017), pp. 106-108. 
25 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 38, f. 29r. 
26 Among the other things, these covenants provided for the “restitution” to Florence of Pisa and 
Livorno at the end of the Neapolitan expedition. See Négociations diplomatique de la France avec la 
Toscane, I., eds. Abel Desjardins and Giuseppe Canestrini (Paris, 1859), pp. 601-06. 
27 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 31, ff. 36v and 47r. 
28 Landucci, Diario fiorentino, p. 98. 
29 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 32, ff. 92r, 97v, 102r, and 176rv. 
30 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, I., pp. 205, 208, 216-217, and 223; Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” pp. 303-
309; Giovio, Historie, I., ff. 83v-84r. 
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the citadel. Like mortal enemies, they bombarded our brigade, killing several 
of our men. Our officers, then, ordered the retreat.  
 
Not content with that, the French captain sold also the “new citadel” to the rebels, a few days 
after the attack.31 
Nonetheless, the republican government did not accept the aid of the forming Italian 
League, the alliance between Venice, Rome, Milan, and other minor states, against the French 
menace. This intransigence lasted long. The royal lies, the “victorious overcoming” at Fornovo, 
the retreat in Asti, the return of Charles in Lyon, did not change the minds of the frateschi 
rulers, comforted by Savonarola’s sermons, and frightened by a probable “confusion” and a 
possible “revolution.”32 Ludovico Sforza tempted the arrabbiati, but without any significant 
results. The confederation, then, was compelled to defend Pisans, for obtaining the Florentine 
support. The first Milanese and Genoese contingent arrived in Tuscany in the autumn of 1495, 
along with Venetian money. 33 In the next year, even the Holy Roman Emperor, Maximilian I, 
besieged Livorno, but his expedition resulted in an unexpected, resounding failure.34 During 
the following season, the campaign would have dragged by. Victories would have alternated 
with defeats. Fortresses and towns would have been conquered and then lost. Diplomacy and 
war reached an impasse. Nor the Florentine efforts nor the allied reinforcements would have 
broken the stalemate, until the spring of 1498.               
   
Springtime in Florence, springboard for war 
 
The situation would have changed radically, in those weeks. In Florence, the politics took 
another sudden twist. Savonarola was losing popularity, due to papal excommunications, and 
because of the split of his party. During the vespers of the Palm Sunday, on April 8th, a small 
group of compagnacci assaulted the monastery of Saint Mark, followed by a large number of 
armed citizens, with the purpose of “annihilate their opponents.”35 The surprised frateschi 
barricaded themselves in the temple, defending its doors with prayers and handguns. During 
31 Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” pp. 322-323; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, I., pp. 265-66; Rinuccini, Ricordi 
storici, p. 149; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, pp. 115-16; Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, pp. 135-37. Giovio, 
Historie, I., ff. 142r-144v; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 230. 
32 Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, p. 145; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, I., pp. 207, 236, 243-44, and 251. 
33 Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” pp. 324-25; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, pp. 37-38; Giovio, Historie, 
f. 147v; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, p. 116.  
34 Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, pp. 102-10; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 47-61. 
35 Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 46. 
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the tumult, the principal exponent of their faction, Francesco Valori, was chased and killed by 
his rivals. The Signoria, then, decided to storm the church with artillery, “like it was a castle,” 
and to support the attackers with trained infantrymen. Eight hours later, the Dominican friar 
was arrested.36 His capture preceded the fall of his followers. Forty of them were charged with 
misconduct, favoritism, and clientelism, and punished with exiles, fines, and temporary 
exclusions from public offices.37 The arrabbiati were finally overthrowing their adversaries.38  
Simultaneously, the piagnoni lost another symbolic leader. Charles VIII, in fact, passed 
away in Amboise on April 7th. The death of the French sovereign was a turning point in 
Florentine foreign policy. The swaggering Milanese faction, in fact, renewed and strengthened 
its relations with Ludovico Sforza. The former enemy was delighted at the possibility to bring 
to a successful conclusion his preceding diplomatic efforts. The duke offered to the new 
government a financial aid for the Pisan war, promising also to mediate between Florence and 
its Genoese enemies.39 Although the letters from Lombardy were received with “relief” and 
“happiness” by rulers, the common people had a very different opinion on the subject. Piero 
Parenti and Jacopo Nardi reported the union was feared to conceal and stage an oligarchic 
coup. Piero Vaglienti accused explicitly the Moro of being a “whore,” doubting that he 
extended the hand of friendship only to be protected against his aggressive Venetian 
neighbors and from the pretensions of the new king of France, Louis XII, who was claiming the 
Milanese duchy because of his grandmother’s inheritance.40   
The Republic underwent a further major upheaval in the next month. On May 20th, the 
Venetian and Pisan troops routed the Florentine forces at San Regolo. The army, run into an 
ambush, suffered heavy losses. Several condottieri were imprisoned, and eighty men-at-arms 
were grabbed or killed. The rest of cavalry was deprived of horses and arms. About one 
hundred and fifty infantrymen died, while most of the survivors disbanded. The Florentine 
commissioner, Guglielmo de’ Pazzi, and the general governor, the count Rinuccio from 
36 Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, pp. 171-74; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, pp. 246-48; Landucci, Diario 
fiorentino, pp. 170-71; Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, pp. 150-53; Cambi, “Istorie,” in Delizie degli 
eruditi toscani, XXI., ed. Ildefonso di San Luigi (Florence, 1785), pp. 119-21. 
37 ASF, Consulte e pratiche, 64, ff. 82r-85v 
38 Cambi, “Istorie,” pp. 121 and 132; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 167-75; de’ Nerli, Commentari, 
p. 132, Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, p. 162. 
39 ASF, Consulte e pratiche, 64, ff. 59r-60r; Biagio Buonaccorsi, Diario (Florence, 1568), p. 2; Parenti, 
Storia fiorentina, II., p. 158; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 257. 
40 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 184; Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, pp. 172-73; Vaglienti, Storia 
dei suoi tempi, p. 54. 
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Marsciano, escaped imprisonment fortuitously, but they were soon charged with imprudence 
and greed. 41  
 
Our commanders noticed six hundred light horses plundering in Maremma. 
The men-at-arms of the count Rinuccio and the infantrymen of Ciriaco from 
Borgo Sansepolcro, then, went to meet the foes. Treacherous countrymen, 
however, informed the rebels about our counterattack, and Pisans were 
able to prepare an ambush between San Regolo and Lari. Our brigade, in the 
meanwhile, assaulted the enemies, and recover their booty. Hankering after 
loot, our troops fell into the trap, and routed.          
 
Apart from the defeat, the Marzocco’s officers had to face other severe difficulties, in those 
weeks. The political turmoil in the capital had serious repercussions on the management of the 
encampment, entrenched in the proximity of the border town of Pontedera.42 Guglielmo de’ 
Pazzi complained repeatedly about the delays of orders, the indiscipline of mercenaries, and, 
above all, the shortage of money and food. At the end of April, the hay for horses and oxen 
was lacking. On May 6th, the commissioner had to put down a mass brawl between “our 
desperate and starving soldiers.” He had to “buy on credit, begging for everything.”43 After the 
rout, the new, arrabbiati Dieci decided to drastically remedy the whole plight, “not only 
securing towns, but also taking the offensive.”44 
 
Italian captain, French warfare 
 
The numerous letters dispatched from the Palazzo dei Priori on May 21st testify all of the 
measures taken by officers to confront the immediate perils. According to Parenti, “if our plans 
used to proceed slowly, now we are animated.” Several thousand florins were collected from 
the convicted frateschi. The Dieci urgently requested five hundred infantrymen from the 
Pistoiese commune, and called to arms several condottieri, as Alessandro Bentivoglio from 
Bologna, Ottaviano Riario from Forli, and Astorre Baglioni from Perugia. They also sent to the 
41 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 57, ff. 137r and 207r; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 179; Vaglienti, 
Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 51; Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, pp. 173-74; Marino Sanudo, I diari, I., ed. 
Federico Stefani (Venice, 1879), pp. 966-67 and 974-77; Domenico Malipiero, “Annali veneti,” Archivio 
Storico Italiano 7, no. 1 (1843), p. 503; Girolamo Priuli, “Diari,” I., ed. Arturo Segre, in Rerum Italicarum 
Scriptores, XXIV., 3., ed. Giosuè Carducci and Vittorio Fiorini (Città di Castello, 1912), p. 82. 
42 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 57, f. 169r; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 184. 
43 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 56, f. 155v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 57, ff. 147r, 189r, and 211r. 
44 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 58, f. 125r. 
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encampment another general commissioner, Benedetto de’ Nerli, tasked with resisting the 
Pisan attacks until the arrival of the new general captain, Paolo Vitelli from Città di Castello.45 
The nominated commander of the army had already served in Florentine forces, like 
other members of his family. His father, Niccolò, fought against Sienese and Neapolitan troops 
after the Pazzi’s conspiracy, and was restored to the signoria of Città di Castello by Lorenzo de’ 
Medici in 1482. His older brothers, Camillo and Giovanni, were Florentine connestabili, that is, 
heads of mercenary infantrymen, during that decade.46 Paolo followed their footsteps with his 
own company, led with his younger brother, Vitellozzo, earning the esteem of allies and 
enemies.47 In September 1495, they were under the walls of Pisa. Two years later, the Republic 
paid to them twenty-five thousand florins for the services of three hundred man-at-arms, 
encamped in Valdichiana. Their correspondence for 1497 reveals the “friendship” between the 
Vitelli and the leaders of the Savonarola’s faction, as Paolantonio Soderini and Francesco 
Valori. Moreover, one of their secretaries, Cerbone Cerboni, stayed permanently in Florence.48 
Far from Tuscany, along with Camillo, Paolo and Vitellozzo gained a valuable military 
experience at the time of Charles VIII’s expedition. The three relatives, in fact, were hired by 
the king, as well as other Italian condottieri. During the march toward Naples, they were 
probably impressed by the Ultramontane siege strategy, by the crushing of Montefortino and 
Monte San Giovanni. The rapidity and the efficiency with which French gunners could move, 
aim, and fire their guns represented an absolute, frightening novelty. The practice of 
positioning numerous guns near the walls, the simultaneity of the explosions, the saturation 
bombardments, the use of iron cannonballs, and the immediate assaults were unprecedented 
in Italian Renaissance sieges.49 The brothers learned a lot from this warfare, about the use of 
ordnance and the infantry tactics, the strict discipline and the violent brutality.50 Vitellozzo and 
45 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 56, f. 172rv; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 57, 141v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Missive, 58, ff. 127r-128r. See also Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 179; Sanudo, Diari, I., p. 973. 
46 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, f. 31r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 24, ff. 58v-59r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 27, f. 250v;  
47 Sanudo, Diari, I., p. 547. 
48 ASF, Lettere varie, 3, 6r; ASF, Lettere varie, 5, ff. 37r, 71r, and 87r; ASF, Lettere varie, 9, f. 2r. 
49 Contamine, “L’artillerie royale française à la veille des guerres d’Italie,” p. 248; Pepper, “Castles 
and cannons in Naples campaign,” in The French descent into Renaissance Italy. Antecedents and effects, 
ed. David Abulafia (Aldershot, 1995), p. 291. 
50 Pieri, Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana, pp. 366-368; Cecile Clough, “The Romagna 
campaign of 1494. A significant military encounter,” in The French descent into Renaissance Italy, p. 193. 
For the innovation of French guns, and their impact on Italian warfare, see: Pepper, “Castles and 
cannons in Naples campaign,” pp. 286-91; Hall, Hall, Weapons and warfare in Renaissance Europe, 87-
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Camillo mastered pike squares. Paolo, instead, got very interested in firearms, and especially in 
the cannons, in the culverins, and in the falcons of the royal artillery. After their return in 
Umbria, both of them commissioned Florentine and Pistoiese artisans to craft bronze 
harquebuses, molds for the casts of handguns, “French” spears for heavy knights, and infantry 
pole weapons “according to the Swiss custom.” A Spanish gunmaker, maestro Pietro, was 
entrusted, instead, with the manufacture of several falcons. Two cannons were also requested 
from the Florentine commune.51 
The relationships with France and Florence led to a formal condotta with these states. 
The two-year contract was signed on February 12th 1498. Under its terms, Paolo and Vitellozzo 
had to maintain two hundred men-at-arms and two hundred mounted crossbowmen, with an 
annual, net wage of forty thousand florins.52 Despite the high number of troops, Paolo was not 
appointed with the title of general captain due to the previous agreements between the 
Republic and Charles VIII, which forbidden an unilateral designation.53 The death of the king, 
and the incumbent Pisan menace, eventually favored the promotion. 
 
On June 1st, Paolo received the ceremonial baton and the Florentine insignia from the 
Signoria, in praise of his “virtue and experience,” and with “honor, convenience, benefit, and 
reputation of the Republic.”54 Someone, however, despised the appointment. The captain, in 
fact, was chosen in preference to the general governor, Rinuccio from Marsciano, who could 
vaunt sixteen years of uninterrupted career in the Florentine army.55 The Dieci tried to explain 
their reasons, but the count felt very angry at the nomination, threatening to leave the 
encampment with his company and his five brothers, Lamberto, Ludovico, Bernardino, Pirro, 
and Alessandro. In the capital, his resentment and his “dishonor” were soon manipulated by 
the frateschi against the new arrabbiati officials. Once again, the political division of the city 
95; Ridella, “Produzione di artiglierie nel XVI secolo,” pp. 78-87; Jean-François Belhoste, “Nascita e 
sviluppo dell’artiglieria in Europa,” in Il Rinascimento Italiano e l’Europa, III. Produzione e tecniche, pp. 
335-43. 
51 ASF, Lettere varie, 3, ff. 3r, 21r, 31r, 40r, 40r, 67r, 112r, 121r, 124r and 153r; ASF, Lettere varie, 5, 
ff. 9r and 36r;  ASF, Miscellanea repubblicana, 3, e. 98, f. 79r. 
52 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 43, ff. 94r-99v. 
53 Négociations diplomatique de la France avec la Toscane, I., p. 604. 
54 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 43, f. 111v; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, 
p. 179; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 55. 
55 ASF, Otto di pratica, Missive, 7, ff. 40v-41r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 17, ff. 20r-26r; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, c. 81v; Ferdinando Ughelli, Albero et istoria della famiglia de’ conti di 
Marsciano (Rome, 1667), pp. 73-74. 
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had major repercussions on the conduct of the war. Only a significant rise in the governor’s 
condotta convinced him to stay, but the appearance of obedience concealed a fierce rivalry, 
stirred up by the various factions, not counting the Venetian attempts to corrupt and hire the 
count.56 
In the meanwhile, the light cavalry of the rebels continued to raid the countryside. On 
June 3rd, two hundred horsemen appeared in the vicinity of Montecarlo. The formidable 
Venetian stradiotti ventured even into the neighborhood of Florence, sacking inns and burning 
vineyards around San Miniato, San Casciano, and Santa Gonda.57 Nonetheless, Florentine spies 
reported numerous problems among their ranks. Men-at-arms were not properly paid. 
Gunpowder lacked. Above all, the Venetian officers, the provveditore Tommaso Zen and the 
“governor of the militia” Marco from Martinengo, were deeply unpopular among citizens and 
soldiers, because of their “villainy” and their quarrels.58 On June 7th, however, Pisans decided 
to carry out a surprise assault against Ponsacco, in order to bar the way to enemy reinforces. 
The artillery “heavily” damaged the town walls, but Florentine “perturbation” did not last long. 
On the next day, the night advance of the entire Vitelli’s company from Montopoli compelled 
the attackers to withdraw recklessly at sunrise.59 
On June 8th, “two hundred men-at-arms, one hundred and fifty mounted crossbowmen, 
one hundred mounted hand gunners, and one thousand and five hundred infantrymen” 
entered the Florentine encampment in Pontedera, after a long, forced march through the 
Valdichiana, the Chianti region, and the Valdelsa.60 According to the registers of the Dieci, the 
whole army numbered, on paper, seven hundred heavy knights, four hundred and fifty light 
cavalrymen, and more than four thousand foot soldiers.61 Infantry companies, nevertheless, 
were liable to desert, especially if they were not regularly paid. The commissioners lamented 
56 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 57, ff. 140v-141v and 157v-158r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, 
condotte e stanziamenti, 48, ff. 2v-3r; Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, p. 186; de’ Nerli, Commentari, p. 
133; Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 2; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 256; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 183-
84; Sanudo, Diari, I., pp. 1005 and 1022. 
57 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 57, ff. 237r, 270r and 271r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 57, f. 156r; 
Landucci, Diario fiorentino, p. 179.  
58 Sanudo, Diari, I., pp. 985-86 and 990-91; Malipiero, “Annali veneti,” pp. 506 and 509; Priuli, 
“Diari,” I., p. 86. 
59 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 57, ff. 310r, 311r, and 313r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 6rv 
and 10v; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, pp. 55-56. 
60 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 58, ff. 126v and 131r; Sanudo, Diari, I., pp. 990-92; Giuseppe Nicasi, “La 
famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 1504,” Bollettino della Regia 
Deputazione di Storia patria per l’Umbria 17 (1911), p. 346. 
61 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, ff. 2r-7v and 24v-26r. 
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immediately that many connestabili needed recruits, arms, back pays, and current salaries, 
describing their poor condition as a “chaos,” a “random living.” Soldiers besought the Dieci to 
be paid. Giorgio from Imola, for example, bemoaned that he could not “help his companions 
any longer.” The count Cecco from Montedoglio wrote that he had “nothing else to pawn,” 
that he felt “consigned to oblivion,” and that “even friars cannot be patient, with an empty 
stomach.” The inhabitants of Pescia referred that his brigade was constrained to “rob and 
burglarize” the subjects that it had to protect, protesting at its insults and harassment.62 
Guglielmo de’ Pazzi commented that “speeches and promises are useless, now, 
considering the great expenses for this camp,” and with good reason. Parenti calculated that 
the war had a daily cost of one thousand and six hundred florins. The Signori, then, had to 
impose a forced loan, a so-called accatto, scraping fifty thousand florins with an annual 
interest of twelve percent.63 This sum would have spent on wages, and on ammunitions, 
because “soldiers would be useless, if we did not supply them with arms.”64 
 
Supplying the army 
 
In the first half of June, the general commissioners Guglielmo de’ Pazzi and Benedetto de’ Nerli 
were disappointed at the “soaked, worthless gunpowder” present in the encampment. They 
requested the Dieci to dispatch saltpeter, and also all of the “new” culverins and falcons, along 
with carts and draught animals, in order to “protect our land” and “satisfy the captain.” At his 
arrival in Pontedera, in fact, Paolo Vitelli seemed to be very averse to the scarcity and 
disorganization of ordnance.65 Nevertheless, Florentine firearms were not “superabundant.” A 
contemporary inventory of the arsenals of the capital itemized three heavy bronze bombards 
and two iron ones, three bronze cannons, twelve bronze falcons, twenty-six iron spingards, 
and four bronze cerbottane, mounted now on carts, now on trestles and beds.66 The list 
represented the actual production of the city workshops, the combination between the new 
French models and the customary Italian manufacture. 
62 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 57, ff. 252r and 342r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 58, ff. 29r, 48r, 
67r, and 80r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 58, 17rv. 
63 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 186, 190, and 194; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, p. 180; Vaglienti, 
Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 56. 
64 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 91r. 
65 ASF, Dieci di balia, Responsive, 57, ff. 323v, 325r, 342r, and 354r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 
58, f. 43v.  
66 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 58, f. 135v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, f. 337v. 
259
Florentine craftsmen were using tin and copper for the creation of their giant bombarde 
since 1450s, relying on the solid tradition of artists and bell founders. Thirty years later, the 
Republic was undoubtedly in the vanguard of bronze castings. In the public foundries of 
Florence and Pisa, several guns were realized by the renowned Alberghetto Alberghetti and 
Pasquino from Montepulciano, and even by Andrea del Verrocchio. Florentine masters 
experimented on mobile firearms, as spingarde “mounted on carts.” The Medici bank, 
moreover, invested heavily in the purchases of the metals.67 After the fall of the regime, this 
state interest in artillery was also confirmed by the introduction of a significant technological 
improvement. In January 1495, soon after the passage of Charles VIII through Tuscany, the 
Dieci decided to build a new factory for the production of the “very good and very effective” 
French firearms. In March, the first ever bronze cannon produced in Florence was sent to the 
encampment, put on a cart, “according to French custom.”68 
Between the winter of 1495 and the spring of 1498, thirty-eight new guns were cast in 
the workshops of Florence, Volterra, and Firenzuola. Their designers were Francesco di 
Bartolomeo Telli, Bonaccorso di Vettorio Ghiberti, the grandson of the illustrious Lorenzo di 
Cione, and Lorenzo di Giovanni, called Cavaloro, as well as his associate, the “goldsmith” 
Ludovico di Guglielmo del Buono. Other foreign artisans were invited to work in the foundries, 
as Pierre from Douai, Johann from Augsburg, and Antonio Chiariti from Lucca. Even the 
ambassadors in France asked the king for a “master of artillery.”69 All of these craftsmen 
copied the original French firearms, sketching their shapes and imitating the Transalpine 
methods of fusion.70  
 
A French culverin will weigh about one hundred and seven hundred 
kilograms, if it has a bore diameter of twenty or fourteen centimeters, a 
length of three and a half meters […], and a rear part thick as two shot. 
Another culverin will weigh about two tons, if it has a length of three and a 
half meters, and if it fires twenty-seven kilograms of lead […]. 
67 Ansani, “Craftsmen, artillery, and war production,” p. 14. 
68  ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, ff. 15v, 25r, and 32r; ASF, Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 31, f. 149v; ASF, Dieci di Balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 33, f. 245r; ASF, 
Dieci di Balìa, Missive, 32, f. 79rv. For a thorough examination of these sources, see Fabrizio Ansani, 
“The life of a Renaissance gunmaker. Bonaccorso Ghiberti and the development of Florentine artillery in 
the late fifteenth century,” Technology and Culture 58, no. 3 (2017), pp. 760-761. 
69 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 40, f. 356r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 26, f. 82v; 
Négociations diplomatique de la France avec la Toscane, p. 659. 
70 BNCF, Banco rari, 228, 87v-88r 
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French gunmakers are accustomed to cast the breech of their culverins 
three shot thick, that is, one for empty space and two for bronze, that is, 
every side of the chamber as much thick as the gap. This is their own way to 
craft guns with a shot weight of three kilograms of lead, or less. And for the 
pieces with a shot weight of ten, or thirteen, or seventeen kilograms of lead, 
they made these sides two and a half shot thick.  
 
These practitioners also combined technical innovations with traditional machines. Cannons 
and culverins were cast in a single, safer piece, but several falcons were equipped with a 
separate breech, like old spingards, or combined in a sort of ribauldequin.71  
After assuming the command, Paolo Vitelli urged the Dieci to enhance the production of 
these new guns. Throughout the summer, he frequently, anxiously requested heavy and light 
ordnance, “as fast as the masters can manufacture it.”72 Captain’s chancellors supervised the 
construction of new private furnaces for “an easier and better melting,” whilst the Dieci 
ordered the reopening, the repairing, and the widening of the public foundry of the Sapienza. 
Finally, more than sixteen tons of bronze were cast in thirty-two pieces. They were twenty-two 
small falcons of various forms, loaded with one and a half kilogram of lead projectile, and, 
above all, ten cannons, “round, with trunnions,” long from three and a half to four and a half 
meters, weighed from one and a half to two tons, and armed with sixteen and a half kilograms 
of iron shot.73 The price was fixed, as usual, at ten florins di grossi every three hundred and 
thirty kilograms of cast bronze. The cost of pieces weighing less than this measure, such as 
falcons, was set at eighty lire for the same quantity of molten metal.74 
 
The ordnance was promptly moved towards Pontedera, easily transported by the Arno 
river on numerous rafts, or dragged by oxen over the Tuscan hills. In any case, the servants of 
the Signoria were authorized to draft men and animals for completing the task. Several other 
falcons were rapidly shifted from the Vitelli’s stronghold of Città di Castello, so as to “they 
71 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, ff. 181rv and 360v-361r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 13, ff. 
190v-191r. 
72 ASF, Lettere varie, 3, ff. 160r, 163r, 183r, 197r, 204r, 249r, 254r, and 256r. 
73 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 367v, 387v, 427v, 488r and 508v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, 35, ff. 161v, 223v, 244r, 301r, 314r, and 317r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 23, ff. 241v-
242r; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, 183. 
74 ASF, Dieci di Balia, Munizioni, 5, f. 181rv; ASF, Dieci di Balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 318r and 508v. 
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cannot halt, nor by day, nor by night.”75 All of these guns were mounted on French style carts, 
vehicles that “had a robust axle that connected two well carved wheels, in order to shoot 
incessantly and without shelters. The wheels had solid bent spokes, and were strengthened 
with thick iron plates and nails” for withstanding difficult journeys and impassable roads.76 The 
old wooden supports, beds and trestles, were dismantled and discarded.77 The Dieci tasked 
with the manufacture of these new carriages Domenico di Pacino, also known as Nolla, 
Bartolomeo di Ventura Banchini, and the Pratese brothers Lorenzo and Francesco Bifolchi. 
Vitellozzo Vitelli lauded the “worthy” masters for their “incomparable” skills. In a couple of 
weeks, they realize fifteen carrette, each one priced fifty lire. Moreover, they crafted thirty 
pairs of “large” wheels, and modified several old carts with new spokes and new axles.78 The 
Florentine officers also hired Niccolò di Antonio di ser Lolo “with twenty-five horses, twenty-
five men, and twenty-five carts” for the shift of light pieces, with an exorbitant monthly salary 
of two hundred florins, and with the guarantee of free accommodations, free hay, and free 
firewood.79 Antonio from Certaldo, instead, was charged with supervising land transports.80 
Thanks to these vehicles, Paolo Vitelli built a reputation as an “admirable” strategist, capable 
of “leading artillery over mountains and across rivers, like an ancient and strict Roman 
general.”81  
 
The major problem of the new ordnance consisted in its iron projectiles. According to 
contemporary chroniclers, they were totally unknown to Italian warfare before the French 
75 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 86v-88r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, ff. 71v, 83r, 90v, 
91v-92r, and 124v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 1r, 88r, 101r, and 104v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Responsive, 57, ff. 286r and 315r. 
76 Andrea Bernardi, “Cronache forlivesi,” I., 2., ed. Giuseppe Mazzatinti, in Monumenti istorici 
pertinenti alle provincie di Romagna (Bologna, 1896), pp. 17-18; Niccolò Machiavelli, Libro dell’arte della 
guerra (Venice, 1550), f. 96rv. 
77 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 28r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 58, f. 49r; ASF, Lettere varie, 
3, f. 204r. 
78 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 356r, 360r, 364v, 367r, 371r, and 446v-447r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Debitori e creditori, ff. 162v and 168v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 23, ff. 207r and 210r; ASF, 
Lettere varie, 3, ff. 160r, 183r, and 350r. 
79 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 47, f. 13r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, ff. 7v-8r and 75r; ASF, Lettere varie, 3, f. 220r. 
80 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, f. 27v. 
81 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, c. 123v; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 256; Parenti, Storia 
fiorentina, II., p. 192; Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, p. 187. 
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descent.82 As with the guns, Florentine masters assimilated the new technology immediately, 
but Tuscan ironworks could not cast a sufficient quantity of cannonballs, both for the poor 
quality of local metal and for the dearth of adequate blast furnaces.83 An effective saturation 
bombardment, however, needed hundreds of missiles.84 The Dieci tried to deal with this issue 
in any way. On June 4th, they demanded from the town of Castrocaro all the shot that the 
French army had left here fours year before, during its march towards Naples. The entreaty 
aroused a dispute about an hypothetic royal permission for signing the projectiles over to the 
Republic, but the subjects had to eventually give in, after a couple of weeks. Five hundred iron 
balls, so, were dispatched to the capital, a half for cannons, and a half for culverins. They cost 
nothing, except  the mere transport and some thanks.85 Nevertheless, the captain expected 
more projectiles, because he “did not intend to lift a siege due to their scarcity.”86 Giovanni di 
Pierfrancesco de’ Medici, the general commissioner of the province of Romagna, suggested 
smuggling these pallottole from the Venetian state, or acquiring them from the nearby 
factories of Piombino and Elba. A master of the Estense ironwork of Fornovolasco offered the 
Dieci his services and his goods. 87 In July, the officers signed a contract with a Angelo di Filippo 
from Brescia and Baldo di Giovanni from Careggi for a furniture of a three hundred cast iron 
shot.  
 
I remember that today, on July 21, 1498, we have made a bargain with 
Agniolo di Filippo from Brescia and Baldo di Giovanni from Careggi for cast 
iron shot, weighing up to fifty libbre each, according to the model. We will 
pay thirteen lire for every hundred libbre of metal, and Agniolo and Baldo 
have to hand two hundred cannonballs by August 5th and three hundred by 
the 10th of the same month. They have to bring the shot in Signa at their 
expense, except the custom duties of our territory. 
 
82 Vannoccio Biringuccio, Pirotechnia (Venice, 1558), f. 117v; Francesco Guicciardini, Storia d’Italia, 
ed. Silvana Seidel Menchi (Turin, 1971), p. 78. 
83 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 5, f. 37r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 6, ff. 231v-233r; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Entrata e uscita, 14, f. 10v; ASF, Dieci di Balìa, Missive, 32, f. 96r. 
84 Contamine, “L’artillerie royale française à la veille des guerres d’Italie,” pp. 247-48. 
85 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 10, f. 243rv; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 352v-386v; ASF, Dieci 
di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 35, f. 164rv; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, ff. 47v-48r, 60r, and 98v; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 1r, 9v, 51r-52v, 60v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 57, ff. 293r, 294r; ASF, 
Lettere varie, 3, f. 208r; Marino Sanudo, La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia, ed. Rinaldo Fulin (Venice, 
1883), p. 127. 
86 ASF, Lettere varie, 3, f. 237r. 
87 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 120r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 57, f. 283r. 
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The two bought the merchandise in Mantua, Brescia, and Bologna. One month later, the 
associates earned more than one thousand and two hundred lire.88 The Dieci ordered also to 
sculpt traditional, inexpensive stone shot in the quarry of the gorge of Golfolina. Stonecutters 
prepared four hundred rocks for the cannons, and five hundred for the old bombards. The 
expense ranged from seven to fourteen soldi each. Other innumerable, small cast lead 
projectiles were made from six tons of metals.89 At the end of August, nonetheless, the captain 
was still requesting “shot and powder, powder and shot.”90 
 
According to the Venetian payer in Pisa, Vincenzo Valier, the Florentine army could line 
up “two hundred guns mounted on carts, including twenty-five cannons and two bombards.” It 
is likely that also iron spingards and old passavolanti were pressed into service,91 obliging the 
general commissioners to engage several new gunners, and to spend more than one thousand 
and four hundred golden florins for their services. These masters had skills not only in aiming 
ordnance, but also in casting bronze, refining saltpeter, crafting incendiary missiles, repairing 
pieces, and carving vehicles. They came from the whole European continent. Francesco from 
Lucca received twenty florins for betraying Pisans. Cristoph and Johannes from the Holy 
Roman Empire offered a free period of probation for “demonstrating their virtues,” sponsored 
by Vitelli’s chancellor. Johannes Anzi was defined by the Dieci as “excellent” and “vain.” 
Bernardo from Novara presented himself as an “expert gunmaker” and a “perfect gunner.” 
Anton and Wilhelm from Freiburg, and Giovanni from Piedmont, boasted their abilities to 
realize “artillery, carts, shelters, bastions, battering rams, and other defensive and offensive 
engines.” All in all, Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, Gascons, Dutchmen, and Spaniards were 
on the Florentine payrolls, as well as many other Italians. Ioannis from Greece and Giovanni di 
Bartolomeo Boriani were their “heads” in the encampment.92 Their “tireless and important 
work,” their “promptness,” satisfied the captain.93    
 
88 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 355rv and 457v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 35, f. 
215v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, f. 108r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 70v, 102r, and 109v. 
89 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 374v and 386r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 35, f. 
167v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, f. 95r. 
90 Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 1504,” p. 366. 
91 Sanudo, Diari, I., p. 1103. 
92 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, ff. 33v-35r, 61r, 107v-108v, and 
173v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 58, f. 117r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, ff. 9r, 104r, and 122v; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 87v and 129r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 58, f. 43v. 
93 ASF, Lettere varie, 3, f. 322r. 
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The high number of firearms also necessitated the Republic raising the output of 
“mealed” and “corned” gunpowder, the first used for the charges of heavy artillery, the second 
for portable firearms.94 During the summer, a new mill was opened in Leghorn, entrusted to 
Piero di Zanobi, called Zucca, one of the principal Florentine masters, active since early 
1480s.95 Another factory was constructed in the capital, near the Ponte alle Grazie, and 
equipped with a bronze boiler for “refining and drying” saltpeter. It was managed by a 
versatile engineer, Filippo di Giovanni, nicknamed Pippa, and Jacopo di Corso, also known as 
Baia. Officials enrolled also several carpenters in manufacturing the explosive in the pre-
existent workshop of San Niccolò. The aforementioned Bartolomeo di Ventura Banchini, for 
example, did not craft only carts and wooden handles of harquebuses. He could also refine 
eleven tons of raw saltpeter and eight tons of “rotten and bad” gunpowder. Another 
collaborator, Nuziato, was simply a “painter.” The propellant of all of these artisans was paid 
five florins for every three hundred kilograms of saltpeter.96 
The encampment, also, was tooled up with riddles, boilers, scales, and other tools for 
making powder.97 In the first days of August, however, the Dieci were compelled to requisition 
a large amount of explosive from their fortresses of Volterra, Leghorn, Arezzo, Cortona, Borgo 
Sansepolcro, and Pistoia. The consumption grew soon to such massive amounts that it 
exceeded the public productive facilities. 98 The appointees, then, commissioned private 
apothecaries to fabricate the compound. Giovanni di Stagio Barducci dispatched eight tons to 
magazines, and Giovanni di Simone Formiconi more than one thousand kilograms. Zanobi di 
Mechero, instead, purified the nitrate. This explosive was costly, approximately ten florins for 
every three hundred kilograms of raw material.99 Five hundred kilograms of finished article, 
moreover, were acquired in the Papal States for forty-five florins.100  
94 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, f. 107v. For the different typologies of gunpowder, see Hall, 
Weapons and warfare in Renaissance Europe, pp. 69-74; Walter Panciera, “La polvere da sparo,” in Il 
rinascimento italiano e l’Europa, III. Produzione e tecniche, pp. 307-15. 
95 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 27, f. 25v: ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, ff. 25r and 115rv; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, f. 45r. 
96 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 373v, 428r, 451rv, 452v and 495v-498r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Debitori e creditori, 35, ff. 178v, 222v, 224v, and 225v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 23, ff. 324r 
and 331r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, f. 144v. See also Ansani, 
“Geografie della guerra nella Toscana del Rinascimento,” pp. 86-88. 
97 ASF, Lettere varie, 3, ff. 196r and 197r. 
98 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, ff. 77v, 81v, and 82v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 74v. 
99 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, 460v, 447v-478r, and 509r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 
35, ff. 226r, 231r, 236v, and 244r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, f. 130r. 
100 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, f. 358v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 70v. 
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The overall expenditure was very, very considerable. By the end of the campaign, the 
Florentine guns consumed more than thirty-six tons of gunpowder, nine times more than the 
preceding year.101 For its transport, the Dieci had also to purchase about six hundred barrels. 
Their price was fixed to twelve soldi for the “small” containers, and fifteen for the “large” 
ones.102 
 
For improving and maintaining this levels of productivity, the Dieci had to collect a large 
quantity of raw materials, encouraging internal commerce and augmenting importations from 
the neighboring regions. The duties on the Volterranean yellow sulfur, for example, were 
temporarily abolished. Three hundred and thirty kilograms of this mineral had a value of seven 
florins. In the countryside, the cut down of willows and the production of charcoal was 
authorized and promoted, in spite of public or private rights to forests and timbers. Beech and 
chestnut, instead, were required for stoking furnaces and for casting metals. In general, three 
hundred and thirty kilograms of burnt wood cost twenty-seven lire and ten soldi.103 
Saltpeter, instead, was not artificially produced in Tuscany. It was “scarce as much as 
necessary.” 104 Merchants had to procure it abroad. Piero di Matteo Berti, a Florentine 
businessman, sold three and a half tons of raw nitrate for four hundred and thirty-seven 
florins. Giovanni Bentivoglio, the lord of Bologna, allowed his allies to pick up three hundred 
kilograms of refined material. The brothers Andrea and Faragano were rewarded with ten 
florins for the opening of their modest nitrary in Castrocaro. Small quantities of raw compound 
were also dispatched from the castles of Modigliana and Firenzuola, or bought from the 
aforementioned Pippa, or from Pratese and Viterbese masters, or from one the keepers of 
Florentine arsenals, Gaspare di Antonio Pasquini. All imports were exempted from taxes and 
tolls.105  
The most important deals, instead, were negotiated and signed by republican envoys to 
Italian courts. In August, in Genoa, the Florentine ambassador Braccio Martelli obtained four 
101 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 35, ff. 22v, 110v, 180v, 242v, 251v, and 286v. 
102 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, f. 412v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 35, f. 203v. 
103 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 423r and 426v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 35, ff. 
228v and 255v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 58, f. 79r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, f. 104r; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Missive, 60, f. 134r. 
104 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 128r. 
105 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 341r, 344v, 347r, 361r, 362r, 381v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori 
e creditori, 35, ff. 219r and 235v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, f. 124rv; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, ff. 82v and 119v. 
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tons of saltpeter to the value of seven hundred florins, including various duties and chartered 
boats. He tried also to smuggle other material through a “secret way,” with the help of friendly 
retailers.106 In the same period, Francesco Gualterotti, in Rome, traded eight tons of refined 
mineral with the Sienese banker Giulio Spannochi.107  
 
Today I met both the saltpeter maker, Antonio from Leccia, and a boy of 
these Spannochi. I have concluded a deal with them on eight tons of 
saltpeter. The price has been fixed at fifty ducats for every thirty-three 
kilograms of merchandise. The goods must be consigned to the customs 
officers of Florence within a month. The bankers will pay the expenses for 
transportations, except the tools of our state. The saltpeter has to be 
similar, or even better than the sample that I received from your lordships 
[…].  
I could not obtain a discount, because these Spannochi know how to sell 
their stuffs timely, and how to move this materiel through the Sienese 
territory. Besides, they have not agreed to supply more saltpeter in less 
time. However, they have guaranteed that the first barrels will appear in our 
capital within fifteen days.       
 
All of this mineral was rapidly “transformed in gunpowder.” A few weeks later, also Ludovico 
Sforza was persuaded to supply ten tons of “indispensable” refined nitrate, dispatching them 
from the Adriatic port of Pesaro. Nevertheless, despite urgency, the transport was slower and 
more problematic than expected, due to the lack of barrels, sacks, and mules. In the 
meanwhile, in Milan, a Neapolitan merchant offered a significant amount of goods to the 
Florentine emissary, Francesco Pepi.108 By the mid of August, the Dieci affirmed that they “had 
bought so much saltpeter that masters can mix gunpowder until the end of the campaign.”109  
 
The army was provided also with portable firearms. Francesco from Asti cast numerous 
bronze harquebuses in Leghorn. Baldo di Giovanni from Careggi traded one hundred and 
sixteen iron harquebuses, purchasing them in Brescia, along with the cannonballs. The priced 
106 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, 108v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 
60, ff. 88v-89r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 58, f. 338v. 
107 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 394v, 398v, 406v, 407v, and 409r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, 35, f. 248r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 23, f. 351v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, f. 
127v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 143r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 58, ff. 175rv and 183r 
108 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 410v, 448v, and 511v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 
35, f. 314r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 128rv, 131v, and 136r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 54, 
ff. 60rv, 69r, 78v, and 89r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 58, f. 219v. 
109 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, f. 93v. 
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was fixed at twenty lire for every thirty-three kilograms of merchandise. The same cost had the 
twenty-eight pieces traded by Niccolò di Alessandro Machiavelli. A carter, Piero di Bino, sold 
instead eighty “heavy Brescian handguns” at three lire and three soldi each. The Dieci 
purchased also six hundred iron scouring sticks. 110 Several iron harquebuses were also 
transported from Città di Castello. The captain himself solicited fuses, ramrods, trestles, and 
encourage the presence of “useful” foot soldiers and mounted units armed with hand guns. He 
appointed his secretaries and his servants to buy one hundred bronze firearms in Florence and 
in Bologna, along with their molds and their ramrods. He also contacted fifty Pisan 
scoppiettieri, convincing the general commissioners to hire their company.111 
 
The Republic supplied its army also with thousands and thousands darts. In June, thirty-
eight thousand quarrels were stored in Florentine arsenals, alongside seventeen thousand 
bolts. Angelo di Filippo from Brescia and Baldo di Giovanni from Careggi deposited further 
twenty-seven thousand “common” arrowheads and five thousand “large” ones, as well as ten 
thousand “olive leaf, half-moon, pointed, and spiked” pieces for mounted crossbowmen. They 
received three thousand lire. Francesco de’ Nerli, instead, made one thousand lire from thirty-
one thousand artifacts of “common” type.112 Arrowheads were then fixed to shafts by 
assembly workers. Fletchers, instead, bound the feathers. The three brothers Nonni, Antonio, 
and Santi del Nonni manufactured almost eighty thousand darts, during the whole summer, 
purchasing the wooden part of quarrels over the Umbrian Apennines.113 Besides quarrels, the 
Dieci acquired linen thread for the manufacture of bowstrings. Eighteen thousand bobbins 
were shifted in Pontedera, at a cost of one hundred and eighty florins, more or less.114  
110 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 341rv, 421v, 447v, 466r, and 467v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori 
e creditori, 35, f. 185v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 58, f. 83r. 
111 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 58, f. 43r; ASF, Lettere varie, 3, ff. 90r, 112r, 121r, 153r, 160r, 183r, 
196r, 197r, and 204r; Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 
1504,” pp. 383 and 386. See also Pieri, Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana, p. 373. 
112 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 362r and 473r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 35, f. 
218v. 
113 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 35, ff. 57v, 174v, and 246v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, f. 174r. For the production cycle of darts, see Ansani, 
“Craftsmen, artillery, and war production,” p. 17. 
114 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 350r and 478v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 48, f. 126r. 
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So, one arrow after another, one cannon after another, the Dieci would have spent six 
thousand and six golden florins on ammunitions, within the end of their semester, on 
December 1498.115  
 
Market and mercenaries   
 
Officers had at their disposal also steel and wooden crossbows, but these weapons were 
usually bought from soldiers. Infantrymen had the property of their bucklers, of their sallets, of 
their swords. They could purchase arms in camp, or in the shops of retailers of second-hand 
goods, or even from their employers. The Dieci usually deducted the price of these supplies 
from wages. The connestabile Dionigi Naldi, for example, received twenty crossbows, twenty-
two cuirasses, and one hundred and fifty helmets instead of five hundred and fifty lire of 
salary. Generically, a breastplate could be sold at seven lire, a reinforced cuirass at sixteen lire, 
a simple armet at three lire and five soldi, a spear at twelve soldi.116 Men-at-arms, instead, 
preferred the renowned, resistant Lombard articles. Paolo and Vitellozzo Vitelli were indebted 
to maestro Giacomo di Pietro from Milan for six hundred and fifty ducats, the price of several 
gauntlets, spaulders, pauldrons, vambraces, greaves, “Swiss” breastplates, “Italian” and 
“French” armets, barbutes, helmets, and a full armor. During the Pisan campaign, they 
purchased one hundred and fifty “resistant” and “good-looking” cuirasses. 117 In Florence, the 
brothers bought only horses of various breeds and coats, black, gray, bay, for warfare or 
transport. Their value fluctuated between fifteen and forty-three ducats.118 A tack maker from 
Borgo Sansepolcro also put forward to the captain a society for producing and trading saddles 
for the company.119  
 
Giovannantonio, I beg you for asking Paolo and Vitellozzo if they want 
twenty-five or thirty saddles for them, at a fair price. I will made every tack 
at my expenses, saddle, stirrups, breastplates, girths, and blankets. I will sell 
the finished piece at two golden ducats […]. Their lordships have only to 
hand me a list, signed by the purchasers of these saddle, men-at-arms, or 
mounted crossbowmen, or light cavalrymen. I hope to earn ninety-five 
ducats. I will halve the profit with their lordships, like a good and honest 
115 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 39, f. 292v. 
116 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 351r and 415r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 84r and 101v.  
117 ASF, Lettere varie, 3, f. 237r; ASF, Lettere varie, 5, ff. 6rv, 7v, and 75r. 
118 ASF, Lettere varie, 3, f. 53r; ASF, Lettere varie, 3, ff. 12r-13r. 
119 ASF, Lettere varie, 9, f. 5r.  
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associate. However, at the moment, I beg fifty ducats from their lordships, 
in order that I can go to the fair and buy leather, saving some money. I hope, 
with the help of God, to craft all of these stuffs within six months.  
 
The two condottieri often sold or lend to their troop also clothes and hoses, and paid and 
rewarded their men-at-arms with berets, giornee decorated with the white “French” cross, 
cloaks, tabards, “Turkish” casacche, and various and colorful textiles, as baize, velvet, plain 
weave, brocade, and satin. Paolo and Vitellozzo, instead, often dressed in elegant Transalpine 
fashion, with a certain proud.120  
The condottieri also looked after the barracks of their brigade. The Dieci refunded to 
them two thousand and seven hundred lire for two hundred and thirty five “tents for two 
bottoms.” Obviously, the captain had the privilege of “decent” mattresses, blankets, and 
pavilions.121 His dignity was also symbolized by the republican insignia. Florentine government 
offered to its general captains and its general governors the flag of the Commune, a large, 
square white standard with the red lily. The taffeta, the silk, and the manufacture came to fifty 
florins.122 Other banners were used for the cavalry squadrons and the infantry units.123     
 
Sir Cerbone, we are sending you six shields with six different liveries painted 
on them, along with an azure flag. You have to task a tailor with the making 
of six standards for the infantry as large as the azure one, and all of them 
have to be marked with the pictures of the shields and the numbers, one, 
two, three, etcetera. You have also to order five other white banners for the 
men-at-arms, but larger than the azure one. The first have to depict a calf, 
the second a lion, the third a black horse, the fourth a red eagle. For the fifth 
use a purple fleur-de-lis, which represents the coat of arms of the king of 
France. The symbols have to be visible and apparent. 
 
120 ASF, Lettere varie, 3, ff. 48r, 90r, 161r, 183r, 235r, 316r, and 320r; ASF, Lettere varie, 5, ff. 15r, 
61r, and 62r; ASF, Lettere varie, 6, ff. 114r-131r. For these markets in clothes and textiles inside 
mercenary and “mercantile” companies, see Mario del Treppo, “Gli aspetti organizzativi, economici e 
sociali di una compagnia di ventura italiana,” Rivista Storica Italiana 85 (1973), no. 2, pp. 253-75; William 
Bernardoni, “La compagnia del capitano Micheletto Attendolo nella contabilità quattrocentesca della 
Fraternita dei Laici di Arezzo,” Annali aretini 22 (2014), pp. 115-44.  
121 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, f. 49r; ASF, lettere varie, 3, f. 160r.  
122 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 22, f. 190v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 30, f. 225v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 42, ff. 167v and 171v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, f. 92r; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 26, f. 59v. 
123 ASF, Lettere varie, 3, f. 99rv. 
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Contrary to other companies, the vitelleschi did not depend exclusively on the Dieci for 
the equipping their soldiers with spears. Through his brother-in-law, Francesco Bracciolini, 
Paolo could buy hundreds of pole arms in Pistoia. This town, at that time, was the Tuscan 
center of their production. Goods were sold in Florence, in Siena, in Lucca, and even in Pisa. 
Pace di Pippo and Donato di Giuliano were two of the most important manufacturers of shafts 
and iron pointed heads. A local wholesaler, Doffo di Piero Partini, controlled the market, 
dealing with customers, offering sales on “excellent stuffs,” and recommending his “very good 
friends.” Doffo tendered with the captain for one hundred items for infantry at sixty lire, and 
one hundred “French” spears for cavalry at twenty-two florins. The institutional buyers, 
instead, paid a bit more, both for traditional arms and new, Transalpine shapes.124 In any case, 
the Dieci stocked up with shafts and spearheads, dispatching the finished products in their 
camps. At the end of the campaign, they had acquired ten thousand blades in Brescia and in 
Pistoia, and seven thousand and six hundred spears for infantrymen, light horse, and men-at-
arms. 125   
 
From Buti to Librafratta 
 
In spite of all these expenditures, in the midsummer the army was still entrenched in the 
Florentine territory, in the vicinity of the village of Calcinaia, near to the Arno river. After the 
Pisan withdraw, the operations had slowed down. The only significant encounter took place on 
July 26th, when Paolo Vitelli set a trap for the enemy light cavalry in the surrounding of Cascina, 
capturing one hundred and fifty prisoners and fifty mules laden with food.126 According to 
Parenti, the Florentine government, at that time, was not giving any order to move, or to 
attack. The captain, instead, waited for money, guns, and reinforcements, while engineers and 
architects tried to repair the walls of Ponsacco. Soldiers could only protect the indispensable 
harvesting of wheat, helping peasants and pioneers.127     
124 ASF, Lettere varie, 3, ff. 21r, 49r, and 346r; ASF, Lettere varie, 5, ff. 33r and 112r. 
125 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Munizioni, 7, ff. 342r, 351r, and 362r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 
35, ff. 168v, 173v, and 232v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, f. 145v; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, f. 93v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 91r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 
53, f. 154r. 
126 Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, pp. 56-57; Sanudo, I diari, I., pp. 1026-28; Priuli, “Diari,” I., p. 93. 
127 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, f. 12rv; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive,  60, ff. 18rv and 42rv; ASF, Dieci 
di balìa, Responsive, 58, f. 48r; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 188.  
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The Florentine officers, besides, had to supply their troops also with “ammunition of 
food.” Soldiers “cannot feed on Only Ghost,” wrote, provocatively, Guglielmo de’ Pazzi, 
remembering the necessity of “abundant” provisions in order to prevent desertions and 
protests. On the first half of June, the Dieci had to arrange a public bread market in the town 
of Pontedera. Several bakers, here, blend the flour lent by the government. Five servants 
supervised the production of nourishment, and its influx from the surrounding towns. In 
Florence, the Dieci often organized the transportation of bread from the capital to the camp. 
The monthly cost of pane cotto, biscuits, sacks, and baskets, could exceed the sum of five 
thousand lire, but the “mobile city” of an army could consume more food than expected.128 At 
that time, this “fifth quarter” of Florence numbered about eight thousand “inhabitants,” not 
counting hundreds of merchants, artisans, carpenters, bricklayers, stonecutters, cooks, wives, 
lovers, prostitutes, boys, servants. It was necessary to raid the countryside for obtaining pigs, 
steers, and goats. Peasants, moreover, could sold meat, eggs, fruit, cheese, and the 
indispensable wine, the drink most beloved by soldiers.129 Above all, villagers provided hay for 
men-at-arms. Bales, in fact, were granted to knights without any payment. In the valley of the 
Arno river, officials obliged every countryman to dispatch one kilogram of straw to Pontedera, 
threatening latecomers and reluctant subjects with fines and imprisonment.130 
 
Plundering and skirmishes engaged the troop until the arriving of a Milanese contingent, 
two hundred men-at-arms and two hundred and fifty mounted crossbowmen, leaded by the 
count Ludovico from Mirandola. In Romagna, another Lombard condottiere, Gaspare 
Sanseverino, better known as Fracassa, barred the way to enemy Venetian reinforcements. At 
the beginning of July, Ludovico Sforza was deciding to side manifestly with Florence, proposing 
the marquis of Mantua as the general captain of their league, and sending an envoy for 
reconciling Paolo Vitelli and Rinuccio from Marsciano. Another ambassador had to mediate 
between Florence and Siena.131  
128 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 33, f. 223v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, ff. 81v, 83v, 110v, 112v, and 113v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Missive, 59, f. 139rv. 
129 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 36, f. 214rv.  
130 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 35v, 90v, 99v, and 103v. 
131 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, ff. 35v and 39v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 39rv and 43r; 
ASF, Consulte e pratiche, 64, ff. 87r-98r and 101r-102r; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 190; Buonaccorsi, 
Diario, pp. 2-4; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, pp. 57-58. 
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After various procrastinations, hence, the Dieci decided finally to made the most of the 
opportunity. In the general city council, they proposed  a new tax on the Florentine 
countryside, attaining twenty thousand florins. A subvention of fifteen thousand ducats, 
moreover, was offered by the duke of Milan.132 This ready cash was spent in enlisting new 
infantry companies. In a couple of weeks, the treasurer of the Dieci, Alfonso Strozzi, enlisted 
more than one thousand provvigionati. Seven Florentine connestabili came forward with four 
hundred men. Dionigi Naldi moved five hundred companions from Romagna, and hundreds 
and hundreds of Italian, Swiss, and Spanish mercenaries followed the army, waiting for a 
contract. As usual, moreover, Pistoiese commune conscripted two hundred infantrymen. The 
Dieci issued also a peremptory proclamation, imposing upon every knight and every foot 
soldier to left Florence and reach the encampment immediately, and menacing corporal 
punishments for the deserters. Four citizens were assigned to review the troops.133  
Two thousand pioneers were also mobilized in the villages of Casentino, in the Scarperia 
region, and in the Pratese countryside. Several “loyal” and “reserved” spies were sent in Pisa 
and in Cascina, in order that “we can defend ourselves easily, and offend the rebels 
confidently.”134 On August 15th, the officers solicited the new general commissioners, Piero 
Popoleschi and Jacopo Pitti, to finally guide the army towards an enemy position.135 
 
You ought to regard the desires of our city. The people expects some results 
from the provisions we have so difficultly made. Considering the proper 
supplies of artillery and gunpowder, and having hired five thousand 
infantrymen, we have already satisfied all of the captain’s demands. Here, in 
Florence, everyone judge that the victory consists in the quickness of your 
actions. The Signori, as well as private citizens, reminded us of soliciting your 
departure from the encampment. Within Friday, or Saturday, the troop has 
to begin its march, according to your wise opinion and to the captain’s 
experience and art. Be diligent. We would not like to be charged with 
delaying this expedition. 
 
Notwithstanding another altercation between the captain and the governor, the Florentine 
soldiers left Calcinaia on August 19th, before dawn, pointing north, with the purpose of 
132 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 54, ff. 49v, 69r, 94v and 95r; ASF, Consulte e pratiche, 64, ff. 97r-
99r. 
133 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, ff. 69rv, 94rv, and 95v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 85v, 91v, 
and 99r; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 58. 
134 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 28v, 36v, and 72v-73r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Responsive, 58, f. 43r. 
135 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 90r. See also ASF, Consulte e pratiche, 64, ff. 105r-106r. 
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conquering the hills that dominated the Pisan plain and bordered the Lucchese territory. 
Florentine commanders, in fact, were trying to isolate the rebels from their allies, blocking the 
road towards Liguria and Emilia, and cutting off the daily arrivals of food, weapons, and 
reinforcements from the deceitful, treacherous neighbors.136 
 
Shortly after its departure, the army appeared under the walls of Buti. Thanks to their 
carts and their trunnions, fourteen cannons and fifty falcons were immediately fired. The 
bombardment lasted four hours. The town, nonetheless, did not surrender, and had to be 
taken by force. Its resistance was severely punished by the captain himself, according to the 
brutality of his French masters. He ordered the hanging of several inhabitants, and even 
children were imprisoned and sent in Florence. The hands of five gunners, moreover, were 
amputated, and hanged on the shoulders of the unfortunate soldiers.137 Sanudo reported that 
this loss and this violence caused anguish and fear among the Pisan troops. Only twelve days 
before, they had believed that the Florentine army was disbanding. The maimed, above all, 
frightened to death the commissioner of the Most Serene Republic, Piero Duodo, and the 
Venetian general governor, Marco from Martinengo.138 The new warfare was apparently 
working. The replacement of the old, cumbersome, giant artillery with a full train of mobile 
ordnance was speeding up the assaults. The siege of an “insignificant hovel” could not slacken 
the campaign anymore. On the contrary, the Florentine army had covered six miles, and 
shelled and seized a town, in just one day. 
The news and the progresses cheered up and “united” Florentine people. Relying on the 
“hope of further and better successes,” four hundred thousand florins were collected in a few 
days, and handed to payers. The government announced also the condotta of Giovampaolo 
Baglioni from Perugia, a longtime friend of the Vitelli, with seventy men-at-arms and fifty 
mounted crossbowmen. Furthermore, beating the Venetian competition, the Commune and 
Ludovico Sforza hired the lord of Piombino, Jacopo IV Appiano, appointing him with the title of 
Milanese general governor, and entrusting to him two hundred knights.139  
136 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, ff. 101v-102r and 107r; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 192 
137 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, f. 111v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 101v and 102v; Landucci, 
Diario fiorentino, p. 183; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 59; Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, p. 177; 
Sanudo, Diari, I., p. 1068; Priuli, “Diari,” I., p. 95. 
138 Sanudo, Diari, I., pp. 1039, 1056, and 1062; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, pp. 256-57. See also Pieri, 
Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italia, p. 373.  
139 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 48, ff. 8v-9r and 10r-11r; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Missive, 60, f. 92r; ASF, Lettere varie, 3, f. 259r; Sanudo, Diari, I., pp. 1058 and 1063. 
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Only the frateschi seemed to be displeased with the military and diplomatic 
achievements of the arrabbiati Dieci.140 The Florentine rulers disputed also the objective of the 
expedition. The officers demanded from their commissioners to besiege Vico Pisano, one of 
the principal towns of the rebels, “well defended by eight hundred Venetian infantrymen and 
hundreds of armed peasants.” The captain, instead, preferred obstinately to storm the nearby 
fortress of Verruca, a formidable but remote observation post over the valley below. The Dieci 
protested “animatedly” against his decision, considering the enterprise to be “unnecessary, 
dishonorable and harmful for the reputation of our Republic and our powerful army,” and a 
“deceit of our soldiers for wasting time and requesting another pay.” They reaffirmed that “we 
cannot bear the cost of this campaign any longer, if you do not quickly get other significant 
results.”141 
 
In the meanwhile, on August 28th, the village of Calci, located about ten miles east of 
Buti, gave in, along with its hamlets. Also the fortified monastery of Saint Michael, about a half 
mile west of Verruca, was occupied by Florentine forces in the same days. The captain ordered 
also the construction of a bastion over the Dolorosa, a high rocky spur placed in the 
neighboring woods. Then “we will move towards Vico, in order to satisfy our lords, even 
though we would rather attack the castle.”142 Between the army and the victory, however, 
there were two other major obstacle. The first was the soldiers’ request of money, interpreted 
again by the Dieci as a “regrettable and dishonest blackmail,” a “sign of disloyalty.” The second 
was a terreplein fortified with wooden structures and artillery, which protected the hillside of 
Vico.143 
 
Yesterday, on August 30th, with the help of God, we carried the ordnance to 
this bastion. Gunners fired a few shot, while we were pitching the tents of 
our encampment. The last night cannons hit the target repeatedly and 
vigorously. Now, enemies are abandoning the place, due to our 
bombardment. They are taking refuge in Vico. We hope that, with the help 
of God, the town will be captured soon. In any case, sir Corrado, you have to 
solicit coins and gunpowder from our lords, and especially the cash. There is 
no doubt at all that these soldiers will willingly die for this excellent Signoria, 
after receiving their wages. 
140 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 110v; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, pp. 192-93. 
141 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, ff. 112r-113r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 102v. 
142 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, ff. 123v-124r; ASF, Lettere varie, 3, f. 254r; Sanudo, Diari, I., pp. 
1064, 1073, and 1075. 
143 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 117v-118r; ASF, Lettere varie, 3, f. 255r. 
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  The Dieci replied that the seizing of Vico would have easily guaranteed the accumulation of “a 
large amount of money, which are the nervus belli,” demonstrating to the adversaries, and 
especially to Venetians, that “we are winning, wealthy, and united.”144   
On September 1st, the guns were aimed at Vico, but they malfunctioned, due to the 
heavy rain. Moreover, an enemy culverin, along with two falcons, was storming the batteries, 
damaging shelters, breaking three carts, and killing two gunners. Pisans were striving 
desperately to react to the Florentine predominance, supplying the besieged town with 
gunpowder, shot, and arrows. They also raided frequently the vicinity of Pontedera, and 
enlisted several infantrymen. Nevertheless, the rebel army was decidedly outnumbered by its 
foes. According to Vincenzo Valier, the Venetian commanders had at their disposal only one 
thousand foot soldiers and fifty cavalry squadrons, too few for attempting effective 
counterattacks. On September 4th, the infantry captain, Giacomo from Tarsia, struggled to 
create a diversion, fighting back against the garrison of the church of Saint Michael, and 
overcoming it.145 
This maneuver was probably too late. Two hundred soldiers had left Vico two days 
before, reducing the likelihood of enduring a strike. The Florentine ordnance, above all, was 
aimed at “the weakest and most undefended part of the walls,” as suggested by the same 
enemy deserters. Witnesses referred that artillery shot one hundred and fifty projectiles per 
day, breaching more than ten meters of stone.146 On September 5th, four hundred infantrymen 
mutinied, “after the breaking of the wall, because they did not want to die.” 
 
We had took control of Vico Pisano in this way. Our guns reduced the 
defenses to rubble, and we hoped to attack in the evening. However, our 
adversaries were scared, and they did not crave to await the battle. So, they 
entered negotiations, granting to us the possession of the town and of their 
guns. We promised to spare both the life and the belongings of the 
inhabitants.               
 
144 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 125r-126r. 
145 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 127v; ASF, Lettere varie, 3, ff. 292r and 293r; Parenti, Storia 
fiorentina, II., p. 194; Sanudo, Diari, I., pp. 1074-76, 1078, and 1085. 
146 Landucci, Diario fiorentino, p. 183; Sanudo, Diari, I., pp. 1078 and 1084. 
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Paolo Vitelli menaced only the last, stubborn defenders with the mutilation of their hands. He 
also claimed  the captured firearms, four culverins and several spingards and falcons.147  
 
After the conquest, the rest of the army split, coming back temporarily to Bientina, 
Pontedera, and Calcinaia. Carpenters and smiths repaired carts and cannons. Architects, 
stonecutters, and bricklayers reconstructed the damaged walls of Vico.148 Condottieri, instead, 
solicited money. Again. And again. The captain was “on fire,” because of the “scarce 
provisions” of the Dieci for several condottieri, for the Milanese crossbowmen, and for “all the 
infantrymen, that are continuously breathing down our necks.” The cash was essential for 
“swelling the ranks of the companies” and for “persuading the brigade to stay with us, while 
the enemies are offering generous pays.” He also solicited “gunpowder, shot, and pioneers,” 
explaining that “the autumnal bad weather could halt the campaign soon,” and complaining 
that “everything has to be begged, everything arrives after one year.”149     
In Florence, the necessity of money lead even to a modification in the electoral system. 
The officials responsible for the public debt were proposed exclusively by the Signoria, and 
then hurriedly voted. They were urged to lend fifty thousand florins. An irritated Vaglienti 
commented that “this war is waged by the savings of our people,” while “the magnates are 
getting richer from the interests on their loans.”150 
Citizens, however, could not get rid of this problem. Pisans did not give up. They fortified 
the town of Cascina, the tower of Foce d’Arno, and  the fortress of Librafratta, digging moats, 
building ravelins, and realizing terrepleins. On September 10th, moreover, one thousand foot 
soldiers and one hundred and fifty mounted crossbowmen assaulted the bastion of the 
Dolorosa, endeavoring to regain the control of the adjacent hills.  
 
This morning, at sunrise, the rebels reached the Dolorosa, bearing ladders 
and portable firearms. Here, they attacked our position, wounding forty of 
147 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, f. 148v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 135rv; Lettere varie, 3, f. 
286r; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 59; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 257; Guicciardini, Storia 
fiorentina, p. 188; Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, pp. 177-78; Cambi, “Istorie,” pp. 134-35; Sanudo, 
Diari, I., pp. 1078-79 and 1085; Priuli, “Diari,” I., p. 99. 
148 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, ff. 152v-153r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 138r, 143r, and 
145r; Sanudo, Diari, I., pp. 1099 and 1103; Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica 
Fiorentina fino al 1504,” p. 385.  
149 Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 1504,” pp. 372-77, 
382, and 384. 
150 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 194-95; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 60. 
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our men. Informed, the captain got on his horse, and prepared his company. 
He set off for the hills immediately. Vitellozzo, instead, left from Vico for 
Calci, in order to occupy the passes and block the roads towards Pisa, 
preventing the enemy retreat. At the sight of our forces, Pisans withdrew, 
but they soon encountered our soldiers hidden on the slopes. A skirmish 
broke out. After a while, the captain struck our foes from behind, putting 
them to flight. Finally, we captured six connestabili and one hundred 
stradiotti. We grabbed also the most part of their infantrymen, and Giacomo 
from Tarsia was seriously wounded.  
 
It was a heavy defeat for the rebels. Their infantry was totally overwhelmed, and lost 
numerous crossbows, “countless” quarrels, and all of the guns. Florentines, on the contrary, 
became the “absolute masters” of the countryside. Vitellozzo raided as far as the gates of Pisa, 
plundering one hundred beasts of burden, and taking several captives among the peasants.151 
Furthermore, on September 17th, the commissioners ambushed a Venetian convoy that 
transported five thousand kilograms of gunpowder from Ravenna to Pisa.152 
This rise was interrupted only by the umpteenth dissension within the Florentine 
government. According to Guicciardini, Rinuccio from Marsciano and “arrogant and inexpert” 
rulers, backed by the common people, coveted to besiege Cascina, or even Pisa, taking 
advantage of the enemy disbandment. Paolo Vitelli and his “supporters,” instead, were of the 
opinion that both these cities were “almost impregnable,” due to the “defense of valorous and 
desperate men” and the “high number of guns.” The captain would rather have surrounded 
the Pisan region, depriving the rebels of any possibility of military assistance from Venice, 
Lucca, and Genoa. At last, on September 23rd, he personally decided to march on Librafratta, 
completing the conquest of the hills and the encirclement of the countryside.153 
 
Today, on September 28th, we took control of the bastion of Librafratta in 
this way. As soon as the enemies saw our artillery, they shouted out ‘pacts, 
pacts,’ and demanded for capitulating within three hours. We did not agree, 
and a skirmish broke out. After a little while, we seized the post definitively.  
   
151 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, ff. 140v-141r; ASF, Lettere varie, 3, f. 301r; Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 
10; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, pp. 183-84; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 257; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, 
II., p. 195-96; Sanudo, Diari, I., pp. 1092-93.  
152 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 60, f. 154rv. 
153 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Missive, 59, p. 152r; ASF, Lettere varie, 3, f. 294rv; ASF, Miscellanea 
repubblicana, 3, e. 98, f. 50r; Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, pp. 188-89; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 
197-98; Sanudo, Diari, I., p. 1105;  
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Two other towers fell three days later. The entire fortress yielded on October 3rd, after a “good 
bombardment.” In the same days, the army, “six thousand infantrymen, one thousand and five 
hundred light horses, and five hundred men-at-arms,” occupied also Filettole, securing the 
high valley of the Serchio river.154  
The war theatre would have later moved eastwards, in the mountain region of 
Casentino. The agreements between the Most Serene Republic and Piero de’ Medici, in fact, 
would have resulted in an invasion of Tuscany in the fall of 1498, and in an effective diversion 
from the Pisan campaign. In a “disordered” Florence, the frateschi and the palleschi gave 
“openly” the impression to conspire against the state. The firsts, above all, criticized and 
defame the Dieci di Balìa and all of the arrabbiati rulers. Parenti commented, sadly, that “we 
were so close to the victory. Now, we are on the brink of our ruin.” 155 
Whilst the Venetian troops overflowed into the borders, Paolo and Vitellozzo Vitelli 
were compelled to leave from the encampment for Arezzo on mid November. The brothers 
carried with them the most part of the army, and, obviously, six cannons, two culverins, and 




Numerous guns, saturation bombardments, unprecedented violence, immediate surrendering, 
and rapid movements. The victories of Paolo Vitelli seemed to be a triumph, for his French 
fashioned warfare. Five fortified positions, among towns and fortresses, fell one after the 
other, in the course of forty-seven days. Vico and its bastion, above all, were seized in less than 
a week. Compared to the sieges of the previous decade, the differences were many, and 
significant. The conquest of Citerna and Città di Castello, in 1482, required five months. 
Pietrasanta resisted Florentine assaults from August to November 1484. Eight heavy bombards 
did not subdue Sarzana in 1487, frustrating the republican commanders. 
154 ASF, Lettere varie, 3, ff. 298r and 304r; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, p. 186; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi 
tempi, p. 60; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 199; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 257; Buonaccorsi, Diario, 
p. 14; Sanudo, Diari, II., ed.  Guglielmo Berchet (Venice, 1879), pp. 8 and 16; Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di 
Città di Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 1504,” pp. 398-99. 
155  For this alliance between the Venetian government and the exiled son of Lorenzo the 
Magnificent, see Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 193-212; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, pp. 257-59; 
Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, pp. 179-83; Malipiero, “Annali veneti,” pp. 509-10 
156 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, ff. 69r, 72r, 73r, 75r, 81r, 82v, and 90r. 
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The new strategy was not slowed or hindered by the shift and the positioning of the 
traditional, cumbersome bombards. Gunners should not have to wait weeks for their weapons. 
Not even the absence of pioneers could halt the operations. The captain protested 
continuously about their desertion, but the ordnance could be transported everywhere, in 
spite of everything. By hand, if needed.157 Carts and trunnions, moreover, permitted a simple 
aim. And the iron shot proved to be undoubtedly effective.  
This rapidity, however, was counterbalanced by the necessity of a planned, constant, 
adequate supplying of projectiles, gunpowder, and firearms. The Dieci had to improve their 
management of the equipment. Within six months, the expenditures on ammunitions doubled, 
exceeding six thousand golden florins.158 The production increased. New workshops were 
opened, and new craftsmen were employed in refining, mixing, assembling, casting. During the 
whole summer, gunmakers realized more than thirty pieces, as much as they had 
manufactured by the adoption of the French technology. The outputs reached the same, 
notable levels of the preceding years, when the Pisan factories were still under the Florentine 
control.  
Nevertheless, the natural scarcity of the saltpeter and the frequent shortage of missiles 
compelled the officers to turn often to foreign markets. Dozens of cannons consumed high 
quantities of propellant, and were completely useless, without their proper shot. Timely 
provisions were becoming a serious problem, with evident repercussions. The lack of this 
indispensable materiel deferred the march of the army for two months and a half, while the 
soldiers pretended repeatedly to be paid.  
Besides, the troops were  the most recurring item on the balance sheet of the 
Commune. 159 Half of the incomes of the Dieci di Balìa was spent on condottieri and 
connestabili. Between June and December 1498, men-at-arms received thirty-six thousand 
golden florins. Infantrymen earned sixty-six thousand golden florins. But the cost of the 
conflict included also gunners, garrisons, commissioners, chancellors, spies, transporters, 
postmen, debts, and “extraordinary” expenses. By the end of the year, the officials disbursed 
157 ASF, Lettere varie, 3, ff. 287r, 291r,  
158 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 34, f. 156r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 39, f. 
292v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 40, f. 193r. 
159 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 34, ff. 129r, 227r, and 235r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, 39, ff. 292v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 40, ff. 182r, 199r, 200r. 
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more than two hundred thousand golden florins, tripling the payments of the three preceding 
semesters.160 
Florentine people found the consequent raises in taxation highly irritating. The 
accusations against the rival factions, the “evil” aristocracy, the “corrupt” government, and the 
“incapable” Dieci multiplied. Rulers and soldiers seemed to prolong the agony of an endless 
war.161 Another political crisis was imminent.162 Citizens would not have justify delays, in 1499.                   
 
160 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 30, f. 293v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 34, f. 
238v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 39, f. 292v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 40, f. 
202v. 
161 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 207-10; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, pp. 61-62. 
162 Cadoni, Lotte politiche e riforme istituzionali a Firenze tra il 1494 e il 1502, pp. 101-75. 
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Appendix 1. Expenditures on ammunitions of the Florentine Republic 




Sources: ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 25, f. 186r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, 29, f. 251r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 30, f. 264r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Debitori e creditori, 34, f. 156r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 39, f. 292v; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Debitori e creditori, 40, f. 193r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 43, f. 272v; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 45, f. 329v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 15, ff. 238r, 
255r, 277v, and 304v. 
 
 














Appendix 2. Expenditures on gunners of the Florentine Republic 




Sources: ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 25, f. 47r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, 29, f. 248r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 30, f. 283r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Debitori e creditori, 34, f. 224r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 39, f. 292v; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Debitori e creditori, 40, f. 56r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 43, f. 272v; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 45, f. 329v. 
 
 























Appendix 3. Expenditures on heavy and light cavalry of the Florentine Republic 




Sources: ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 29, ff. 247r and 254r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Debitori e creditori, 30, f. 247r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 34, ff. 129r and 227r; 
ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 39, ff. 292v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 40, 
ff. 182r and 199r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 43, f. 272v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Debitori e creditori, 45, f. 329v. 
 
 
























Appendix 4. Expenditures on infantry of the Florentine Republic 




Sources: ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 25, f. 173r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, 29, f. 252r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 30, f. 289r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Debitori e creditori, 34, f. 235r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 39, ff. 292v; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Debitori e creditori, 40, f. 200r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 43, f. 272v; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 45, f. 329v. 
 
 













Appendix 5. Overall expenditures on army of the Florentine Republic 




Sources: ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 29, ff. 247r, 252r, and 254r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Debitori e creditori, 30, ff. 247r and 289r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 34, ff. 129r, 
227r, and 235r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 39, ff. 292v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori 
e creditori, 40, f. 200r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 45, f. 329v. 
 
 










Appendix 6. Overall military expenditures of the Florentine Republic 




Sources: ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 29, f. 255v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e 
creditori, 30, f. 293v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 34, f. 238v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, 
Debitori e creditori, 39, f. 292v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 40, f. 202v; ASF, Dieci di 
balìa, Debitori e creditori, 43, f. 272v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Debitori e creditori, 45, f. 329v; ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 15, ff. 178v and 315r. 
 
 
















Figure 7. An ideal bombard, depicted by Matteo de’ Pasti in 1470s 
Oxford, Bodleian Library, Douce 289 
Drawing by Angela Marino 
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ARTICLE VIII 
SUPPLYING THE ARMY. 1499. 
THE SIEGE OF PISA 
The Journal of Medieval Military History 
 





The Venetian invasion of the mountain region of Casentino, in September 1498, had 
undoubtedly diverted Florentine attention from the reconquest of Pisa.1 The menace of a 
heavy defeat, as well as the threat of a Medicean restoration, represented a serious problem 
for the troubled Republic, now compelled to fight on two fronts, “with a daily expenditure of 
one thousand and fifty hundred florins.”2 Only after five months of stalemate, encouraged by 
Ludovico Sforza, the opponents entered into negotiations.3 They were both wearied by “the 
draining of wells full of ducats” and “the bargaining, the extortion” of their mercenaries.4  
In the first days of April 1499, however, the two peace agreements proposed by the 
duke of Ferrara dissatisfied each one of the three contenders. Pisans protested firmly against 
the loss of their “freedom,” complaining about the numerous, important concessions to 
Florentines, such as the cession of public incomes, the assignment of city fortresses, and the 
appointment of foreign criminal judges. To this unconditional submission, they preferred to 
abandon the town, or to die bravely, defending the walls against their “bloodthirsty” enemy.5 
Venetian senators, instead, accused Ercole d’Este of treason, blaming him for dooming their 
1 Biagio Buonaccorsi, Diario (Florence, 1568), pp. 16-19. 
2 Piero Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., ed. Andrea Matucci (Florence, 2005), pp. 217. 
3 Domenico Malipiero, “Annali veneti,” Archivio Storico Italiano 7, no. 1 (1843), p. 530; Buonaccorsi, 
Diario, p. 17; Luca Landucci, Diario fiorentino, ed. Iodoco del Badia (Florence, 1969), pp. 192-193; 
Giovanni Cambi, “Istorie,” in Delizie degli eruditi toscani, XXI., ed. Ildefonso di San Luigi (Florence, 1785), 
p. 137; Francesco Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, eds. Piero and Luigi Guicciardini (Florence, 1859), pp. 
194-195. 
4 ASF, Consulte e pratiche, 64, ff. 184r-185v; Piero Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, eds. Giuliana Berti, 
Michele Luzzati, and Ezio Tongiorgi (Pisa, 1982), p. 70; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 252. For the 
economic situation in the lagoon, see: Malipiero, “Annali veneti,” pp. 527-528 and 535; Girolamo Priuli, 
“Diari,” I., ed. Arturo Segre, in Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, XXIV., 3., ed. Giosuè Carducci and Vittorio 
Fiorini (Città di Castello, 1912), pp. 103, 109, 113 and 117. 
5 ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 25, f. 199rv. 
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allies to “slavery,” and charging him of nullifying years of fights, efforts, and expenses.6 Last 
but not least, Florentines found the pacts “insulting and disgraceful,” since they would have 
took control over their rebels “in the name only.”7  
At least, the infamous accords stipulated also the cessation of hostilities between the 
three states, from April 25th onwards. The troops of the Most Serene Republic, in particular, 
would have had to leave Tuscany, abandoning both the valley of Casentino and the 
countryside of Pisa. From this point of view, the resistance of the “fifth power of Italy” against 
the most dominant army of the Peninsula was a remarkable achievement. Although, this 
accomplishment was certainly not that military success that it could have been. 
During the winter war, the Florentine companies had had several chances to trounce the 
foreign invaders. An easy, decisive attack on the enemies, barricaded and isolated in the town 
of Bibbiena, was yet avoided by the general captain, Paolo Vitelli. 8  Thanks to his 
unprecedented hesitation, the commander was supposed to be either inadequate as a leader 
or greedy for more money.9 Someone reported that he was manipulated into loafing by a 
group of “evil citizens.”10 In any case, his stalling tactics resulted only in a partial disruption to 
enemy supplies, and in a “gentle,” futile offensive.11  
The people of the capital could not stand this disheartening idleness. According to 
common belief, the entire campaign had been only “a continual succession of frauds” 
committed by soldiers.12 Four thousand infantrymen and three thousand knights had given the 
impression of “not caring at all about our success,” while the most significant assaults were 
carried by peasants and lumberjacks, leaded by the belligerent abbot of the monastery of 
Camaldoli, Basilio Nardi.13 Other political scandals were created by the “presumptuous” and 
6 Malipiero, “Annali veneti,” pp. 537-538; Priuli, “Diari,” I., p. 116; Marino Sanudo, Diari, II., ed. 
Guglielmo Berchet (Venice, 1879), pp. 589-590. 
7 Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, pp. 200-201; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 252-254.  
8 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 69r, 70v, 72r, 73r, 75r, 81r, 82v and 90r. 
9 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 209, 219, and 241. 
10 Cambi, “Istorie,” pp. 137 and 139; Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, pp. 191-192; Cerretani, Storia 
fiorentina, ed. Giuliana Berti (Florence, 1994), p. 259; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 62. 
11 Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 259; Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, p. 186; Bartolomeo Masi, 
Ricordanze, ed. Giuseppe Corazzini (Florence, 1906), pp. 40-41. 
12 Bartolomeo Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 261. 
13 Jacopo Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, ed. Lelio Arbib (Florence, 1842), p. 187; Parenti, Storia 
fiorentina, II., p. 227; Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, p. 191; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 66. 
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“imprudent” general commissioners, through the reckless concessions of safe conduct to 
public enemies, such as Piero de’ Medici and Guidubaldo from Montefeltro.14  
 
These blunders and these delays were mostly due, however, to the extreme 
fragmentation of the Florentine society. The peril of an irremediable defeat had not faded the 
deep divisions between frateschi and arrabbiati, common people and oligarchic aristocrats.15 
The conflict, on the contrary, was perceived as an opportunity for annihilating the opposition, 
for subjugating the people, or for overthrowing the institutions. Not to mention the 
machinations of Medicean conspirators, the “slowness” of war was attributed to the contrast 
between the Milanese faction and the party of the French king, a friction embodied even in the 
military hierarchy.16 The ongoing rivalry between Paolo Vitelli and Rinuccio from Marciano for 
the command of the army represented not only a “pernicious disunity” within the 
encampment, but also the frequent renewal of condotte of both the captain and the governor, 
along with the consequent surge in the number of their men-at-arms, “raised the expenses so 
much that the city could not bear the whole cost of its troops.”17 
Further problems were caused by different economic factors. The high interest rates on 
forced loans, for example, made several magnates “exploiters of their community and 
destroyers of their motherland,” that is, profiteers.18 Privileged dodgers, moreover, were 
censured for their friendship with tax collectors.19 For a few commentators, the individual 
profit favored even the first ratification of the unfair pact with Venetians.20  
14 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 212 and 233; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, p. 192; Vaglienti, Storia 
dei suoi tempi, p. 67; Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, p. 192; Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, p. 187.  
15 Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 66; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 210 and 221. 
16 Landucci, Diario fiorentino, p. 192; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 211 and 219. 
17 Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, pp. 197-199; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 209 and 239. 
18 Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 61. For the connection between the growth of public debt and 
the stabilization of political dependences in Renaissance Florence, see Louis Marks, “The financial 
oligarchy in Florence under Lorenzo,” in Italian Renaissance Studies, ed. Ernest Jacob (New York, 1960), 
pp. 123-147; Alison Brown, “Public and private interest. Lorenzo, the Monte and the Seventeen 
Reformers,” in Lorenzo de’ Medici. Studi, ed. Gian Carlo Garfagnini (Florence, 1992), pp. 103-138; 
Anthony Molho, “Debiti pubblici ed interessi privati nella Firenze tardomedievale,” in La Toscana al 
tempo di Lorenzo il Magnifico Politica, economia, cultura, arte (Pisa, 1996), 825-838 and 850-854; Lauro 
Martines, “Forced loans. Political and social strain in Quattrocento Florence,” The Journal of Modern 
History 60, no. 2 (1988), pp. 300-311. 
19 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 208. 
20 Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, p. 194. 
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The Dieci di Balìa, in particular, were publicly criticized for embezzling in the private 
interest of their relatives and friends.21 In the first weeks of the campaign, in fact, the random 
appointment of too many commissioners had squandered “sixty thousand ducats,” causing a 
“complete confusion” over the transmission and the application of orders.22 The opposing city 
camps did not restrict themselves to rebuke these “thefts.” Displaying defamatory writings in 
the busiest crossroads of the capital, the “sects” incited the citizens to kill political adversaries 
and to set fire to their houses.23 
The popular faction appropriated this “intense hatred” soon. In May, it staged a protest 
against the “spendthrift Dieci,” opposing the re-election of the ten officials, thought to be the 
“major cause of wars and debts.”24 At the same time, the population agitated against the 
lockout of public positions, planned by the ruling, “malicious” leaders of frateschi. Everyone 
lamented that “nor authority nor wealth are within our reach.”25 
Thus, the “resented citizens” mounted a stiff resistance in the general city council, and 
“decided not to approve further taxations, considering how wickedly money was wasted.” 
Laws were not promulgated, and magistrates were not voted in.26 Within a month, the 
persistent obstructionism had major repercussions on Florentine domestic affairs. On May 
31st, a new electoral, sweeping reform abolished nominations and introduced draws, 
broadening access to government posts.27 On June 3rd, above all, the Dieci did not enter the 
office, leaving the Republic without a proper military ministry.28  
Nevertheless, a new offensive against the rebels was close to be launched. On June 7th, 
the Florentine general commissioner briefed the Anziani of Pisa that the truce had eventually 
21 Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, p. 202; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 259. 
22 Well testified by the sources, these perks amounted to thirty-seven thousand florins. See ASF, 
Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 38v-39v. 
23 Parenti, Storia fiorentina. II., pp. 212-213. 
24 Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, pp. 188-189; Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, pp. 201-203; 
Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 258. 
25 Nerli, Commentari, pp. 134-135; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 240 and 243-244. 
26 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 240; Nerli, Commentari, p. 135; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 
67. 
27 Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, pp. 203-204; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 263-264; Nerli, 
Commentari, p. 136. 
28 Giorgio Cadoni, Lotte politiche e riforme istituzionali a Firenze tra il 1494 e il 1502 (Rome, 1999), 
pp. 113-144; Guidubaldo Guidi, Lotte, pensiero e istituzioni politiche nella Repubblica Fiorentina dal 1494 
al 1512, II. Gli istituti sovrani e di governo (Florence, 1992), pp. 791-792. 
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expired, and that the peace agreement was definitively invalidated.29 Despite offers and 
promises, the rebels had persistently refused to obey the conventions between their former 
protectors and their previous lords.30  
 
They are defenseless, they are alone, and yet they are pertinacious, waiting 
for external support, and relying upon our weakness and our disagreement 
[…]. Even though they are despaired, they don’t lose heart. Therefore, we 
couldn’t, we shouldn’t believe that they will voluntarily fall under our yoke 
[…]. For these reasons, the force of arms is the sole means for reclaiming 
Pisa. A military intervention is necessary. 
 
The government consulted repeatedly about the opportunity to attack, assessing the costs of 
an umpteenth expedition, and arguing that a simple demonstration could have sufficed to get 
the rebels back to the negotiating table. The citizens agreed on pillaging the Pisan countryside, 
“for the moment. Next, we will figure out what to do,” according to “opportunity and utility.”31  
The same Signoria took on the responsibility for organizing and directing these initial 
operations. The prior Dieci were invited to cooperate informally with the officers in the 
planning of the sack. And yet each of the city factions, as usual, “intended to end this long-
lasting war for its own benefit.”32 
 
Return to the Pisan countryside 
 
Before leaving, the Dieci di Balìa had to handle the deteriorated relation with their general 
captain. Paolo Vitelli was in fact insisting on several, “disagreeable” claims in order to lead the 
new campaign. In the first days of May, the officers had already debated over an higher 
premium for his service, and a separate contract for his brother Vitellozzo. During the 
following weeks, the commander requested also the cancellation of a personal debt, which 
amounted to sixteen thousand golden florins, and an advance of ten thousand ducats. And 
also his brother Giulio, the bishop of Città di Castello, made the most of these negotiations, 
demanding several ecclesiastical benefices in the diocese of Anghiari. Republican envoys, at 
29 ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 25, f. 238r; ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 31, f. 790r. 
30 BNCF, Carte Machiavelli, 1, e. 75, f. 1rv; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 75; Parenti, Storia 
fiorentina, II., p. 266; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 261. 
31 ASF, Consulte e pratiche, 65, ff. 17r-18v and 29rv; ASF, Acquisti e doni, 1, e. 3, f. 1r; Nardi, Istorie 
della città di Firenze, p. 196. 
32 Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, p. 203; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 259 and 266. 
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last, had to grant the possession of captured artillery, the addition of sixty knights to his 
condotta, and the payment of twelve thousand florins.33 
The sudden elevation of the captain, however, would have really annoyed the governor. 
The quarrel between the two commanders intensified. Paolo Vitelli expected his subordinate 
to be under contractual obligations, reaching a settlement over an “unquestioning obedience.” 
Rinuccio from Marciano showed a total disregard for this “inappropriate” agreement. On the 
contrary, he denied “to obey to such a soldier,” reserving to take orders only from the state 
commissioners. He even refused to participate to the expedition, unless the Signori protected 
the prerogatives of his rank, which included the position of his pavilion, his signature on the 
joint announcements, and other minor privileges.34 
In Florence, “this contention sparked off a major, further dispute between the advocates 
of both condottieri.” The Signori investigated several possibilities of resolving the controversy, 
including the transfer of the governor to the valley of Serchio, between Lucca and Pisa. 
Eventually, the officers appointed an emissary to the count, trying to mediate the differences 
and to placate the commanders, “because their disunity ruins the city,” and “this competition 
is reckless.”35 Surprisingly, the pacification was as swift as effective. Bernardo Nasi persuaded 
Rinuccio from Marciano into joining up with Paolo Vitelli, “without imposing any condition.” 
Since then, “the two vied only for pleasing each other.”36 
Once this problem was solved, other concerns were raised about the preparations for 
the campaign. According to the condottieri, the success of the plunder depended upon the 
recruitment of two thousand infantrymen and the employment of a sufficient number of 
pioneers. These troops would have been useful for repelling any enemy counter-attack, 
permitting the army to move nimbly all over the Pisan plain.37 In order to finance the 
expedition, the Signori claimed one hundred thousand florins from the city councils.38  
 
33 ASF, Consulte e pratiche, 65, ff. 9r-10r and 16r; Nerli, Commentari, p. 136; Giuseppe Nicasi, “La 
famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 1504,” Bollettino della Regia 
Deputazione di Storia patria per l’Umbria 21 (1915), pp. 112-116. 
34 ASF, Lettere varie, 6, ff. 139rv and 155r; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 266-267; Nerli, 
Commentari, p. 136; Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 23. 
35 ASF, Acquisti e doni, 1, e. 3, ff. 1r-2v; ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 10rv; Nicasi, 
“La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 1504,” pp. 125-126. 
36 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 14r, 15v, and 17r; ASF, Lettere varie, 6, f. 139rv. 
37 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 7rv; Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e 
la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 1504,” pp. 114 and 127-128. 
38 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 10v; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 75. 
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On June 10th, the captain arrived in Pontedera. Three days later, the governor followed 
on. Their companies encamped in the village of Fornacette, nearby the enemy stronghold of 
Cascina.39 Several small bands of soldiers started immediately to cut grain and to burn barns, 
“until our enemies cannot avail of a single ear.”40 Despite the absence of pioneers and 
infantrymen, the mercenaries devastated the country “as far as the gates of Pisa.” On June 
16th, the army occupied the village of Settimo and the abbey of San Savino, barring the road to 
Cascina.41 
The “obstinacy” of their adversaries had in fact convinced the Signori to escalate the 
war. On June 14th, the officers decided to deliver on the siege of this town, “which we have 
recently promised to our people for raising funds for this campaign.”42 The captain agreed with 
this decision, underlining the ease of a conquest as well as the opportunity to gain control of 
the entire Pisan countryside. Once again, he demanded a large number of reinforcements and 
a consistent supply of munitions, that is, guns, powder, and shot. Above all, he complained to 
rulers about “begging for money,” because “we endure more to be paid, than to defeat our 
foes.”43 
Within June 17th, seven falcons, one culverin, three cannons and two bombards were 
shipped to the encampment through the fluvial port of Signa. More than three hundred barrels 
of powder were also consigned to the gunners, along with five hundred iron and four hundred 
lead projectiles. The Signori guaranteed that “ammunition will not lack.”44 In the meanwhile, 
they provided also thousands of florins for six hundred heavy knights, seven hundred light 
horsemen, three thousand conscript and professional infantrymen, and two thousand 
pioneers.45  
39 Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 1504,” pp. 123 and 
127. 
40 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 15r and 20r; ASF, Lettere varie, 6, f. 139v; ASPI, 
Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 25, ff. 249r and 250r; Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 23; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, 
p. 196; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 268; Giovanni Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” Archivio Storico Italiano 
6, no. 2 (1845), p. 340. 
41 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 20r; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 268; 
Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” p. 340; Ser Perizolo, “Ricordi,” Archivio Storico Italiano 6, no. 2 (1845), p. 394. 
42 BNCF, Carte Machiavelli, 1, e. 71, ff. 1r-2v; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 268 and 270. 
43 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 14v and 18r; ASF, Lettere varie, 6, ff. 141v and 
147r; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 268; Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica 
Fiorentina fino al 1504,” p. 133. 
44 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 20v; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, p. 197; Vaglienti, 
Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 75. 
45 Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 75; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 268. 
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The opposing forces amounted, instead, to sixty dismounted crossbowmen, two 
hundred and forty infantrymen, and seven hundred townspeople. Nevertheless, several 
soldiers were deserting, “tempted by the enemy pay, by the enemy booty.”46 The Pisan 
commissioner carped at the Anziani about the lack of reinforcements, “men, men, men, good 
men, brave men.” However, the defenders were scared away by the “widespread rumor” of 
the enemy “French customs,” that is, an immediate bombardment and a merciless assault, 
those tactics followed victoriously by Paolo Vitelli during the preceding conquest of Buti, Vico, 
and Librafratta.47 
These predictions would have been confirmed soon. On June 21th, the Florentine army 
reached Cascina. The commissioners offered easy terms of surrender, but the rebels did not 
hoist any white flag, attempting instead a surprise sortie.48 Therefore, the captain positioned 
quickly the first batteries, in order to shield pioneers during the construction of shelters and 
the excavation of trenches. In the following day, the cannons were disposed too, while the 
absence of carpenters delayed the placement of heavy bombards.49  
Nonetheless, the heavy rain and the enemy counter-fire hampered the offensive. Only 
on June 25th, in the early morning, “more than twenty-five heavy guns” opened fire on the 
town, knocking down about thirty meters of ramparts. 50  After “twenty-six hours” of 
uninterrupted shelling, the garrison capitulated.51 On June 26th, the Signori could finally rejoice 
at this “sudden” victory, “and all of our subjects are astonished and impressed.” The conquest 
of Pisa “is reckoned to be easier by now.”52 
Numerous prisoners were took to the prisons of Florence, including the commissioners 
and the castellan of the rebels.53 Only their leader, Rinieri della Sassetta, remained in the 
encampment, guarded by the men-at-arms of both captain and governor. Unexpectedly, this 
46 ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 25, ff. 248v, 250r, and 251rv. 
47 ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 32, f. 12r. See also Supplying the army. 1498. 
48 Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, p. 196; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 75; Parenti, Storia 
fiorentina, II., p. 270. 
49 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 26v-27r; Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di Città di 
Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 1504,” pp. 134-135 and 137. 
50 ASF, Lettere varie, 9, f. 3r; ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 25, ff. 254v and 255r. 
51 Bonaccorsi, Diario, p. 23; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 270; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 261; 
Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 75; Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, p. 196; Guicciardini, Storia 
fiorentina, p. 204; Filippo, Alamanno, and Neri Rinuccini, Ricordi storici, ed. Giuseppe Aiazzi (Florence, 
1840), p. 162; Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” p. 340. 
52 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 31r. 
53 Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 75; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, p. 197; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, 
II., p. 270; Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” p. 340. 
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“public enemy, traitor to the Republic,” managed to get away, “frightened of a capital 
sentence or a life imprisonment,” that is, “inappropriate punishment for a soldier.”54 The 
people protested at this “further deceit,” but the government could only lie about it, 
“declaring that Rinieri had been intentionally released, in order that he could favor our 




By the end of June, the Signori recommended the commissioners to take full advantage of the 
temporary disbandment of the enemies, a perfect opportunity for occupying the surroundings 
of their city.57 Without hindrance, the soldiers encamped nearby Riglione, halfway between 
Cascina and Pisa. The observation tower of Foce, not far away from the mouth of the Arno, 
was captured shortly afterwards. Almost encircled, the Pisans abandoned their only remaining 
post in the countryside, burning the fortified terreplein of Stagno to the ground.58 
In the meantime, following the advice of his astrologer, the captain fixed the date for 
the eventual siege of Pisa on the first days of August.59 So, “for favoring the help of the stars,” 
the preparations commenced immediately. In the beginnings of July, the officers questioned 
the commander on the requirements for the enterprise, “from the most insignificant to the 
most important one.” 60 The Signori were particularly dubious about the “ordinary and 
extraordinary” expenditures, considering that the Republic had exhausted its purse, and that 
the people had been “squeezed dry.” Forty thousand florins of ready cash were spontaneously 
furnished by a group of magnates, even if the government refused to pay any interest on their 
loan.61 Besides, a “large quantity of capitals” was the sole means for winning.62 
54 ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 25, f. 256v. 
55 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 270-271; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 76. 
56 Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, pp. 204-205; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 261; Buonaccorsi, Diario, 
pp. 23-24. 
57 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 31rv. 
58 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 34r and 37r; ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 25, 
ff. 258v-259r; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 261; Bonaccorsi, Diario, p. 24; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi 
tempi, p. 76; Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” p. 341. 
59 Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 1504,” pp. 143-144. 
60 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 35v. 
61 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 33v, 36v, and 38r; ASF, Consulte e pratiche, 65, ff. 
58r-68r; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 275. 
62 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 38v. 
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Having raised money, the Signori had to satisfy several other requests made by their 
“rude and greedy” general captain once too often. His salary, for example, had to be paid in 
golden currency. The company of his brother Vitellozzo had to be increased with twenty-five 
men-at-arms. His friends had to be hired and pleased. His debts had to be paid off.63 Despite 
the “unfairness” of these claims and the disappointment of the citizens, “everything was 
granted.”64  
As usual, the condottiero “required also large procurement of weapons and a large 
recruitment of soldiers, in order to be at an advantage over the enemy, at the cost of 
unbearable disbursements.”65 Munitions, men, and funds had to be provided within July 28th, 
otherwise “we won’t advance for any reason.”66 The state envoys repeatedly consulted him 
about the numbers of combatants and supplies.67 He demanded at least eight thousand 
infantrymen and one thousand pioneers.68 Above all, he assessed the quantity of gunpowder 
at fifty tons, more or less.69 
 In Florence, the production of the propellant was still entrusted to Piero di Zanobi and 
Jacopo di Corso. A new contract with the Dieci di Balìa was signed in February, for a monthly 
commission for four and a half tons of material. The monthly salary was fixed to six golden 
florins for the two masters, and two for their three assistants. The officers would have 
conceded, moreover, all the public facilities to the artisans.70 During the summer, the Signori 
reached similar agreements with their habitual private suppliers. The apothecaries Giovanni 
Barducci and Giovanni Formiconi would have received a payment of forty-five florins for every 
three hundred and thirty kilograms of material.71  
63 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, ff. 86v-87r; ASF, Consulte e pratiche, 65, ff. 41r-
46v and 67r-69r; ASF, Lettere varie, 6, f. 181rv. 
64 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 276.  
65 Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, p. 211. 
66 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, ff. 46v-47r; ASF, Lettere varie, 6, f. 177r. 
67 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 34v-35r. 
68 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 41r, 42r, 45r, 46v, and 47v; ASF, Miscellanea 
repubblicana, 5, e. 166, f. 1r; Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino 
al 1504,” pp. 144-145. 
69 ASF, Miscellanea repubblicana, 5, e. 166, f. 1r. 
70 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti, 46, ff. 12r and 52v. 
71 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 151v-152r. 
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The problem with the procurement of the primary raw material, however, was not 
solved. One year later, the shortage of saltpeter occurred again.72 The contemporaneous 
preparations for war in Venice and in Milan made the nitrate scarcer than usual, on the Italian 
market. Only a few foreign dealers could offer their goods to the Signoria, and even Florentine 
merchants, as Filippo del Vigna and Piero Berti, could dispatch only a modest quantity of the 
compound.73  
The officers, hence, had to track saltpeter down elsewhere. A first request was sent to 
the government of Lucca, on July 12th. The Signori sought about ten tons of nitrate, relying on 
the “common desire of peace and quiet.” The Anziani declined the proposal, affirming that 
they could not remove anything from the public arsenals without the consent of the city 
council, and recognizing “how dangerous is, in the present times, to face a shortage of 
saltpeter.”74 A local dealer, however, decided against the state interest. Benedetto Buonvisi, in 
fact, sold five tons of material to a Florentine agent, earning six hundred and eighty golden 
florins.75 
On July 26th, another letter was sent to Gian Luigi Fieschi, one of the principal politicians 
of Genoa. The Signori explained that, “considering the stubbornness of our rebels, and 
pondering the possibility of a lengthy siege, we might have necessity of a great deal of 
gunpowder.” 76 A Florentine engineer, Filippo di Giovanni, reached the Ligurian port for 
soliciting the negotiations. At long last, another private seller, David Lomellino, shipped four 
tons of the product to Livorno, getting six hundred golden florins.77 
The Florentine emissary in Romagna, Niccolò Machiavelli, found out that the six tons of 
powder kept in the warehouses of Castrocaro “exploded two years ago, ruining the whole 
castle.”78 The envoy demanded also four tons of propellant from Caterina Sforza, “offering to 
borrow or to buy them.” The lady of Forlì “replied that she has been lacking powder,” but she 
tendered to halve a load of saltpeter recently stored in the docks of Pesaro. The owner, 
72 See Supplying the army. 1498. 
73 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, f. 74r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 
141r; 163v, and 179r. 
74 ASF, Signori, Missive prima cancelleria, 51, f. 134rv; ASLU, Anziani al tempo della libertà, 537, ff. 
203r and 204v. 
75 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, f. 31r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, f. 
154r; ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 35r; ASLU, Colloqui, 3, f. 557. 
76 ASF, Signori, Missive prima cancelleria, 51, ff. 135v-136r. 
77 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, ff. 45v and 74v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e 
uscita, 30, f. 188r; ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 64r. 
78 ASF, Signori, Responsive, 12, f. 135r. 
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Leonardo Strozzi, contracted the whole quantity of the commodity, that is, six tons, priced 
seven hundred and fifty golden florins. 79  
The Signori tried also to acquire one ton of the mineral from the Balìa of Siena, yet 
obtaining only three hundred kilograms.80 The marquis of Massa, Alberico Malaspina, was 
instead deaf to the Florentine request.81 Enduring several refusals, and in spite of a general 
reluctance, the officers managed to collect about fifteen tons of saltpeter between the last 
weeks of June and the first days of August, all handed to their artisans. Giovanni Formiconi 
manufactured two tons of propellant. An elderly Stagio Barducci could only craft one hundred 
kilograms.82 Despite the absence of his partner, transferred to Livorno, Piero di Zanobi 
extracted twenty-one tons of powder alone, working all night long, and even during 
festivities. 83  The master accomplished so much in so little time, and the output was 
undoubtedly high, compared to the preceding years.84 Nevertheless, it failed to meet the 
expectations of the general captain.85  
For this reason, the Signori had to “empty out all of our fortresses, which are the core of 
our dominion.”86 The castellans of Arezzo, Borgo San Sepolcro, Volterra, and Castrocaro were 
ordered to deliver the most of the gunpowder at their disposal. A similar instruction was given 
to officers of smaller towns, such as Poppi, Dovadola, and San Gimignano. The explosive was 
also searched through the Valdarno. Even Vico Pisano, Cascina, Monte Carlo, and other posts 
nearby the enemy were completely cleared of it.87 One after another, more than six tons of 
propellant were gradually brought in the encampment from the whole Florentine territory.88  
79 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, f. 180v; ASF, Signori, Responsive, 12, ff. 120r and 141r; 
BNCF, Carte Machiavelli, 2, e. 87, f. 1r; BNCF, Carte Machiavelli, 2, e. 88, f. 1rv. 
80 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, f. 35r and 38r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e 
uscita, 30, f. 193v; ASF, Signori, Missive prima cancelleria, 51, f. 142rv. 
81 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 51r. 
82 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 192v and 194r. 
83 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, f. 27v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, 
ff. 194v and 226r; ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 50v. 
84 In 1495, for example, four masters had produced a similar quantity of explosive over a period of 
six months. See Fabrizio Ansani, “Craftsmen, artillery, and war production in Renaissance Florence,” 
Vulcan 4 (2016), p. 6. 
85 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, f. 226r. 
86 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 70v. 
87 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 166v, 176v, 177v, 186r, 187r, and 217v; ASF, Signori, 
Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 50v-51r, 61v-62r, and 67r. 
88 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 215v-216v. 
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In the first week of August, the Signori estimated the amount of the already dispatched 
powder at thirty tons. By the end of the month, they would have conceded that “all of our 
reserves are depleted.”89 
 
Nearly eight hundred barrels of powder were loaded onto barges, and transported by 
the Arno, along with hundreds of spears and thousands of arrows, lots of firearms and plenty 
of shots. Other tools, such as ropes and nails, shovels and hoes, were occasionally moved by 
land, often going through the river port of Signa.90 This continuous movement of weapons 
between the city and the camp caused a certain “confusion” about their management. In 
order to avoid this disorder, the Signori appointed a particular commissioner “to receive 
materiel, to count up how many munitions come in, and to inform us about the needs of the 
encampment,” day by day.91 On July 13th, Domenico Federighi took charge of the magazines of 
Pontedera, organizing the distribution and the allotment of the equipment.92 The general 
commissioner were frequently invited to contact him for obtaining “timely and sufficient 
supplies.”93  
Moreover, the direction of the warehouse of Cascina was assigned to Michele 
Compagni, one of the two watchmen of the arsenals of the capital. His colleague, Gaspare 
Pasquini, remained in Florence, instead, helping the officers in bargaining with craftsmen, in 
buying goods, and in consigning armaments. Antonio from Verrazzano, a former “suboverseer” 
of the Dieci di Balìa, was entrusted with the accountancy of the whole procurement.94 Tasked 
with the conveyance of the ordnance was Antonio from Certaldo. 95  Surprisingly, the 
inventiveness of this carter would have been fundamental to solve the issue of the lacking 
cannonballs.  
 
89 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 68v and 88r. 
90 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 135r, 146v, 147r, and 198v. 
91 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 41v. 
92 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, ff. 20r, 28rv, and 82rv. 
93 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 47r. 
94 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, ff. 26r, 27r, and 42v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata 
e uscita, 30, f. 129r. 
95 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, f. 55v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, 
condotte e stanziamenti, 46, f. 21v. 
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On July 23rd, the general captain and the general governor wrote a heartfelt letter to 
their secretaries, expressing their “unwillingness” and their “dissatisfaction.” For stressing the 
importance of the complaints, the two condottieri signed the missive “with our own hands.”96  
 
Antonio from Certaldo has informed us that only five hundred iron 
cannonballs are available for the enterprise, among the ones remained after 
the conquest of Cascina, the projectiles recovered under its ramparts, and 
the missiles purchased in Ferrara. This news was like a stab wound to our 
heart, because this ammunition is the most important, most indispensable 
requisite for this marvelous siege, and nothing can be done without it. In 
desperation, we have found a very good remedy to this shortage. Antonio, 
in fact, has told us that a large quantity of copper and bronze is stored in the 
public and private warehouses of the capital, hence cannonballs can be cast 
in these two metals. Our excellent Signori ought to collect this material and 
make shots from it. Each round must be suitable for our heavy guns, 
weighing from fifteen to seventeen kilograms. 
We assure their lordships that we will not besiege Pisa if they do not 
guarantee an adequate supply of cannonballs, because our foes are 
strengthening their defenses, and our artillery is the sole means of subduing 
the rebels. Our masters will be berated and disappointed if they do not 
make this provision. Still, they should spare no expense and no efforts in 
pursuing this immortal glory, raising to fame among the other Italian 
powers.  
We consider this procurement to be the fortune of this state, of this siege, 
and of the two of us. 
 
The Signori considered this solution to be “very effective,” and relaid their commissioners that 
“our captain will want for nothing.”97 Thus, five gunmakers, three bellfounders, and two mint 
workers were hurried into manufacturing the bronze munitions, trying to meet the set 
deadline. 98 The officials coped with improvisation. In a couple of days, they built the 
reverberatory furnace of each master. Francesco Telli, Lorenzo Cavaloro, Ludovico di 
Guglielmo, Bonaccorso Ghiberti, Giovanni Antonio Moro, Jacopo Pintegli, Giuliano d’Andrea, 
Jacopo del Mazza, and Damiano di Giovanni were also provided with charcoal and timber. A 
large amount of metal was collected from the arsenals of the capital. Five tons of copper, two 
tons of tin, and one and a half ton of brass were acquired from the Strozzi bank. Two tons of 
96 ASF, Lettere varie, 6, f. 168r. 
97 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 52r and 53v. 
98 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, f. 86r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 
172r-174v and 196r-197v. 
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used copper arrived from the castle of Firenzuola, even if they were “fused with earth and 
bricks.”99  
Several “rotten weapons,” such as damaged falcons and broken handguns, were handed 
to Bonaccorso Ghiberti. In his account books, the craftsman complained about this “useless, 
unworthy waste,” underlining the poor quality of the metals, and wondering at the large 
quantity of burnt material. In the presence of the Signoria, the artisan initially refused to obey 
the command of the government, but his attitude would have been mitigated by the promise 
of a larger payment.100 A similar assurance had to be given to the other founders.101  
In a short time, however, the castings were about to start. The Signori expected “nearly 
eighty shot per day” of their masters.102 Between July 29th and August 2nd, three hundred cast 
bronze cannonballs were dispatched to Cascina.103 Within two weeks, Florentine masters 
would have craft six hundred and eighty-nine missiles. The cost of these “overpriced” goods 
amounted to three hundred and fifty golden florins, excluding the expense and the 
consumption of the raw materials.104 
A couple of florins were also paid to Andrea di Pasquino and Paolo Soglianni. The 
Signoria, in fact, would have commissioned these goldsmith to engrave a message on four 
gilded projectiles, with the intention of deriding and demoralizing the besieged rebels.105 
 
This cannonball does not bring hopes of our clemency. The virtues of our 
captain could not strike the fear of servitude into you, until now, but you 
will suffer an ordeal sooner rather than later. 
 
99 ASF, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 168v, 169v, and 170r. 
100 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 170v, 195v, and 212v; AOI, Debitori e creditori di 
Bonaccorso di Vettorio di Lorenzo Ghiberti, 13229, ff. 50v-51r; AOI, Ricordanze di Bonaccorso di Vettorio 
di Lorenzo Ghiberti, 13230, ff. 33v-35r. See also Fabrizio Ansani, “The life of a Renaissance gunmaker. 
Bonaccorso Ghiberti and the development of Florentine artillery in the late fifteenth century,” 
Technology and Culture 58, no. 3 (2017), pp. 774-775. 
101 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 172r-174v.  
102 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 53v. 
103 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, f. 177r; ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 
61v and 63v; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., 280; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 76; Anonymous, “La 
guerra del Millecinquecento,” Archivio Storico Italiano 6, no. 2 (1845), p. 367. 
104 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 171v and 173r; ASF, Signori, Missive seconda 
cancelleria, 21, f. 122v. 
105 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, f. 179v; AOI, Debitori e creditori di Bonaccorso di Vettorio 
di Lorenzo Ghiberti, 13229, f. 50v; ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, f. 190v. 
303
According to chroniclers, the Pisan would have given instead numerous, contemptuous 
answers to these words of warning.106 
Beg for forgiveness, sinners. We are devoutly fighting for our motherland. 
So far the incapacity of your captain is giving us freedom, rather than 
holding us in captivity. 
Before producing the bronze missiles, the Signori had tried their best for obtaining a 
sufficient number of iron projectiles, continuing with the previous attempts of the Dieci di 
Balìa at incentivizing the production of cast metal. After the problematic stockpiling of the 
previous campaign, the officers had in fact hired three masters especially “for manufacturing 
iron cannonballs.” Their workshop was opened, during the month of December, in the 
surroundings of Pistoia.107 In February, Giovanni from Chieri, Anton from the Holy Roman 
Empire, and Lancillotto from Pistoia produced forty-five “heavy” shot for cannons and four 
“small” missiles for culverins.108 The captain approved these shots as “very profitable.” In June, 
he told his chancellor to solicit their manufacture, “so that missiles won’t be in short 
supply.”109 
A general dearth of raw materials, however, would have affected this industry very 
soon. The iron mines, in fact, were not widespread on the Florentine territory.110 Thus, for 
“keeping their promise” to supply the army, the officers were compelled to recycle second-
hand metal. Rusty weathervanes and old rods were bought in Florence, Arezzo, Cortona, 
Pontedera, Vico, and Cascina.111 On July 26th, seven tons of this “scrap iron” arrived in Pistoia, 
but the poor quality of the metal hampered the production, causing “a few difficulties” to the 
furnace. 112  The Signori had even to sent two of their gunmakers for repairing the 
106 Anonymous, “La guerra del Millecinquecento,” p. 367. 
107 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 23, f. 542r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Deliberazioni, condotte e 
stanziamenti, 46, ff. 12v-13r. 
108 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, ff. 29r, 41r, 67v, and 110r.  
109 Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 1504,” p. 137. 
110 Mario Borracelli, “Siderurgia e imprenditori senesi nel Quattrocento fino all’epoca di Lorenzo il 
Magnifico,” in La Toscana al tempo di Lorenzo il Magnifico. Politica, economia, cultura, arte (Pisa, 1996), 
pp. 1218-1220. 
111 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, f. 169r; ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 
43v; ASF, Consulte e pratiche, 65, f. 61r. 
112 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 47v. Similar problems with the low quality of 
metals were noticed in the ironworks of Ercole d’Este. See Enzo Baraldi and Manlio Calegari, “Pratica e 
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malfunctioning plant.113 Nevertheless, from July to August, this team of founders could 
manufacture only one hundred and sixty-three projectiles, weighing two and a half tons.114  
On July 16th, six other tons of “waste” were transported to Colle Val d’Elsa. Here, on 
behalf of the Republic, Ludovico Buonaccorsi rented and improved an entire ironwork for the 
purpose, ordering to construct adequate furnaces and reliable bellows, and purchasing the fuel 
for the flames in Siena.115 The master Simone from Romena directed the castings, along with 
two charcoal burners and two other assistants. From July to September, they crafted three 
hundred and ninety-four shot of various sorts, weighing a total of four and a half tons.116  
The Signori tried even diplomacy to amass the materiel. On July 7th, the ambassador in 
Venice, Giovanni Battista Ridolfi, requested an official license to acquire iron cannonballs in 
Brescia. The former competitors denied the aid, because the Senate was “in want of 
projectiles.”117 On July 14th, another letter was sent to Giovanni Gonzaga, brother of the 
marquis of Mantua, demanding the concession of a number of missiles.118 Nevertheless, only 
the duke of Ferrara, Ercole d’Este, decided to lend two hundred shot.119  
Among other things, the officers resorted to the licit and illegal markets. The Florentine 
right-hand man, Baldo from Careggi, succeeded in smuggling about a hundred shot out of the 
Venetian territory.120 The agent in Lucca, Francesco Spina, bought, for about four hundred 
golden florins, four hundred and sixty-five cast cannonballs and eighty-eight forged rounds. 
The seller was, once again, Benedetto Buonvisi.121 
Finally, the officers collected one thousand and six hundred iron shot, while one 
thousand stone missiles were sculpted by Simone del Pollaiuolo in the quarry of the Golfolina. 
diffusione della siderurgia ‘indiretta’ in area italiana,” in La siderugie alpine en Italie, ed. Philippe 
Braunstein (Rome, 2001), p. 102. 
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116 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, ff. 22r, 32r, 37v, and 42v; ASF, Dieci di Balìa, 
Entrata e uscita, 26, f. 321r. 
117 ASF, Signori, Legazioni e commissarie, 24, ff. 28v-29r. See also Sanudo, Diari, II., 896. 
118 ASF, Signori, Missive prima cancelleria, 51, f. 134v. 
119 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, f. 164r; ASF, Signori, Missive prima cancelleria, 51, ff. 133r 
and 134v. 
120 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, f. 175r; ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 55r. 
121 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, f. 21r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 26, f. 
320r; ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 35v and 64r. 
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The most of them were specially made for the bombards, weighing about sixty or seventy 
kilograms.122 Furthermore, the gunpowder makers prepared numerous incendiary projectiles. 
Jacopo di Corso provided two hundred and forty firebombs.123 The two hundred and eighty 
shells crafted by Piero di Zanobi contained a lethal mixture of camphor, alcohol, pitch, varnish, 
turpentine, and powder.124 
These significant quantities of shot and powder had to suit a large number of guns. As 
usual, the captain would have relied on his weaponry to hammer the enemies, and its vast 
utilization was “the right way” to sap the shelters and to wear down the morale of the rebels. 
The commander, then, desired to “abound with artillery, so that our bombardments cannot be 
stopped by any nuisance, by any breakdown.”125 Already in June, he had repeatedly requested 
the cannons left in Casentino after the winter war, still blocked by impassable mountain roads. 
The firearms arrived in Florence a month later, and were immediately transported to the 
encampment by river.126  
In any case, the Signori were not late in stirring other firearms from the city magazines. 
The commissioners were also allowed to shift several guns from Empoli and Pontedera.127 
From Livorno, instead, came the “miraculous” basilisk, a giant weapon of two pieces, seven 
meters long, loaded with thirty kilograms of metal.128 Despite these spare arms, Paolo Vitelli 
was not satisfied. He demanded other ten brand new cannons, but the Signori alleged several 
difficulties with their production.129 The captain then insisted on casting three or four firearms 
at least.130 Finally, the officers had to grant one culverin and one cannon, realized by Ludovico 
di Guglielmo and Lorenzo Cavaloro.131  
122 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, f. 192r. 
123 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, f. 22r; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, 
ff. 168v and 191v. 
124 ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, f. 191r. 
125 ASF, Lettere varie, 6, ff. 147r and 149v; ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 25, f. 266v. See also 
Supplying the army. 1498. 
126 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 23rv, 25rv, and 43r; ASF, Lettere varie, 6, f. 111r, 
149v; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, p. 197. 
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128 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 64r; ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 25, ff. 265r 
and 274r; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 85; Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” p. 345. 
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130 ASF, Lettere varie, 6, f. 170r. 
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Within July, the Signori would have gathered together a “beautiful ordnance,” pressing 
into service recent French guns and traditional Italian weapons. The former amounted to forty 
or fifty units, “among culverins and cannons, all mounted on carts.” The latter were two heavy 
and three small bombards, along with several mortars. The remaining pieces were mainly 
falcons and spingards.132  
For cushioning his irreplaceable artillery from the enemy missiles, the captain decided to 
substitute weak wooden mantlets with resistant wicker gabions, filled with rocks and earth.133 
Additional defenses were made with double wool mattresses and with bundles of branches.134 
For erecting and replacing these shelters, the Signori took on lots of carpenters and sappers.135 
Other masters were responsible for the carriages, the trestles, and the beds of the guns.136 
 
The Signori put numerous efforts into fulfilling the captain’s demand promptly. They had 
in fact to keep the momentum, “well aware of the hazards of losing time.”137 Therefore, the 
most part of the materiel was transported to the encampment within the fixed term. On July 
28th, the infantry companies arrived too. The camp would have been then populated by “about 
fifteen thousand men between infantry and cavalry composed the army.” According to a Pisan 
observer, “the enemy has on their payroll six hundred men-at-arms, five hundred mounted 
crossbowmen, eight thousand foot soldiers, four thousands conscripts, three thousand 
pioneers, and one hundred and fifty gunners.”138 Florentine chroniclers reported about ten 
thousand infantrymen and one thousand heavy cavalrymen, excluding skilled and forced 
labor.139 
The nourishment of this populous “mobile city” represented another challenging issue, 
for the government. According to the general commissioners, the subjects of the nearby 
132  Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 76; Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 262; Portoveneri, 
“Memoriale,” p. 341; Anonymous, “La guerra del Millecinquecento,” pp. 365 and 376. 
133 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 280; Anonymous, “La guerra del Millecinquecento,” p. 365. 
134 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 78v, 80r, and 88r; Portoveneri, “Memoriale,” p. 
343; Anonymous, “La guerra del Millecinquecento,” p. 377. 
135 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, f. 31r; ASF, Signori, Missive seconda 
cancelleria, 21, ff. 45r and 48r. 
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137 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, f. 38v. 
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139 Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, p. 262; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 76; Parenti, Storia 
fiorentina, II., p. 279. 
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villages were in fact unable to prepare a meal for this multitude of combatants. Consequently, 
the appointees had to buy bread and wine away, in Empoli, in Castel Fiorentino, in Colle Val 
d’Elsa, in Signa, and even in Volterra and in Pistoia. Peasants and vendors were also expected 
to organize a daily market in the camp, “always assuming that they can earn their living and 
that they are well treated.” In addition, the city officials responsible for the provision of grain, 
the Ufficiali della Grascia, guaranteed continuous distribution of bread among the tents. On 
July 31st, on the eve of the assault, the bakers of the capital would have cooked more than 
fifteen thousand loafs just to support their army.140 
Haste and ingenuity. The fortification of Pisa 
At that time, the “extensive preparations” of the Republic had undoubtedly alarmed all the 
neighboring states. The government of Lucca, in particular, was worrying over reckoning and 
retaliation, due to its long-lasting duplicity in assisting Pisans and deceiving Florentines.141 The 
widespread rumors of an imminent invasion urged the government to fortify the capital, 
purchasing munitions, recruiting infantrymen, and hiring engineers. The troops were ordered 
to defend the towns of Viareggio, Mutrone, and Pietrasanta too. Moreover, aid and advice 
were asked from the lord of Bologna, the marquis of Mantua, and the duke of Ferrara. Three 
ambassadors were also sent to the Florentine encampment, “for mitigating every severe 
intention.”142 Paolo Vitelli, however, had already promised to restore Pietrasanta to its former 
owners, “within eight days from the fall of Pisa.”143 
Of course, the Pisans were in plight too, and not only because of the external threat. 
Since the departure of the Venetian garrison, in fact, they had experienced several financial 
difficulties. The usual trades with Lucca and Genoa had been hindered by the raging plague 
throughout the spring. The winter heavy rain had flooded the countryside, making the summer 
140 ASF, Signori e collegi, Condotte e stanziamenti, 17, f. 28v; ASF, Dieci di balìa, Entrata e uscita, 30, 
ff. 206v-209r; ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, ff. 44r, 51r, 59v, and 62r; Nicasi, “La famiglia 
Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica Fiorentina fino al 1504,” pp. 150-151. 
141 Renzo Sabbatini, “Interessi economici e ragioni diplomatiche. La repubblica di Lucca tra Francia e 
Impero ‘in tante revolutioni delle cose di Italia,’” in Diplomazie. Linguaggi, negoziati e ambasciatori fra 
quindicesimo e sedicesimo secolo, eds. Eleonora Plebani, Elena Valeri, Paola Volpini (Milan, 2017), pp. 
165-187.
142 ASLU, Colloqui, 3, ff. 561-562 and 579-584.
143 ASF, Miscellanea repubblicana, 5, e. 166, f. 1v.
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harvest poor. The surviving grain had been cut and burnt during the enemy sack.144 Poverty 
and famine had weakened the unity among the citizenry. Moreover, the refusal of the peace 
agreement had deepened the split, stinging the people into mistrust and dissension.145 
Peasants and artisans desired to return under the former dominion to get back peace and 
prosperity. The majority of the ruling magnates, instead, firmly rejected the accord, because 
“they were sixty or seventy thousand ducats in debt with Florentine merchants” and “doubted 
about vengeance.”146  
In April, these oligarchs had suggested three alternatives to the Venetian Senate. First of 
all, they proposed to sell the whole “real estate” of the city to the Florentines within the space 
of two months, fixing the prices of houses, fortifications, palaces, and workshops. They also 
considered the possibility of presenting the Most Serene Republic with “our city, our 
countryside, our fortresses, our children, our women, our capitals.” Lastly, they even offered 
to leave the city, requesting to be transported in an overseas possession, such as Cyprus and 
Crete.147  
A month later, the Anziani appointed ambassadors to all the states of the Peninsula, 
pressing for money, food, and troops. The diplomats reached the duke of Ferrara and the king 
of Naples. They reminded the rulers of Siena and Lucca that “Florentines wish to conquer the 
entire Tuscany.” The envoys had recourse even to the “divine court” through the pope. And 
letter was sent to the emperor too, pleading “for motherland, for freedom.” 148  This 
“confidence in our powerful allies,” however, was soon undermined by numerous rebuffs. In 
Venice, the messengers were not admitted to the public audiences. His Holiness was hesitant 
to bless the rebellion. The Sienese government flattered the emissary, promising everything, 
but offering nothing.149 Even the citizens of Lucca refused the requests, averting “a possible 
Florentine reprisal,” on the advice of Ludovico Sforza.150  
The duke of Milan was in fact the mastermind behind several rejections, forbidding the 
Genoese, the Lucchese, and the Sienese from assisting the rebels. He was insisting, instead, on 
144 ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 25, f. 192rv; ASLU, Anziani al tempo della libertà, 136, f. 677.  
145 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 20v-21r. 
146 ASF, Signori, Missive seconda cancelleria, 21, ff. 20v-21r, 25v, 43v, and 44v; Parenti, Storia 
fiorentina, II., pp. 242 and 270; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, p. 77. 
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their surrendering, “for the good, the peace, and the union of Italy.”151 In late June, the Pisans 
appealed the Moro for reaching a new compromise, but the negotiations failed when he sided 
openly with their foes. The masses accused him of this “waste of time,” of his “about-turn,” 
but the “Italian dragon” was at that time desperately needing Florentine reinforcements for 
repelling the imminent French and Venetian invasion of Lombardy.152 
Considering their diplomatic isolation, the rebels could only try to put up an effective 
defense. In order to “afford necessities” and raise revenues, the Anziani began to gather all the 
silver goods from ecclesiastical and public buildings, auctioning them in the markets of 
Lucca.153 A taxation “on every single inhabitant” was also imposed, and money were collected 
especially for the “salaries of our soldiers.” The contribution was compulsory, and people paid 
up to five ducats for not being imprisoned.154 
On July 22nd, the Anziani designated six general commissioners “to supply and fortify the 
city,” along with a Venetian engineer, Sebastiano from Monselice.155 In order to allow a clear 
shot for artillery, they decided to level houses, churches, vineyards, and copses all around the 
city. The suburbs of San Marco, San Giovanni, and San Bernardo were burned and abandoned. 
The height of gates and towers was lowered.156 Moreover, a new ravelin was built near the 
Porta Calcesana, for preventing an assault from northwest. In the southern perimeter, the 
bastion and the ravelin of Stampace were fortified with several casemates. 157  Similar 
structures were walled up also in the surroundings of the fortress of the Cittadella Vecchia, 
which guarded the downstream areas of the river. The imposing Cittadella Nuova, instead, 
protected the opposite western bank.  
The Pisans relied heavily on their massive walls, two meters and a half thick, and eleven 
meters high. For containing the “fury” of foes, however, it would have been necessary to erect 
an additional barrier six meters behind the ramparts. In the first days of the siege, men and 
women worked promptly and intensely at this terreplein, “five hundred meters long, nine 
151 ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 25, ff. 222v-223r and 262v-263r. 
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meters thick, and four meters high.” Two large, deep ditches were dug alongside it. Moreover, 
numerous “barrels and baskets, full of earth,” were put in front of the shelter for deflecting 
the blows of artillery.158  
As for munitions, the rebels had at their disposal a certain number of “mad culverins,” 
that is, “beautiful and furious things” copied from the new French models. One of this 
firearms, the “Bufalo,” was “so huge and so good that it can fire twenty kilograms of iron with 
great accuracy.”159 Several cannons and “lots of falcons” were also available for gunners.160 
Many other traditional iron guns, such as bombards and spingards, were stored in the city 
arsenals too.161 
A significant reserve of saltpeter and gunpowder was left in the two citadels by the 
Venetian garrison. The nitrate was also bought in Lucca, in Genoa, and in Palermo, and refined 
in the mills of the Vecchia.162 Iron projectiles were instead ordered from the mine of 
Fornovolasco, in the nearby region of Garfagnana, over the preceding months.163 Stone 
ammunition were probably sculpted from the ruins of leveled houses and lowered towers. 
Three tons of lead, moreover, were extracted from the dismantled roofing of the city 
baptistery. 164  Incendiary missiles were crafted from pots and flasks. 165  The arrows of 
crossbowmen were poisoned.166 
So, “twenty-four men-at-arms, one hundred and fifty mounted crossbowmen, five 
hundred infantrymen, one thousand citizens, two thousand peasants,” leaded by Gurlino from 
Ravenna and Rinieri from Sassetta, were disposed to fight, waiting for the last showdown.167 
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Trialing the artillery 
 
On July 31th, the Florentine troops were ready to operate. On that day, a small contingent 
seized the solitary tower of Asciano, securing the nearby coastal swamps. The captain 
punished the strong resistance of the garrison with his habitual brutality. Five prisoners had 
both hands amputated, and their eyes were scratched without mercy.168 It was the last 
warning for the rebels. At sunset, the army eventually moved in the direction of Pisa.169 
In the gloom, the camp was positioned in front of the south-eastern walls of the city, 
“regarded as the weakest part of the enemy fortifications.” The tents were pitched in a large 
area “between the monastery of San Donnino and the church of San Giovanni al Gatano.” 
Paolo Vitelli ordered immediately to aim all the cannons at the rampart between the bulwark 
of Stampace and the church of Sant’Antonio. In a single day, the weapons wiped out twenty-
five meters of stone, and other seventy were pierced, and were supposed to collapse under 
the blows of bombards.170 The Florentine gunners “fired about two hundred shot per hour on 
the wall and in the city. The entire world seemed to be getting destroyed.”171 Witnesses 
counted “from six hundred and fifty-three to seven hundred and fifty-five shots.”172  
In the evening, the captain rearranged the batteries. The cannons neared the edge of 
the external ditch, “fifteen meters away from the ramparts.” The bombards and the basilisk 
were planted at their back.173 On August 2nd, the guns were pointed at three different spots, 
thirty meters distant from each other. The shelling “goes on without intermission.” The captain 
reported that another opening, seven meters wide, was made near the tower of Stampace. 
However, he solicited “powder and shot, powder and shot, powder and shot, powder and 
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shot, and shot and powder,” because “the victory, or the defeat, depend on these two 
things.”174  
The condottiero addressed this concern in several missives. On August 4th, he recognized 
the consumption of one hundred barrels of propellant per day, bemoaning the fact that “half 
of the ordnance is used intermittently.” On August 5th, he signaled his discontent with the 
distributor of munitions, and over the “disorder” of his shipments. On August 12th, he noticed 
that “due to the shortage of explosive, only six heavy guns out of forty have fired in the last 
five days.” Thus, he had to repeat that, without an opportune procurement, “every expense is 
vain.”175 
The Signori were mindful that “ammunition could lack in proportion to its use, turning a 
promising glory into a manifest infamy.” Nevertheless, they “judge this shortage to be too 
early. If so, we cannot remedy this problem, because a new gathering of saltpeter will take a 
long time.”176 The officers had even admitted that “it is impossible to arrange all of these 
stuffs, during a campaign.” 
Whichever Italian power could not provide a sufficient quantity of ammo, if 
too many guns had to be employed for such a long time. Everyone could 
easily understand this issue […]. We are trying our best to solve this 
problem, but money cannot remedy it alone, since the complexity of the 
manufacture of both shot and powder. 
The only way of getting round this dearth was a decisive, sudden assault. After a week, the 
rulers seemed to be already disappointed at the “lengthy delays” of the expedition.”177 But 
Paolo Vitelli did not share their pessimistic appraisal of the situation.  
If someone says that this siege is dragging on, I tell him that, in recent years, 
not any expedition has been as demanding as this one. These excellent 
masters and these magnificent citizens, accustomed to fighting wars, can 
perhaps remember that castles and hovels used to resist to the powerful 
armies of every Italian state for months. Now, instead, we are besieging 
Pisa, and I can affirm that the operations are on track, regardless of robust 
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ramparts, many ditches, sturdy shelters, innumerable guns, and obstinate 
defenders.  
He was only lamenting that “the enemies are fully equipped with munitions, while we are 
running out of everything. The rebels could attack us, at the moment, with their counter-
fire.”178 And Pisans, in fact, had already started to bother Florentines with their firearms. 
Several gunports were chiseled into the base of the walls, so that “a cannon and a culverin 
could intimidate their troops, killing and wounding their men.” Other gunports were realized in 
the Cittadella Vecchia, allowing the rebels to open fire on the left flank of their foes. Located 
“through its smoke,” the Florentine artillery was repeatedly forced to draw back and to stop 
the fire.179  
Along with the powder, therefore, the saltpeter was the “salvation of the city.”180 It had 
been generously, privately supplied by several Lucchese magnates, along with troops and 
money. By mid August, a large part of their fellow citizens was firmly inclined towards Pisans, a 
support backed by the secret state council.181 The Florentines noticed this frantic activity, but 
could not prevent the arrival of both reinforcements and materiel from the valley of Serchio.182 
The assailants, however, were not giving up. Notwithstanding “the sturdiness of the 
ramparts, the artillery have razed them in four different places.”183 About two hundred meters 
of walls had been destroyed in a week.184 On August 8th, the captain ordered to demolish the 
crumbling tower of Stampace, and to raze its ravelin the ground. In the following day, the fire 
was concentrated on the eastern ravelin of the Cittadella Vecchia, in order to cease the enemy 
barrage. Moreover, dissembling two assaults on the breaches, Paolo Vitelli studied and tested 
the defenses of the rebels.185 
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On 10th, at dawn, the Florentine infantry launched a general attack on the bulwark. This 
“cruel battle” lasted about three hours. Pisans threw even incendiary missiles, and their 
artillery “wounded lots of our soldiers,” but the troops succeeded in scaling the ruins, raising 
the lily flag on the collapsed tower. Someone managed to venture into the city. At that very 
moment, the infantry columns would have had the possibility to assault the rear terreplein, 
but, inexplicably, “Vitellozzo did not want to strike again.” Paolo assented to the choice of his 
brother, ordering the retreat, and “wasting the chance of seizing the city.”186  
Besides, the Pisans were extremely afraid, and “our citizens and our rustics were 
dismayed at this assault. All of them forsook the shelters.”The southern quarter of the city was 
quickly abandoned. Numerous inhabitants fled to Lucca, and many others were ready to 
escape. So, “monitoring these movements, the Anziani appointed four ambassadors to 
negotiate with Florentines.”187 On August 11th, the Florentine general commissioners granted a 
safe conduct to these envoys, informing the Signoria of this turnaround. The commanders 
suggested agreeing, “with no ifs or buts.” In Florence, the rulers debated whether or not this 
accord could be signed, and the city assembly resolved to require a total submission. After a 
long wait, however, “nobody from the Pisan side came in the encampment.”188  
The Signori were bitterly discontented with this “trick,” assuming it to be an “expedient 
for gaining time.” Above all, they could not “understand why the infantry has still not assaulted 
the terreplein.” The officers admonished again the commissioners to take action, because “the 
more you delay, the more you have problems.” The condottieri were pushed into “bringing 
this enterprise to a conclusion,” avoiding “boredom” and “hesitation,” and taking advantage of 
the “will our soldiers, who desire to fight and to die with honor.” In particular, the mercenaries 
“should care about their reputation, by now. They ought not to mind about the death of one 
hundred men.”189  
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To complicate matters further, revenues were becoming more difficult to collect. Sixty-
four thousand ducats had been already spent, and “the strongboxes are empty.”190 The 
citizens were “prostrated and discouraged, observing these slow, lukewarm proceedings.” All 
the public councils were in turmoil. People accused rulers, commanders, and ministers. As for 
them, the Signori were worried about “the responsibility for having impoverished, for having 
assassinated our subjects in vain, for the purpose of equipping our army.”191 To drop this 
charge, they instructed the commissioners to determine a date for the battle and to circulate 
the rumors about a probable sack of Pisa, inducing warriors to stay in the encampment.192  
The first deadline of August 18th approached and passed, in spite of all the preparations. 
The term was extended to August 20th, and then set for August 22nd. The captain, however, 
postponed the encounter again, now demanding the wages of his companies, now requiring 
hundreds of conscripted reinforcements.193 Finally, he decided to attack on August 25th, “once 
the walls are leveled further.”194  
In the meantime, in fact, the captain had directed his gunners to wipe out “more of the 
ramparts, so that soldiers could attack safely. He preferred to avoid a bloodshed.” Above all, 
he was alerted to the possibility that “falcons and spingards will slaughter the Florentines, if 
they had the presumption to storm the terreplein.” Thus, the army needed to gain an easier 
access to the earthwork. Several stonecutters were asked to splinter the walls manually, trying 
to drop the debris into the internal moat, but they made an unsuccessful attempt.195  
Carpenters and pioneers had instead buttressed the ruins of Stampace. Several heavy 
firearms were positioned in this new, four-storey casemate, with the intention of shelling the 
Cittadella Vecchia and the Porta a Mare. The latter, in particular, was the main aim of the 
operation. Through this entrance, in fact, the army would have easily penetrated the city, 
getting round the inner ditch. The rebels responded promptly by fortifying the gate, and by 
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building their own emplacement near the church of Sant’Antonio. Once again, they were trying 
to interfere with the enemy cannonade.196  
Since August 19th, “two cannons, two culverins, two falcons, and two spingards” fired 
continuously on the Porta, while mortars hit the city randomly. The basilisk and one of the 
bombards, instead, were aimed at the terreplein.197 On August 25th, four other heavy pieces 
were “unexpectedly” placed on the wreckage of the ravelin, “a marvelous, hard effort, 
considering that this earthwork was ten meters high.” So, “making an awful din and giving an 
unbelievable fright,” the guns pounded the shelters of the rebels.198 
Nothing much else happened, all the rest of that day. In Florence, the population was 
waiting to hear from the commissioners by the hour, “even if no one doubted that our soldiers 
had conquered at least the southern half of Pisa.” In the evening, the main square was 
crowded with “perplexed” individuals. Only by night a messenger brought news that the battle 
was cancelled, “since the encampment was in complete disorder.”199 
Nobody has believed that this army was in such a mess, and nobody has 
acted against it. They have only insisted on the battle. However, making our 
preparations, we have found out that only one thousand infantrymen 
hanged around the camp, all dissatisfied with deferred payments. Along 
with the governor, I have talked to the commissioners, explaining that the 
soldiers will leave tomorrow, if they do not get their salary today […]. 
Moreover, we have requested two thousand other foot soldiers, but these 
reinforcements have to arrive here within eight days. If our lords satisfy our 
demands, we will continue fighting, hoping for victory. Otherwise, the 
artillery will be lost, to the detriment of this Republic. We are sorry, but 
these are our excuses. We are sure that the Signori will blame us, but they 
will be undoubtedly wrong.  
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“I came, I saw, I cheated” 
The letter of the captain shocked the Signori. To their utter astonishment, the officers could 
not believe this “menace of a manifest ruin, after coming close to an indubitable victory.”200 
Nevertheless, they were certified that only one thousand and five hundred infantrymen had 
remained in the encampment. The soldiers, “after spending weeks in idleness,” had been 
decimated by the “marshy air” of the Pisan countryside. Paolo Vitelli and Rinuccio from 
Marciano fell ill too. And the malarial fevers had taken the lives of four general 
commissioners.201 
Apart from the epidemic, combatants were deserting due to the delays of payments. 
Several companies had refused to be involved in the operations without receiving their salary 
first. According to the appointees, men were already clamoring, and the captain was indignant 
at the “sinister behavior” of the Signori, at their decision to skimp on this money, “saving a few 
thousand coins, after having spent a million and a half florins.” His fellows “did not deserve a 
similar treatment.”202 In a long missive sent to his secretary, he expressed frustration over the 
shortage of gunpowder, the late supplies, and the absence of soldiers, pioneers, and 
stonecutters. But, “yes, my lords are right in stoning me to death, because this is the usual 
reward for loyalty and devotion.”203  
Both sides were accusing each other of acting in bad faith. During the general city 
council, the chancellor of the Signoria, Marcello Adriani, listed all the provisions made since 
the conquest of Cascina, demonstrating the efforts of the government and the faults of the 
commander. Besides, “anybody was surprised,” and “no one can explain the whys and the 
wherefores of the situation.” The masses, “despaired and fatigued, shouted at aristocrats and 
condottieri,” accused of spinning yarns about the war.204 However, “difficulties emphasize 
virtues,” and the majority of the citizens was not disheartened at all. In the last week of 
August, in order to prevent the rout of the army and the loss of the guns, merchants and 
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magnates funded more than seventeen thousand florins. The Signori ordered to mobilize 
conscripts and to muster infantrymen. Moreover, the rulers imposed upon the captain to 
continue the siege, “averting ignominy” and “earning reputation.” 205  The commander 
disagreed, and unwillingly conceived a new plan, “only to obey an order.” According to this 
scheme, the army should have attacked the north-western quarters of the city, hindering 
exchanges of goods and troops between Lucca and Pisa. Nonetheless, he was conscious that 
his extra demands for artillery, powder, and shot could be barely satisfied twice.206  
 
In any case, the prompt disbursement let  the army defend the encampment, 
maintaining the position in the ruins of Stampace, “which could be called Stamped, by now, 
because of the innumerable artillery hits it had suffered.” The bombardments were still 
continuing from both sides. Pisans had even aimed their “Bufalo” at the enemy casemate, with 
satisfactory results. Their gunners damaged cannons, destroyed wool shelters, and cracked 
beams, forcing the garrison to seek shelter from the return fire. On August 28th, the post was 
attacked as well, but the skirmish was not decisive.207 
A more dangerous raid was carried out on the Florentine rear on August 31st. During a 
sortie, the rebel mounted crossbowmen captured an entire convoy nearby Cascina, depriving 
the adversaries of bread and wine, and affecting immediately the price of food. Similar 
ambushes multiplied in the following days. On September 4th, Pisan light cavalry managed to 
arrive to the encampment, quite undisturbed. Commissioners noticed that “Pisans are cockier 
than ever.” Florentines, on the contrary, “were abundant of nothing, except fear and 
hunger.”208  
These hazardous circumstances led the captain and the governor to arrange a retreat. 
The Signori “felt offended” by this decision, considering “all the past procurement and all the 
future provisions.” They expected the commissioners to wait for reinforcements, money, and 
supply, “to the glory of the city.” The officers differed, above all, “about abandoning Stampace, 
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because we have spent seventy thousand florins on putting a foot in Pisa, and we do not want 
to raise it without necessity.” The condottieri, however, were not opened to suggestion. In 
spite of the severe reprimand, they would not have changed their minds, judging the aid “to 
be too late.”209 
On September 7th, “the Bufalo chased away the Vitelli.” The army started to move 
backwards, marching along the river, and reaching the village of Vettola, two miles away from 
Pisa.210 While departing, the “terrified” Florentines “ left a huge quantity of munitions behind, 
that is, ladders, shot, carts, timber, tools, light guns, and even a culverin.”211 Only part of the 
artillery could be safely transported to Cascina by land. The heaviest guns, instead, were 
hastily dismantled and shipped to Livorno. On the journey, however, a violent storm hit four 
overloaded boats, sinking them near the mouth of the Arno. Sailors and soldiers tried to hide 
the pieces under the sand, but the Pisan recovered them after a couple of days. The two 
bombards and the “famous” basilisk made a triumphal entrance in Pisa, along with iron 
cannonballs, pavises, spears, “so that our rebels can now offend our army with our 
weapons.”212 The Signori commented laconically that “this expedition has been dogged by 
great misfortune.” And, by some unlucky chance, even the Torre di Foce was lost, sold to 
Pisans by a disloyal guard.213 
On September 13th, Florentine troops withdrew further, stationing in San Savino. On the 
next days, the camp was definitively placed between Settimo and Cascina, and the ordnance 
shifted to Pontedera.214 So, “in this way ended this expedition, even though we had relied on a 
potent force and a valorous captain, even though the rebels had been desperate and alone.”215 
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A chronicler remarked that “Pisa was the tomb of the wealth, the honor, and the life of our 
Florentines, on account of the traitorous captain.”216 
 
Two weeks after this disastrous retreat, the Signoria secretly ordered to capture of 
Paolo Vitelli. The officers had in fact received several confirmations of his “infamy,” reported 
even by the general governor.217 On September 28th, the “traitor” was arrested, and his 
correspondence impounded. Taken to Florence, the commander was immediately brought to 
trial. He was tortured into making an admission, but he denied all the allegations.218 Thus, his 
opponents proposed a capital punishment for “recovering our lost honor.” His former 
supporters remained silent. The crowd shouted “hang him, hang him.”219 Eventually, a council 
of citizens reaffirmed his disobedience, his “contempt,” and his “murders.”220  
On October 1st, the Signoria, the Collegi, and Otto di Guardia found him guilty of treason 
and rebellion against the Republic.221 According to the pleadings, he was charged with 
deliberately losing the siege, with retreating without the consent of the general 
commissioners, and with sinking part of the state artillery. Moreover, he had been prosecuted 
for trying to seize Cascina and Vico, in order to blackmail his masters, imposing on them a new 
contract and an unfair payment. Also the past accusations of idleness, incompetence, and 
disloyalty, made during the war in Casentino, were not forgotten nor forgiven.222 
Therefore, Paolo Vitelli was summary beheaded on the roof of the public palace, in front 
of an expectant, joyful crowd.223 In the following days, the head of his infantrymen, Cherubino 
from Borgo a San Sepolcro, received a death sentence too. His chancellor, Cerbone Cerboni, 
was imprisoned. Both of them admitted that the captain had signed an agreement with the 
pope to give Pisa to Cesare Borgia, and Florence to Piero de’ Medici. According to their version, 
216 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., p. 299. 
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the captain had planned also to take control of Cortona and Borgo San Sepolcro, expanding his 
state and his power.224  
In the capital, however, the public opinion was divided. Piero Parenti wrote that, 
“without confessing, the captain had saved our rulers from their faults,” and Piero Vaglienti 
noticed that several oligarchs had a part in his plot. Other compromising ties were underlined 
by Filippo de’ Nerli and Giovanni Cambi.225 Jacopo Nardi, Luca Landucci, and Bartolomeo 
Cerretani also accused the captain of being in collusion with the duke of Milan, deceiving 
Florentines again and again. 226 Only Francesco Guicciardini tried to defend the former 
commander, but the “convincing evidence” of his innocence was a questionable matter of 
honor and reputation. The justification for the retreat after the capture of Stampace could 
have been easily interpreted as an incapacity to take an advantageous opportunity.227 
If the defeated were not sure about his guilt, the winners would always have testified to 
the loyalty of the enemy leader. Pisans commented that he was “a victim of the rage of our 




Apart from his “rotten and greedy” behavior, Paolo Vitelli was not the only, truly responsible 
for the resounding defeat. According to a general commissioner, “several individuals wished 
the captain to fail, desiring only harm and disorder.”229 The divisions of the Florentine society 
into rival factions had undeniably slowed down the collection of money, and consequently the 
procurement of ammunition. Above all, the political maneuvers of the magnates and the long 
delays in war had fueled the suspicions of the common citizens. Disorders in the encampment 
were considered expedients for subversive activities, and the rout was even thought to be an 
224 Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, pp. 90-91; Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 306-307; Landucci, 
Diario fiorentino, p. 203; Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, pp. 204 and 206; Cambi, “Istorie,” p. 144. 
225 Parenti, Storia fiorentina, II., pp. 303 and 306; Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, pp. 81-82 and 85-
86; Nerli, Commentari, pp. 137-138 
226 Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, pp. 198-200; Landucci, Diario fiorentino, p. 202; Cerretani, 
Storia fiorentina, p. 265. 
227 Guicciardini, Storia fiorentina, pp. 211-214. 
228 ASPI, Comune di Pisa, Divisione C, 25, f. 276r; Anonymous, “La guerra del Millecinquecento,” p. 
382; Ser Perizolo, “Ricordi,” p. 394. 
229 ASF, Consulte e pratiche, 65, f. 93v. 
322
“achievement” of the oligarchs. In fact, “they cannot tolerate a victory of the people,” won 
without the misuse and the misconduct of the compromised Dieci di Balìa.230  
As for them, the Signori did not accepted the intrusion of aristocrats into military affairs. 
On the contrary, they supported the popular request to control expenses, to reduce an 
intolerable squandering, and to prevent the further enrichment of the wealthy.231 Officials 
continuously reminded the commissioners of their financial straits, of the necessity to eke 
funds out.232 And yet the Republic invested the considerable sum of two hundred thousand 
florins in the summer months. 233 During the siege, forty thousand golden florins were 
disbursed for the soldiers only.234 From July 1st to August 31st, the overall cost of materiel 
amounted to more than four thousand golden florins, but they were not sufficient “to remedy 
for the shortage of missiles and gunpowder, the manufacture of which depends upon several 
factors.”235 
 
The high consumption of propellant and the lack of metallic shot were probably another 
crucial aspect of the failure of the enterprise. Overconfident in his ordnance, the captain raised 
repeatedly this subject, but the Florentine Republic had not the actual possibility to manage an 
artillery warfare on such a large scale, and for such a long time. In the preceding campaign, the 
garrisons of Buti, Vico, and Librafratta had surrendered after a few hours. One year later, the 
defenders of Cascina had yielded in almost the same way. But the assault on a larger city, and 
the destruction of a thicker rampart, needed days of prolonged, incessant shelling.  
Officers were not prepared for this eventuality. The propellant was constantly in short 
supply, and the fire was frequently intermittent. More than fifty tons of gunpowder went up in 
smoke during the four-week siege. The gunners consumed about fifteen tons of explosive 
more than the preceding year, and yet they were not enough.236 The Florentine masters 
worked incessantly through the whole summer, but they could not rely on a significant 
quantity of saltpeter for crafting the mixture. The purchases of the raw material were in fact 
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discontinuous, and the state did not own any nitrary on its territory.237 Only in first years of the 
sixteenth century two public factories would have been opened in Arezzo and in Castrocaro, 
both entrusted to local masters.238 
The logistic issue was worsened by the malfunction of the ironworks of Colle Val d’Elsa 
and Pistoia. The poor quality of metal, the partial incompetence of manpower, and the 
technological backwardness of furnaces determined an overall low productivity of missiles.239 
According to officers and commanders, any shortage could have represented “a serious risk of 
defeat.”240 When the army ran out even of bronze projectiles, the chance of victory decreased 
significantly. Without hundreds cast cannonballs, in fact, an effective saturation bombardment 
was impossible to perform.241  
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, in order to solve these problems, the Republic 
would have hired several alpine masters, following the contemporary example of the duke of 
Ferrara. 242  The furnace of Colle continued to function in the following years without 
interruption.243 Another workshop was built in Florence, in the foundry of the Sapienza. Here, 
several bellows, moved by an “ingenious device,” allowed the production of hollow shells for 
incendiary missiles.244 In less than a decade, the Republic no longer suffered a shortage of 
missiles. According to contemporary registers, thousands and thousands of iron shot were 
fabricated in the dominion at that time.245 The bronze projectiles, instead, were never used 
again. The remaining seventy-four units were recycled into new cannons.246 The ones left 
under the Pisan walls were sold as precious souvenirs in Lucca.247 
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With regard to ordnance, a third reason behind the Florentine defeat was the 
unexpected “aggressive defense” adopted by the rebels.248 The use of new cannons and “mad 
culverins” to shield a besieged post was in fact unprecedented, in the Peninsula. Compared 
with traditional spingards, these weapons could inflict an extensive damage among the enemy 
lines, wreaking havoc on soldiers and commanders, and impairing, above all, their own 
ordnance. The continuous counter-fire from the city had effectively hindered the attacks, 
contributing to slow down the entire operation. Thus, planned as rapid, the offensive lasted 
longer than expected, until the assailants retreated, decimated by malaria, and weakened by 
desertions. 
Therefore, its first serious test highlighted strengths and weaknesses of French-style 
ordnance. Its performances were still impressive, compared to the customary, awkward 
bombards, but, against determined defenders and fortified cities, they were not astonishing 
“war-winning weapons.”249 Nevertheless, the complex procurement of ammunition would 
have compelled the Florentine Republic to develop and boost the manufacture of firearms, 
shot, and propellant, facing a “revolutionary challenge” in terms of administration, credit, and 
manufacture. Authorities should have arranged timely provisions for their troops, reorganizing 
the whole commodity chain, from the exploitation of natural resources to the distribution of 
weapons. Officers could not have improvised haphazard solutions to maintain and to deploy 
the new technology in an adequate manner. They rather had to combine appropriately the 
“government of artillery” with the “governance of production.” 250 
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